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ABSTRACT
Kant's Rational Foundations for Religious Faith is a work of philosophy and
religion. The dissertation as a whole falls within the field of Kant studies. In
particular, the interpretations of Kant made by several contemporary scholars are
analysed in depth with the view to establishing the rational basis by which Kant
thinks faith gains a foothold in his philosophical programme. Two obstacles to the
establishment of faith in Kant's programme are presented. The first is the problem of
coherence that Gordon Michalson expounds regarding Kant's Religion Within the
Boundaries ofMere Reason. The second is the problem of knowledge as presented in
the work of P. F. Strawson and others. In proposing a way past the latter of these two
problems, a hypothesis is made for how to overcome the former. The proposal is to
understand faith not in terms of knowledge, but instead in terms of cognition. When
this is done, Kant's train of reasoning for the development of his transcendental
theology becomes clear. It yields a hypothesis for interpreting Religion by focusing
the combined resources of cognition and faith on certain underdeveloped aspects of
Kant's thought. Chief of these underdeveloped aspects is the human moral
disposition. I demonstrate that this hypothesis, when applied exegetically to Religion,
overcomes the most significant objections raised by Michalson. Kant's rational
foundations for faith are shown to reach their fullness when an existential decision is
made to believe in God based on a simultaneous conviction in the meaningfulness of
the world. For Kant, such an existential faith has a specific shape that is fleshed out
in his analysis of human depravity as a problem for belief in the meaningfulness of
the world a nd t he p ossible adoption of the disposition of the prototype of perfect
humanity as solution to it.
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A brief overview of Kant's Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason
(1793) and The Conflict of the Faculties (1798) is enough to raise a number of
important questions in the mind of any reader who attempts to grasp the whole of
Kant's philosophy while at the same time trying to make sense of his specific views
on religion. Does the topic of religion offer Kant's philosophy anything new? Why
does he tackle this topic at the end of his career rather than at the beginning or
somewhere in the middle? Is Kant's philosophy of religion merely an extension of
his moral philosophy or is it more properly thought of as a development of his
transcendental theology? Does Kant's philosophy of religion need traditionally
religious concepts like grace and redemption, and, if so, how does he justify this need
in terms that satisfy the critical tenets of his philosophy?
In answer to these questions and many others that will arise along the way,
this dissertation argues that a theologically affirmative interpretation of Kant is
possible and that such an interpretation can be understood in a way consistent with
his critical philosophy. This dissertation delineates the fundamental features of such
an interpretation by first, understanding them in the context of other successful
interpretations of Kant, second, juxtaposing them with the strongest challenges to the
coherence of Kant's philosophy of religion in the current literature, and third,
positing an interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion that brings together the
best resources of the successful interpretations along with new insights for the
explicit purpose of overcoming these challenges.
This current volume is a substantially revised version of one previously
submitted in the Fall of 2001, entitled Reading Kant Religiously. Of that original
dissertation, only Chapter One remains, and that in a substantially edited and revised
form. Chapter One is a compilation of the philosophical portions of the former
Chapters One, Two, Three, and Four. It outlines three interpretations of Kant's
philosophy of religion from the history of Kant interpretation over the last century,
and presents three contemporary interpretations of Kant's rational foundations for
religious faith that c orrespond to the three historic interpretations. Outside of this
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compilation, virtually none of the original dissertation has survived. Portions of the
arguments from Chapter One are already in published form. A version of the
argument in Section One can be found in the 'Editor's Introduction' to Kant and the
New Philosophy of Religion. Sections Two and Three are revised portions of
arguments found in two different articles, entitled 'Kant and Religion: Conflict or
Compromise?' and 'Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task',
respectively.2
Chapter Two of this new revised version summarizes the work of Gordon
Michalson as a complex and critical assault on the coherence of Kant's Religion
Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason. It also begins the task of responding to these
criticisms from the perspective of the three interpreters from the previous chapter,
each of whom defends the coherence of Kant's philosophy of religion with a
different set of resources and arguments. Chapter Three examines Kant's view of
knowledge as a fundamental problem facing any interpretation of Kant that purports
to provide a critically defensible understanding of faith. I argue that two resources,
namely, cognition and faith, stemming from Kant's Critique ofPure Reason provide
room in Kant's thinking for the development of his transcendental theology in terms
of an existential faith rooted in practical reason and inspired by the needs of reason in
its judicial employment.
Chapter Four provides an expository interpretation of Religion for the
expressed purpose of overcoming Michalson's most difficult challenges. The
interpretation in Chapter Four shows that there is a discernable line of argumentation
in Religion that, when properly understood, is resistant to the kinds of criticisms
Michalson forwards. Chapter Five completes the defence of Kant against
Michalson's objections by showing that the final portions of Religion and The
Conflict of the Faculties support the interpretation previously espoused. As this
dissertation is primarily constructive and set on the backdrop of two influential and
1
Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, Eds.
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Forthcoming Fall 2005).
2 Chris L. Firestone, 'Kant and Religion: Conflict or Compromise?' Religious Studies 35 (June 1999),
151-171. Chris L. Firestone, 'Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task', International
Journal ofSystematic Theology 2/l(March 2000), 63-78.
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critical discussions of Kant (viz., the problem of knowledge found in the first
Critique a nd t he problem o f coherence forwarded b y i nterpreters ofR eligion), we
cannot hope to field every possible objection. Nevertheless, the dissertation provides
a presentation of Kant's rational foundations for religious faith and a partial defence
of these foundations in the face of two significant challenges to its viability.
It is important to note that this dissertation will focus on Kant's philosophy in
English translation and interpretation with but a few exceptions. The twentieth
century witnessed the publication of an immense amount of secondary literature on
Kant in English, covering his entire philosophy and representing an extensive variety
of interpretation. Over the last three decades, this has become increasingly true for
interpretations of Kant's philosophy of religion, and applications of them in the
discipline of theology. The current interest in Kant's philosophy and its relationship
to religion and theology in the Anglo-American context coincides with a virtually
complete and liberally annotated translation of Kant's writings recently published by
Cambridge University Press. These two occurrences have made it possible and in
some ways preferable to do Kant interpretation in English with reference to the
German for clarification and elaboration. This is the genre of this study.
What makes this kind of study timely and a real contribution to the field of
Kant studies is not just the fact that the primary and secondary literature is now in
place to make it feasible, but that this study addresses a significant lacuna in the field
of Kant interpretation. Historically, the field of Kant interpretation has been
successful in setting the agenda in epistemology broadly considered, but equally
unsuccessful in taking into account the implications of Kant's writings on religion
for his philosophy as a whole. Very often Kant's chief writings on religion are
dismissed as incoherent in themselves or inconsistent relative to Kant's previous
critical philosophy. As a result, this field has only recently been able to affirm
theologically affirmative interpretations of Kant's philosophy of religion as
reasonable alternatives to the traditional standard for interpreting Kant. This
dissertation is written in conscious awareness of this context and seeks to bridge the
gap between the theologically affirmative (but under-appreciated) aspect of the
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tradition of Kant interpretation and the theologically negative (but fully appreciated)
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aspect of tradition often called 'the traditional interpretation'.
At least part of the reason for the timeliness of this study can be attributed to
the situation surrounding the publication of competent and comprehensive
translations of Kant's texts. While Kant's first and second Critiques were both
translated (1838 and 1873, respectively) and disseminated (the late nineteenth
century) relatively early, Kant's writings on religion were generally translated and
disseminated later. Although Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason was
first translated by J. Richardson in 1 799 and then again by J. William Semple in
1838, it only became widely disseminated in the English-speaking context after the
1934 publication of Theodore M. Greene's and Hoyt H. Hudson's popular
translation. The Conflict ofthe Faculties is most significant in this regard. It was not
fully translated into English until Mary J. Gregor's 1979 translation. Very little
work, for example, has been done on the relationship between Conflict and Religion,
even though Conflict was written after the lifting of the censorship and covers many
of the same themes as Religion.4 For this reason, at least in part, the view that
Religion is little more than an extension of Kant's practical philosophy has inflated
currency in the literature. More work needs to be done on this topic from both the
point of view of Kant's philosophy as a whole and the point of view of Kant's
writings on religion. This dissertation provides a step forward towards this end.
My heartfelt appreciation goes out to the community of scholars past and
present at t he University of E dinburgh. lame specially t hankful t o Nick A dams,
Gary Baddcock, Ken Gavel, Jeffrey Privette, and Kevin Vanhoozer for their
friendship and support over the extended time it took to research and write this
3
For the definitions and analyses of the terms 'theologically affirmative interpretation', 'theologically
negative interpretation', and the 'traditional interpretation' see the 'Editors' Introduction' in Kant and
the New Philosophy ofReligion. The volume as a whole brings together for the first time many of the
most influential affirmative interpreters of Kant's philosophy of religion currently working, including
John Hare, Ronald Green, Elizabeth Galbraith, Stephen R. Palmquist, Leslie Stevenson, Philip Rossi,
and Michel Despland.
4
See A lien W . Wood, ' General Introduction' i n I mmanuel Kant, PracticalPhilosophy, tr. and ed.
Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), xiii-xxxiii (esp. xxviii).
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dissertation. Their willingness to listen, read, and dialogue concerning matters not
always germane to their particular fields of interest was invaluable to me in
crystallizing my own ideas. Of particular importance to my most recent work on
Kant are the poignant criticisms of Peter Byrne, my external examiner. His lofty
expectations and specific challenges sent me on a quest to understand Kant in a way
far more ambitious than I had previously thought possible (or even desirable). I now
know otherwise. Whatever new insight this dissertation contains owes its inspiration
to his careful assessment ofmy earlier work.
I also want to give a special thanks to Stephen R. Palmquist of Hong Kong
Baptist University. My initial exposure to the difficulties of interpreting Kant's
writings well came during his postgraduate supervision ofmy work in the year and a
half leading up to the Hong Kong handover to China in 1997. Many, if not most, of
the good ideas in this dissertation (assuming, of course, there are some) first began to
surface in the conversations, camaraderie, and communion of that difficult time.
Another person I need to thank is Nathan Jacobs, who as a former student of mine
(and now fellow sojourner in Kant interpretation) provided invaluable assistance in
the form of emotional, spiritual, and academic support in the preparation of this most
recent version. Chapters Four and Five are an outworking of our joint study of
Kant's philosophy of religion and will be important parts of a new book on Kant's
Religion that we hope to produce in the coming years. I, of course, assume sole
responsibility for this text as it stands presently.
I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues at Trinity International
University in Deerfield and the Tyndale House Fellowship in Cambridge, as well as
the many others (too numerous to mention each by name) who helped to provide the
context for completing this project. This is especially true of my wife, Beth, and
children, Hannah, Matthew, Emma, and Rebekah without whose support this
dissertation would never have been completed.
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NOTES ON TEXT QUOTATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS
As already mentioned, this dissertation will focus on Kant's writings in
English translation. I have made every effort to adopt the new Cambridge University
Press (CUP) translation throughout, although, since this has involved a great deal of
revision of my notes and quotations, there may still be some minor differences
lingering in a few of the translated passages. In contexts where the particular source
under consideration is obvious, I have taken the liberty of simply highlighting the
pagination of the standard German edition of Kant's works, Kants gesammelte
Schriften, edited by the Royal Prussian/German Academy of Sciences. If the source
text is unclear or paraphrased, I have footnoted the text, giving the page numbers of
both the English and German. Although The Cambridge Edition ofthe Works of
Immanuel Kant only capitalizes the first word of individual titles to Kant's works, I
will treat these titles in the same way that I treat all titles by capitalizing the major
words. At the time of writing the relevant portions of this dissertation, CUP had not
yet published the complete volume on Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology. Therefore, I
decided to use the Critique ofJudgement, translated by James Creed Meredith, and
the address 'Concerning Sensory Illusion and Poetic Fiction', translated by Ralf
Meerbote. These two editions are listed under the 'Other Editions' heading below.
There are a number of places where translations not listed below are cited, especially,
for example, Kemp Smith's translation of the first Critique and my own translation
of specific words and phrases from Kants gesammelte Schriften. These usages are
usually limited to important exegetical contexts and in each case where appropriate
the citation is duly footnoted. A full bibliographic record of secondary sources is
located in the appendices. The complete list of bibliographic citations and
abbreviations of Kant's writings used in this dissertation is provided below:
The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant
(General Editors: Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood)
Correspondence. Tr. and Ed. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
VI
Critique ofPure Reason. Trs. and Eds. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997). Cited as 'first Critique'.
Lectures on Ethics. Tr. Peter Heath and Eds. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Lectures on Logic. Tr. and Ed. J. Michel Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1997).
Lectures on Metaphysics. Trs. and Eds. Karl Americks and Steve Naragon
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Opus Postumum. Trs. Eckart Forster and Michael Rosen, and Ed. Eckart Forster
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
Practical Philosophy. Tr. and Ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996). This text includes, among other works, 'An Answer to
the Question: What is Enlightenment?' (cited as 'What is Enlightenment?'),
Groundwork of The Metaphysics ofMorals (cited as 'Groundwork'), Critique of
Practical Reason (cited as 'second Critique'), 'Toward Perpetual Peace', and The
Metaphysics ofMorals.
Religion and Rational Theology. Trs. and Eds. Allen W. Wood and George di
Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This text includes
'What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?' (cited as 'Orientation'), 'On
the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy' (cited as 'Trials in
Theodicy'), Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason (cited as 'Religion'),
'The End of All Things', The Conflict of the Faculties (cited as 'Conflict'),
'Preface to Reinhold Berhard Jachmann's Examination of the Kantian
Philosophy ofReligion', and 'Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion'
(cited as 'Lectures on Religion').
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770. Tr. and Ed. David Walford (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992). This text includes, among other works, 'An
Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism' (cited as 'Optimism'), 'The Only
Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God',
'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics' (cited as
vii
'Dreams'), and 'On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible
World' (cited as 'Inaugural Dissertation').
Other Editions
Critique ofJudgement. Tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
Cited as 'third Critique'.
Kant's Latin Writings: Translation, Commentaries, and Notes. Tr. and E d. Lewis
White Beck (New York: Peter Lang, 1986). This text includes, among other




This dissertation will explore the nature of theology in light of the full scope of
Kant's philosophical programme. No single study can hope to address every aspect of
Kant's thinking on this topic. My plan instead is to locate and trace what I take to be one
particularly important line of reasoning in Kant's work that grounds theology on
principles consistent with his critical writings. The line of reasoning that I have in mind
originates in the first Critique, develops in his subsequent writings, and crystallizes in
his thinking in Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason. The idea is to present
the case that Kant's moral theology begins the extension and development of his
philosophical programme in a way that both adheres to his strictures on knowledge set
out in the first Critique, and prepares for the development of rational theology in accord
with the transcendental character of Kant's philosophy of religion.
Much of what I will argue throughout is set on the backdrop of Gordon
Michalson's influential exploration of Kant's philosophy of religion. In introducing the
topic of Kant and theology, he observes that the interpretation and reception of Kant's
philosophy in the two centuries since Kant's death have been characterized by two very
different tendencies. One tendency has been theologically affirmative, 'veering off in the
direction of constructive theological efforts to accommodate Christian faith and critical
thinking'.1 Interpretations of this kind understand Kant's philosophy to be both
chastening of and in some sense supportive of traditional forms of religion and
theology. Such 'affirmative' interpretations find room for faith in different corridors of
Kant's philosophy. Nevertheless, the common feature of this tendency is to believe that,
despite the appearance of Kant's theoretical philosophy, there are very real and
reasonable ways in which theology gains a foothold in Kant's philosophical programme.
The task of interpretation is to articulate precisely how Kant secures this foothold.
' Gordon Michalson, Kant and the Problem ofGod (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 4-5.
2 For a complete account of this current trend, see Stephen R. Palmquist and Chris L. Firestone, eds. Kant
and the New Philosophy ofReligion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, Fall 2005).
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Michalson takes this tendency of interpretation to be the predominant one insofar as it
has given rise to a whole set of problems and approaches unique to the theological
discussion after Kant.
Michalson, however, notes that another prevalent tendency is to argue that
Kant's philosophy implicitly advocates the 'abandonment of theism'. Interpretations of
this kind understand Kant's philosophy and i ts i nfluence on theology to be primarily
negative. This position, Michalson's own, argues that Kant's 'efforts to ameliorate the
theologically destructive effects of the Critique ofPure Reason implicitly makes things
worse for Christian theism, not better'.3 This tendency understands Kant's influence to
be traceable down the predominately atheistic path of Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and Marx.
Kant, according to this tendency, releases human autonomy and sets it up in such a way
that it becomes imperialistic and reductionistic relative to theology in all its
manifestations.4
My thesis is that Kant's late writings, most especially his classic text Religion,
provide a consistent development of his moral foundations for theology. The faith that
Kant made room for was indeed moral faith, but, as I will argue, it was more than just
morality. I contend moral faith only comes to completion (and indeed fruition) for Kant
in the context of his turn toward the topic of religion and the question of hope. This turn
is not solely determined by Kant's moral philosophy, but instead is the result of ongoing
developments in Kant's thinking on the transcendental nature of his philosophy. These
developments, I suggest, are consonant with the doctrines of central concern to Kant's
theoretical and practical philosophy and are propelled by further concerns expressed and
only partially addressed in the Critique ofJudgement. In particular, the question of hope
3
Michalson, Kant and the Problem ofGod, 5.
4 For the purposes of this dissertation, interpretations of Kant's philosophy that tend to be received in a
theologically negative way will be called 'traditional'. These interpretations are thought either to
undermine all conceivable theological efforts to stake a claim regarding the nature of God, or to
understand all talk about God to be an example of theological non-realism or deism. Referring to the
'traditional interpretation' of Kant's philosophy within these parameters is common parlance in the field
of Kant studies, just as it is in the broader philosophical academy. See 'Editor's Introduction' in Kant and
the New Philosophy ofReligion, Chris L. Firestone and Stephen R. Palmquist, Eds.
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occasions Kant's development of the moral theology, moving it decisively towards the
use of distinctly religious concepts and an existential conception of transcendental
theology.5
The thesis of this dissertation thus amounts to a presentation of Kant's
transcendental theology and a partial defence of this theology against the charge of
incoherence. Chapter One looks at three models for advancing beyond the first Critique
and thereby understanding the whole of Kant's philosophical programme, including
most importantly Kant's philosophy of religion. Section One develops an historical
account of these three ways as representative of the tradition of Kant interpretation in
English. In Sections Two, Three, and Four, we focus on each of these three
interpretations respectively by looking more closely at three contemporary
representatives of them. Considering the work of Ronald Green, Adina Davidovich, and
Stephen R. Palmquist, we examine each interpretation for exegetical proficiency and its
potential for providing a Kantian basis for theology. I argue that each of these
interpreters is successful, albeit i n markedly different ways, in establishing a rational
basis in Kant's critical writings for the development of theology. However, each
interpreter has to make interpretive concessions in order to make Kant's philosophy of
religion consistent with his philosophy as a whole. These interpretations seem to indicate
that, in order to understand Kant's philosophy of religion to be a consistent
philosophical proposal, one needs simultaneously to deny specific insights in his critical
philosophy proper or add to that philosophy something that it is not readily prepared to
accept. This sets up the question of whether or not it is possible to interpret Kant in a
way that provides a sound basis for theology and is consistent with his critical writings.
In the context of trying to determine if the issue of Kantian coherence has more
to do with subsequent interpretations or with Kant's writings themselves, we turn in
5
Throughout the dissertation, the term moral theology is used in reference to the kind of theology that
depends exclusively on Kant's practical philosophy. The term transcendental theology, however, is
context specific, and used to refer to each of the various stages in the development of Kant's rational
foundations for religious faith beginning in the first Critique and extending throughout his writings until
his death.
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Chapter Two to Kant's main text on religion, Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere
Reason. This work serves as the litmus test for all interpretations that purport to provide
the definitive reading ofKant on religion and theology. First, we consider an interpreter
who argues that inconsistency is the only constant in Kant's thinking on religion. This
involves doing a detailed examination ofGordon Michalson's interpretation of Religion.
The idea is to understand many of the central conundrums and inconsistencies in Kant's
work, as understood by Michalson, and to locate those problems that need to be
overcome if a sound philosophical basis for theology is to be established. In other words,
Michalson's work becomes the main interlocutor in this dissertation for the defence of
any interpretation found to be a sufficient understanding of Kant on religion and
theology. After looking at these problems from the point of view of Michalson, we then
return to the interpretations of Green, Davidovich, and Palmquist as a means for
resolving them. We find that, although these readings go some way toward resolving
these difficulties, they are not able to answer all of the objections (and some of the most
important among them) and, to that extent, are likewise not able to present a complete
and cogent case for a secure foundation for theology within the confines of Kant's
philosophical programme.
With this established, Chapter Three turns to the first Critique to make plain the
fundamental problem Kant faces in the establishment of the rational foundations for
faith. We begin in Section One by examining a theological problem present in Kant's
theoretical philosophy. There Kant argues that 'All concepts, and with them all
principles, even such as are possible a priori, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the
data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity'
(B195). Knowledge and the substantive use of the categories of the understanding
appear restricted to appearances and derivations from appearances for Kant. By looking
at the work of P. F. Strawson and Henry Allison, we explore two ways of understanding
Kant's claims in the first Critique with a view to unpacking the grounds by which Kant
believes himself licensed to move theology away from dogmatics, with its emphasis on
being grounded in the appearance, to a more critical form of theology, with an emphasis
on being grounded in the practical.
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In the context of exploring a debate, started by Peter Byrne, over the very
prospect of grounding theology in the practical, I present a case for this grounding
beginning with the first Critique. This involves making two sets of distinctions. In
Section Three, the distinctions made are between knowledge (Wissen) and cognition
(Erkenntnis), on the one hand, and faith (Glaube), opinion (Meinen), and knowledge
(Wissen), on the other hand. The chapter concludes with an explanation of why Kant
takes cognition and faith to be essential for understanding rational theology, not as
merely a formal element of his moral theology but as an existential part of his judicial
philosophy.6 In the context of Keith Ward's interpretation of this transition to the
practical as an example of 'empty formalism', I argue with Allen Wood and Leslie
Stevenson for the establishment of a new method for understanding Kant's account of
theology rooted in practical reason. With this fresh understanding of the role of
cognition, its distinction from knowledge, and the place this carves out for religious
faith, the chapter closes with a section devoted to articulating a new interpretive
hypothesis for interpreting Religion that I call the 'Transcendental Union Thesis'.7
The climax of the dissertation is an expository interpretation of Religion in
Chapter Four according to the Union Thesis. I argue in Chapter Four that Religion is an
extension and development of Kant's moral theology in terms of a prototypical theology.
In particular, I argue that the role of human cognition and moral faith first espoused in
the first Critique comes to the fore in Kant's thinking in Religion and warrants his
movement beyondmerely moral theology (i.e., where God is consideredmerely as a
postulate of the moral life) and into what he calls 'rational religion' (i.e., where God is
considered ash aving c ondescended i n t he p erson o f t he p rototype a nd as s uch is t he
proper object of any truly rational faith). It is faith in the reality of the human moral
6 This movement to the practical in the latter stages of the first Critique marks the beginning of the
renowned fact-value bifurcation of philosophy and sets Kant on his later quest to 'bridge the gap' between
nature and freedom that we find in the Critique ofJudgment. It also initiates a kind ofmoral metaphysic of
cognition that will not reach its fullness until the arguments of Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere
Reason.
1 The term 'Transcendental Union Thesis' is explained in more detail in Chapters Three and Four. For the
sake of brevity, I will refer to this thesis as just the 'Union Thesis' throughout the dissertation.
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disposition that is key to the grounding of Kant's prototypical theology in reason.
Rational religion provides Kant with an array of reasonable ways of speaking about
religion and theology. It is constituted in Kant's philosophical programme through the
convergence of cognition, faith, the moral philosophy, and the question of hope.
Central to Kant's thinking on rational religion, I argue, are three forms of union
that act as pillars holding up the main sections of his philosophy of religion; these pillars
support theology in Kant's philosophical programme and are the main contributions of
his critical inquiry into religion. These three pillars comprise the three main parts of the
Transcendental Union Thesis. The three parts refer to three senses of union found in the
first three Books ofReligion. They are each important to keep in mind in order to master
the many complex arguments and sub-arguments in Religion. The first is a conceptual
union of humanity as an object of human cognition. There is, argues Kant, a universal
idea of the human species (or humanity's moral disposition). On closer analysis for
Kant, it is found out that this universal moral disposition is fundamentally corrupt. This
problem makes way for Kant to present a second union in Book Two, namely, a possible
union of the human person with the prototype of perfect humanity through moral faith.
This second union involves belief, not in the gradual progress of human persons toward
moral perfection, but in the complete replacement of the human disposition with the
disposition of the prototype through the act of conversion. The third union is found in
Book Three. This union involves a community of individuals under the good principle
who intentionally and freely come together for the purpose of overcoming the evil
principle.
Where Chapter Four provides an expository interpretation of Religion according
to the Union Thesis, Chapter Five focuses on Kant's second experiment in Religion
(Book Four) and The Conflict ofthe Faculties. Religion confirms the merits of the Union
Thesis and extends it by addressing those aspects of Christianity that are not consonant
81 borrow the term 'prototypical theology' from an essay by Nathan Jacobs, entitled 'Kant's Prototypical
Theology: Transcendental Incarnation as a Rational Foundation for God-Talk' in Kant and the New
Philosophy ofReligion.
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with rational religion; Conflict is at once a political treatise and a philosophical
statement on the place of theology in the ongoing quest for human understanding in the
university. I argue, in light of the interpretation of Religion previously espoused, that
Conflict builds on the groundwork of rational theology established in Religion by
expounding the basic criteria for Kant's philosophical framework for the ongoing work
of theology. This includes an important role for the biblical scholar/theologian and for
historical faith as that necessary feature of Kant's religious worldview promising to
hasten the day when one universally true rational religion will be realized.
In the end, this dissertation provides a statement of and partial defence for Kant's
conception of transcendental theology as a distinctly moral/rational/religious theology; it
is rooted in the possibility of belief in God afforded by human cognition in Kant's
theoretical philosophy, the grounding of belief in God as a postulate of Kant's moral
philosophy, the establishing of belief in God through an existential commitment to the
meaningfulness of the world, the fleshing out of belief in God as development ofKant's
rational theology in the first three books of Religion, and finally the framework for
religious practice and theological method outlined respectively in Book Four ofReligion




I. Three Interpretations of Kant's Philosophy of Religion
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the history of Kant interpretation with a
view to understanding the various approaches to interpreting the whole of his
philosophical programme and its implications for his philosophy of religion. The point
here is not to conduct anything like a complete survey of Kant's texts, nor is it to
highlight every possible interpretation. Instead, we will take stock of Kant's programme
insofar as it demonstrates potential for establishing a rational foundation for theology.
Guided by the tradition of Kant interpretation, the analysis below seeks to identify
concepts that, according to Kant and his key contemporary interpreters, appear important
to the nature and viability of Kant's philosophical programme. These interpretative
strategies provide guidance on how to understand Kant's writings on religion that are
explored in more detail in the subsequent sections and chapters.
Interpretations of the writings of Immanuel Kant are unique in the history of
philosophy. No single author has been so widely praised while at the same time so
diversely understood. The extent of this interpretive diversity becomes immediately
apparent w hen o ne c onsiders t he n ature o f t he 1 arge, b ut s till m anageable, amount o f
literature in Kant studies at the turn of the previous century. The late nineteenth century
is when Kant studies began to distinguish itself as a major subdivision of philosophy in
the English-speaking academy. For reasons that will become increasingly clear as we
survey the literature, the diversity of interpretation from this period can serve as a
convenient preview of the various 'live options' for interpreting Kant's philosophy
today. Corresponding to the 'back-to-Kant movement' in Germany,1 competent research
on Kant in English showed its first significant signs of life at this time. The surge of
' One of the most important developments in the dissemination of Kant's philosophy was the founding of
the pre-eminent Kant journal Kant Studien in 1896.
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interest in Kant led to a number of significant translations of his writings and notable
secondary sources. These translations, in combination with several noteworthy original
studies, outlined the legacy of interpretive disagreement over Kant's philosophy
throughout the next century.
One of the most important interpretations of Kant emerging from this period was
Kuno Fischer's A Critique of Kant (1888). This account was, at the time of its
translation, the fullest account of Kant in any of the standard histories. Following
Fischer's publication, Edward Caird produced the first significant piece of Kant
scholarship for our understanding of the tradition of Kant interpretation. Caird's two-
volume work, entitled The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1889), was the first
substantial work on Kant in English covering the full extent of his philosophy. His
interpretation of Kant's philosophy is divided into four books. The first three books
correspond to the three Critiques and the fourth book addresses Kant's Religion. For
Caird, as well as Fischer, the most natural reading of Kant is the holistic one.4 'For the
theoretical, the practical and the aesthetic and religious consciousness are not really
independent things, or the products of independent faculties, which stand side by side
with each other; they are different forms of one conscious life, forms which rise out of
each other in a certain order determined by the very nature of the intelligence'.5 Caird
understood Kant's thought to be a coherent and dynamic whole, in which apparent
contradictions find their resolution in the development and filling out of ideas, rather
than in their relative demise due to logical inconsistency.
Another influential translation, entitled Kant by Friedrich Paulsen, was published
in 1902. It provided an account similar to that of Caird in detail, but opposing it in its
2 See translator's comments in Kuno Fischer, A Critique ofKant (London: Swan Sonnonshein, Lowrey,
1888), esp. v.A Critique ofKant was vol.5 ofFischer's History ofModern Philosophy.
3 Edward Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Vols. I and II (Glasgow: James Madehose &
Sons, 1889). Caird's interpretive divisions closely follow Kant's own. The titles ofhis books are 'The
Critique of Pure Reason', 'Kant's Ethical Works', 'The Critique of Judgment', and 'Kant's Treatise on
Religion Within the Bounds ofMere Reason'.
4
Fischer, A Critique ofKant, 146. See also 'Translator's Preface', vi.
5
Caird, The Critical Philosophy ofImmanuel Kant, 644.
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overall vision. Among their notable agreements was their emphasis on 'system' or
'critical wholeness' in the interpretation of Kant. Instead of understanding Kant as a
philosopher of four realms, however, Paulsen stressed Kant's early critical position of
there being essentially two intellectual realms. At the time Kant wrote the first edition to
the first Critique, he had hoped that a complete critical philosophy would only need
theoretical and practical explications. '[T]he chief question always remains: "What and
how much can understanding and reason cognize free from all experience?" (Axvii)'.
Kant's transcendental philosophy, Paulsen thus believed, 'falls into two branches: The
metaphysic of nature and the metaphysic of morals or natural philosophy and moral
philosophy. This corresponds to the great division of the objective world into spheres of
nature and of freedom. The physical and moral world constitute as it were the two
hemispheres of the globus intellectuals'.6 Paulsen downplays the importance of Kant's
work after the second Critique and highlights Kant's failing health and inability to
construct an adequate metaphysic upon the foundation of his transcendental philosophy.7
Henry Sidgwick's The Philosophy of Kant and Other Lectures provided a
complement to Paulsen's work. The book was compiled posthumously from Sidgwick's
lecture notes in 1905. His account ofKant's philosophy runs parallel to Paulsen's in that
it too asserts the systematic sufficiency of Kant's theoretical and practical philosophies.
It differs slightly, however, by rejecting the image of dual spheres in Kant's work,
positing instead the idea that Kant's theoretical philosophy served as the foundation
upon which the practical philosophy was built. To Sidgwick's mind, Kant believed that
the 'ultimate aim of the whole of his philosophy is to establish the beliefs in
"Immortality, Freedom, and God'" and he 'establishes them primarily as postulates of
the practical reason, resting ultimately on our certain, irrefragable conviction of duty,
together with our equally strong conviction that, in order that morality may be more than
an idle dream, reason must assume a supersensible world in which happiness depends on
6 Friedrich Paulsen, Immanuel Kant: His Life and Doctrine (London: J. C. Nimmo, 1902), 110.
7
See, for instance, pages 43 and 111. 'Thus in all respects the "doctrinal" construction fell far short of the
"critical" foundation'. Paulsen, Immanuel Kant, 111.
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the performance of duty'.8 Significantly, Sidgwick to my knowledge never mentions the
third Critique or Religion in his writings that reached publication, and, when addressing
topics such as the imagination and God, he limits himself to the technical applications of
the first Critique or the postulates of the second Critique.9
Caird and Sidgwick, like their complements Fischer and Paulsen, set the early
agenda in Kant studies with the emergence of Kant's popularity. In an important way,
their interpretations summarised 19th century Kant scholarship and demarcated the
parameters ofKant studies for the 20th century. As we have seen, two distinct avenues of
interpretive influence emerged: Kant as the philosopher of four realms (theory, practice,
judgement, and religion) and Kant the philosopher of two realms (theory and practice).10
John Watson forwarded a third possibility in his The Philosophy of Kant Explained
(1908). He held that Kant's critical philosophy was in fact a consistent and coherent
whole. He pointed out that there existed an inordinate gap in the two-realm
interpretation of Kant and that the largely ignored third Critique had only to be properly
understood to see the adequacy of Kant's own three-realm resolution. In the theoretical
philosophy, the phenomenal/noumenal gulf represented an impassable barrier. Practical
reasoning compels us to go beyond sense perception, because nature must 'permit... the
realisation of freedom; in other words, the sensible and supersensible realms must be so
adapted t o each o ther t hat t he former d oes n ot present an i nsuperable o bstacle to t he
realisation of the latter'.11 For Watson, this clearly meant that the third Critique was no
simple corollary to the theoretical or practical philosophies, nor was it an afterthought of
little consequence. Even though Kant had not envisioned the need for writing it in the
8
Henry Sidgwick, The Philosophy of Kant and Other Lectures (London and New York: Macmillan,
1905), 17 and 18, respectively.
9
Sidgwick, The Philosophy ofKant, 63 and 184-195.
10 These two positions roughly separate two German schools of thought in the Neo-Kantian tradition: the
Marburg School of Herman Cohen and the Baden School of Paul Natorp. Frederick Copleston, S. J., A
History ofPhilosophy, Vol. VII (New York: Double Day, 1963), 362.
11 John Watson, The Philosophy ofKant Explained (Glascow: J. Maclehose and Sons, 1908), 396.
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early 1780's,12 the third Critique was, in Watson's opinion, the necessary and natural
next step of Kant's critical inquiries. 'We must therefore expect that Judgment will
mediate between understanding and reason by bringing into harmony the realm of nature
and the realm of freedom, and that it will also be related to the feeling of pleasure and
pain as the link between knowledge and desire'.13 Watson nowhere mentions religion
with regard to the critical philosophy, but he does find consistency and completeness in
Kant's three-realm understanding of reason.14
Interest in Kant's philosophy of religion peaked in the decade following
Watson's interpretation. The 1920's saw a revival of interest in the field of religion and
religious experience due to the exceedingly popular work of Rudolf Otto. Otto's Das
Heilige of 1917 (ET The Idea of the Holy, 1923) represented an attempt to develop
Kant's programme squarely into the realm of religion. Otto argued for four realms in his
transcendental philosophy. According to Otto, Kant did not write a fourth Critique,
because he did not recognise that religious experience was a universal phenomena. If he
had, Kant would have been able to identify and articulate the unique sphere of religion.
In short, Otto set out to do what Kant did not, namely, discover the necessary conditions
for the universal phenomena of religious experience that could be observed throughout
the world. He called it the 'holy'. According to Otto, the holy is the common
12
Lindsay, in support of the thlee-Critique interpretation, writes, 'It will be remembered that Kant, in his
letter of June 1771 to Marcus Herz, where he first talks of the work which was to become the Critique of
Pure Reason, says that he has been concerned with what is "involved in the theory of taste, metaphysics,
and moral theory.'" Lindsay also points out other references in Kant's earlier letters that suggest that
'aesthetics ranked with metaphysics and moral theory as part of the general Critical program'. See A. D.
Lindsay, Kant (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1934), 215-220.
13
Watson, The Philosophy ofKant Explained, 396-7.
14 In Watson's earlier work, he links morality and religion, but writes that Kant in the third Critique 'points
beyond the abstractions of the sensible and the supersensible to their actual concrete unity; but... the most
he can persuade himself to say is, that man is entitled to a rational faith in God, freedom and immortality,
though these are objects which lie beyond the range of his knowledge'. John Watson, Christianity and
Idealism (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1897), xxxvi.
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denominator of all religious experience; it identifies the human as essentially a religious
being, and completes reason at its highest level.15
Spurred on by the work of Rudolf Otto, Clement Webb wrote an influential and
timely book entitled Kant's Philosophy of Religion (1926). This book was Webb's
attempt to clarify the philosophical importance of religion in a purely Kantian context.
On one level, his view represented a kind of tripartite synthesis ofKantian interpretation.
It contained aspects of Caird's, Sidgwick's, and Watson's views, but comprised yet a
new vision of the whole of Kant's philosophy. Like Watson, Webb recognised the
seriousness of the gap in Kant's natural and moral philosophies and found the bridge
between them in Kant's writings of the 1790's. Unlike Watson, however, he ignores the
pertinence of the third Critique,16 finding the bridge instead in Kant's writings on
religion. 'To appreciate the position of Kant in the history of philosophy of religion it is
well to bear in mind his threefold division of the interest of human reason into the
scientific, the moral, and the religious'.17 Only religion, in Webb's estimation, could
provide the successful mediation of reason's transcendental dichotomy. This part of his
work was successful in bringing the subject of religion back into purview of the way we
understand Kant's philosophy.
Unity in Kant's philosophy, according to Webb, 'was essentially unattainable by
the method of Science' and pure practical reason was of little help as well. Webb
asserted that the essential bridge in Kant's philosophy 'was apprehensible by faith, or, in
other words, belonged to the sphere of Religion'.18 On a deeper level, however, Webb's
interpretation displayed significant inconsistencies. His interpretation neglected the third
15 See Chris L. Firestone, 'Rudolf Otto' in The Dictionary ofHistorical Philosophy, Ed. Trevor A. Hart
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 410-412.
16 Clement Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1926), 71-2. Webb called
the third Critique an 'artificial "architectonic"' and claimed that many of its arguments properly belonged
to one or the other of the earlier Critiques. He believed that the most important function of the third
Critique was as a precursor to Kant's work on religion. '[W]e shall not therefore be surprised to find in the
Kritik der Urtheilskraft, and especially in the second part of it, which deals with teleology, passages of
great importance to the student of his philosophy of religion'. Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 72.
17
Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 2.
18
Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 2-3.
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Critique, and, as a result, was unable to explain satisfactorily how the progression of
Kant's thought might justify the distinctiveness of religion. He conjoined religion and
morality in a way reminiscent of the Paulsen/Sidgwick line of interpretation. 'It is the
distinctive feature of the philosophy of religion that it teaches us to seek in our moral
consciousness and there alone the essence of religion; for although in Religion there is,
according to [Kant], as I have already pointed out, a certain connexion established
between practice and theory, which are otherwise at odds, it is this connexion in which
the practice determines the theory and not the theory the practice'.19 The integral
connection between religion and morality seems to be why Webb believed that Kant
held to the primacy of practical reason.
Webb's interpretation supplanted the earlier work of Caird, Sidgwick, and
Watson, and became the century's leading perspective of Kant on religion. Its strength
lay in its ability to synthesise features important to each of the three main interpretations
of Kant, rather than its exegetical accuracy or explanatory virtues. Webb's interpretation
integrated the systematic completeness of Watson's account, Caird's concern for the
distinctiveness of Kant's philosophy of religion, and the two-tiered Kantian
interpretation of Sidgwick. The third of these interpretive approaches, however, seems to
have most significantly influenced Webb's understanding of Kant. A vital bridge
between nature and freedom in the first two Critiques was absent in Webb's estimation
and Kant had not succeeded in providing one in the third Critique. Webb argued that
religious faith was the principal resource in Kant's writings to solve the problem. This
faith was not a religious faith based on purely religious or theological resources; it was a
moral faith in the postulates 'God' and 'immorality' based on pure practical reason.20
Since the publication of Webb's Kant's Philosophy of Religion, this linking of
faith to moral postulates, and religion to practice, has become the traditional approach to
19
Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 17.
20
Any consideration of 'Kant's general view of the world ... must bear in mind his conception of faith as
a sufficient ground for action, though not for demonstration to the theoretical intelligence; and also his
doctrine of the primacy of practical reason over the theoretical'. Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 76.
14
interpreting Kant. In the interpretations of Sidgwick, Watson, and Caird, we find three
quite different attempts to demarcate the fundamental contours of Kant's philosophy.
Sidgwick held a two-tiered view, Watson suggested a three-realm view, and Caird
argued for four forms of reason. Webb's interpretation marked a shift of balance towards
Sidgwick's interpretation. The first sign of this shift was the publication ofDie Religion
innerhalb der Grenzen der blofen Vernuft (ET Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, 1934). Even though the translation itself quickly became the new standard and
proved quite reliable in this role, Theodore M. Greene's introductory essay set the tone
for its reception into the field of Kant interpretation. His essay certified the
Webb/Paulsen moral interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion and dismissed
Caird's interpretation.21 Instead of simply providing a good overview of the various
ways in which one might approach reading Religion, Greene prescribed the two-realm
view as the only good way o f understanding Kant. Webb's book and Greene's essay
served to catalyse the trend toward what I have called 'the traditional interpretation'.
In the years leading up to the contemporary discussion of Kant's philosophy of
religion, which began for the sake of argument with the publication of Allen Wood's
book Kant's Moral Religion (1971) and Michel Despland's book Kant on History and
Religion (1972), numerous publications and debates centring on the two and three-realm
interpretations epitomized the field of Kant studies. An interesting comparison, typical
of this period, can be made between the interpretations of Richard Kroner in Kant's
Weltanschauung (1956) and Stephan Korner in Kant (1955).22 For Kroner, 'Two great
cultural powers are at the very foundation of the Kantian philosophy: natural science and
moral life. The manner in which Kant pits these two powers against each other
constitutes the dynamics of his system. For in their reality he sees the foci around which
21 Theodore M. Greene, 'The Historical Context and Religious Significance of Kant's Religion' in
Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits ofReason A lone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H.
Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1934), ix-lxxviii. In a footnote on page xxxvii, Greene
highlighted Webb's contribution to the interpretation of Kant's view of religion. For his summary
dismissal ofCaird's interpretation, see lxviii.
22 Richard Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956) and Stephan
Korner, Kant (London: Penguin Books, 1955).
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all philosophical thought moves, and he regards it as of the utmost importance to co-
• • 9T • • •
ordinate the two within a system'. Kroner carried the theme of dualism throughout his
interpretation of Kant's writings. It permeated into a complex system of dualisms based
Kant's scientific and moral emphases in the first two Critiques.24
Korner, on the other hand, held to a three-part view of Kant's philosophy and its
implications for religion. According to him, 'The Critiques of theoretical and practical
reason are a systematic survey of a priori principles of empirical knowledge and of
morality. They are not the whole system and not even the whole outline of the critical
9 S
philosophy. ... Another Critique had to be thought out and written by Kant'. Korner
26
understood Kant to be holding to a close connection between morality and religion.
Yet, he argued for the possibility of a 'rational faith' in the writings ofKant.
[T]he two Critiques h ave p repared t he g round for an a ct o f faith w hich i s i n
harmony with the findings of his critical philosophy. It can in this sense be
called a rational faith. According to Kant it is rational also in the sense that it
satisfies "an interest of pure reason", namely the connexion between the realms
of nature and of moral freedom. However difficult it may be to understand
Kant's n otion o f rational faith, he 1 eaves u s w ith no d oubt that i t is d ifferent
from the apprehension either of the moral law or of the world of empirical fact.
It belongs to the sphere of religion.27
Korner highlights the importance of faith and the role of the third Critique for providing
harmony among the critical components of Kant's philosophical programme. However,
23
Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung, 2.
24 This can be seen in Kroner's understanding of God and God's relationship to human knowledge. He
writes, 'God, and God alone, knows the full truth at a glance.... One can say that the entire separation of
object and subject as well as that of theoretical and practical reason is only human; in the comprehension
of God it does not exist. How far this comprehension can be fathomed by us is a difficult question'.
Kroner, Kant's Weltanschauung, 81-2. Kroner's understanding of the dualisms in Kant capture the radical
difference between the divine and human standpoints. For him, Kant's prolegomena to metaphysics ends








he did not explore the possibility of a link between these two aspects. For Korner, Kant's
philosophy o f r eligion i s d istinct from h is ethics i n t hat i t p rovides t he v ital u nifying
function. Nevertheless, it remains an enigmatic feature of Kant's thought; its only
definitive place is in 'the realm of faith', which remains outside the confines of standard
philosophical dialogue.
A valuable contribution to recent trends in Kant scholarship is Michel
Despland's Kant on History and Religion (1973). In Despland's words, his book
attempts to 'bring out the full meaning of Kant's philosophy of religion not primarily
through the study of his views on morality and on the source of the moral law, but rather
through the study of his views on the philosophy of history and on the problems of
theodicy'.28 His interpretation resists the temptation to understand Kant's philosophy of
religion solely from the point of view of his earlier work, not by rejecting the traditional
interpretation outright, but by emphasizing the development of Kant's thought into
insights and perspectives unique to his later work. If Webb's Kant's Philosophy of
Religion marked a turning point in the history of Kant interpretation, then we could
rightly say that Despland's book marks a returning point. He fleshes out the concepts of
community and hope in Kant's philosophy of religion, and, in so doing, relieves much of
the stress on Kant's moral philosophy for interpreting his philosophy of religion.
Grace and revelation, in Despland's interpretation of Religion, act as necessary
supplements to the human striving after goodness and a perfect moral kingdom. In
Religion, Despland points out, the church plays a vital role in humankind's progression
towards a perfect moral kingdom. The purifying and reforming of humankind via the
church are made possible, on the one hand, by 'reason as the focus that draws and attracts',
and, on the other hand, by 'revelation and grace [which are] the dynamic realities that move
man along this progressive path'.29 According to Despland, Kant's posture with regard to
religion is one of reform. His interpretation liberates Kant's philosophy of religion from
the other philosophical spheres, and shows that it contributes to the unification of the
28
Despland, Michel, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973), 1.
29
Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 242.
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whole of his philosophy by regulating and chastening theology so that religion may in
the end fulfil its proper function.30
Despland's interpretation marks the return of a dispute in contemporary Kant
scholarship between the three different ways of interpreting Kant's philosophy. His
arguments make it clear that the traditional interpretation of Kant is often times too
restrictive. Kant's writings display optimistic tendencies in regards to religion that
suggest over and again that he took the study of religion to be an important resource for
his philosophical programme. This has direct implications regarding how we interpret
his chief text on religion. Religion was certainly reliant upon Kant's moral philosophy,
but, more than this, argues Despland, it demonstrated a definite and positive inclination
towards the tenets of empirical Christianity, contained elements of hope from the third
Critique, and left undecided, from the perspective of reason alone, the ultimate questions
of revelation and religious experience. Despland's work paved the way in the field of
Kant interpretation for re-examining the various ways of approaching Kant's philosophy
of religion.
Around the same time as Despland's book, Allen Wood presented another
influential account of Kant's philosophy of religion. Its importance for our discussion is
that, like Despland's book, Wood's Kant's Moral Religion defends the claim that there is
rational room, and perhaps even need, for the belief in revelation and grace in Kant's
philosophy of religion. According to Wood, 'Kant does not dogmatically deny the
possibility of a divine revelation to man', even if knowing that God has revealed himself
is another matter entirely.31 He also makes an important point that 'Trust in God's
forgiving grace, then, is an important aspect ofmoral faith, and it is itself justified in the
ReligionHe highlights Kant's assertions never to contest the 'inner possibility of
revelation' and 'the necessity of a revelation as a divine means for the introduction of
religion' as proof of this contention. However, an instructive tension exists in Wood's
30
Despland, Kant on History and Religion, 246.
31 Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 204.
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interpretation that is absent in Despland. For Wood, Kant's theoretical and practical
philosophies combine to create a kind of antinomy in Kant's account of religion. He
explains it in this way: 'But though divine revelation itself is not possible [sic], it is
impossible for any man to know through experience that God has in any instance
actually revealed himself.33 Kant's decision not to dismiss the possibility of revelation
makes for an uneasy tension with his theoretical philosophy. Is it both possible for God
to b e revealed a nd impossible t o k now i t w as God? A nd i f s o, w hat d oes t his i mply
about any theological knowledge claim within the Kantian paradigm?
Wood's analysis of this difficulty focuses on the distinction in Kant between
'inner' revelation and 'outer' revelation. The former, which he links to morality, is said
to serve as a 'touchstone' for any understanding of 'genuine revelation'. The later has to
do with empirical religion and Kant's theoretical philosophy. Wood's interpretation in
Kant's Moral Religion resonates with the two-realm interpretations ofKant in the way it
focuses on the moral dimensions of Kant's philosophy of religion. Yet, there is no
sustained argument for why the concepts of taste, teleology, and history should be
excluded at this crucial juncture. Wood's interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion
parallels Despland's with the exception that Despland considers the historical dimension
and its symbols as integral elements to understanding Kant's writings on religion.
Religion, according to Despland's interpretation, is a complex and interwoven nexus of
perspectives germane as much to the first and third Critiques as it is to Kant's moral
philosophy. It is clear, for instance, that Kant believed that God could not reveal himself
solely to a person's understanding or the theoretical faculty of sense experience, and that
despite this lack of knowledge reason in its practical employment supports belief in God.
It is not so clear, in light of Kant's Critique ofJudgement (as well as a number of his
later writings), what this means for the prospects of revelation according to the whole of
Kant's philosophy. Despland's interpretation takes considerable account of this insight
without explaining how it might be more fully realized, while Wood's interpretation
recognizes it, but is unsure about how to understand it coherently.
33
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Wood's position on Kant's philosophy of religion has gradually become less
optimistic and more entrenched. In his article 'Kant's Deism', for instance, Wood argues
that it was Kant's intention to transform Christianity into rational religion, 'including]
as much as possible of it within the religion of pure reason'.34 Wood adopts the position
that, for K ant, h istorical r eligion i s d erivative o f r ational r eligion, a nd 1 ikewise r elies
exclusively on practical considerations for its determination. In Wood's interpretation,
as it develops in the years following Kant's Moral Religion, religion becomes essentially
an expression of morality.35 Interpreters like Denis Savage and Bernard Reardon have
promulgated this position in Kant studies. Savage argues against the thesis of Wood's
early work by suggesting that Kant was a common deist who rejected the possibility of
divine revelation outright.36 In Kant as Philosophical Theologian (1988), Reardon
suggests that 'What Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone offers us is ... a
reinterpretation of Christianity solely in terms ofmoral values'.37 Not only does Reardon
contend that Kant limits Christianity itself to the moral tenets of his system, but also he
makes the case that all manifestations of religion for Kant are exclusively linked to his
moral philosophy. Reardon summarizes, 'Religion, accordingly, is equivalent to
morality, but as seen not so much from the standpoint of the individual moral
conscience—which is what ethics, in Kant's view, presents—as, so to speak,
34 Allen W. Wood, 'Kant's Deism' in Kant's Philosophy ofReligion Reconsidered, eds. Philip J. Rossi
and Michael W. Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 9.
35 The primary exegetical evidence Wood forwards is based on a passage in which Kant lays out the four
logical positions—the 'rationalist', 'pure rationalist', 'naturalist', and 'supernaturalist'—that may be
adopted toward revelation (see 6:154-5). Wood argues that 'Kant is plainly a rationalist because he is
simply an agnostic about supernatural revelation'. Wood, 'Kant's Deism', 11. John Hare argues the
opposite—Kant was a 'pure rationalist'. John E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits,
and God's Assistance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 41-45. For Kant, the issue seems to be an ongoing
debate that must be decided in the context of both philosophers and theologians: 'The point of dispute can
therefore concern only the reciprocal claims of the pure rationalist and the supernaturalist in matters of
faith, or what either accepts as necessary and sufficient, or only as accidental, to the one and only true
religion' (6:155).
36 See Denis Savage, 'Kant's Rejection of Divine Revelation and His Theory of Radical Evil' in Kant's
Philosophy ofReligion Reconsidered, 54-76.
37 Bernard M. G. Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1988),
90.
20
"objectively", as part of that divine moral order in which the individual has his essential
role'.38
One of the main reasons why this theologically bleak line of interpretation has
been under increasing pressure in recent years is that it has lacks a comprehensive
account of the whole of Kant's philosophy. At the beginning of Kant's Moral Religion,
Wood notes well the dilemma of the traditional interpretation: 'Much careful and fruitful
labor has been devoted to the analysis of the subtle argumentation of Kant's
epistemology and moral philosophy; but his philosophical outlook as a whole, his view
of the world and man's place in it, is often grotesquely caricatured'.39 He follows that
comment with an outline of the solution: 'there is an area of Kant's philosophical
thought—itself badly neglected by responsible scholarship—which though no less
demanding on the reader than most of his writing, does give us a more or less direct
access to Kant's outlook as a whole. ... This area of thought is Kant's investigation of
rational religious faith'.40 Like Despland, Wood highlights a problem with
interpretations of Kant that reduce the theological spectrum of his thought to mere
morality and outlines a number of key features to be considered by any plan that might
address this problem.
This is where more theologically affirmative interpretations of Kant have gained
a foothold in the contemporary debate over how to interpret Kant. Typically, these
interpreters hold that there is room for rational thought, discourse, and belief about God
within the parameters of Kant's philosophy, provided that such thought, discourse, and
belief are not limited to the resources of Kant's theoretical philosophy alone. The
foundation for theology comes from a different part of Kant's philosophy that, though
not dependent on the theoretical philosophy, is deemed to be compatible with it. In other
words, the case for theology in Kant cannot be made with reference only, or even
primarily, to the first Critique; it requires arguments drawn from texts that Kant wrote
38
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after the first Critique. These arguments usually make it a point to capture a sense of the
whole of the philosophical enterprise, something that is often lost to those interpreters of
Kant who emphasize the authority of the first Critique for understanding the nature and
extent of Kant's philosophical programme. Among these theologically affirmative
interpretations of the whole of Kant's philosophy, the way the arguments are articulated
and defended varies greatly. In the years following Despland, three approaches
(analogous to the tradition outlined above) have become central to the interpretive
debate.41
Ronald M. Green has taken up the task of advancing beyond the traditional
interpretation in order to interpret Kant's philosophy of religion in a theologically
affirmative and relevant way. In his three books, entitled Religious Reason (1978),
Religion and Moral Reason (1988), and Kant and Kierkegaard: The Hidden Debt
(1993),42 he offers the most thoroughly worked out case in the current literature for what
I call 'the moral interpretation'. In a recent article, Green writes, 'At the heart of [my]
program is the conviction that the moral judgments that we make and the array of
religious beliefs that surround them arise from complex but ultimately comprehensible
operations of practical reason'.43 His interpretation of Kant continues the stream of
interpretation consisting of Paulsen, Sidgwick, Webb, and Greene. This group, as noted
earlier, emphasizes the two-realm reading of Kant's philosophy and interprets Kant's
philosophy of religion based on Kant's moral philosophy. Green argues that Kant's
philosophy provides an opening in the theoretical philosophy and thereby creates a
bridge between the theoretical and practical philosophies. This connection between the
theoretical and practical provides room necessary for substantiating a meaningful form
41 See Stephen R. Palmquist's introductory essay to Kant and the New Philosophy of Religion, entitled
'The Place of This Volume in Recent Kant Scholarship'.
42 Ronald M. Green's Religious Reason: The Rational and Moral Basis ofReligious Belief (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978), Religion and Moral Reason: A New Methodfor Comparative Study (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), and Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
43 Ronald M. Green, 'Probing the Depths of Practical Reason: Looking Back over Twenty-five Years',
Journal ofReligious Ethics, 25/1 (Spring 1997), 15.
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of theology. Key to Green's interpretation is the practical philosophy; it not only
provides the justification necessary for metaphysical beliefs, but also provides the
necessary and sufficient conditions for metaphysics in all its rational forms. We will take
a closer look at Green's interpretation in the next section.
Adina Davidovich presents a case for the three-dimensional view of Kant's
philosophy in line with Fischer, Watson, Korner, and Cassirer and applies it to Kant's
philosophy of religion. In her book Religion as a Province of Meaning (1996), she
focuses on Kant's third Critique, making the case that the faculty ofjudgement became,
for Kant, reason's most important faculty. This is not only crucial, thinks Davidovich,
for understanding how Kant's whole programme comes together, but also is decisive for
determining the nature of Kant's philosophy of religion. She summarizes her interpretive
strategy in her prefatory remarks:
I contend that in his last systematic works Kant considered religion an essential
bridge between the worlds of theory and praxis and elevated its status as such to
that of a necessary principle through which alone the unity of reason is
established. Accordingly to this conception of religion belief in God is neither
theoretical nor practical. I argue that through his discoveries in the Critique of
Judgment Kant came to consider belief in God as a contemplative belief.44
The picture of Kant's philosophy that emerges is a bifurcated sphere of theory and
practice held together and harmonized by judgement. Religion, in her view, became an
expression of Kant's understanding of what is most important to judgement. She calls
this kind ofjudgement 'reflective' and 'contemplative' reasoning in its highest form, the
form ofjudgement that deals with life's most important questions. Her interpretation
contends that Kant's faculty of judgement, as explicated in the third Critique, not only
provides an explanation of the language used to express human metaphysical beliefs, but
also provides the only meaningful access we have to metaphysics.45 The opening in her
44 Adina Davidovich, Religion as a Province ofMeaning: The Kantian Foundations ofModern Theology
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), xv.
45 See Chris L. Firestone, 'Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task', International Journal of
Systematic Theology 2/1 (March 2000), 63-78. There, I argue that Davidovich's thesis is an example of the
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interpretation o fK ant i s 1 ess ad irect access o r bridge t o t he t heoretical a nd m ore an
approximation process in which humans strive to understand God as the provider of
harmony between nature and freedom and the ultimate guarantee of justice. Her
interpretation, as an example of what I call 'the poetic interpretation', will be the focus
of Section Three.
We also find in the recent literature a renewed attention to the stream of Kant
interpretation initiated by Caird. Stephen R. Palmquist makes the case that Kant's
philosophy is best understood as a system of three perspectives with an overarching
ontology.46 Palmquist's interpretation provides a good example of the four-realm
interpretation or what I call 'the religious interpretation'.47 His interpretation argues that
Kant's later writings, particularly his writings on religion and his posthumous writings,
bring into sharp relief a 'Transcendental Perspective' in which reason comes to
consummation in the pre-reflective interface of reason and being-itself at the outermost
bounds of human experience. This fourth realm acts as a fourth perspective of reason in
Palmquist's terminology that becomes vital to the coherence and completion of Kant's
philosophy. Palmquist's interpretation is based on the conviction that, for Kant, the
religious uniquely manifests itself in the reality of human experience. According to
Palmquist, Kant's understanding of religion is founded on the experience of God as
being-itself. This is the origin and ground of all reasonable theological discourse and
belief. Understanding this feature of Kant's thinking provides the necessary and
sufficient conditions for what Palmquist calls 'Critical Mysticism'. Palmquist's religious
interpretation has a direct impact in the way Kant's philosophy of religion is interpreted
'poetic hypothesis' for interpreting Kant's philosophy. The poet uses reflection and error to project images
of the Highest Good and in this way seeks contemplative harmony for reason. For Kant's definition of the
poet, see Critique ofJudgement, tr. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 176-77 (314).
46 See also Gregory R. Johnson, 'The Tree of Melancholy: Kant on Philosophy and Enthusiasm' in Kant
and the New Philosophy ofReligion.
47
Palmquist accepts this designation in his contribution to the book Kant and the New Philosophy of
Religion.
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48in that it relies upon the experience of God as a powerful personality and a loving lord.
Palmquist's interpretation is the focus ofSection Four.
As we will see, each of these interpretations finds room in Kant's philosophy for
theology in some form (albeit quite differently from interpreter to interpreter). But the
question to keep in mind throughout this survey (and the question that we will address in
this chapter and the next) is whether the room carved out for theology is truly on Kant's
terms or representative of creative attempts to philosophise where Kant does not. My
argument regarding each of these interpretations is that they do succeed in providing a
rational foundation for theology out of Kant's philosophical programme, but that this
success is not always achieved in ways consonant with Kant's philosophical programme
on the one hand, and philosophy of religion on the other. This chapter focuses primarily
on these interpretations as they relate to Kant's critical writings proper, while the next
chapter focuses on them relative to Kant's writings on religion.
II. Ronald M. Green's Moral Interpretation ofKant
In the most general sense, Ronald Green's interpretation of Kant's critical
writings amounts to a self-contained and systematic philosophy of reason.49 It is self-
contained in the sense that almost all human experience is said to derive from reason's
often intense need to be logically consistent, and systematic in the sense that every
significant human trait is held to be either directly or potentially treated within the
system's general framework. The interesting thing about Green's interpretation is that it
posits a two-realm view of Kant's philosophical programme that does not reduce
religion to morality in an eliminative way; instead it provides a coherent account of
Kant's philosophy as an integrated system based on two realms of philosophy in
48 As Palmquist somewhat contentiously puts it, '[Kant] not only believed in the reality of a transcendent
God represented by our theoretical idea, manifested in our practical reason (speaking to our conscience),
and communing with us in prayer, but also actively experienced this reality in his daily life'. Stephen R.
Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2000), 313.
49
Green, Religious Reason, 28.
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dynamic relationship and a philosophy of religion that is theologically affirmative. The
first realm of the philosophy he calls theoretical reason and designates as Kant's
'epistemology'; the second is practical reason or Kant's 'ethics'. Taken together, these
two realms constitute the overarching structure of Kant's entire philosophical
programme. The questions of hope and human identity, which are questions from the
first Critique that appear on first blush to transcend the questions of knowledge and
duty, can be explained by the 'deep structure' of reason in its theoretical and practical
employments. This deep structure not only provides a clear picture of the whole of
Kant's philosophical programme, but also a clear indication of what Kant was trying to
accomplish in his writings on religion.
Green focuses most of his attention on the inner workings of practical reason.
Although Kant's critical writings emphasize what Green calls practical reason's moral
viewpoint, practical reason is necessarily composed of three interrelated 'points of
view'—the moral, the prudential, and the religious. In describing Green's interpretation,
we will try to maintain his most recent usage. Thus, for the two overarching parts of
Kant's philosophy, we will use the terms 'theoretical reason' and 'practical reason', and
designate his three subdivisions of practical reason as either 'points of view' or
'viewpoints'. Green believes that each point of view is important for, though the latter
two are only implicit in, Kant's system. The implicit nature of these two viewpoints
should not, however, lead the interpreter to think that they are somehow less important.
According to Green, the internal logic of Kant's thinking depends on rightly
understanding these points of view. By understanding the implications of these
viewpoints on Kant's critical philosophy, we can understand its internal consistency as
well as the consistency and profundity of Kant's philosophy of religion. Green contends
that the logic of transcendental philosophy suggests three practical points of view taken
together are all that is necessary to complete reason, that is, to bridge the gap between
freedom and nature. This bridge of the fact/value divide establishes the location of the
philosophical basis for religion and theology. Reason, thus, comes to consummation
with the three viewpoints of practical reason.
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The first point of view, or the surface structure of practical reason, is moral
reasoning. In answering the question 'What ought I to do?' in any given situation, reason
is naturally led to seek the ideal answer from a point of view which suppresses or even
ignores our own 'special needs and desires'. This viewpoint of practical reason is what
Green calls 'a direct expression of reason'.50 Moral reasoning orients us to knowledge of
the ideal action in any situation (subject of course to the limits of one's knowledge of the
facts). An ideal action is a selfless act of doing on behalf of others, not in the sense of
completely ignoring the self, but in viewing oneself as just one amongst others affected
by the decision. '[Moral reason] involves a perspective of radical impartiality or
"omnipartiality" before the choices facing us as moral agents. It asks us to choose as
though we might be any of the people affected by our conduct'.51 Practical reason acting
morally is by definition so completely impartial that the term 'impartial reason' may be
used as its synonym. By standing outside of ourselves so to speak, as though we were
our own moral legislators, reason is able to establish the standard of perfect partiality
necessary for moral effectiveness. Green believes that the impartial/moral point of view
is the only viewpoint of practical reason that legitimates the categorical imperative as a
• • • • S9
constitutive principle ofpractical reason.
Despite the crucial role that the categorical imperative has for Kant's moral
philosophy, it was not the only principle that Kant thought necessary in order for
practical reason to know what to do in a given situation. Green believes that the second
half of the second Critique shows that happiness is related to practical reason in a way
that transforms its inner workings into a new point of view.
Now we leam that happiness plays an important, indeed indispensable, role, in
moral reasoning. In addition to the categorical imperative, Kant tells us,
practical reason has as its presupposition and requires belief in the attainability
of the "highest good," understood as the proportionate and exceptionless union
50
Green, Religious Reason, 34.
51
Green, Religion andMoral Reason, 6.
52
Green, Kierkegaard and Kant, 45.
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of virtue and happiness. Without a constitutive role for the highest good, he
says, morality would lack a complete object and moral striving itself would
become empty and vain.53
Green contends that Kant's discussion of happiness and the Highest Good at this crucial
juncture implies practical reason has or at least should have deeper structural levels than
the moral point of view alone (which he believes is constituted without reference to
happiness and the Highest Good). In the second stage of practical reason, just as
impartial reasoning compels us to do what we ought to do in an ideal world of thought or
from a perspective of 'omnipartiality', prudential reasoning, given the reality of our
individual situations in the actual world, urges us to choose according to our 'personal
concerns'. It is that self-centred employment of reason that Kant would later develop
into his theory of radical evil.
Below the surface of moral deliberation, personal happiness ineluctably
transforms the inner workings of practical reason and constitutes a completely different
and competing point of v iew. Moral reasoning, when personal happiness is seriously
considered below the surface of moral deliberation, becomes prudential reasoning. One
might say that if moral reasoning answers the question of duty by emphasizing duty to
others, prudential reasoning answers the question by emphasizing the duty that we have
to ourselves. Green does not use the term, but his view of prudential reasoning could be
called partial reasoning, where partial is taken to mean 'favouring oneself as opposed
to the less desirable 'reasoning in part'. Prudential reasoning provides a viewpoint for
making decisions that are partial to one's self. When reasoning prudentially, we are
compelled to act according to our own special needs and desires because 'impartiality
before t he s ocial array o f d esires can cause all or m ost o fmy d esires—and t he m ost
important among them—to be suppressed'.54 Prudential or partial reasoning puts the
urgency of our own concerns to the forefront of our minds; it condones selfishness when
selfishness is necessary to maintain our essential interests in the real world.
53
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Like Green, Allen Wood calls feeling (or the pursuit of happiness), when it
constitutes a form of practical decision-making, 'reason as prudence'; however, unlike
Green, instead of ascribing to it a status equal (and subsequent) to moral reason, he treats
it as a preliminary form of practical reason which must give way to pure practical
reason. 'Reason as prudence, therefore, defines a natural good for man prior to any
moral considerations. ... Human happiness, well-being, or the natural good in given
instances, however, may be either included in the object of pure practical reason, or
excluded from it'.55 If feelings of happiness can be included in the object of pure
practical reason then it is 'a good for morality'; if feelings of happiness constitute one's
actions and remove the moral law as the necessary condition of practical deliberation,
then it 'is in fact a moral evil in Kant's view'.56 For the purpose of attaining the purest
practical reason, Kant argues that we must decide to give the formal principle
precedence over the material principle in practical reason, 'for, as a principle of right, it
has unconditional necessity, whereas the [material principle] necessitates only if the
empirical conditions of the proposed end, namely of its being realized, are presupposed'
(8:377). Practical reason has no necessary conflict with itself in its pure form; only
pmdential reasoning introduces conflict.57 In contrast to Wood, Green's clever insight is
that p rudential r easoning i s 1 ogically i nevitable and a n ecessary c omponent o f h onest
human reasoning. This honesty creates the opportunity for reason to both embrace
religion and bridge the gap between nature and freedom.
If one's initial reaction is to doubt the centrality of this notion of prudential
reason in Kant's philosophical programme or to think that it cannot be made to cohere
with Kant's strict emphasis on the moral law, Green asks us to wait for his complete
55
Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 82.
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Wood, Kant's Moral Religion, 82-3.
57 The conflict with which Kant appears explicitly concerned is not between impartial and partial
reasoning, but between the fluctuating (conditional) judgements opposing one another within prudential
reasoning itself. 'The world will by no means perish by there coming to be fewer evil people. What is
morally evil has the property, inseparable from its nature, of being at odds with itself in its aims and
destructive of them (especially in relation to others similarly disposed), so that it clears the way for the
moral principle of the good, even if progress is slow' (8:379).
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explication of Kant's system of practical reason. Admitting happiness into moral
deliberation does not degrade virtue; it, as already suggested, makes practical reason
honest. When theoretical reason encounters the world, we learn that we not only have
knowledge of things as they appear, but we also have knowledge of our own desires in
relation to those things. Theoretical reason in a sense transforms moral reasoning, which
before might have been called the 'pure' practical reason of virtue, into prudential
reasoning, or a more genuine form of practical reason based on personal happiness. This
complete transformation sets up a conflict in practical reason. In difficult situations,
impartial and partial reasoning compel us to choose diametrically opposed courses of
action. If these two employments of practical reason were our only recourse, we would
find ourselves in constant turmoil and would be forced in the most difficult
circumstances to self-destruct. Difficult moral decisions provide so much internal
tension that reason's only 'reasonable' way forward is to seek an even deeper level of
practical deliberation. Here, the concept of the Highest Good becomes vitally important.
Employing what Kant designated in the second Critique as an 'object' of
practical reason (5:4 and 5:115), Green suggests that the idea of the Highest Good can
have a constitutive role in practical reason. All that is necessary in Green's opinion to
secure such a role for the Highest Good are the postulates God and immortality fully
clothed in culturally contingent religious beliefs and practices. They allow us to act on
behalf of the Highest Good knowing perfectly well that it may not be achievable in this
life. 'There is, in fact, no third use of reason that can adjudicate the conflict between
morality and prudence. But it may be that there is another way of handling the dispute
between reason's two employments, o ne that i nvolves s howing that nod ispute really
exists',58 Religious reason, constituted by the Highest Good and supported by religious
adherence, does not adjudicate the conflict; it simply views the situation in a whole new
way. This new way is rooted in the religious beliefs and practices emerging out of the
cultural/linguistic context of history. We can believe in the reality of our central
58
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religious doctrines because reason demands these beliefs as a stabilizing bridge between
theory and practice (prudence and impartiality).
Reason employed religiously insists that the discrepancy between morality and
prudence is 'only apparent, not ultimate'. Religious reason teaches us that the only
rational way forward in decisions that affect our special needs and desires is to believe
that moral retribution and rewards are certain. 'Just as a belief in retribution eases the
apparently insuperable opposition between prudence and morality, so religious beliefs
can make it rational to renew our dedication to moral effort even as we realize the
difficulty of this task and the failures that loom before us'.59 Because reason necessarily
finds itself in conflict between the action of virtue and the action of happiness, only the
postulation of a moral will greater than our own and faith in this postulate can guarantee
that virtue and happiness will ultimately be brought together in their proper proportion.
It is an improbable choice, but when all else is eliminated it is our only hope. 'Kant's
total argument', Green contends, 'drive[s] us to the realization that his own transcendent
resolution, as offensive as it may be, is the one to which reason is ineluctably driven'.60
Although it is not entirely clear how this reconciliation is effected and sustained, it may
not be wide of the mark to summarize it in the following way. Religious reason allows
us to embrace the internal strife caused by practical reason's other two employments: it
urges us to act morally, and, in the event that special needs and desires require strictly
prudential decision making, it justifies our actions through faith in postulated religious
beliefs. For Green then, transcendental belief is grounded in the relationship between the
practical conflicts of reason and the theological beliefs of actual religious traditions.
Green's analysis of Kant's practical philosophy makes sense out of Kant's drive
toward the religious in his later writings by linking them decisively to the practical
philosophy. In so doing, he goes a long way toward establishing a reasoned foundation
for religion and theology i n Kant's p hilosophy. H e argues that the relentless logic o f
Kant's moral philosophy, divided into partial and impartial components, requires faith
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not just in a formal idea of God suitable for right action, but also faith in the reality of
God consonant with Kant's theoretical strictures on knowledge. According to Green,
the logical force of reason in conflict conjoins morality and metaphysics and leads to a
breakthrough of Kant's first Critique strictures on knowledge. By appealing to the logic
of a practical faith in God and immortality clothed in the phenomena of culture-specific
religious beliefs and practices, Green argues that Kant shows how theology is critically
rooted in reason. Green avers that practical faith in God and immortality 'opens a narrow
aperture in the restraining wall of human cognition [Kant] built in the first Critique'.61
Theory is breached by the needs of practical reason, which, by its inherent logic,
demands belief in those ideas which can guarantee the eventual fulfilment of the Highest
Good. Because theoretical reason has already linked itself to practical reason through
prudential reasoning, the way back to theory is open along the same path, which at a still
deeper level is transformed into religious reasoning.
At the core ofGreen's interpretation ofKant then is a two-way bridge connecting
nature and freedom. The empirical realm of reason, by forcing us to take our personal
interests and predicaments seriously, links itself to practical reason, transforming its
inner workings by changing moral reasoning into prudential reasoning; and practical
reason, by postulating God and immortality as moral beliefs according to strict logic
applied to our internal conflicts and external cultures, links itself to theoretical reason by
creating an aperture in its limits, transforming the conflict of impartial and partial
reasoning into religious reasoning.
In this simple and straightforward manner, Green's interpretation systematizes a
number of the important elements in Kant's practical philosophy. It accounts for both
Kant's primacy of practical reason doctrine and his later turn to religion with a powerful
hermeneutic hypothesis for understanding Kant's philosophical programme as a whole.
This whole provides the philosophical framework for theology rooted in the various
religious traditions and practices around the world. Belief in and discourse about God is
61
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possible because the internal logic of reason is driven out of necessity to fuse morality
and metaphysics. Historical religious beliefs and practices are the means by which this
synthesis takes place. In the second half of Religion and Moral Reason, and then again
in his work on Kant and Kierkegaard, Green begins the task of showing how Kant
understood in this way provides a fruitful account of religion in its various forms, and a
foundation for discourse about God that makes sense of human experience.
There are a variety of points at which Green's interpretation is open to criticism,
however. For example, it could be contended that freedom in Green's interpretation is
very different than freedom in Kant's moral philosophy proper. According to Henry
Allison, for example, freedom and the moral law imply each other. Outside of its
relationship to the moral law, freedom is likely to be hindered rather than helped.62
Green's interpretation could also be criticized insofar as it answers the questions of duty
and hope at the expense of the questions of knowledge and human identity. Are our own
prudential concerns the most appropriate theoretical aperture for the establishment of a
moral theology? Most significantly, however, and this will be our primary focus for the
rest of this section, the viability of Green's interpretation as an interpretation of Kant
seems to hinge on the concept of transformation.
Green's interpretation of Kant's philosophy of religion centres around an
unresolved problem in Kant's practical philosophy. When practical reason encounters
the world and incorporates our desire for personal happiness into our moral
deliberations, it leads to the reconstitution ofmorality into a new prudential form. This
new viewpoint, Green contends, constitutes a new kind of freedom; we are 'free to be
immoral' as well as free to do our duty. The freedom to be moral and the freedom to be
immoral constitute opposing practical viewpoints, which lead reason into what appears
to be an irresolvable conflict, one which is only exacerbated when we are confronted
with the most difficult of life's decisions.63 According to Green, the problem is resolved
62 See Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 114-18.
63
Kant, in The Metaphysics ofMorals, highlights two concepts of freedom, negative freedom and positive
freedom. This division does not su ggest c ompeting n otions of freedom, but complementary notions of
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for Kant in the transformation of practical reason into a third viewpoint. The purpose of
this second and final transformation of practical reason is to replace the uncertainty and
inequity inherent in the dual employments of practical reason with the certainty and
equity of one dominant religious employment. In this light, the transformation of
freedom moves one step beyond even prudence. Instead of having two disputing notions
of freedom, one emphasising the freedom to be moral and the other the freedom to be
immoral, practical reason in Green's account is logically driven to transform freedom
once again according to the concept of the Highest Good. We, as individuals, are no
longer compelled to act according to ends designed to enhance our innate capacity to be
free, but ends based on our capacity to be just. Green's interpretation thus comes to
culmination in the concept ofjustice as the supreme moral principle.64
Although Green is right to link the moral law and the Highest Good to Kant's
philosophy of religion, his interpretation is vulnerable on the issues of human justice and
moral transformation. We will focus on the latter of these two issues here and address
the former in more detail in the next section.65 Contrary to Green's interpretation, it
seems to me that Kant wants transition, and not transformation, to be the modus
operandi of his philosophical system. I will argue for the remainder of this section that,
to the extent that Green's interpretation diverges from Kant's concept of transition, it
becomes less viable as an interpretation of the whole of Kant's philosophy in general
and the details of his philosophy of religion in particular. We begin with the first
Critique. There, Kant made two points of note concerning transformation and transition:
freedom that lead to practical reason's fulfilment. 'Freedom of choice is this independence from being
determined by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom
is that of the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical. But this is not possible except by the subjection
of the maxim of every action to the condition of its qualifying as a universal law' (6:213-214).
64 In the last section of The Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant's discussion of ethics and morals, like that of
Green, concludes with the concept of justice. Instead of focusing on human justice as the supreme end of
all our actions, Kant appeals to 'divine justice' (6:489). Divine justice has to do with the ultimate ends of
our actions. Divine justice incorporates the concepts of eternity (immortality), God, and the Highest Good
by appealing to reflective teleology and the end of the human race in love (6:488).
65 Where Green locates the concept of human j ustice in the realm of individual decision-making, Kant
locates it in the realm of political decision-making. See 'Doctrine of Right' in the first half of the
Metaphysics ofMorals, and Kant's essay 'Toward Perpetual Peace'.
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firstly, the concept of transition is to be favoured over certain kinds of transformation,
and secondly, the concept of transition will be useful for the ultimate completion of the
transcendental philosophy. In discussing some of the positive aspects of Plato's
philosophy in the Transcendental Dialectic, a practical application of transformation,
similar to one which Green's interpretation espouses, is the target ofKant's indignation:
Whoever would derive the concepts of virtue from experience and make (as
many have actually done) what at best can only serve as an example of an
imperfect kind of exposition, into a pattern from which to derive knowledge,
would make of virtue something which changes according to time and
circumstance, an ambiguous monstrosity not admitting of the formation of any
rule (A315, B371).66
Notice how Kant's tone is stern and personal. His main point is that giving a
determinative role to experience (or the personal concerns which arise because of
experience) in practical deliberation turns virtue into something it cannot be. This
transformative procedure is the very opposite of what Kant took to be correct about
Plato's theory, that is, his method of moving from the original idea of virtue to
judgements about moral worth and not the other way round. Mierklejohn's 1887
translation is less emotive on this point than Smith's and perhaps even more revealing.
Instead of using a term like 'monstrosity' to translate lUnding\ Mierklejohn chose the
ft7
word 'nonentity'. For Kant, a conception of virtue transformed under the conditions of
experience becomes literally a nonentity. Transforming moral reasoning into prudential
reasoning is not a matter of simply transforming virtue into something like qualified
self-interest (which would seem to exemplify the essence of Smith's translation
66 Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (London: The
Macmillan Press Ltd., 1929). In order to maintain continuity with the published form of this section, all
subsequent quotations of the Critique ofPure Reason in this section are from this text. However, I have
expanded the section beyond its published form and added references to the new Cambridge University
Press translation in the text and footnotes to maintain an overall continuity.
67 Immanuel K ant, Critique ofPure Reason, tr. J. M. D. Mierklejohn (London: George Bell and Sons,
1887), 222. In the Cambridge University Press translation of the first Critique, Guyer and Wood side with
Mierklejohn's translation. Mierklejohn also used the word 'transform' instead of 'make' to translate
'machen'. Here, Smith's translation, as well as Guyer's and Wood's translation, which also uses 'make', is
the better translation.
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anyway). On the contrary, the above passage suggests that our understanding of self-
interest, g iven t he v arying c onditions a nd c omplexities o f 1 ife t hat c ontribute t o i t, i s
critically unstable and incapable of attaining any usable form.
Within the context of the first Critique, however, we are getting somewhat ahead
of ourselves. Kant at that time had not fully articulated the concept of transition, and we
have to follow the development of his thought carefully to avoid reducing it simply to
the sum of its parts. Kant's negative view of moral transformation is offset in his system
by the positive affirmation of the concept of transition. Although the details are not
specifically worked out in this text, Kant did go as far as suggesting that the concept of
transition would allow the critical philosopher to navigate beyond the realm of scientific
reason into the 'wide and stormy ocean' of metaphysics itself (A235, B294-295). The
possibility of this role for transition is first brought to light in the chapter entitled
Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement. In writing of perception, Kant notes, 'Now, from
empirical consciousness to pure consciousness a gradual transition [Verdnderung] is
possible, the real in the former completely vanishing and a merely formal a priori
consciousness of the manifold in time and space remaining' ( A166, B 208). Although
this suggestive remark was meant to provide only one part of numerous smaller
arguments for categorical thinking, it anticipates further developments in Kant's
thinking and his later more extensive use of transition (Ubergang) in explicating his
critical philosophy.
Kant is sure enough of the merits of transition to bring up the idea later and in
increasingly important contexts. One of these contexts is a section immediately
following the one in which Kant discusses transformation (quoted above). While noting
the limitations that theoretical reason imposes upon the critical philosopher, Kant asserts
that the concept of transition could play an important role in seeing the ideas of freedom,
immortality, and God as potential avenues for reason's self-consistent extension. '[The]
concepts of reason', he writes, 'may perhaps make possible a transition [Ubergang] from
the concepts of nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give support to the
36
moral ideas themselves, bringing them into connection with the speculative knowledge
68of reason. As to all this, we must await explanation in the sequel' (A329, B385-386).
The importance of transition for moving from the theoretical employment of reason to
the practical employment is later confirmed in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals. Written between the first and second Critiques, Kant describes the purpose of
this short work as 'nothing more than the search for and establishment of the supreme
principle ofmorality' (4:392). Kant divides Groundwork into three sections which all
bear the word 'transition' in their titles. In fact, Kant makes it clear that the book as a
whole was to serve as a transitional phase for a 'Critique ofPure Practical Reason' and
a prolegomena to his proper Metaphysics ofMorals. According to Kant, all this would
be done without severing 'the unity of practical [reason] with speculative reason ...
which must be distinguished merely in its application' (4:391).
Groundwork, understood as a preparatory and transitional phase in Kant's
writings, leads directly to the second Critique. This movement is not, as we have already
noted, performed in any way by transforming reason, only by the promise ofmoving to a
new vantage point, one appropriate for a critical answer to the question of duty (viz.,
What ought I to do?). This explanation of transition is most closely related to the
definition of the German word Ubergang, meaning literally 'to walk over', as to gain
another perspective. Ubergang connotes movement 'over' or 'across', whereas a word
like Umformung, meaning 'transformation', connotes a turning 'over' or 'around'. Only
by moving to a different point of view—one with its own rule—can reason hope to
resolve the question of duty. As would be expected, the concept of transition surfaces at
key junctures in the second Critique. In that work, Kant makes it clear that it is not only
desirable to go beyond his first Critique (of theoretical reason) in order to make a
critique of practical reason, but also possible to do so 'because reason is considered in
transition to quite a different use of those concepts from what it made of them there.
Such a transition makes it necessary to compare the old use with the new, in order to
68 Kant refers to freedom, immortality, and God as 'unavoidable problems set by pure reason' in the
'Introduction' to the first Critique (A3, B7).
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distinguish well the new path from the previous one and at the same time draw attention
to their connection' (5:7). Kant later provides a synopsis of the details for this transition
after his table on freedom in the Analytic of Practical Reason. He highlights an
analogous connection between theory and practice: 'One quickly sees that in this table
freedom is regarded as a kind of causality—which, however, is not subject to empirical
grounds of determination—with respect to actions possible through it as appearances in
the sensible world' (5:67). The passage goes on to assert that freedom, considered under
the concept of transition, can be understood as a 'causality outside the sensible world'
because it is presented to practical reasoning in association with the moral law (5:67).69
Putting aside for a moment the conceptual debates surrounding this claim, it will
be useful for the exegetical aims of this section to juxtapose this positive portrayal of
transition with the resolutely negative portrayal of transformation that Kant reaffirms in
the second Critique. One such passage associates transformation with the Epicurean and
Stoic philosophers of the ancient Greek schools. Interestingly, we find it near the
beginning of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason, the part of the second Critique that
Green often refers to in support of his interpretation:
One must regret that the acuteness of these men (whom one must, nevertheless
admire for having in such early times already tried all conceivable paths of
philosophical conquest) was unfortunately applied in searching out identity
between extremely heterogeneous concepts, that of happiness and of virtue. But
it was in keeping with the dialectical spirit of their times, which sometimes
misleads subtle minds even now, to suppress essential and irreconcilable
differences in principle by trying to change them ... and this usually occurs in
cases where the unification of heterogeneous grounds lies so deep or so high, or
would require so complete a transformation of the doctrines assumed in the rest
69
Henry Allison has defended at length two theses that are important to mention with regards to freedom
and the moral law. They are the 'Incorporation Thesis' and the 'Reciprocity Thesis'. The Incorporation
Thesis is 'the view that inclinations or desires do not of themselves constitute an incentive or sufficient
reason to act but do so only insofar as they are "taken up" or "incorporated" into a maxim'. Allison,
Idealism and Freedom, 109. As noted earlier, the Reciprocity Thesis is that the moral law and
transcendental freedom imply each other.
38
of the philosophic system, that they are afraid to penetrate into the real
difference and prefer to treat it as a diversity merely in formulae (5:111-112).
The identity of 'the real difference' between the concepts of happiness and virtue to
which Kant alludes in this passage is open to some debate, but one thing seems clear:
whatever it is, it should not be discerned by transformation. Empirical considerations of
happiness are primarily a matter for theoretical reasoning and moral considerations of
virtue belong to practical reasoning. This is not to say that there is no relationship
between them, but only that a critical explanation of such a relationship should resist all
forms of transformative synthesis. As mentioned earlier, Kant calls the idea of the
Highest Good 'the object' of practical reason, but, in the context of second Critique, its
significance is not fully explored.
Despite the distrust of transformation that is found interspersed throughout the
second Critique, it is at the same time not hard to see how Green derives prudential and
religious reasoning from passages in the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason. At the
beginning of Book Two, for example, Kant writes that the Highest Good must be 'the
whole object' of pure practical reason (5:109). For Green, phrases like this provide
interpretive evidence that the Highest Good might become a constitutive principle in the
final employment of practical reason, even though Kant is quick to point out that the
Highest Good 'is not on that account to be taken as [the pure will's] determining ground'
(5:109). The point is further supported, it would seem, by the first paragraph in the
following section entitled 'On the Dialectic of Pure Reason in Determining the Concept
of the Highest Good' (5:110-113). There Kant writes:
That virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of whatever
can seem to us desirable and hence of all our pursuit of happiness and that it is
therefore the supreme good has been proven by the Analytic. But it is not yet, on
that account, the whole and complete good as the object of the faculty of desire
of rational finite beings; for this, happiness is also required, and that not in the
partial eyes of a person who makes himself an end but even in the judgment of
an impartial reason, which regards a person in the world generally as an end in
itself. For, to need happiness, to be also worthy of it, and yet not to participate in
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it cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being that would at
the same time have all power, even if we think of such a being only for the sake
of experiment. Now, inasmuch as virtue and happiness together constitute
possession of the highest good in a person, and happiness distributed in
proportion to morality (as the worth of a person and his worthiness to be happy)
constitutes the highest good of a possible world, the latter means the whole, the
complete good, in which, however, virtue as a condition is always the supreme
good, since it has no further condition above it, where as happiness is something
that, though always pleasant to the possessor of it, is not of itself absolutely and
in all respects good but always presupposes morally lawful conduct as its
condition. (5:110-111)
A passage like this supports the contention that both happiness and the Highest Good
have significant roles in the constitution of practical reason. Happiness, it seems, must
also be considered as part of the aim of practical reason. Only with an assumed role for
happiness in practical deliberation can we reasonably expect that the Highest Good
could conceivably be a part of a possible world under the governance of the supremely
wise Creator.
Now the question that remains to be decided is what the role for happiness and
the Highest Good might be for the critical philosopher. An answer to this perplexing
problem is pursued in greater detail in the third Critique and Religion. However, Kant
uses language similar to Green's in the concluding paragraph of the above section to
point to the resolution of this difficult question from the practical perspective:
Thus the question, how is the highest good practically possible? Still remains an
unsolved problem despite all the attempts at coalition that have hitherto been
made. The Analytic has, however, shown what it is that makes the problem
difficult to solve, namely that happiness and morality are two specifically quite
different elements of the highest good and that, accordingly, their combination
cannot bee ognized analytically (as i f s omeone w ho seeks h is o wn h appiness
should find, by mere resolution of his concepts, that in so acting he is virtuous,
or as if someone who follows virtue should in the consciousness of such conduct
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find that he is already happy ipso facto); it must instead be a synthesis of
concepts. (5:112-113)
Here Green's dialectical structure is in place and the elements virtue, happiness, and the
Highest Good find roles amenable to Green's interpretation. From these passages, one
could argue that Green has a strong case. Yet, his position is more enlightening in its
deviations from details ofKant's argument than it is in its similarities to it.
If there is one conclusion to the Analytic in the first half of the second Critique
that seems to demand complete adherence by any interpreter of Kant, it would have to
be the proposition that 'The moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will'
(5:109). The moral law is the very proof that freedom 'does in fact belong to the human
will', that 'pure reason can be practical ... [and that] it alone, and not reason empirically
limited, is unconditionally practical' (5:15). To say that a prudential decision is practical
is to make either a false statement or to make a conditional statement. The first
possibility we need not consider here, for some prudential decisions are selfish in a quite
negative sense or simply evil. The second possibility, however, Kant does seriously
consider. The condition which makes a prudential decision practical in the strictly
Kantian sense is the condition that all our prudential musings conform to the moral law.
Green is clearly correct to notice that Kant is aware of another principle (viz., our desire
to be happy) at work in moral deliberation, and that the moral law and the prudential law
are logically opposed to one another, and even that they call for a synthesis to complete
a full critique of practical reason. However, he appears outside the parameters of what
Kant's writings will allow when he argues that the moral law must give way to
happiness in the first instance and the Highest Good in the second, and that freedom
must be transformed from its pure moral state to a more honest moral/religious state.70
70 In Chapters Two and Four, I will argue along with Green that transformation does have a positive role
in Kant's philosophy of religion, but this role is not one that transcends the moral law but only fulfils it.
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III. Adina Davidovich's Poetic Interpretation of Kant
Adina Davidovich's Religion as a Province of Meaning: The Kantian
Foundations of Modern Theology capitalizes on the work of Watson, Korner, and
Cassirer, and advances the three-realm interpretation of Kant's philosophy in a new
form. Where Green finds the ground of religion and theology in reason's practical
employment, Davidovich finds this ground in reason's judicial employment.
Davidovich's interpretation draws attention to the fact that Kant's philosophy has at its
disposal the faculty of judgement, which, in the context of the first and second Critiques,
has no constitutive function. In Critique of Judgement, however, aesthetic and
reflective/teleological judgement, which are the themes of its first and second halves,
work together to form a kind of judicial reasoning. According to Davidovich, the faculty
of judgement is the supreme faculty of reason and judicial reasoning is the supreme
employment of reason. They generate the human capacity to contemplate by poetically
fusing feelings and concepts, and thereby harmonizing nature and freedom.
Contemplation, as such, is the constituent feature of religion as a realm ofmeaning and
the chief means by which the gap between theory and practice can be overcome.
Davidovich explains, 'Kant is led to a position that we can only characterize as the
supremacy of contemplation over both practical and scientific concerns'.71
Understanding the inner workings of contemplation and its relationship to the third
Critique is crucial to understanding the novelty and profundity of Davidovich's
interpretation ofKant.
The significance of Kant's third Critique for Davidovich comes to the fore early
in Province ofMeaning. In the chapter entitled 'The Conflict between the Interests of
Reason', she argues that, even though Kant at one point did hold to the primacy of
practical reason, the third Critique reveals that this was not his final position. As Kant's
philosophical programme developed, the transcendental method of reason in transition
(first modelled in Kant's move to the second Critique) demanded that a third Critique be
71
Davidovich, Province ofMeaning, 40. Italics mine.
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thought up and written. If Kant's philosophy is thought of in a bifurcated form, the
Copernican revolution as an answer to Hume's dilemma of causality is as much a
problem for philosophy as it is a solution. The nature-freedom divide is, philosophically
speaking, as potentially problematic as the causal gap between experience and
knowledge. Where for Hume we have only a feeling of a necessary connection between
repeatable observations and scientific knowledge, for Kant we have causality and
freedom as opposing a priori constituents of reason. Hume's philosophy admits to an
inductive separation, while Kant's philosophy appears to be on the verge of
transcendental contradiction. According to Davidovich's interpretation, this is a
sufficient reason to expect from the third Critique a resolution to the problem of
unifying the whole transcendental system ofphilosophy.
As with Hume, Kant in the third Critique turns to feeling in order to resolve the
problem of a gap. Feeling, for Kant, is not limited to the empirical context, but refers
more fully to an experience of beauty and the sublime in the context of hope and Highest
Good. His expressed intention is to undertake a transcendental quest to find the a priori
constituents for the faculty of judgement.72 The degree of success of Kant's quest in the
third Critique is a long-standing debate in the field of Kant studies. Realizing this,
Davidovich thus begins her interpretation with a frontal assault on the common
assumption that the primacy of practical reason is a cornerstone of Kant's philosophy.
According to her defence, Kant asserts the primacy of practical reasoning only over
theoretical reasoning, and only because of the stifling effects caused by the conflict
between our inclinations (theory) and the moral law (practice). Davidovich does not
find in Kant, however, the kind of prudence and religious belief (understood as purely
practical resources) for bridging this gap that we find in Green's interpretation. The
insoluble conflict between theoretical and practical reason is exacerbated by the infinite
72 'But now comes judgement, which in the order of cognitive faculties forms a middle term between
understanding and reason. Has it got independent a priori principles? If so, are they constitutive or merely
regulative, thus indicating no special realm? And do they give a rule a priori to the feeling of pleasure or
displeasure, as the middle term between the faculties of cognition and desire, just as understanding
prescribes laws a priori for the former and reason for the latter?' (168)
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gap between them and no bridge can be constructed with the resources of either side.
Kant explicitly addresses the gap between nature and freedom only in the third Critique,
and, for this reason, it is there, and not in the second, that we should expect Kant's
unification of nature and freedom.74
As a hypothesis for understanding the trajectory of Kant's philosophical
programme, Davidovich's interpretive strategy has considerable appeal; it gathers in
Kant's third instalment to his critical philosophy while maintaining the purity and
integrity of the previous two, and it provides an important role to Kant's highly
influential but often maligned theory of aesthetics and contemplation. However, as an
interpretation of Kant's philosophy in the context of a lengthy tradition, it must
overcome a couple of obvious objections. If judicial reasoning or contemplation did
actually b ecome p rimary for Kant i n t he y ears after w riting t he C ritique ofP ractical
Reason, why did he neither reconfigure the original doctrine nor defend the supposedly
new doctrine? And why are his later writings on religion at least as prone to a moral
interpretation as they are to a poetic interpretation? Davidovich's arguments are most
convincing in e stablishing t he necessity in Kant's mind for the unification of reason.
There are textual obstacles, however, to establishing contemplation as the supreme
concern of Kant's critical philosophy that she has to overcome and it will be worth
taking a closer at these obstacles as they present themselves in the third Critique.
The chief concern of the third Critique is to understand how it is that reason can
hold the theoretical and practical perspectives simultaneously and in unity. From the
perspective of theoretical reason, actions have consequences that can only be understood
meaningfully according to the category of causality. From the perspective of practical
reason, all deliberate human action must finally be free action, even if this means, in
situations of physical coercion that freedom manifests itself only as the free
objectification of oneself. These two interpretations of 'freedom'—one pragmatic and
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'Albeit, then, between the realm of a natural concept, as the sensible, and the realm of the concept of
freedom, as the supersensible, there if a great gulf fixed' (175-176). 'There must, therefore, be a ground of
the unity of the supersensible ... [which] renders possible the transition from the mode of thought
according to the principles of the one to that according to the principles of the other' (176).
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the other transcendental—appear at odds with one another. Davidovich places this
problem under the rubric of epistemology. In trying to live a moral life, reason confronts
the following problem: How do we know 'that moral acts, worthy and vicious, do take
place'?75 We need to know that good and evil actions 'are realized' in order to have a
reasonable hope of overcoming the state of nature that threatens to undo us. In other
words, the problem of the gap between nature and freedom boils down to a problem of
history. Davidovich sums it up this way: 'Kant sees this as a problem that can only be
answered through a teleological principle, from the point of view of a conception of the
end of history in light of the rational Ideal of the Highest Good'.76 We need to know that
there is history, because only in knowing that we are actually capable of acting freely (in
spite of the causal nexus of the world) can we hope to become truly moral.
For Davidovich, the problem of unity creates the critical space necessary for a
third employment of reason based on human 'contemplation' or 'contemplative reason'.
This space is dependent on the idea of the Highest Good and the existence of an all-
powerful moral judge who insures its viability. 'Armed with this contemplative
principle, humans can interpret the world itself as the stage for moral evolution and not
just some blind mechanical causality'.77 She unpacks the method of contemplation in
reference to the third Critique. '[W]e learn from the Third Critique', she writes, 'by
• 78
reflecting on the various reflective judgments, we reach contemplative conclusions'.
The key words in her definition are 'reflecting' and 'reflective judgments'. The former,
she contends, refers to 'thinking' (or discursive reasoning), while the latter involves the
conjoining of 'feeling' and 'purposiveness'. Reflective judgements provide the grounds
for theological faith and religion as a realm of meaning. The fusion of our theological
75
Davidovich, Province ofMeaning, 54.
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Davidovich, Province ofMeaning, 57. For Davidovich, however, 'Religion cannot be interpreted as
providing an account of the historical evolution of Practical Reason ... [or] an "evolutionist" theory of
Practical Reason because for him the moral law is a fact of Reason'. Davidovich, Province ofMeaning,
142.
78
Davidovich, Province ofMeaning, 154.
45
reflections and the purposiveness that we feel in nature provide Kant's first secure
philosophical foundation for religious belief and practice.
Feeling is the main focus of Kant's account of aesthetic judgement in the third
Critique. The faculty ofjudgement, in this sense, 'finds a reference in itself to something
in the Subject itself and outside it, and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but is still
connected with the ground of the latter, i.e., the supersensible—a something in which the
theoretical gets bound up into unity with the practical in an intimate and obscure
manner' (353). Davidovich identifies this 'something' as the notion of a 'supersensible
79
substrate' by which 'Kant accounts for the universal validity of the judgments of taste'.
She likewise writes that 'The analysis of taste thus becomes a decisive stage in the
restoration of unity to our cognitive powers'.80 This designation, if taken literally and in
the context of Davidovich's overall interpretation, can be misleading, however. In
Davidovich's way of interpreting Kant, aesthetic judgement is only 'decisive' in the
sense that it paves the way for an even more decisive role for teleological reflection. She
supports this interpretive strategy by comparing the form of the third Critique to that of
the first Critique. 'According to my interpretation of the first part of the Third Critique,
the task of the analysis of judgments of taste is analogous to the aesthetic of the First
Critique. Like the discussion of space and time, the analysis of the judgments of taste is
O 1
a propaedeutic. It paves the way for the study of teleological judgments'. The purpose
of her comparison is to argue that the role of aesthetics in Kant's philosophical economy
is subordinate to that of teleology. This downplaying of the critique of taste is the most
distinctive aspect of her interpretation of Kant's judicial philosophy and the key to
understanding it. This downplaying of aesthetics is also, I believe, the point at which her
interpretation ofKant is its most vulnerable.
The third Critique appears to be more of an exploration than a discovery. Kant
turns i n t he t hird Critique t o judgement too rder t o a ssess w hether o r n ot o r t o w hat
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extent judgement might be constituted by a priori principles. It is true that the second
half of the third Critique, like the first half, has both analytic and dialectic chapters, thus
signalling a significant critical function, but it is not evident, however, that the 'Critique
of Aesthetic Judgement' is propaedeutic to the 'Critique of Teleological Judgement'. If
anything, the details of their functions in the third Critique suggest quite the reverse is
the case. Aesthetic judgements serve to unite freedom and nature through feeling (178).
The role of teleological judgements is to lead us to understand such feelings as being full
of purpose; they 'affect' our understanding ofmetaphysics from a philosophical point of
view by treating science and morality as a 'propaedeutic' to theology (417). This subtle
distinction in the relationship of aesthetic and reflective judgement in Kant's third
Critique is perhaps the most important feature to keep in mind in trying to develop an
adequate account of the third Critique.
Paul Guyer, in his book Kant and the Claims of Taste, addresses the relationship
between aesthetic and reflective judgements in Kant's j udicial philosophy. He writes,
'We may use the theory of reflective judgment to interpret Kant's model of aesthetic
response, but not to identify the a priori principle of aesthetic judgment'.82 To identify
the a priori principle of aesthetic judgement using a deduction of reflective judgement is
to unravel (to make objective) that which by its very nature is enigmatic (subjective, or,
more exactly, intersubjective).83 Guyer expresses this point succinctly as follows:
[W]hat Kant's theory of aesthetic judgement can adopt from his general theory
of reflective judgment is the idea of a cognitive goal, analogous to that of
systematicity, the satisfaction of which is a constant objective on our part, but
not an idea that the fulfillment of such a goal must or even can be postulated in
advance of the experience of particular objects. ... Kant's ultimate connection
between the faculty of reflective judgment and our pleasure in objects of taste
depends on the fact that the fulfillment of the aesthetic analogue of systematicity
cannot, if it is to be pleasurable, be anticipated on the basis of any
82 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 65.
Henceforth cited as Claims of Taste. See also Kant, Critique ofJudgement, 33 (191-92).
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conceptualization of the object of taste. Thus a principle which allows us to
postulate a priori that nature possesses a property in virtue of which it conforms
to our own faculty of reflective judgment is not merely irrelevant to Kant's
theory of taste; it is actually precluded by the explanation of aesthetic response
which lies at the basis of that theory.84
IfDavidovich appeals to aesthetic judgement as that instance in which reflective unity is
experienced, then taste, and not contemplation, must be the essence of Kant's judicial
solution to the problem of unity. Guyer argues convincingly for the hermeneutic priority
of 'aesthetic judgement' for reason in its third employment over 'reflective
judgement'.85 B asically i t i s t he a esthetic e xperience o f t he s ubject t hat, according t o
Kant, occasions a smooth transition from theory to practice and not the meaningfulness
attributed to that response by reflective judgement. Reflective judgement, instead, helps
us to understand how it is humanly possible to conceive of a unity between the
theoretical and practical perspectives of reason. Aesthetic judgement provides the unity
that we actually experience. Through the feeling of harmony (purposiveness) which is
totally mysterious (without a purpose), we experience things as 'beautiful'.
All this is not to say that reflective judgement is superfluous or nugatory.
Davidovich understands that 'To be able to recognize spatio-temporal events as moral
oz
acts, we need to be able to contemplate nature in terms of final causes'. The main
feature of reflective judgement is not to constitute an instance of aesthetic judgement,
but to demonstrate that it is possible to ascribe meaning to those ineffable (but genuine)
feelings o f purposiveness that are p art of a purely aesthetic experience. It fills in the
teleological blind spot ofjudicial reason with a creatively constructed, humanly oriented
possibility. T his p oetic designation p ushes t o t he v ery b orderline o f t he p hilosophical
quest and is consonant with Kant's first Critique strictures on knowledge. In this way,
Davidovich's doctrine of contemplation can provide an important philosophical resource
84
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for doing theology, because it makes sense of the purposiveness that we feel without
being able to identify definitively its source or to adjudicate decisively its truth.
Provided we reflect passionately and soundly on life's deepest questions in full
recognition of the empirical facts and in obedience to the moral law, the religious life
can flourish. Theological truth claims must remain, however, more like reasonable
approximations of truth rather than manifestations of truth.
Contemplative judgements make their first appearance in the third Critique in the
'First moment' of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful'. There, Kant forwards a definition that
puts aesthetic judgements under the rubric of contemplative judgements. '[T]he
judgement of taste is simply contemplative, i.e., it is a judgement which is indifferent as
to the existence of an object, and only decides how its character stands with the feeling
of pleasure and displeasure' (209). Now, a question immediately arises. Does this mean
that aesthetic judgements are determined in any sense by reflective concepts or simply
that they fall into a new non-empirical category of judgement? Kant's answer is clear:
'But not even is this contemplation itself directed to concepts; for the judgement of taste
is not a cognitive judgement (neither a theoretical one nor a practical) and hence also is
not grounded on concepts, nor intentionally directed to them' (209). What distinguishes
judicial reasoning from the theoretical and practical employments of reason is not that it
ascribes a purpose to feelings of pleasure, though it certainly does, but that it enables us
to experience purposefully, freely, and without interest, and in so doing allows reason to
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make a transition smoothly and peaceably between nature and freedom.
For Kant, pure judgements of taste are not derivable from concepts chosen from
the free play of contemplation, since such j udgements would inevitably have interest
attached to them. They are instead 'aroused' when 'the imagination (as the faculty of
intuitions a p riori) i s u ndesignedly b rought i nto accord w ith t he u nderstanding, (as a
87 In the second moment of aesthetic judgement, Kant argues that taste has a universal quality. It is this
universal quality that moves us to imagine taste as a possible manifestation of purpose (purposiveness),
even as part of a grand purpose (a finality), and to share in this with others. 'The judgement of taste does
not postulate the agreement of everyone ... it only imputes this agreement to every one ... it looks for
confirmation, not from concepts, but from the concurrence of others'. Kant, Critique of Judgement, 56
(216).
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faculty of concepts,) by means of a given representation' (190). This free sense of
purpose, without a definitive purpose of its own, unites freedom and nature using only
its a priori resources, that is, without an imaginative notion of purpose. What then is the
function of contemplative/teleological judgements in relation to the broader economy of
Kant's judicial philosophy?
A hint of this function can be found in Kant's third moment of judgements of
taste. In summing up why feelings of pleasure in aesthetic judgements are 'merely
contemplative', Kant explains that 'We dwell on the contemplation of the beautiful
because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself (222). Kant implies here
that even though there is an immediacy and universality to feelings that we call
beautiful, they are not necessarily lasting impressions. Only through the contemplation
oo
of teleological reflection are aesthetic judgements able to persist. Contemplative reason
stores the experience of purpose afforded by taste in the free play of the imagination and
in human memory.
It should not be assumed, however, that teleological judgements capture any
actual purpose inherent in an experience of beauty. For Kant, our contemplated purposes
are more like symbols for a hidden divine purpose. Such a divine purpose may or may
not be the constitutive a priori principle of aesthetic judgements of beauty, but the
content of the divine purpose is certainly beyond the grasp of any conceivable human
perspective alone. This should not deter us from constructing such a purpose in its
absence, however. As Kant in his 'Dialectic of Teleological Judgement' put it, 'For the
reflective judgement ... we must think a causality distinct from mechanism, namely a
world cause acting according to ends, that is, an intelligent cause—however, rash and
undemonstrable a principle that might be for the determinative judgement'1 (389).
88 'It is of note that the imagination, in a manner quite incomprehensible to us, is able on occasion, even
after a long lapse of time, not alone to recall the signs for concepts, but also to reproduce the image and
shape of an object out of a countless number of others of a different, or even of the very same, kind'. Kant,
Critique ofJudgement, 77 (234).
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In the extended section that follows this statement, Kant goes on to outline
important considerations for the determination of any ultimate causality. In the
teleological employment of judgement, Kant contends we 'cannot avoid the necessity of
drawing a distinction between the possibility and actuality of things' (401). Unlike the
theoretical philosophy, which demands that we think of the immediate experience as
things-in-themselves, judicial reason demands that we recognise the provisional nature
of imaginative thought. 'For if the understanding thinks it—let it think it how it will—
then the thing is represented as merely possible. If it is conscious of it as given in
intuition, then it is actual, and no thought of any possibility enters into the case' (402).
Kant thinks that, in trying to move smoothly from the second Critique to the
third, and from aesthetics to teleology, reason needs a contemplative purpose to
accomplish cognitively what aesthetic judgement only accomplishes experientially
through taste. It achieves its demands, but, in view of the third Critique alone, only in
the realm of possibility. The realm of possibility, however, is not stagnant; it moves
toward the realm of actuality. On Davidovich's interpretation, teleological reflection is
spurred forward by the idea of the whole in the context of our incomplete and inadequate
conceptions of the Highest Good. The idea of the whole chastens and guides the human
understanding, and, for this reason, is crucial to substantiating Kant's philosophical
writings after the first Critique.
Davidovich's interpretation of Kant understands the whole as a 'regulative'
concept of contemplation. In reference to its importance to science, she writes, 'Kant
introduces the concept of an organized whole as a regulative concept of reflective
judgment that guides Reason, in its manifestation as Judgment, in its search for
sufficient causes of organisms'.89 Clearly, however, the idea of the whole has an even
more important role in Davidovich's interpretation than merely the advancement of
science. The whole guides reason towards a unified conception of experience by
89
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regulating the expansion of reflective reason towards the contemplation of nature and
freedom under one purpose.
There exists an important difference between Davidovich's and Kant's
understanding of the whole. There are at least two senses of holism present in Kant's
writings. Elsewhere, I have designated them under the terms hermeneutic and hermetic
conceptions of the whole.90 The hermeneutic conception of the whole follows from
Kant's constant reminders to his readers of the importance of keeping in mind his whole
system when reading its parts. This sense of the whole is not what I am referring to as
the point of disagreement between Davidovich and Kant. The hermetic conception of the
whole is different, however. The whole in this sense refers to the surplus ofmeaning in
human cognition that yields the possibility of faith from a philosophical perspective. In
Chapter Three, we will focus on cognition as a crucial aspect of Kant's theoretical
philosophy for establishing a rational foundation for faith. For now, it is enough to
notice that Davidovich, because of the way she prioritizes teleological reflection over
aesthetic judgement, uses the concept of the whole as the constitutive feature of human
reflection on God, world, and humankind, whereas Kant maintains the primacy of
practical reason and develops these grounds for theology in answer to questions that still
remain to be addressed in his subsequent writings.
IV. Stephen R. Palmquist's Religious Interpretation ofKant
Palmquist's interpretation defends the contention that there is one overarching
perspective that is fundamentally important for understanding the nature and extent of
Kant's philosophy. The insights of Green and Davidovich have provided the structure of
our analysis thus far. Depending on which part of Kant's post-theoretical philosophy is
held to be primary, a completely different understanding of the extent and limitations of
Kant's philosophy of religion emerges. When practical reason is held to be both the
90 These terms are developed in Chris L. Firestone, 'Kant's Two Perspectives on the Theological Task',
International Journal ofSystematic Theology 2/l(March 2000), 63-78.
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primary perspective of reason and the only perspective of fundamental significance to
theology, the resulting 'gap' leads to partial reasoning and a prudential theory of
religion. Ifjudicial reason is held to be the bridge connecting theory and practice and the
supreme perspective of reason, the whole becomes the constitutive element of all
theological reflection and religious practice.
The most distinctive part of Palmquist's religious interpretation, the part
separating it from the other two so far examined, is the assumption that religious
experience is experience of a special kind. This experience is not, strictly speaking,
scientific, moral, or aesthetic, but instead is mystical. Religious experience is the
experience of something non-worldly impinging itself upon us. According to Palmquist,
reason has this kind of fourth dimensional access to reality. A critical examination of
this religious function of reason is both necessary and sufficient for a complete
explication of our metaphysical beliefs. Palmquist's technical name for it is the
'Transcendental Perspective'.91 The Transcendental Perspective does not have a special
relationship to any single Critique, but is the overarching perspective governing all of
them. As Palmquist writes, 'This over-arching "Transcendental (or "Copernican")
Perspective", which is based on the assumption that the subject imposes certain a priori
conditions on the object, defines the systematic context into which all three Critical
systems fit'.92 The Transcendental Perspective, because it is the most general of all
Kant's assumptions, surfaces primarily in the 'Preface', 'Introduction', and 'Doctrine of
Method' sections of Kant's Critiques, and only approaches critical completion in his
writings published posthumously.
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The very idea that Kant's philosophy might require a third transition to this
overarching fourth perspective is not obvious just by simply surveying his major works
in a linear or chronological fashion. Kant's system does not appear either readily
equipped for such a transition or in the immediate need of one. His philosophy, as
Davidovich argues, is composed of three Critiques in dialectical formation, each
representing a different perspective and each in active interface with the others. Reason,
fully extended, depends upon this interface for its constitution and stability. Under the
religious interpretation, however, this structural description of reason serves only as a
technical explanation of reason's inner workings; it is indicative only of a careful
analysis of reason under the strict condition that such an analysis takes place without
appeal to experience. This sort of inquiry constitutes a critical account of the
fundamental parts of reason, but does not constitute a critical account of the whole as it
manifests itself in our actual encounter with the world. Only a critical assessment that
takes into account our being in the world is able to complete Kant's transcendental
philosophy.
This way of understanding Kant's philosophy is indicative of Palmquist's
interpretation in his most recent book, entitled Kant's Critical Religion. To this point,
we have followed the technical development of Kant's philosophy into three parts or
realms. Palmquist's interpretation of Kant is compatible with the understanding of Kant
suggested by this account. His interpretation, however, as it moves into Kant's later
writings, goes a step further. He understands the ontological features of Kant's
posthumous writings in such a way that they fill in what Kant terms a second 'gap' in his
critical philosophy. According to Palmquist, Kant refers to this gap in a letter to
Christian Garve in 1798 (12:256-12:258). We will discuss this letter in more detail
below. The letter was written seven years after the third Critique, and is sketchy enough
in its details so as to make the nature of the gap referred to in it not easy to discern with
anything like certainty. However, armed with Kant's pre-critical essay 'Dreams of a
Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics' and the notes left on Kant's desk
when he died (now called the Opus Postumum), Palmquist makes a bold and original
case for what he coins 'Kant's Critical Mysticism'.
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Critical mysticism assumes that human experience has, as it source, a unique
ontological dimension. This assumption involves the conviction that we actually have
religious experiences that a re distinct from all other kinds of experience and that are
rooted in our encounter with the world at its most fundamental level. These experiences
are hard, if not impossible, to put into words, but they are among the most basic or
primordial features of our experience. They make up a unique dimension of human
experience—the religious—and provide the ground for all theological and metaphysical
discourse. Humans as a species have universal access to this religious dimension of
reason, but for some this capacity to experience religiously goes unrecognized. When
this capacity is critically assessed, Palmquist believes it becomes clear that the
overarching transcendental perspective provides the decisive perspective of reason. It
unites Kant's philosophy into a metaphysical whole and leads reason to its final
consummation. We will here be tracing Palmquist's cumulative case for a religious
interpretation beginning with his analysis of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and ending with
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his analysis of the Opus Postumum.
Palmquist's strategy for supporting his version of the religious interpretation
depends upon showing a relationship between the beginning and end of Kant's
philosophy. At the beginning of Kant's philosophy, Palmquist contends that the seeds of
Kant's mature ideas were originally sewn in his encounter with the mystical writings of
Swedenborg in the 1760's. In 1766, this encounter led Kant to write 'Dreams of a Spirit-
Seer'. In this essay, Kant vehemently criticized Swedenborg's account of his supposed
mystical experiences for lacking any sense of philosophical rigour and 'containing] not
a single drop of reason' (2:360). Often interpreters take this firm rejection of
Swedenborg's writings to mean that Kant was against the possibility of any kind of
mysticism whatsoever. Gregory Johnson, in the Introduction to the latest translation of
'Dreams of Spirit-Seer', disagrees with this conventional wisdom. Johnson asks
essentially three questions: (1) Why did Kant choose to publish "Spirit-Seer"
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anonymously? (2) Why does Kant here depart from his notoriously stolid academic
prose? (3) Why does Kant vacillate between such extremes of scorn and admiration,
indifference and fascination, for Swedenborg's work? Johnson points to the possibility
that Kant was "two-faced" in his dealings with Swedenborg—interested as much in
career advancement as with being perfectly transparent about his real affinities for a
controversial figure like Swedenborg.94 Palmquist concurs with Johnson's analysis, and
argues that the conventional interpretation is unwarranted. He understands 'Dreams of a
Spirit-Seer' to be exemplary of the cognitive context out of which Kant's critical
writings emerged. He uses the metaphor of a tree and its soil to describe Kant's interest
in Swedenborg's mysticism. Like a tree, Kant's philosophy grew out of this soil of
mysticism. 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' thus represents, according to Palmquist, the hidden
seed of his philosophical quest.
At the end of his philosophy, the Opus Postumum was Kant's attempt to
compose a mystical finale to his system. Its primary task, according to Palmquist, was to
seek to understand the inner workings of the overarching transcendental perspective of
reason. This perspective provides reason with its primary subjective faculty and unifies
theory, practice, and judgement into a whole system of transcendental philosophy. For
Palmquist, Kant's third Critique had shown how to begin the task of bridging the gap
between t heoretical and practical r eason, b ut' the b ridge h e h as b uilt i s not n early a s
strong and secure as might be desired'.95 The Opus Postumum supports the view that
Kant desired a final Transcendental Perspective that could provide ontological closure
for his philosophy. Palmquist holds the combined force of re-evaluating the significance
of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and the Opus Postumum supports the veracity of the
religious interpretation and the compatibility of mysticism with Kant's philosophy. We
will work our way toward an interpretation of the Opus Postumum under the religious
94 Kant on Swedenborg: Dreams of a Spirit-Seer and Other Writings, Ed. Gregory R. Johnson, Trs.
Gregory R. Johnson and Glenn Alexander Magee (Swedenborg Foundation, 2002).
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interpretation by following Palmquist's reading of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and relating
this reading to the flow ofKant's writings in his critical period.
Palmquist begins his interpretation of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' by
acknowledging the obvious point that Kant rejects most of Swedenborg's visionary
claims as being critically untenable. Kant's language is at times harsh and his tone often
sarcastic. The reason for this uncharacteristic approach is not clear. Whatever the actual
case, he later seemed somewhat embarrassed by 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and did not
include the essay in a book of his collected writings.96 Palmquist's suggests that the tone
of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' is often over-interpreted. Limiting ourselves to what Kant
actually writes, argues Palmquist, we discover that Kant is clearly against mysticism of a
certain kind, namely, fanatical kinds of mysticism, which attempt to usurp reason's
authority in its rightful domains, and superstitious kinds of mysticism, which attribute
special powers to worldly things without good reason for doing so (2:360). Palmquist
contends that, although Kant condemns Swedenborg's writings as an ad hoc mixture of
both of these bad forms of mysticism, he does not disavow all forms of mysticism
without exception. Palmquist feels that this way of approaching 'Dreams of a Spirit-
Seer' creates enough room to think that Kant could have developed a positive position
on m ysticism i n h is s ubsequent w ritings w ithout c ontradicting t he c ritical t one o f h is
earlier work.
What is needed is a constructive argument from the writings of Kant's critical
period. Palmquist believes that the case for critical mysticism emerges in the comparison
of 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' with the first Critique. In describing the content of 'Dreams
of a Spirit-Seer' as it relates to Swedenborg's writings, Palmquist writes, 'Many of the
important doctrines of his Critical philosophy are foreshadowed in this book (and, using
rather different language, in Swedenborg's own books).'97 In one passage in 'Dreams of
a Spirit-Seer', for instance, Kant outlines two advantages to maintaining a critical
approach to metaphysics; both sound very much like his emphasis on critical inquiry and
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limits in the first Critique. The first advantage is that it neutralizes the work ofmystics
like Swedenborg, who enlist reason to support theories about hidden properties of things
without reasonable cause (2:367). 'The second advantage of metaphysics', according to
Kant, 'is more consonant with the nature of the human understanding. It consists both in
knowing whether the task has been determined by reference to what one can know, and
in knowing what relation the question has to the empirical concepts, upon which all our
judgements must at all times be based. To that extent metaphysics is always a science of
the limits ofhuman reason' (2:367-8). The emphasis on limits, Palmquist points out, is a
clear indication of its relatedness to Kant's later critical writings.
Other passages in 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' foreshadow the central themes of the
second Critique (2:369-73). In a series of rhetorical questions, for example, Kant asks,
'What, is it only good to be virtuous because there is another world? Or is it rather the
case that actions will one day be rewarded because they are good and virtuous in
themselves? Does not the heart of man contain within itself immediate moral
prescriptions?' (2:372). Material links like these provide the first part of the evidence
that Palmquist forwards in support of his interpretation. This is not original exegesis in
the sense of saying something about Kant's writings that is not already acknowledged by
QO
other scholars. Palmquist's work on 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer', however, is
constructive and helpful in that it puts all in one place many arguments and evidences
from kindred interpreters (as well as Kant himself) that create enough interpretive room
to think that there really is a link between Kant's early encounter with mysticism and his
later critical philosophy."
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Rather t han u nderstanding ' Dreams o f a S pirit-Seer' a s a w ork o f e ither ' pre-
Critical' or 'Critical' philosophy, Palmquist sees it as a writing of transition. It exhibits
the kind of critical resourcefulness important to his early writing and anticipates features
integral to his later transcendental writings. This is Palmquist's interpretive prelude to
the assessment of the mystical significance of the first Critique. He marshals evidence
from the first Critique to support the claim that the critical method was part of Kant's
broader methodology throughout his career. 'The Critical method is, for Kant, the
method of striking the middle way between two extremes.... It operates by trying to
locate a boundary between what can be known (and proved) and what can never be
known (yet remains possible)'.100 What distinguishes his so-called 'critical period' (i.e.,
the time after 1770) from his pre-critical period (i.e., the time before 1770) is not the
discovery of a new critical method, but the turn to the subject or the Copernican
revolution. 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' does not lack the critical method, but it does lack
any clear understanding of the Copernican insight. IfPalmquist is right, it is conceivable
to t hink o fK ant a s b eing b oth c ritical o f S wedenborg's s piritual v isions a t o ne p oint
while later accommodating transformed versions of these ideas under the paradigm of
transcendental philosophy.
Palmquist argues that the main difficulty of finding anything other than disdain
in Kant's application of the critical method to mysticism is that interpreters often read
'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer' and the first Critique as compatible 'Copernican' rejections of
mysticism. 'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer', according to Palmquist, represents a pre-
Copernican mixture of perspectives in which Kant vents his frustration at not being able
to cope satisfactorily with Swedenborg's claims. Palmquist writes, 'The fact that
"glimpses [of 'the infinity in the finite and the universality in the individual'] are
distrusted" by Kant is taken by most interpreters as a distrust of immediate [religious]
experience, when in fact Kant's expression of distrust in such "glimpses" always relates
to their inadequacy when viewed from reason's theoretical standpoint, the standpoint
100
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that aims at and depends on empirical knowledge'.101 The question of knowledge that
commanded Kant's attention in the first Critique led to the formulation of a theoretical
account of reason in which mysticism finds no secure foothold.
In short, P almquist b oils down the role of'Dreams' to two points. Firstly, he
argues that in writing 'Dreams' Kant's goal was 'to reject uncritical (speculative or
fanatical) forms of mysticism, not in order to overthrow all mysticism, but to replace it
with a refined Critical version, directed towards this world and our reflection on it from
various perspectives'. Secondly, Palmquist argues that Kant also wanted 'to prepare the
way for his own attempt to provide a metaphysical System that could do for metaphysics
what ["Dreams"] does for mysticism'.102 This interpretation of the relationship between
Dreams and the first Critique corresponds, according to Palmquist, with the concluding
portions of Conflict and the posthumous writings. This kind of holistic interpretation of
Kant provides a kind of cumulative case argument in Palmquist's religious
interpretation.
Kant's posthumous writings are important to Palmquist's interpretation, but
specifying their exact meaning is a difficult task. Palmquist admits that 'it is now
extraordinarily difficult—if not impossible—to know for sure just what Kant himself
• • • 101
was aiming to get across in that final work'. Employing the critical method meant that
Kant would weigh both sides of an issue, searching for what was right about both, before
making a judgement. For this reason, making any definitive claim regarding the meaning
of the Opus Postumum is impossible. For Palmquist, however, this does not mean that
these writings should be ignored. If the Opus Postumum was to be the final instalment in
Kant's philosophy, it would indeed have important ramifications for interpreting his
philosophy. For this reason and armed with his understanding of mysticism from
'Dreams of a Spirit-Seer', Palmquist adopts the interpretive posture of a reasoned
speculation to interpret the Opus Postumum as the final instalment in Kant's 'Critique of
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mysticism'.m As Palmquist puts it, 'The final confirmation of the mystical character of
Kant's world view will require a thoroughgoing examination of [the Opus Postumum],
for in this work Kant was attempting to realize his long standing dream of establishing a
Critical mysticism on the basis of his Critical metaphysics'.105 In short, Palmquist argues
that the Opus Postumum appears to be Kant's attempt in his final years to provide an
ontological climax to his philosophical system.
Palmquist's most important argument is perhaps best expressed in an essay
entitled 'What is "Tantalizing" about the "Gap" in Kant's Philosophical System?',106
which has since become Chapter XI of Kant's Critical Religion. This essay draws
attention to a conundrum in Kant's last years. The conundrum surfaces in Kant's
correspondence mentioned earlier. Consider the following excerpt from Kant's
September 21, 1798 letter to Christian Garve:
I see before me the unpaid bill ofmy uncompleted philosophy, even while I am
aware that philosophy, both as regards to its means and ends, is capable of
completion. It is a pain like that of Tantalus though not a hopeless pain. The
project on which I am now working concerns the "Transition from the
metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." It must be completed,
or else a gap will remain in the critical philosophy. Reason will not give up her
demands for this; neither can the awareness of the possibility be extinguished;
but the satisfaction of this demand is maddeningly postponed, if not by the total
paralysis ofmy vital powers then by their increasing limitation. (12:257)
Here, Kant confided to his friend that there was a tantalizing 'gap' in his system and that
he was working on (in what is now the Opus Postumum) a final transition that would
resolve the problem. In the light of our earlier analysis, such a transition might not seem
out of place. This situation, however, is unusual and deserves further consideration. In
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his ' Tantalizing' essay, Palmquist argues that the ' gap' referred to in Kant's letter to
Garve is bound to be misunderstood 'if it is read through the closed and relatively bland
spectacles of Ktl [the first Critique] and Kt3 [Metaphysical Foundations of Natural
Science], rather than through the more open and fresh spectacles of Kt7 [the third
Critique] and Kt8 [Religion within the Bounds ofMere Reason], where Kant's Critical
Mysticism comes to the fore'.107 Defending the legitimacy o f the Opus Postumum as
corroborating the extension of Kant's philosophy into an overarching fourth perspective,
one which picks up where the third Critique and Religion left off, is important to
substantiating Palmquist's theory as being ofKant.
In the Introduction to the recent Cambridge translation of the Opus Postumum,
the translator Eckart Forster suggests, on the basis of a 1795 letter from Kiesewetter, that
Kant must have wanted to make some kind of 'transition' since at least as early as 1790.
Quoting Kiesewetter, Forster reports 'that "for years now" Kant had promised to present
the public "with a few sheets which are to contain the transition from your Metaphysical
Foundations ofNatural Science to physics itself.108 If the 'gap' mentioned in the letter
to Garve in 1798 was referring to the same issue, then the Opus Postumum is in fact
Kant's preparation for repairing the first Critique. In this view, the Opus Postumum is
best read as an amendment to the theoretical philosophy, and not a formal transition to a
completely new perspective. Palmquist argues against Forster's explanation of the gap.
He suggests that the gap mentioned in Kant's letter to Garve refers to something more in
line with the natural development of his thoughts than a change in the first Critique
itself. The gap is related to the need to synthesize the metaphysical wings of Kant's
system. Suffice it to say that the issue is complicated. Neither explanation appears to
yield a strong enough case to be conclusive, and certainly neither can provide a firm
enough premise to yield an argument for or against the religious interpretation.
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Given the fragmented nature of the Opus Postumum and the conjecture involved
in relating its content to the arguments of Kant's early writings, the content of
Palmquist's thesis is difficult either to substantiate or argue against. He must appeal
broadly to considerations outside of Kant's critical period and at the same time forward
disparate pieces of data from the critical period to support his thesis.109 According to
Palmquist, critical mysticism depends, not on sloppy reasoning or an emotional
encounter with the world, but upon symbols.110 Kant identifies the starry heavens above
and t he moral 1 aw w ithin a s two o f t he most important s ymbols from Kant's famous
passage in the second Critique (5:161-162). Similar examples can be found in the third
Critique and Religion. While discussing the pleasures of nature and morality in the
Analytic of the Sublime, Kant writes, 'if we call the sight of the starry heaven sublime,
... we must take it, just as it strikes the eye, as a broad and all-embracing canopy: and it
is merely under such a representation that we may posit the sublimity which the pure
aesthetic judgement attributes to this object' (71). He follows this representation of the
starry skies with a similar exaltation of the moral law: 'The object of a pure and
unconditioned intellectual delight is the moral law in the might which it exerts in us over
all antecedent motives of the mind' (72).
The chief difficulty in Palmquist's interpretation is that nowhere in all the textual
evidence from Kant's writings do we find an instance of sustained defence for 'Critical
Mysticism' and an overarching fourth perspective. Although his interpretation makes
sense of many often-neglected passages in Kant's writings, none of these passages
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comprise the central theme of a text. The closest possible example of such a 'text' is the
Opus Postumum, and yet it went unpublished by Kant and is without enough
hermeneutic signposts to go beyond conjecture with anything like certainty. Are these
notes meant for eventual publication? If so, how close to completion are they in their
present form? If not, are they merely the musings or something more? How much
interpretive license are we to take with these documents?
One way to move toward an answer might be to consider the Opus Postumum,
despite its obvious shortcomings, as if it were a text. In order to attain the level of
cogency that Palmquist needs, we would have to have some reason for justifying the
importance of Kant's second grouping of fascicles (Vllth fascicle, 1st fascicle, and
wrapper 1st fascicle) over and against all of the other fascicles. Although there are some
circumstantial reasons for proceeding in this way, these reasons are not conclusive.
Making a difficult case even more difficult, a number of the other fascicles were also
written around this time, making it appear that several purposes were at work in Kant's
mind at the same time. This fact allows Palmquist to focus on the religious aspects of
these writings and Forster to focus on the scientific portions, both arguing for
independent but contradictory positions. The Opus Postumum is simply too
discombobulated and its details too complex for any kind of definitive interpretation to
be made. Certainly, the first Critique has a strong influence on these writings (esp., the
IVth fascicle on Oktaventwurf the II fascicle on the ether proofs, and the Xth and IXth
fascicles on the possibility of physics). Unfortunately, no vision of the whole is found in
the posthumous writings themselves. There are no sensible introductions and no
conclusions drawn. There is simply no text.
As it stands, the Opus Postumum can be used to proof text several interpretations
of Kant's philosophy. One could envision the proponents of all three interpretations so
far examined using the Opus Postumum as support. In the final fascicle, for instance, we
find evidence that seems to support the two-realm and three-realm interpretations. The
moral or two-realm interpretation is supported, for example, by passages emphasizing
the two-realm understanding of philosophy and the ongoing importance of the morality
in developing and sustaining the idea ofGod.
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A being which includes the whole of all possible sense-objects, is the world. (A
being in relation to whom all human duties are likewise his commands, is God.)
(21:21)
The two principles: that of moral-practical and the principle of technical-
theoretical reason (to which mathematics also belongs) together form complete
unity. (21:22)
The judicial or three-realm interpretation likewise finds support in passages affirming
the Highest Good and the highest Being as mutually significant concepts, and ultimately
important to the constitution of transcendental philosophy.
A being who is originally universally law-giving for nature and freedom, is God.
Not only the highest being, but also the highest understanding - good (with
respect to holiness). Ens summum, summa intelligentia, summum bonum. The
mere idea of him is likewise proof of his existence. (21:14)
[God] is the highest being with respect to power, and, as a being who has rights,
a living God in the quality of a person. A single God, like the object of his
power, subordinate to him: one world. (21:17)
These concepts are altogether contained analytically in the idea of the highest
being, which we ourselves have created; but the problem of transcendental
philosophy remains unresolved: Is there a God? (21:17)
In one passage all three interpretations seem to be operative:
Three principles: God, the world, and the concept of the subject which unites
them and brings synthetic unity into these concepts (a priori) insofar as reason
makes this transcendental unity itself. Aenesidemus. God, the world, and /; God,
the world, and the human spirit, as that which combines the former two: moral-
practical reason with its categorical imperative.





The highest good (blessedness, happiness) (21:23)
According to the religious or the fourth dimensional interpretation, man is at the
perspectival centre of reality, and Kant's emphasis on the 'I' seems to support this
interpretation. However, practical reason and the moral law appear to maintain a kind of
constitutive role for the subject. The combination of the two would then be called the
human spirit. This supports the moral interpretation from which we began our inquiries.
Kant then writes that the ' intelligent subject' combines God and the world under the
principle of the Highest Good. This appears to support the three-realm interpretation.
One thing is for certain, the Opus Postumum comprises Kant's handwritten notes and
should not be read as a completed and affirmed text in their present unfinished form. At
many places, Kant seems to be experimenting with several different trajectories in his
thinking simultaneously.
Despite the ambiguities, Palmquist presses on, arguing that there is a discemable
theme in the Opus Postumum of such significance as to provide the key to interpreting
Kant's philosophy as a philosophical whole or complete system. It is traceable to the
often-repeated phrase 'God, World, and Man'. Kant repeats one thing with sufficient
regularity in the Opus Postumum to be regarded as one of his main points. For Kant,
'mankind itself (or the idea of man in the world) is the unifying link between God and
the world'.111 According to Palmquist, 'the highest point ofKant's system is reached ...
when we are able to conceive of "God above me, the world inside me, the human spirit
112within me—combined into one all-inclusive system of transcendental philosophy.'"
The climax of Palmquist's interpretation (under the religious interpretation) of Opus
Postumum is found in the idea of man. 'Kant now saw before his eyes the possibility of
composing a metaphysical Doctrine of unity of all forms of human experience under one
transcendental idea, the idea of "man" as the being in whom "God and World" are
united'.113 According to Palmquist, ' Kant's entire philosophical System culminates in
111
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this 'one man'—that is, Kant himself, and each of us, as representatives of the ideal
God-man'.114
For Palmquist then, the Transcendental Perspective itself is the fulfilment of
reason; it provides the highest vantage point from which reason is able to conceive
reality. The defining moment of this grand conception, what makes it more definite than
mere poetic possibility, is the immediacy of our experience that Palmquist calls 'Critical
Mysticism'. This Critical Mysticism represents 'a metaphysical bridge between the
Metaphysics of Morals and the Metaphysics of Nature' that might also be called a
'Metaphysics of Religious Experience'.115 For Palmquist, this metaphysical bridge or
'mystical life' is the 'empirical realization of religion'. Although 'it transcends the
bounds of rational philosophy ... [it] can ... serve as the natural conclusion of a healthy
philosophy, and also the final goal of reason itself.116 Kant's critique of the mystical
moment of the human being's encounter with being-itself in the Opus Postumum brings
closure to his philosophical quest; it also brings us to the doorstep of German Idealism.
This closure allows the dialectic of immediacy—God, world, man—to remain the
culmination of the philosophical quest, and to be its ontological point of departure and
its point of contact with theology.117
The religious interpretation in the sense of Palmquist is difficult to argue against
insofar as it agrees with much of our earlier analysis, advancing beyond the two- and
three-realm interpretations on the basis of arguments stemming for Kant's marginal texts
and their relationship to the whole of his philosophical enterprise. His emphasis on
mysticism and inscrutability provide an intriguing lens through which to read Kant's late
writings and specific passages throughout Kant's work that affirm religion and theology.
However, as we turn specifically toward Kant's philosophy of religion, the explanatory
114
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117 For two diagrams of the God-man-world relationship in Kant's philosophy, according to Palmquist's
reading, see Figures XII. 1 and XII.2 in Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, 354 and 375.
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power and limitations of Palmquist's interpretation become clear. In Religion, Kant
immediately points to the problem of radical evil as a threat to human moral striving on
the one hand, and human hope on the other. In the next chapter, however, evil is shown
to be an even more radical conceptual problem for Kant's philosophical programme. A
coherent account of hope will depend less on the promotion of a mystical encounter with
God and the merits of human effort, and more on moral faith in the idea of perfect
humanity and divine grace.
In conclusion, it is important to note that the three interpretations focused on in
this chapter provide coherent and sensible accounts of the grounds for theology found in
Kant's philosophy. Additionally, each of these interpretations makes the case that Kant
himself provides the room for theology in one or another corridor of his philosophy after
the first Critique. To this extent, what these interpreters have shown is that it is possible
to provide a creative interpretation of Kant with affirmative theological implications.
Nevertheless, the verdict we must render is that the room c arved out for theology in
these interpretations is not always demonstrable on Kant's terms. If my analysis is
accurate, then none of the interpretations succeeds in such a way that all of Kant's
principal concerns are met.
In keeping with this conclusion, the next chapterwill focus on Kant's writings on
religion and suggest, following the work of Gordon Michalson, some of the most
difficult challenges for interpreting Kant are found in the heart of his philosophy of
religion. In particular, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason presents
significant problems for understanding the coherence of Kant's thought. Focusing on
Michalson's interpretation, we catalogue the chief difficulties in making sense of Kant's
Religion. The intent is to use the difficulties Michalson exposes as a backdrop for the
analysis of the work of Green, Davidovich, and Palmquist, and to formulate a new
hypothesis for interpreting Kant's Religion. Each of their interpretations gives an
account of Kant's philosophy of religion that goes some way towards overcoming the
difficulties that Michalson presents. However, I argue that, although each of these
interpretations provides valuable resources for understanding Kant's philosophy of
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religion, none of them on their own succeeds in overcoming some of the most




BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON
I. From Philosophy to Philosophy of Religion in Kant
In the previous chapter, I argued that there are at least three discernable
interpretations in the tradition of Kant studies that have, with varying degrees of
exegetical persuasiveness, looked to Kant's writings after the first Critique to establish
rational foundations for religious faith. Our task in this chapter is not to decide the
promise of the theological systems built on these Kantian foundations, but merely to
understand the foundations themselves and show the extent to which they are viable as
interpretations of Kant. What we are more concerned with is whether or not (or to what
degree) the Kantian foundations established by these interpretations are consistent with
Kant's philosophy of religion, and, to the degree that they are not found to be so
consistent, whether or not a more secure foundation might be established via some
correction or combination of these interpretations. We have already pointed out some of
the weaknesses in these interpretations with regards to Kant's philosophy proper. These
weaknesses are not necessarily fatal, nor are the arguments presented in their support
exhaustive, but the previous chapter indicates that no interpretation ofKant's philosophy
as a whole seems equipped to contain in its explanatory purview all the specific passages
and general themes found in Kant.
In t his c hapter, wet um t o t he i nterface o f p hilosophy a nd t heology i n Kant's
Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason. In Gordon Michalson's early work on
Kant, he makes the case that Religion is best understood as a complete text and an
important contribution to Kant's philosophy. He also argues that Book Three of Religion
presents the interpreter with tensions that threaten to undermine the integrity of Kant's
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entire philosophy of religion.1 In recent years, Michalson's challenge to Kant's project
in Religion focuses on the heart of the arguments in Books One and Two. Although
Michalson holds Kant's position to be instructive and a profound influence on
Enlightenment and Post-Enlightenment thinking, he states unequivocally that 'Kant's
position is a nest of tangles', 'riddled with inconsistencies', and 'meets with
awkwardness'. According to Michalson, the arguments of Religion are 'sufficiently
problematic' so as to lead to an 'entire set of wobbles' (or 'telling wobbles'). We will
unpack Michalson's defence of these claims below.
Michalson's treatment ofReligion assumes Kant to be fundamentally committed
to human autonomy. This interpretive emphasis on human autonomy is rooted in Kant's
central concern to articulate and defend his practical philosophy. Michalson believes that
the themes of autonomy and morality spill over into Religion and are among its defining
features; ass uch, t hey a re c racial c omponents t o c onsider w hen m aking s ense o f t he
text. Kant's commitment to autonomy and morality, Michalson believes, puts his
philosophical programme in a conceptual strongbox from which transcendental theology
and a viable philosophy of religion cannot reasonably escape. Michalson writes, '[Kant]
wants human autonomy to take over the role traditionally played by divine action in the
creation of a good universe, with a corresponding displacement of the supernatural
world by the noumenal realm where Kantian freedom enjoys its possibility'.3 It is this
guiding presupposition which leads Michalson to conclude that there are numerous
'wobbles' throughout Kant's philosophy of religion and that these wobbles have a
crippling effect on his attempt to account for religion and theology under the rubric of
transcendental philosophy.
1 See Gordon E. Michaelson, Jr., The Historical Dimensions ofa Rational Faith: The Role ofHistory in
Kant's Religious Thought (Washington: University Press of America, 1979). We will return to this book in
Chapter Four with specific reference to potential problems with Book Three of Religion. I have not been
able to track down why there is a spelling change in Michalson's name after his first book. For ease of
reference, I will simply use the most recent spelling (i.e., without the 'e') in all references except direct
references to this book.
2 Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom: Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8.
3
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 8-9.
71
The next section will follow Michalson's interpretation of Kant and attempt to
outline these 'wobbles' and 'conundrums' as a guiding set of problems to be resolved by
any interpretation of Kant that seeks to achieve both a unified understanding of Kant's
transcendental theology and a coherent understanding of his philosophy of religion.
Sections Three and Four return to the theologically affirmative interpretations outlined
in Chapter One. Each of these interpretations of Kant has creative ways forward for
grounding theology according to Kant's writings and we will focus on the many
resources they present for overcoming Michalson's chief concerns. I will argue,
however, that these resources are only partially successful at overcoming Michalson.
Their inability to account for Religion in light of the various wobbles outlined by
Michalson indicates that more needs to be done to discern the rational grounds for
theology according to Kant. This task we will take up in the next chapter.
The purpose of this chapter is thus to flesh out the challenge facing theologically
affirmative interpreters of Kant by Kant's philosophy of religion. In particular, we will
examine the various conundrums in Religion, as presented by Michalson, which must be
accounted for and made sense of if there is to be a satisfactory interpretation of Kant.
The next section summarizes Michalson's arguments that Kant's philosophy of religion
exhibits numerous inconsistencies and is out of step with central components of his
philosophy. Sections Three and Four explore resources in Kant for the resolution of the
apparent inconsistencies in Religion. As we will see, the main interpretations of Kant are
able to handle the various wobbles only by glossing over the specifics of what Kant has
laid out in Religion. More needs to be done if we are going to be able to resolve the
specific conundrums identified by Michalson.
II. Conundrums and Wobbles in Kant's Religion
In the Introduction to Fallen Freedom, Michalson identifies four 'wobbles'
which constitute what he takes to be the main inconsistencies of Kant's philosophy of
religion. The first of these is Kant's apparent assertion of two incompatible (if not
outright contradictory) claims, namely that human beings have an original predisposition
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to good and yet also possess a propensity to evil.4 Speaking of the threefold
characteristics of the human disposition (viz., animality, humanity, and personality),
Kant states: 'All these predispositions in the human being are not only (negatively) good
(they d o n ot r esist t he moral 1 aw) b ut t hey a re a lso p redispositions to the g ood (they
demand compliance with it)' (6:28). On the other hand, when referring to humanity's
propensities, Kant writes, 'propensity to genuine evil, i.e. moral evil...must reside in the
subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law.
And, if it is legitimate to assume that this propensity belongs to the human being
universally ..., the propensity will be called a natural propensity of the human being to
evil' (6:29). Michalson takes these statements to be in fundamental opposition and
indicative of inconsistencies still to come.
The second 'wobble' concerns Kant's declaration that evil is both innate within
humanity and something brought about by individual acts of human freedom.5 Kant
captures both of these in 6:38, where he writes: 'This innate guilt...is so called because
it is detectable as early as the first manifestation of the exercise of freedom in the human
being, but ... must nonetheless have originated from freedom'. According to Michalson,
Kant has some explaining to do. On the one hand, he assumes evil to be present in
human nature prior to any exercise of the will, and on the other hand, that humans are
responsible for radical evil because we bring it upon ourselves through the exercise of
freedom. Kant himself recognizes the tension as he attempts to press ahead. He asks,
'But does not the thesis of the innate corruption of the human being with respect to all
that is good stand in direct opposition to this restoration through one's own effort?'
(6:50) In spite of his awareness of this issue, his answer is forthright: 'Of course it does'
(6:50). From this point forward, Kant attempts to unpack how this conundrum could be
the case. Michalson believes Kant's efforts in this regard are noble but no less abortive.
The third difficulty Michalson identifies has to do with the uneasy relationship
between the moral demands placed on human effort and the insurmountable nature of
4
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 8.
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evil. In Kant's view, radical evil 'must equally be possible to overcome ... for it is found
in the human being as acting freely' (6:37) yet Kant asserts later that radical evil cannot
be eradicated through human effort.6 Regarding our obligation to deliver ourselves from
radical evil, Kant writes: 'The human being must make or have made himself into
whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil' (6:44). It seems that, for
Kant, if it is within human power to overcome radical evil through moral fortitude, we
are required to do so. We are obligated to resist and overcome temptation and evil
according to the moral law. Nevertheless, Kant also asserts an apparently contradictory
claim, namely, that we are not able to overcome evil on our own. 'This evil is radical,
since it corrupts the ground of a 11 maxims; as natural propensity, it is also not to be
extirpated through human forces, for this could only happen through g ood maxims—
something cannot take place if the subjective supreme ground of all maxims is
presupposed to be corrupted' (6:37). How is it that Kant can maintain both our moral
obligation to overcome evil by our own accord and at the same time assert that we are
powerless to do so?
The fourth and final 'wobble' is closely related to the third: Kant appeals to
divine grace despite his assertion that 'The human being must make...himself into
whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil' (6:44). Divine aid may
be necessary in light of the pervasive nature of evil and the fact that Kant thinks it to be
innate, but this necessity appears to contradict the cardinal Kantian dictum, 'Ought
implies can'. Ifwe ought to make ourselves victorious over the temptations of nature and
our own propensity to evil but, in fact, may be in need of divine assistance, we have
been led deep into murky crosscurrents of human autonomy and divine intervention.
What philosophical theory can have human beings acting freely to make themselves into
what they ought to be and yet, at the same time, assert that humans must be
fundamentally assisted by a divine being in the achievement of this goal? Kant's appeal
6
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to divine grace seems not only arbitrary, but thinks Michalson, 'antithetical to his
deepest philosophical instincts'.7
Michalson surmises that the cause of Kant's various wobbles at the outset of his
philosophy of religion is the desire to reconcile his denial of knowledge with his earnest
'metaphysical trust'. He suggests that '[Kant's] ability to incorporate both radical evil
and ultimate coherence in a single outlook reflects a deep metaphysical trust on his part,
o
a trust that is perhaps the decisive dividing line between Kant and Ivan'. Where Ivan
Karamazov from Dostoyevsky's The Brothers Karamazov despaired in the face of
radical evil, declaring God's handiwork to be incoherent, Kant is more optimistic.
Michalson notes, 'Kant's universe is finally coherent...[and] the "center does hold'".
The picture Kant affords is a unified vision in which 'reality as a whole is the scene of
an ongoing, cooperative effort between humanity and God in the production of a moral
universe'.10 This picture is not as orderly as we might hope, however, because the
movement towards Kant's telos in the Highest Good is propelled by the needs of reason.
These needs 'subtly transform certain logical features of his train of thought into a
metaphysical content'.11 Kant's metaphysical trust in a balanced universe hinges on a
concept of the Highest Good in which virtue and happiness are maintained in proper
proportion. It is not at all clear, thinks Michalson, why happiness gets a foothold in
Kant's moral theory. All we know is that 'God enters Kant's scheme by riding on the
• • • • 12coattails of the principle of proportionality'.
Michalson forwards a two-part thesis that fundamentally depends on the four
'wobbles' previously summarized. The first part of the thesis is defended in the final two
chapters of his interpretation of Kant on 'Radical Evil', and focuses on the first two
7
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Kantian wobbles presented above. There, Michalson defends the position that 'Kant's
view...produce[s] the series of wobbles I allude to in my introduction to this study,
culminating in his oscillation between appeals to human autonomy and divine action in
• • 1 ^
his account of the salvation process'. The second is found in his subsequent section on
'Moral Regeneration', and focuses on the last two: according to Michalson,
'Kant's...strategy for recovering from radical evil delivers his entire philosophy of
religion into a subterranean yet vicious circularity...[which] arises out of...Kant's
appeal to symmetry and direct proportion'.14 In summation, the circularity articulated
by Michalson turns on the twofold realization that God's existence is postulated in the
second Critique by appeal to the symmetrical universe, while the symmetrical universe
is guaranteed in Religion by appeal to God.
Michalson believes that Kant can defend the claim that moral evil is a
transcendental condition for the possibility of evil action. Such a formalized concept of
evil 'depicts one of the ways in which freedom can relate to the moral law, namely, in a
way that subordinates the moral law to the incentive of self-love'.15 However, Michalson
thinks that such a formal claim is dependent not on transcendental reflection, but on the
observation of the empirical reality of evil actions. It is thus not rooted innately in or
along side freedom in the human being, but merely a transcendental placeholder,
limiting freedom and expanding our understanding of how freedom functions. Yet, as
noted earlier, Kant clearly wants more from his account of radical evil. 'This evil is
radical', Kant contends, 'because it corrupts the ground of all maxims...moreover...the
ultimate subjective ground of all maxims is postulated as corrupt' (6:37). Despite being
based on purely formal inquiries, Kant goes on to assert that evil is 'innate'. Kant has
not succeeded, argues Michalson, in bridging the gap between the formal establishment
of evil (as a limitation of and corrective to freedom) and the ontological identification of
evil as a fundamental corruption of the human subject.
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Michalson takes this tension to be clear from the outset ofReligion, where Kant
establishes straight away that 'the source of evil cannot lie in an object determining the
will through inclination, nor yet in a natural impulse; it can lie only in the rule made by
the will for the use of its freedom, that is, in a maxim' (6:21). Here appears what
Michalson takes to be a clear chronological gap that works against Kant's identification
of evil as an innate corruption of the will. He takes this to mean that Kant is working
from the belief that maxim-making—a decision of the will in the context of a particular
set of circumstances—is often corrupted, with the stronger claim that there is something
essentially evil about the human being. For Kant, 'every maxim contains both moral and
[sic] sensuous incentives' and 'moral evil itself is a property of the act of the will that
freely subordinates one incentive to another, the moral to the sensuous'.16 Where the
whole notion of maxim-making for Kant appears to be merely an epistemic process of
decision making that triggers the will, moral evil (which Kant derives from maxim-
making gone wrong) is a positive or ontological reality: 'far from being a mere
limitation or negation, moral evil is a specific variety of free "doing" that gets
crystallized in a maxim'.17
Kant adds a further layer of complexity to this problem in his distinction between
Willkiir and Wide, and Michalson contends that many of the arguments in Religion trade
on the 'equivocalness' of these two terms. Willkiir is 'the faculty of choice that is subject
1 o
to both rational and sensuous incentives'; it is 'our actual capacity for agency'. Wille,
on the other hand, 'is the source of our respect for the moral law and very close to what
must be rationality itself for Kant'.19 The will {Wille) determines the imperative of duty
and provides it to the will {Willkur), but it has no determining ground of its own and
must allow the freedom and moral agency embedded in Willkur to determine a course of
action. This theory is notoriously difficult to articulate, and appears to convey 'a note of
16
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arbitrariness'.20 Henry Allison takes the WillkiirlWille distinction to be of little
consequence to Kant's philosophy of religion, but Michalson argues that Kant gets a lot
of argumentative mileage out of it. For example, Kant is able to explain how we can
remain rational even when we act immorally. He also is able 'to avoid the trap of only
• • • • 21
being able to impute virtue or a brutish, amoral heteronomy to the moral agent'. Even
when Willkiir acts to subordinate the moral law to the sensuous (sinnlichen) inclination,
Wille continues to lobby for the moral order of incentives. Wille is never eliminated, but
retains its potential goodness. This point, according to Michalson, will be a necessary
22element in Kant's account ofmoral regeneration and his solution to radical evil.
Books One and Two of Religion, says Michalson, rest on such murky
distinctions. Perhaps none is more strained than the distinction between the
'predisposition to good' and the 'propensity to evil'. It is Kant's burden in the opening
part of Religion to examine and explain these features of humanity, and 'chart the
carriers of these two features of human nature in a universe that is presumed to be
9T ... ,
rational'. The predisposition refers to 'human nature as it is prior to any actual exercise
of freedom'.24 When Kant says that we must make ourselves into whatever we are to
become, what he means is that the predisposition prior to action is morally unblemished.
As soon as it encounters nature, however, Kant tells us that this predispoition is
transformed by a propensity to evil. What we know about this propensity is difficult to
ascertain according to Michalson. Kant provides us only with a 'tortured' definition: 'the
subjective ground of a possibility of an inclination' (6:29). What we know is that
somehow in the context of Willkiir, sensuousness gets the upper hand on duty. Kant
20
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 36.
21 Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 36.
22 The culmination of the conceptual murkiness is a wide hermeneutic window from which to view his
subsequent arguments: 'because of what he says about human nature' writes Michalson '.. .the Religion as
a whole can just as easily be read as a Kantian soteriology—surprisingly orthodox in many of its
features—as it can be read as a reduction of religious belief to moral action, which is the reading the book
mainly invites'. Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 37.
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provides both an anthropological portrait of humanity based upon predisposition to
animality, humanity, and personality, and a type of 'calculus of sensuousness' which is
meant to provide a description of a good structure of human predispositions. According
to Michalson, Kant does not adequately define the propensity of evil, merely providing
an example and leaving the reader in the dark as to its precise meaning.
Michalson thinks that this is a crucial gap in Kant's account of moral evil, and it
comes in the vital opening stages of his arguments. In Kant's account of morality,
human propensities are rooted in free choice (Willkur), and yet there is precious little we
can say about how the propensity to evil actually functions. Michalson finds this aspect
of Kant's account ironic. On the one hand, Kant's theory depends on the principle of
proportionality—it gives rise to the idea of the Highest Good, belief in immortality and
belief in God, and yields a highly rationalistic account of morality and religion. On the
other hand, Kant appeals to a propensity to evil somehow imbedded in human nature and
manifest as soon as we are called upon to act—but ineffable when analyzed by the same
rational processes that gave rise to his theory in the first place. 'Kant clearly believes
that all rational beings do in fact succumb to the propensity to evil, but the absence of
genuine argumentation for this crucial point is one of the most outstanding features of
Religion'.25 According to Michalson, the only support Kant does offer is an appeal to
empirical facts: 'from what we know of man through experience we cannot judge
otherwise of him' (6:32). This inference, Michalson asserts, 'cannot support the
argumentative weight Kant seems to be placing on it'.26 In the end, Kant is led to the
'paradoxical judgment that evil is both freely elected and "innate", a view that would rob
either "freedom" or "innateness" of its point'.27
The insurmountable question for Kant, in Michalson's analysis, amounts to the
following: How can Kant avoid making the phrase humanity is evil by nature
synonymous with the phrase humanity is evil by necessity? Kant's answer is hardly
25 Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 46.
26
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satisfactory, argues Michalson, because it is rooted in an attempt to make 'evil by
nature' the equivalent of 'radical evil is innate in human nature'. There are only two
ways to proceed in the assessment of what Kant is doing: either his account of religion
'shades off into self-contradiction' or allow Kant to validate an infusion ofmystery into
his rational account of morality—an infusion that heretofore would not have been
98
allowed. Because of this dilemma, Religion demonstrates that there can be nothing
more than a limited continuity to Kant's project. This has telling consequences for
Michalson's interpretation ofKant's work in Book Three. In Book Three,
[t]here can be no easy appeal to the corporate level as a solution to the
individual's task ofmoral regeneration. Such is the bitter consequence of Kant's
highly individualistic account of the freedom of the will and accountability in
moral matters. One implication of this result is that Kant's own effort to view
history teleologically and propose a general theory of cultural progress is made
vastly more difficult—if not undermined altogether—by what he has to say
about radical evil.29
Kant's Religion projects an overarching v ision of reality in which humanity and God
cooperate in the creation of a morally good and meaningful universe. However, the
specifics of Kant's vision centre around the fall of the human disposition based on
radical evil—so radical that we are unable to save ourselves. Kant's position, according
to Michalson's account, is led into an 'awful paradox' which he concludes must end in
self-contradiction. Regeneration, if it is to be possible, must occur both by our own
power and according to the resources of a good disposition. However, 'it is precisely the
existence of an evil disposition that produces the need for moral regeneration in the first
place'.30 The cutting edge of Kant's account is the movement from moral evil as a
formal change of maxims to the source of this change in the underlying common ground
of all decision-making. 'The underlying common ground of all of our maxims is what
28
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Kant calls the subjective disposition: the disposition, Kant tells us, is "the ultimate,
subjective ground of the adoption ofmaxims'".31 For Kant, this disposition is the unified
expression of freedom in conjunction with the moral law. He calls it 'the supreme
maxim' (die oberste Maxime); it is the individualized personification of the moral law
'that arises out of a free act and gives characteristic tendencies or patterns of our various
acts ofmaxim-making'.32
Michalson thinks it is incumbent upon Kant to explain 'the e xact relationship
between the free act by which the moral agent chooses his or her disposition, and the
33free acts arising out of the disposition in individual acts of maxim-making'. There
seem to be two different levels of choice going on in Kant's account ofmaxim-making;
one is at the level of the supreme maxim, and the other is in the 'everyday moment of
decision making'.34 This leads Kant inevitably into a linguistic quagmire as he attempts
to discuss the 'primordial agency in a way that protects it as agency (instead of
transforming it into a fixed essence), while simultaneously avoiding having this agency
dissolve into formless chaos, unrelated to any structure that could underwrite moral
valuation'.35 Because the theme of unity is so important to any account of human
depravity and eventual regeneration, Michalson feels it is crucial for Kant to maintain
the unified disposition, explain the fluctuations of our maxim-making in individual
circumstances, and give an account of how these two can be done simultaneously.
Although the disposition is the most important and novel contribution ofReligion
to Kant's ethical theory, Michalson believes it cripples Kant's theory and makes his
account ofmoral regeneration incoherent. He suggests that the corroborating evidence is
Kant's consistent appeal to mystery and the 'timely use of the [fallacious] argument
31
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 54.
32
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 54.
33 Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 56.
34 Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 56.
35
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 57.
81
from ignorance'.36 Michalson sees Kant's employment of this fallacy in the form of an
infinite regress: 'For if Kant is going to tell us that freely produced maxims have a
certain underlying ground which is also freely produced, we will inevitably ask what the
"ground of the ground" is (and so on)'.37 Kant is thus required either to give an account
of how moral agency and essence can be held simultaneously, or be subject to an infinite
regress of causes—unpalatable to his rational instincts. Instead, 'Kant deals with the
possibility of a regress by invoking a systematic agnosticism in his effort to account for
the ultimate ground of maxim-making and the source of evil'.38 It is at this point that
Michalson declares Kant's understanding of the human disposition to be nothing more
than 'a useful fiction designed to protect two of Kant's most important insights: the
• • • 39ultimate unity o fmoral agency and the indecipherable character of moral freedom'.
This seems a key reason why Michalson believes Kant veers toward non-realism; a
reasoned analysis of Kant's arguments suggests, according to Michalson, that even the
human disposition, which Kant believes to be a fundamental presupposition if humans
are to have dignity, is simply not viable on the basis ofKant's arguments.
Michalson's conclusions concerning Kant on the disposition are crucial to keep
in mind as he addresses Kant's constructive account of moral regeneration in Book Two
of Religion. It is only because human beings possess rational agency and the ability to
choose moral maxims for themselves without the fixed essence of a moral disposition
that Kant can declare that humans are not 'devilish'. There is hope for moral
regeneration in Religion because humans, through their own efforts and exercise of
reason t hrough freedom, c an m ake t hemselves p leasing t o G od. Put i nto o ther t erms,
'freely willing to reject the moral law would be equivalent to exercising reason for the
sake of being irrational'.40 Kant is able to reject the notion that regeneration is
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incompatible with freedom only through the bifurcation of will wherein Willkiir acts so
that we become evil, but 'neither destroys Wille as a fully rational aspect of the will, nor
does it ever totally lose the capacity to be affected by the rational incentive produced by
Wille\AX Michalson thus holds that Kant is closer to Erasmus than to Luther on the
question of the will. Using Kant's language, Luther holds that 'our fall includes the
destruction of Wille, while Erasmus believes Wille remains intact'.42
The point of central contention in Kant's argument, according to Michalson, is
found in a conundrum in Book One:
This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims; as natural
propensity, it is also not to be extirpated through human forces, for this could
only happen through good maxims—something that cannot take place if the
subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presupposed to be corrupted. Yet it
must be possible to overcome this evil, for it is found in the human being as
acting freely (6:37)
'Upon first reading, this comment simply seems to be self-contradictory: Kant is
evidently claiming both P and not P.... But the comment as a whole is not quite as self-
contradictory as it first appears.'43 The reason that Michalson believes it is not self-
contradictory is not that there is an underlying ontology of human dispositions. Such a
position would appear to commit Kant to the assertion that it is both possible and
impossible for humans to extirpate radical evil. Instead, Kant must be asserting that there
is a fundamental difference between 'extirpating' and 'overcoming'. Michalson points
out that the German word for 'overcoming' is uberwiegen, which literally means 'to
outweigh'. The notion of outweighing appears at first to be an image of the scales in
which our moral progress is weighed, determining ifwe are good enough or holy enough
to be found pleasing to God. Michalson points out, however, that 'To succeed in
'outweighing' the opponent is potentially to succeed by getting help from another body,
41
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but in a manner that still utilizes the bulk and energies of one's own body'.44 This way
of casting Kant's intentions succeeds in setting the stage for divine cooperation without
the spectre of losing human autonomy.
Michalson calls what is left of human autonomy after radical evil and divine
cooperation are admitted into the Kantian paradigm 'the lingering "seed of goodness"
[which] assures the sheer logical possibility of moral renewal'.45 Kant implies further
that 'some as yet unspecified act or set of acts will transform this logical possibility into
a real possibility'.46 Because Kant rejects the possibility of a predisposition to evil, he
necessarily lays out the contours of a transition from logical possibility to real possibility
and implies that this is the intended course of his arguments. Moral regeneration or
conversion, according to Michalson's interpretation of Kant, means 'the transformation
of the underlying disposition—from evil to good'.47 Such a transformation requires a re-
reversal of the moral order of incentives and a restructuring of the affected disposition,
and this must be done under human power along with divine cooperation. Michalson
believes that Kant does not possess the critical resources necessary to address this
problem inherent in reason. It is at this crucial j uncture that Kant appeals to biblical
language in a surprising and remarkable fashion.
In two pivotal statements describing moral regeneration, Kant appeals to
Johanine and Pauline concepts, respectively. In the first, Kant writes, 'And so a "new
man" can come about only through a kind of rebirth, as it were, a new creation (John
3:5; compare with Genesis 1:2) and a change of heart' (6:47). The second is a
paraphrase of Paul's letter to the Ephesians, wherein he writes of 'laying off of the old
man and putting on of the new' (6:48; Eph. 4:22-24). Michalson takes Kant's appeal to
biblical language to be an admission on Kant's part that his own arguments fail when it
comes to moral regeneration. On Michalson's interpretation, this is equivalent to Kant's
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earlier arguments in which he appeals to ignorance or mystery at key junctures or
whenever his own concepts fail him. 'The either/or character of his ethical rigorism
drives him toward the metaphor of a "revolution," while the absence of any principle of
integration between the noumenal-moral and the phenomenal-temporal commends the
appropriation of the Johnannine language of "rebirth" and "new creation.'"48 It is not,
says Michalson, 'sophisticated conceptual technique' which helps Kant to overcome
radical evil at this crucial moment of rebirth, but an account of moral regeneration
emanating from the Konigsberg catechism on which he was raised.49
To this point, Michalson believes that he has shown Kant's account of religion to
be most notable for its numerous points of tension, difficult metaphysical questions, and
assortment of complex considerations. Central to these conceptual issues and 'perhaps
the chief culprit producing conceptual turbulence is what we might call the "before and
after" feature of the transition from radical evil to a renewed disposition'.50 If Kant is
going to talk about moral conversion, some discussion of the temporal progression of the
human disposition is inevitable. Kant must be able to discriminate between the human
agent as fallen and the human agent as redeemed, and yet Michalson judges 'that same
feature is virtually unintelligible from the standpoint of the very philosophy that
demands it'.51 He cites the first Critique in support of this contention:
In respect of the intelligible character, of which the empirical character is the
sensible schema, there can be no before and after.... Reason ... acts freely; it is
not dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes through either outer
or inner ground antecedent in time. (p. 83; B581)
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Kant's consistent assertion then, according to Michalson, is that reason cannot be
thought of in terms of acting definitively in time, for that would be an admixture of the
empirical and moral and thus strictly prohibited. But, in order to account for the very
concept of conversion and explicate it in terms of human freedom, he must have
linguistic access to a before and after conceptual scheme. Michalson thus concludes with
a rather dark portrayal of our prospects for success in a Kantian account of moral
conversion:
Kant has utterly crippled his ability to make clear sense of any instance ofmoral
and religious "change," of any alteration in one's moral condition or religious
state that occurs in sequential terms. The effects of the Second Analogy [in the
first Critique] seep down into the smallest conceptual passages relevant to the
individual's experience of duty and of episodes of moral decision-making, and
they flood into the larger channels formed by Kant's progressive view of history
and by the impact of teleological pressures on his efforts to grasp the career of
freedom in the most comprehensive terms, as reason demands.
The bottom line here, according to Michalson's interpretation, is that Kant's account
'culminates in the paradox that an act having no relation to time produces a moral agent
who is materially different "after" the act from "before"'.52 This again is even more than
a mere paradox for Michalson; the position entails the surprising and rather dubious
ST
position that 'every free act is for Kant a "conversion"'. Since, for Michalson, Kant has
provided no metaphysical connection between moral conversion and temporal
succession, humans must in a sense re-convert at every decision-making moment.
Michalson concludes that this leads Kant's account to a crisis of personal
identity. Considered over time, the person who made the first moral choice to adopt an
evil disposition is 'numerically' different than the person who makes the later choice to
become good again. Even if we can grant that Kant is able to account for the difference
between the original human being possessing a predisposition to good and the same
52
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human who is evil by nature after succumbing to the propensity to evil, we still cannot
account for the same human being who later embraces the good again. As Michalson
puts it, 'the very idea of regeneration or conversion ... suggests two distinct moral
agents, a fallen and a redeemed one; while ... morality's noumenal insulation from the
effects of time suggests just one moral agent'.54 The problems can be reduced to two:
first, 'if ... we end up with two metaphysically distinct agents—it ultimately becomes
unclear how we are intelligibly to relate the issues of fall and regeneration', and second,
'the problem concerns showing that the agent was sufficiently different at one point (in
time?) than at another for the very idea of moral conversion to have meaningful
application'.55
In order to create the conceptual space necessary to establish his account of
moral regeneration, Kant appeals to divine grace and divine aid. Allied with these
concepts we also find Kant's surprising appeal to what he calls 'the personified idea of
the good principle' in Section One of Book Two.56 F or Michalson, this consideration
once again yields the conundrum of competing implications. For, on the one hand, the
close alliance of moral regeneration and the personified idea of the good seems to entail
'the position that Kant's commitment to radical evil forces his position back to some sort
of reliance on a specific historical occurrence—in the form of Christ's breaking the
"power" of the evil principle to hold us against our will'.57 On the other hand, 'every
other feature of his position tends to subordinate history to the imperializing tendencies
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of a universalizing rationality'.58 Kant must then 'integrate a theory of atonement with
his coveted principle of autonomy, with a rather convoluted theory of punishment for
past sins'.59 The convoluted nature of Kant's theory of punishment for past sins,
according to Michalson, provides some of the strongest evidence for the inadequacy of
Kant's account of moral regeneration in general and his more specific accounts of the
divine-human partnership centred on the christic archetype.
Michalson puts his finger on the key question regarding Kant's account: 'But if a
man is corrupt in the very ground of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this
revolution by his own powers and of himself become a new man?'60 Michalson suggests
that in the crucial portions of Kant's argument, the ones that should provide a rejoinder
to this question, 'he simply skips over the answer to the specific question and describes
what the change is like, not how it occurs'.61 Kant thus explains very little regarding
human autonomy and divine aid according to Michalson; instead he merely 'runs
together the question of how moral generation is possible with the christological
question of whether "the personified idea of the good principle" is possible'.62 It thus
appears, according to Michalson, that 'Kant remains utterly agnostic on the question of
the reality of grace' and once again oscillates between two positions, namely, whether
we take Kant's statements about 'divine aid to be actual comments about divine activity
or simply motivational devices designed to offset a sense of moral futility'.63 Kant
appears content simply to accept that these positions are on the frontiers of reason's
capacity to understand and—at least for the time being—mysterious.
Before moving to the last topic of importance in Michalson's interpretation of
Religion, it is important to understand the essence of his characterization of Kant's
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solution to moral regeneration. Michalson holds that Kant's commitment to divine
assistance must simultaneously mean 'restoring the predisposition to good to a position
of preeminence'.64 The predisposition to good, for Michalson, is the ontological and
original state of humanity prior to the exercise and fall of the will. He characterizes
Kant's position as a 'metamorphosis' that moves from 'comments about moral
regeneration ... into the moral psychology of an agent in the grip of radical evil'.65 The
whole discussion can be regarded as a mere descriptive of 'the religious self [which]
learns something about itself rather than something about a state of affairs outside of
itself.66 There is a 'fragile balance' in Kant's position, leading to confusion in the mind
of the reader as to exactly that Kant would have us believe: 'on the one hand, Kant does
not want to place the emphasis on the theoretically dubious beliefs about states of affairs
outside the believer; but on the other hand, he is admitting that radical evil requires the
believer to hope for outside aid in ways that seem to entail certain religious beliefs'.67 If
we are to make sense ofwhat Kant seems to be implying, then understanding his appeals
to divine grace might simply be considered heuristic devices 'employed to produce a
specific moral result and then dropped as, in itself, a matter of indifference'.68
Michalson takes it as obvious that Kant 'somehow translates the appeal to the
figure of Christ into an appeal to our own autonomy'.69 There is in Kant's account no
'ready-made existence of a disposition totally well-pleasing to God, but the existence of
radical evil', and only radical evil 'could produce "difficulties" opposing the reality of
the personified idea of the good principle'.70 Put into the context of 'the problem of how
a defective disposition can, through its own resources, regenerate itself ... and the
problem of the "surplus," concerning the offsetting of debt accrued since the fall into
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radical evil', we have indications for why Kant moves decisively away from pure
philosophy and towards the adoption of biblical claims.71 'The key element in Kant's
solution to the problem of surplus is the universal, rational, archetypal character of this
quality that makes Christ the Christ'.72 For Michalson, the only way Kant can account
for autonomy in the process of moral regeneration and the importance of the archetype
of perfect humanity is to trade on the implicit suggestion that the historic Christ is in fact
a manifestation of universal good. 'The archetype possesses its reality prior to any
historical manifestations, but it so happens to have been made manifest in Christ. Kant's
account amounts to a kind of logos Christology, ethically conceived'.73 Kant not only
borrows from the Christian narrative, says Michalson, but also requires belief in the
person and work of Christ as the means of resolving the problematic of radical evil and
dispositional punishment. The implicit appeal to a rationalistic conception of Christ to
resolve the problem of the surplus is grafted onto what Michalson takes to be 'a rather
awkward theory of punishment for the sin of an evil disposition. [Kant's] specific aim is
to offset the third and last difficulty facing the objective reality of the personified idea of
the good principle. In doing so, he simultaneously produces his autonomous
atonement'.74
The anatomy of Kant's account of atonement is illustrative of how Michalson's
interpretation ofKant works itself out. There are judicial punishments applicable to each
stage of dispositional development that Kant's commitment to symmetry seems to
require. The former disposition requires punishment that the renewed disposition does
not deserve, while the renewed disposition, though on a path ofmoral improvement, still
requires a punishment that Kant seems to believes it can escape. Michalson recognizes
that Kant's theory appears to hinge on punishment 'occurring "during" the change of
heart', but he is not sure what to make of this solution. It appears to him that 'the aspect
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of "duration" here seems to rely on the idea that, for an unspecified period, the moral
agent is neither fully good nor fully wicked—in stark contrast to his more typical
admonition that it is "of great consequence to ethics in general to avoid admitting, so
long as it is possible, of anything morally indeterminate ..." (p.22; p.18)'.75 Kant has
essentially 'boxed himself in: the solution to the problem of the surplus of debt requires
a punishment, but the punishment itself requires a linkage between the moral and the
temporal that strains against other features ofKant's philosophy'.76
In order to understand Michalson's account of Kant's resources for resolving the
problem of atonement in Book Two we must recognize that Michalson suspects there is
neither a unified moral disposition in Kant's philosophy nor an actual personification of
the good principle free of the historical belief in the Christ for its atoning significance. In
his own words, 'One of [Kant's] framing premises, after all, is that the punishment
cannot be justly visited upon the agent possessing a regenerated disposition ... [and] if
the regenerated disposition is the necessary precondition for the departure from evil, it is
77
not clear where Kant can locate the punishment without overriding his own premise'.
This conclusion is the inevitable result of Kant's commitment to the reality of human
autonomy and radical evil, and it forces him to find a solution in an appeal to biblical
language. Reason has run out of resources.
This appeal, as indicated above, leads to what Michalson takes to be an
impossibly awkward and c umbersome doctrine of atonement. The i ssue o f the b efore
and after dispositional state of the human being who has converted to the good yields the
need to punish the person(s) piecemeal. Regarding the punishment of the 'old man',
Michalson concludes, 'Evidently, Kant's point is that, following moral conversion, the
struggles, trials, and temptations that the "new man" faces—faces precisely by virtue of
• ... • 78
having become good again—are viewed as punishments for the earlier self. The
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punishment of the 'new man' who is finite and still 'affected by sensuous inclinations'
complicates the matter; this punishment 'must attend moral regeneration if Kant's
rational standards are to be observed'.79 Only by appeal to this complex 'cluster of
insights' can Kant walk the 'narrow path' of maintaining his prized principle of
proportionality and thus be 'fair' to all the dispositional states concerned. In order to
unify what has become an exceedingly cumbersome account 'Kant effectively fuses
atonement and autonomy'.80
Michalson understands Kant's appeal to 'the Christ principle' to be both the
crucial moment of solution to the dilemma facing his philosophy of religion with the
emergence of radical evil, and the 'surprising' and 'odd' blend of the rationalistic and
the christocentric that makes his solution so difficult to follow and troubled in its
specifics. 'Kant's christology is integral to his overall theory of radical evil, for it is the
debility produced by radical evil that requires the christological account... [and] there is
no problem reconciling Kant's view of Jesus with his overriding rationalist principle,
since the thing that makes Jesus the Christ is an archetype residing in all rational
beings'.81 Despite the positive currency that the Christ principle affords him, Kant is still
saddled with a gap in his thinking that is not so easily filled: 'the capacity of Jesus to
break the power of the evil principle to hold rational beings against their will—is not so
easily absorbed by the rationalist religious insight'.82 He puts the point this way: 'The
sheer fact that it is at least plausible to argue that, in one limited sense, the completion of
Kant's rational religion requires an appeal to a specific historical figure, indicates the
XT
depth of the problem into which his theory of radical evil has led him'.
The whole matter comes to a head in Kant's search for the 'surplus' required to
offset the accrued debt from the original fall into radical evil. The way Michalson sees it,
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the problem all along has been that the inexplicable act producing moral
conversion cannot offset or pay off the moral debt acquired ever since the
original fall into radical evil. Whatever else we can or cannot say about the act
leading to conversion, we can at least say that is was obligatory in its own
moment and cannot serve to offset the accrued debt. Kant's search for the
"surplus" that will offset the debt culminates in the conception of ongoing,
temporal punishment I described earlier.
This search for the surplus also necessitates Kant's appeal to grace, for it 'is itself a
profit which is reckoned to us by grace' (6:75). Michalson takes the whole appeal to
grace a s ambiguous a t b est a nd a s ymptom o f' the i nstability r unning t hroughout h is
entire discussion of moral regeneration'.84 Fundamentally necessary to Kant's entire
account is a clear understanding of 'the payment of this punishment to produce the
needed surplus' and this payment leads to 'his theory of the possibility ofChristology ...
• 85
[which] quite literally becomes a theory of the possibility ofmoral regeneration'.
III. Religion as a Province of Meaning and the Primacy of Practical Reason in
Kant's Religion
In t his s ection and t he next, w e r eturn t o t he interpretations o fR onald G reen,
Adina Davidovich, and Stephen Palmquist with specific reference to the interpretive
difficulties noted in the previous section. We will ask these interpretations—individually
and collectively—to make sense of Kant's arguments in Religion and to provide an
exegetical framework in which the text's more difficult passages can be explicated. Each
of the interpreters presented in Chapter One believes, with varying degrees of assurance,
that their interpretation ofReligion allows it to stand as a complete and coherent work of
religious philosophy. After assessing just how these interpretations claim to be useful in
overcoming the concerns readers tend to have about Religion, I will argue that, on their
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own, none of these interpretations actually resolve the most difficult exegetical
problems.
Turning first to an interface of Adina Davidovich's interpretation with
Michalson's objections, we must backtrack and consider the way in which the previous
Critiques prepare the way for Kant's thinking on religion and theology. She is convinced
that 'central elements of [Kant's] system ... have been obscured by an overzealous
portrayal of his thought as a rigoristic abstract formalism'.86 'Like many theologians of
our time', she writes, 'Kant refused to ground the validity of religious vision in the
authority of revelation or tradition and insisted that we cannot know if our thought about
God corresponds to ontological reality'.87 This does not mean, however, that religion is
meaningless or that we are unable to think and speak of God in meaningful ways.
Important to her interpretation of Kant and his relationship to theology is that thinking
and speaking about God are not exclusively linked to the moral enterprise. At work in
Kant's thinking are at least three different theological models, each useful in its own
right, which 'aspire to find a universal role for faith that is rooted in the predicament of
finite and subjective beings'.88 They are 'ethical postulation', 'imaginative projection',
and 'contemplative construction'. While the first is clearly dependant on Kant's moral
philosophy, the other two are derived from resources found primarily in the third
Critique. It is the last of these three models, the one farthest removed from Kant's moral
philosophy, that Davidovich will go on to utilize in her interpretation ofReligion.
The theological model called 'ethical postulation' constructs theology on the
basis of the moral 1 aw and the ultimate moral end—the Highest Good. ' [In order to]
protect the practice of morality we must cultivate trust in a divine being who will assist
• • • on
in the realization of the ultimate moral end'. This model has come under some attack
because it attempts 'to derive the rationality of faith from an alleged duty to pursue
86
Davidovich, 'Kant's Theological Constructivism', 323-324.
87
Davidovich, 'Kant's Theological Constructivism', 324.
88 Davidovich, 'Kant's Theological Constructivism', 324-325.
89
Davidovich, 'Kant's Theological Constructivism', 326.
94
happiness which, together with virtue, comprises the ideal of the highest good'.90
Davidovich defends Kant's use of this model by limiting what it purports to show. She
argues that the use of the Highest Good in theological construction can show faith to be
rational, but not rationally necessary. The main reason is that realizing the Highest Good
cannot be shown to be a duty; it is a regulative principle that guides us in moving from a
formal moral theory to a theory of ethics. According to Davidovich, a 'better reading [of
Kant's theory of the a priori nature of the moral law] observe[s] that practical reason
regulates activity n ot b y g enerating a bstract p recepts from t he categorical i mperative,
but through licensing maxims that express interests of finite beings'.91 This
understanding of the categorical imperative sees it as a regulator of given maxims and
not the generator of particular maxims. The process of generation presupposes
happiness at the moment of deliberation. The best argument Kant gives for including
happiness as part of moral deliberation, according to Davidovich, involves the concept
of justice. If, in our thought experiments, we conceive of a holy and omnipotent rational
being (God), the concept of justice makes a proportionate understanding of happiness
and righteousness the only bearable (viz., rationally consistent) option.
The theological model called 'imaginative projection' arises in 'Kant's struggle
• • • 92
to respond to the predicament of a person in moral deliberation'. In a manner
reminiscent of Ronald Green, Davidovich asserts that the dynamics of a person's
conscience when in moral deliberation lead us to 'experience our conscience [itself] as
an authoritative figure watching over us'.93 Our personified conscience, complete with
the characteristic of omnipresence, acts 'as a figure from which nothing can hide and
from which we cannot run away'.94 As Kant put it in Metaphysics ofMorals, 'a man
constrained by his reason sees himself constrained to carry on as at the bidding of
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another person\95 Davidovich adds that 'In fulfilling its function, conscience must
project itself outwardly as an image that takes on an uncanny resemblance to the
traditional biblical idea of God'.96 Where Green understands the empirical fact of human
religiosity and specific beliefs that have emerged within the social/cultural nexus of
human affairs to be inherent in Kant's position, Davidovich argues for the purity of
imaginative projection in conjunction with a definite movement in Kant's thinking
toward 'contemplative construction'.
Davidovich points to the third Critique in support of the projection model and to
the connection between the third Critique and Religion for the contemplative
construction model. In the third Critique, Kant argues that 'it is at least possible to
assume a being [that exists] apart from the world, and that legislates morality, and to
make this assumption without any concern about theoretical proof, let alone selfish
interest, but on a basis that (while indeed only subjective) is purely moral and free from
all foreign influence: on the mere recommendation of a Practical Reason that legislates
only to itself (third Critique, 334-5/445-6). Davidovich believes that 'Kant took pains to
clarify that this imaginative projection does not entitle us to suppose that such a supreme
being actual exists outside ourselves'.97 The idea of God formed by the projection of our
conscience, far from mere fantasy however, can be judged by its usefulness for the
moral life. This criterion for theological construction is recommended by practical
reason and brought to completion by judicial reason. If one idea of God is more
adequate in its support of our moral volitions than another, it should be judged rationally
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In Religion, Kant takes the 'projection' argument a step further by describing the
idea of a Highest Good as a social reality that can and should be realized in this world.
This can happen only ifmoral agents, in the spirit of mutual cooperation, combine their
limited powers in a common enterprise of seeking the Highest Good. Kant recognizes,
however, that this necessity has a stumbling block: the reality of human nature points to
evil. Citing the opening arguments of Book Three in Religion, Davidovich argues that
humans are more likely to corrupt each other's moral dispositions than to cooperate in
the realization of the kingdom ofmorality. 'To overcome [the difficulty posed by mutual
corruption in the social make-up of humanity], people must form a social alliance
uniquely designed to combat mutual corruptability. This can be done only through
theological constructivism'.98 It should be noted that Davidovich's interpretation
emphases Kant's focus in Book Three on the moral community and the future prospect
of developing an ethical commonwealth, rather than the more controversial and difficult
passages in Book Two. Theological constructivism is based on the collective
understanding of aesthetic feelings united with teleological concepts, not on moral faith
or redemption. Davidovich calls this process 'contemplation'.
This third model of theological constructivism is based on the subjectivity of
feeling and the process of individual and communal reasoning in dynamic relation: 'The
contemplative idea of God that this model suggests is a necessary correlate of both
moral decision and the scientific quest for truth'.99 Davidovich understands
contemplation to be the imaginative middle ground between theory and practice,
resolving the problem of unity that neither theory nor practice could resolve on its own.
For Kant, contemplative construction means creating a unifying concept or ultimate
reference point for reason that, as in his theory of aesthetics, is indifferent to the
existence of its object. Since neither theoretical reason nor practical reason in the first
two Critiques provides resources by which to reconcile the apparent disparity of nature
and freedom, the third Critique had to 'establish the transcendental unity of the realm of
98
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freedom and the realm of nature'.100 This endeavour leads Kant to the conception of
faith as a reflective contemplation on the idea of a moral designer of the universe,
linking it directly to Kant's understanding of the idea of the Highest Good.
In Kant's analysis of three applications of the faculty o f reflective judgement,
namely, aesthetic judgement, scientific belief in the empirical laws of nature, and the
method of biology, humans use reflective judgement to detect purposive order in natural
objects. This involves 'a contemplative idea of a supernatural substrate of reality that
bridges the gap between freedom and nature'.101 Although we cannot establish the
existence of God, Kant believed that 'we are justified in claiming validity for our
contemplative thought about [a moral designer of nature]'.102 Reason is compelled to try
and understand the purposiveness that it feels in nature. There is thus a dynamic
relationship between aesthetic and reflective judgement. 'Even though the aesthetic
judgment does not rely on determinative rules and concepts of theoretical reason, we
nevertheless require universal assent to our judgments of taste'.103 Such universal assent
carries with it a rationale to understand this felt purposiveness. Davidovich writes, 'Kant
believed t hat the critique o f taste s hows t hat o ur feelings o fp leasure i n t he b eautiful
object commit us to thinking about a possible supersensible substrate, in which the unity
of givenness and purposiveness resides'.104
The discursive process of understanding in the third Critique presents itself as a
weaker form of judgement than we find in the first Critique. Where the first Critique
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requires intuition and concept in synthetic union, the third Critique requires only
aesthetic and teleological judgement contemplatively combined.105 Just as everyone will
not likely agree with any single judgement that an object is beautiful, everyone will not
concur with my reflection on God and the Highest Good. Nevertheless, the dynamic
union of aesthetics and reflection in the form of contemplation 'conveys my conviction
that everyone ought to agree with it'.106 Contemplation is a reflective process aimed at
coming to some understanding of God and the Highest Good, and is necessary to fulfil
the need of reason for systematic completion and experiential harmony. 'Thus, the
analysis of the faculty of reflective judgment lays the foundation for a justification of
faith as a reflective contemplation on an idea of a moral designer, an idea we construct
as a necessary correlate of various employments of reflective judgment'.107 For
Davidovich, therefore, 'Reflective faith is a necessary correlate to both scientific and
moral visions of human life as it secures their much-needed integration in a
comprehensive worldview'.108
It is this vision of Kant's philosophical programme that she carries with her into
the reading ofReligion. In her essay 'How to Read Religion within the Limits ofReason
Alone', Davidovich posits 'that Religion is, in essence, a concrete elaboration of Kant's
more abstract discussion of the reflective thought (contemplation) about God, an idea
which is the main focus of his third Critique'}09 Utilizing third Critique resources, she
supports her thesis by arguing that reason has three powers (as opposed to the
conventional two)—the power of reflection along with the powers of understanding and
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the moral will. The power of reflection bridges the gap between theory and practice by
providing a necessary link between these two domains. She recognizes that the common
approach to reading Religion is to understand it as correlative to Kant's moral
philosophy. It is this approach, she believes, that leads quickly to problems of
coherence—problems that quickly become the kind of textual morass identified by
Michalson. Her emphasis on the third Critique promises to smooth over many of these
difficulties: as she puts it 'Many themes in Kant's discussion of religion, especially his
notion of grace, which have taxed the exegetical ingenuity of his interpreters, emerge as
elliptical allusions to doctrines he developed in third Critique',u0
After outlining the three degrees of evil and the acute psychological difficulties
associated with them, Davidovich turns to the much-maligned concept of Kantian grace.
Though she admits that the admission of grace clearly signals new frontiers for Kant, she
suggests that Kant has at least two good reasons for moving in this direction: first, Kant
'brings to the fore the realization that in order to overcome evil and sin, we must
undergo a total change of heart', and second 'Kant's speculative question reflects the
fact that humans cannot avoid asking themselves what they may hope for in life'.111 At
the heart of Religion is a problem of concern to the moral dimension of human
experience, namely, that humans require a change of heart in order to act upon their duty
in a world full of competing prudential concerns. In order to solve this problem, we must
address the question of hope, employing resources available in Kant's judicial
philosophy. Given the phenomenon of sin and our duty to aspire to a moral
commonwealth, Kant confronts certain questions that reason must answer: 'Can we
reform our hearts to moral perfection? Can we ever regard ourselves worthy members of
the kingdom of morals even though we have all sinned? What punishment do we
deserve for our past sins and how can we atone for them?' Such questions are beyond
the reach of reason (in its theoretical or practical employment) to answer; nevertheless
reason must ask them and needs to answer them. Thus, Kant's philosophy is driven
110
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toward answering questions usually reserved for theology—driven, we might add, by its
own internal momentum. 'This,' according to Davidovich, 'is the task of religious
reflection'.112
Davidovich's movement to religious reflection reflects her belief in the three¬
fold structure of Kant's philosophical programme as explained in Chapter One. Her
strategy for supporting this turn to reflection is based on Kant's insistence that there are
certain questions—those mentioned above for example—that reason must address lest it
be shown impotent in dealing with life's most pressing concerns. Kant puts it this way in
Religion-. 'Thus the investigation is only an answer to a speculative question, but one
that cannot therefore be passed over in silence, since reason could then be accused of
being absolutely incapable of reconciling the human being's hope of absolution from his
guilt with divine justice, and this accusation might be disadvantageous to reason in many
respects, most of all morally' (6:76). Dealing with these questions leads us to reflect on
possible solutions. The point of this reflection is not to determine answers with anything
like certainty; the idea is to bridge the gap between nature and freedom with reflections
on or visions of hope. This, in Davidovich's estimation, is what Religion is all about.
Thus, Kant is not appending new elements to his moral theory or flirting with empirical
theology in a way contrary to his theoretical philosophy. On the contrary, Kant is
reflecting religiously on possible solutions to the problem of sin and the question of
hope.113
This is precisely why Kant is justified in appealing to divine aid. Davidovich
suggests 'that it is only in light of his discussion of the reflective recognition of the
transcendental unity ofNature and Freedom (in the third Critique) that Kant can appeal
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(in Religion) to divine assistance in the perfection of the human heart'.114 Reflection is
the key to understanding the coherence o fKant's appeal todivine aid in spite ofhis
insistence on moral (and even regenerative) autonomy. 'Reason can adopt the idea of the
supernatural c omplement to m oral insufficiency, neither i n maxims of thought nor in
maxims of action'; instead 'Kant maintains that it may be available to the good will' and
'that this belief of Reason, this faith, is reflective''.115 Whatever Kant means by making
divine aid available to the good will (and this Davidovich holds to be enigmatic in
Kant's work), reflective faith is to be understood as a non-dogmatic complement to
reason in its quest for moral hope. Kant writes,
'And if in the inscrutable field of the supernatural there is something more than
it can bring to its understanding, which may however be necessary to make up
for its moral impotence, reason even counts on this something being made
available to its good will even if uncognized, with a faith which (with respect to
the possibility of this something) we might call reflective, since the dogmatic
faith which announces itself to be a knowledge appears to reason dishonest or
imprudent' (6:52).
Among the varieties of faiths available through reason's other faculties, reflective faith
is distinctive: 'it may strengthen the will (Willkiir) to execute the moral decree by
providing for it a concrete vision of the final m oral e nd, a vision of the kingdom of
God'. 116
The results of this insight are important insofar as they provide a significant
rejoinder to Michalson on the coherence of Kant's account of grace. Davidovich notes
'that if we read Kant's discussion of grace (defined as reflective faith) against the
background of the third Critique, we shall realize that reflective faith in grace is a trust
that, ultimately, nature is contrived to make possible the only object which is an end in
114
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itself: i.e., a moral being'.117 In fact, when we look at the beginning of Book Two of
Religion, in which Kant begins by presupposing that the meaningfulness of the world
depends upon the possibility of its conceivability as God's creation for the purpose of
'Humanity ... in its full moralperfection' (6:60), weneed to understand that Kant is
situating his solution to radical evil not only in the moral deliverances of the good will—
whatever they may be—but also in reflection on religion as a province ofmeaning unto
itself. As Davidovich remarks, 'All that reflective faith allows us is to believe that our
nature makes our rebirth possible. Kant calls it "grace" because this reflection depends
on thinking of God as the moral designer of the universe'.118 Since the third Critique has
'determine[d] that the supreme principle of reflective judgment is a thought about a
moral governor of the universe' and reason has determined that rebirth is possible, Kant
has all the cognitive ballast necessary to support his appeal to divine aid.
In this way, Davidovich's way of reading Religion as a continuation of the third
Critique's role of bringing unity to reason provides at least one way to understand Kant
in a more coherent way. Human beings need to believe in divine aid in order to
overcome paralysing doubts about the possibility of moral rebirth and betterment, and
reflective faith allows us to picture the world as a place in which divine aid can occur.
'Kant's project in [both Religion and the third Critique] is to show that a good will is
possible, not that moral action is possible'.119 Reflective faith, however, 'cannot be
adopted in maxims of action, it does not determine the will and does not infringe on its
autonomy'.120 Reflective faith merely allows us to believe that the will, which at some
point i n t he p ast h as chosen e vil, c an b ecome g ood a gain. T his b elief i s a 1 arge s tep
towards answering the question that pulses at the heart of Kant's philosophy of religion:
'What may I hope?' According to Davidovich, 'In Religion the individual can overcome
paralyzing doubts concerning the possibility ofmoral rebirth only with reflective faith in
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divine assistance. In both books [(viz., Religion and the third Critique)] thought about
• • 191
God is reflective and non-deliberative'.
Not only is grace understood in a more coherent fashion on Davidovich's
interpretation, but the theme of forgiveness also starts to make more sense. 'Forgiveness
is no longer an arbitrary indulgence, but an acknowledgement that moral reform leads to
a better life and the realization of the kingdom'.122 There is thus 'a pedagogical role of
faith' that is important to recognize in conjunction with Kant's discussion of agency in
Religion. 'In the systematic moral works, the will was a rational will, a will capable of
determining itself according to duty. It was, however, also a will capable of determining
itself according to maxims suggested by inclination. In Religion, the will can be moral
but it can also be evil. In the systematic works the possibility was recognized and
expressed in the metaphor of the will at the crossroads between its a priori principle and
its a posteriori incentive'.123 Religion focuses on the principle of radical choice
(Willkiir), but its sources are ineffable and 'It is of paramount importance for the agent
to know if there is any way in which the scales of decision can be weighted toward a
moral outcome'.124 This is less a question of practical reason and more a question of
moral education according to reflective faith.
This view of Kant's project in Religion makes more sense out of Kant's positive
language toward empirical/historical religion. Historical religion has a pedagogical
purpose for the moral life. Concerning the will, Davidovich writes, 'The fact that we
have an inborn capacity to recognize duty and to form a moral will, does not guarantee
that we shall indeed decide to accept the decree ofmorality as our principle of action. To
establish the autonomy of morality, Kant portrays the will as a faculty that determines
itself.125 The temptation of natural incentives threatens constantly to incline the will
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(Willkur) toward sensuous inclinations. When we recognize this phenomenon, 'the
question arises as to what, if anything, can be done to assist the will in determining itself
according to duty it legislates to itself.... Historical religion is a nexus of dogma and
• • 19 ft
ritual that provides the required expedients'. Historical religion presents 'an
eschatological picture of world history' in the form of a 'concrete image'.127 Where
morality is concerned, reflection on the Highest Good remains a distant and vague
image. The will is constantly under threat from immediate and practical desires and 'the
fear that virtue is futile and may even lead to suffering'; historical religion, on the other
hand, 'depict[s] a world in which divine providence promises the final realization of
moral ends, the ideas of Reason acquire concretization in the agent's mind and are no
longer marginalized as mere idealizations that have little to do with real life'.128
If religion is a concrete example of the Highest Good, then Jesus Christ is the
concrete example of human perfection. 'Using the power of reflection, we can perceive
the events of Jesus' life as an exemplification of the moral life, and this perception
provides us with an impetus to strive and follow Jesus' example'.129 Davidovich
understands Religion as Kant's exercise in reflection on human hope in the context of
moral failure; his emphasis on the Christ-like archetype of perfect humanity and the
ethical commonwealth as the kingdom of God on Earth 'expresses Kant's belief that the
moral progress of culture depends on an ability to contemplate history as the arena in
which moral ends are realized, and on the ability to perceive particular events as
moral'.130 Grace, according to Davidovich's interpretation, is not an arbitrary granting of
mercy to those who have tried their best to obey the moral law; it is instead an
expression of faith that 'nature is ultimately conducive to the realization of moral
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ends'. Interpreters who link Religion primarily to the second Critique, and then
demonstrate that the combination of the two is riddled with inconsistencies often
overlook this point.
Davidovich has clearly captured a problem with readings of Religion that
understand it only as an amendment to his practical philosophy. Kant's overriding
concern is with the question of hope and in answering this question he utilizes resources
from o utside t he b ounds o f t he p ractical p hilosophy. N evertheless, i t i s reasonable to
question whether or not the arguments of Religion are consistent with his moral
philosophy. Clearly, Davidovich cannot be arguing that Kant's reflective faith can and
should be maintained in spite of the fact that our reflections exhibit either moral or
rational inconsistencies. Ifwe believe in God's grace and forgiveness, and yet are unable
to give an account of how grace and forgiveness cohere with what we take to be
established already, this would weigh heavily against the viability of reflective faith.
This is precisely why Michalson makes so much of human autonomy and responsibility
in the context of divine goodness and justice. In light of these considerations, what
Davidovich must mean is that reflective faith is not a stagnant faith; it is a faith in
motion, a faith constantly reconfiguring itself in light of new insights into the union of
nature and morality under one purpose.132 Such a faith, though likely to need
reconfiguration down the road, provides hope at the very moment despair threatens to
encroach. When our moral failures meet the empirical facts of existence and threaten to
overwhelm us, reflective faith strengthens us to strive toward a higher purpose. This
faith is grounded in aesthetic feeling (viz., beauty and sublimity) and understood against
the backdrop of historical faith.
Religion, by these lights, is Kant's best effort to reflect on the purposiveness he
feels in the aesthetic dimension of human experience and to articulate (or make
concrete) the religious implications of this purposiveness. All the problems mentioned in
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the previous section are genuine problems for Kant, but, on Davidovich's interpretation,
they are not problems that necessarily emerge from the critical philosophy. They emerge
instead from time and experience, and in the particular content of human imagination
and are therefore germane to the discursive intellect of humans concerned with the
question of hope. It really does not matter on Davidovich's interpretation whether or not
Kant's particular claims in Religion actually cohere with one another, only that we
believe they could cohere in some form. Of course, this removes the arduous task of
showing Religion to be coherent from the perspective of like-minded interpreters of
Religion. Coherence is, according to Davidovich, an important consideration in Kant's
thinking, but it is not the most important. Foremost for Kant in the writing ofReligion is
the process of discerning the meaning of the Highest Good, and the stabilization of
reason according to this meaning.
This interpretation, though a resourceful and useful corrective to merely moral
interpretations, is hardly satisfactory to those who argue that it is not possible to interpret
Religion as a coherent whole. They may admit that Davidovich's emphasis on the third
Critique is potentially helpful for understanding Books Three and Four. In particular, the
Divisions entitled 'Philosophical representation of the victory of the good principle in
founding the Kingdom o f God on earth' and 'Historical representation of the gradual
establishment of the dominion of the good principle on earth' in Book Three appear
especially malleable to Davidovich's insights insofar as they present themselves as
inspiring and challenging accounts of how we may envision hope for humanity in the
context of evil through promise of divine provision found in the world's religious
traditions. However, interpreters like Michalson are likely to find Davidovich's
interpretation much less persuasive in accounting for Books One and Two. When
stretched to interpret the whole ofReligion, reflective faith appears to come into conflict
with moral faith.
Ronald Green's interpretation is more convincing in demonstrating both the
primacy of practical reason and the central place of logical exactness and analytic
thoroughness in Kant's thinking. Both appear to be downplayed in Davidovich's
interpretation. Nevertheless, Green sees these attributes as among reason's most
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important v irtues a nd p art o f t he d rive t hat a nimates v irtually e very a spect o fK ant' s
philosophical programme. Practical reason is crucial in this regard and it is difficult to
overestimate its importance in Kant's thinking. It is practical reason that allows Kant to
answer the sceptic of religious faith. Green argues that 'Kant's response to the strict
empiricist's position [on religion] is not waged at all on the empiricism's terrain, the
terrain of theoretical reason, but from the opposing side of practical reason'.133 This is
one reason why Kant believed in the primacy of practical reason, 'because every interest
is ultimately practical, even that of speculative reason being only conditional and
reaching perfection only in practical use'.134 According to Green, even theoretical
reason's purpose is practically oriented 'to comprehend nature's causal sequences in
order to facilitate our command and control of the environment around us'.135 For these
reasons, it should come as some concern to readers ofReligion that the book appears to
threaten the coherence of Kant's thinking on the moral enterprise. When Kant's moral
philosophy is actually employed (or, as Kant puts it in the Preface to the third Critique,
when nature and freedom are considered simultaneously), problems emerge for
understanding morality that reason must address lest it be dubbed ineffectual in dealing
with life's most basic problems.
Clearly, Green is right to emphasize the importance of practical reason. Practical
reason gives theoretical reason a purpose and at the same time moves reason beyond
purely empirical concerns.136 Practical reason has objective resources especially
designed for addressing the problems and answering the questions from the theoretical
philosophy. However, these resources come with some restrictions. Green lists three
rules which govern the ventures of practical reason beyond empirical reason: 1) it cannot
oppose theoretical reason, 2) it cannot contradict theoretical reason, and 3) it must move
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beyond empirical knowledge in a minimalist way.137 Green also adds that practical
reason must recognize that its knowledge is not knowledge in the empirical sense, but a
kind of practical knowledge. Kant refers to this practical knowledge as 'faith' or 'pure
rational faith'. It is, according to Green, 'no less objective and valid than that produced
• 1 T8
through experience'. We know freedom and the moral law, and by extension we know
of the real possibility of the Highest Good even if it cannot be proven to obtain in this
world. Says Green, 'practical reason can be content with the affirmation only of the real
1 ^0
possibility of the Highest Good and does not require absolute proof of its reality'.
This is true of other beliefs as well. 'I can act rationally if I obey the moral rules and at
the same time hold certain beliefs not supported by experience'.140 Green calls these
beliefs 'religious beliefs'. Religious belief is mustering the cognitive self-assurance that
moral obedience is valid in the face of empirical indifference and that the religious
resources of our world are sufficient to meet whatever moral challenges we might face
in nature.
As a rejoinder to Davidovich's interpretation, Green's interpretation has the
inherent strength of emphasizing the force ofKant's desire to be logically consistent
along with the primacy of practical reason.141 These appear crucial to the establishment
of a firm philosophical foundation for theology in Kant, and Green appears to be correct
on these points. His view also accounts for grace to a certain degree by softening Kant's
moral philosophy to include the legitimacy of selfish action and providing a place for
prudential reasoning. Grace becomes a potential object of rational religious belief to the
extent that it balances the scales of moral conflict and completes the logic of relating
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nature and freedom on practical terms.142 Nevertheless, the way Green understands
practical reason in Kant shows limitations regarding how we are to understand Religion.
Green avers that practical reason culminates in the religious belief that acting morally is
the only rational course of action in difficult situations.143 Acting immorally, on the
contrary, occurs because, in the actual employment of our radically free natures, there
are occasions in which we choose to act irrationally. For Green, acting immorally is
tantamount to acting irrationally—or, at least, with a strong sense of flawed practical
reasoning. This, however, appears to b e some distance from Kant's p osition in B ook
One ofReligion. There, Kant is unequivocal: evil is both innate to and freely chosen by
the human species.
Glaringly absent from Green's understanding of Kantian religion is a detailed
explanation of the doctrine of corruption. For Green, Kant's notion of corruption is best
understood as a break in the logical precision of reason and the will to act on such a
break.144 For Kant, however, the disposition itself—that aspect of the human person that
grounds action and secures dignity—is evil. This more ontological doctrine of
corruption remains one of the most remarkable features of Religion and, as we have
seen, precisely how Kant arrives at it is a perennial matter of dispute. Michalson notes,
with some reservations, that Kant arrives at the ontological dimension of human
corruption because of his more formal account of morality. Green's interpretation,
however, never fully accounts for this dimension—perhaps assuming with other
traditional interpreters that Kant is here dribbling on his philosopher's cloak or showing
signs of senility. For Kant in Book One ofReligion, humans are 'evil by nature' and this
142 'We can think of religion as the effort to utilize a possible but unknowable domain beyond our
experience as a way of rationally harmonizing ... those demands of our reason which must be affirmed but
which ... remain contradictory'. Green, Religious Reason, 117. According to Green, grace is a
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means that something fundamental to the human species is prone to evil. Kant calls this
proneness 'a propensity'. It threatens the very possibility of realizing a good disposition
and presents a problem, the solution to which is the primary argumentative thrust of
Religion.
IV. Palmquist's Religious Interpretation ofReligion
Like Davidovich, Stephen Palmquist thinks that Religion must be understood
from the point of view of the third Critique.145 The unity of reason, as nature and
freedom are considered simultaneously, is a third Critique problem and one that
occasions Kant's arguments in Book One ofReligion. Yet, in agreement with Green, he
wants to maintain a sense of primacy for practical reason, even in inquiries under the
auspices of the third Critique. According to Palmquist, practical reason, among reason's
finite employments, is central to Kant's thinking and must not be supplanted in this role
by the transition to judicial reasoning. What makes Palmquist's interpretation of
Religion significant, beyond Green and Davidovich, is that he affirms the depth of
human corruption present in the arguments of Religion and yet utilizes resources
throughout Kant's critical philosophy to help understand it. Theory's important
advantage over practice lies in its immunity from the implications of the judicial
philosophy. The problem of unity, as it manifests itself in Book One ofReligion, is not a
threat to the theoretical reason, but is clearly a concern for practical reason. Practical
reason is the harbinger of reason's ultimate interests. The question of unity, which
justifies the very existence of the judicial philosophy, poses a problem for the interests
of practical reason. Why should we act morally when justice all too often appears absent
from this world and the hope of divine justice, it seems, is not apparently justified? Kant
feels obligated to give an account of religion in which the concerns of the moral life and
145 'That [Religion] is organized according to such architectonic patterns comes as no surprise, if, as I
suggest in [Kant's System of Perspectives: 96], this book constitutes part of Kant's philosophical System.
To view it as such—i.e., as an alternative, or complement, to [the third Critique]—involves the judicial
rather than practical (as Kant's emphasis on morality seems at first to indicate)'. Palmquist, Kant's
Critical Religion, 148.
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divine justice play a central role, all the while taking it as given that the arguments of the
theoretical philosophy remain intact.
Palmquist's approach to Kant's philosophy of religion is unique in that it begins
by focusing on Kant's plan for the development of a transcendental theology. Palmquist
argues that 'even though Kant begins his theology on an essentially negative theological
note, believing he has been able "to discover the fallacy in any attempt [to prove God's
existence theoretically], and so to nullify its claims", he nevertheless devotes
considerable effort to the task of showing how an honest recognition of the limitations of
human reason leaves ample room for drawing affirmative theological conclusions
concerning God's existence and nature'.146 He points out that 'the failure of the
traditional proofs does not settle the issue of God's existence, but poses one of the most
important problems for Critical philosophy to solve'.147 According to Palmquist, it is
important to root our understanding of Kant's transcendental theology in the first
Critique and understand his subsequent reflections on theology as a development of the
conviction that God is the transcendental ideal or the ground of being. Palmquist takes
this emphasis to be consistent with Kant's overarching 'Transcendental Perspective'.
The belief in God as this transcendental ideal, according to Palmquist, makes the
later development of moral theology intelligible. Understanding God as the ground of
being in terms of faith, and linking this concept to the later development of moral and
reflective theologies, means that Religion finds a reasonable touchstone for theology in
each of Kant's Critiques. According to Palmquist, Kant is attempting not only to bolster
his moral theology and flesh out the promise of contemplative thinking for religious
purposes, but also to explore the full range of transcendental theology in Kant's later
writings. In a maneuver suggestive of Davidovich, Palmquist cites three types of
theology, emanating respectively from each of the three Critiques, in support of this
contention.
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The first type, emerging from the first Critique and dubbed 'Hypothetical
Theology', is part of what gave rise to the idea of God as the transcendental ground of
being in the first place. This type of theology is not represented in Davidovich's three¬
fold typology of Kantian theology, but is the point at which Kant initiates his plan to
establish a critical theology. Hypothetical theology 'demonstrate[s] that belief in God is
not logically contradictory, since God's existence, regarded as a constitutive part of the
world, can never be proved or disproved, on the grounds that a conceptualizable
intuition of God is in principle impossible'.148 God, in this first Critique sense, is a
regulative idea.149 Hypothetical theology, focusing on God as a regulative idea, yields
'principles concerning] how "to philosophise about nature", not how to investigate
nature scientifically'.150 Understanding God in the first Critique as a reference point for
investigating nature is a common and incorrect interpretation that is sometimes used to
cast doubt on Kant's project of transcendental theology. According to the first Critique,
metaphysics 'does not need the ideas for the purpose of natural science, but in order to
pass beyond nature' (first Critique, B395).
Hypothetical theology, according to Palmquist, establishes both the consistency
of belief in God and the regulative function of belief for negotiating the complex
questions of central concern to transcendental theology. Hypothetical theology is the
unique contribution of Palmquist's interpretation of Kant relative to Davidovich. It
provides a theoretical basis for the development of moral and reflective theologies in
Kant's writings after the first Critique. Adopting Kant's language, he calls them 'moral
theology' and 'physicotheology'. Moral theology, Palmquist argues, is 'The Ultimate
Rationale for Theistic Belief.151 If the theoretical philosophy makes it possible to
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Kant's Critical Religion, 75. According to Palmquist, there are at least two good reasons for this
recognition. These reasons do not negate the importance of theology in its other forms, but they do suggest
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believe that God exists (viz., that the idea of God as the ground of being is not
inconsistent with human knowledge), then 'the moral theology ... provides the only
adequate philosophical basis for a belief in the existence of God'.152 The emphasis on
moral theology does not compromise theoretical principles by claiming that we can
experience the reality of God's attributes. Kant is asserting only 'that, despite our
inherent ignorance of God's essence, as necessitated by the perspectival nature of human
rationality, it is legitimate for practical purposes to describe God, as long as we
• • 1
recognize the dependence of such descriptions on our own perspectives'.
Palmquist puts Davidovich's imaginative projection and contemplative
construction under the rubric of 'physicotheology'. In both cases, reflection on purpose
accounts for human thinking about God. This, of course, must be understood in the
context ofKant's theoretical objections to the teleological argument for God's existence.
Kant employs the concept of purpose in the context of the third Critique in order to
explain the harmony we feel in aesthetic experiences. On Palmquist's interpretation of
the third Critique, it makes no difference whether or not our reflections on God are mere
reflections or are directly linked to feeling and Kant's theory of aesthetics. According to
Palmquist, the second Critique (and moral theology) 'serves as the only context in which
the concept of God can be rationally justified',154 while the third Critique (and
physicotheology) 'aim[s] to establish ... an experience-based (i.e., existential)
justification of practical belief in God.155 Physicotheology does not establish theoretical
knowledge. Viewed from the perspective of the third Critique it simply makes the
the fundamental importance of moral theology for rational religious belief. The first reason is that 'God's
existence, though not theoretically provable, is nevertheless a necessary assumption for any moral agent
who wishes to conceive of the highest good as being realizable'. Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, 76.
The second is that h olding fast to G od the m oral p ostulate does not establish, as so me h ave argued, a
condition for the possibility of moral choosing. For Kant, 'only freedom has this status; God and
immortality are conditions not of moral choosing, but of regarding morally good choice as a rational
activity'. Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, 76.
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primacy ofmoral belief in the existence of God harmonious with the regulative nature of
belief established on theoretical grounds in human cognition.
Palmquist's interpretation of Kant's transcendental theology as tripartite,
developmental, and rooted in all three Critiques provides an interesting alternative to the
theologies espoused in Green's moral and Davidovich's judicial interpretation. He
identifies the first Critique as the true starting point ofKant's inquiries into the nature of
theology by focusing on both the notion of God as regulative idea and of God as
transcendental ideal or the ground of being. We can think and speak about God not
because we know God in a theoretical sense, but because we believe in him as a
regulative idea that grounds human experience, as an object of moral faith that makes
moral reasoning viable, and as the guarantee of the poetic purpose of world (i.e., the
Highest Good) according to which reason is able to harmonize nature and freedom. All
three aspects ofKant's philosophical theology find their footing in the moral philosophy,
but correspond to the 'three Critical systems' that make Kant's philosophical programme
as a whole. For Kant, the God of moral/religious faith is a 'good governor', a 'holy
lawgiver' and a 'just judge' for these very reasons.156
Because of Palmquist's holistic approach to Kant's development of the
transcendental theology, he is sensitive to the shortcomings of interpretations that
understand Religion as somehow reducing religion to morality in an eliminative way.
Eliminative reduction is when 'one special way of explaining something is not only
necessary, but self-sufficient, so that it can actually replace, or explain away all other
1S7 •
explanations'. Understanding Religion in such a decisively moral way, argues
Palmquist, makes Kant's arguments there appear radically inconsistent. It is better, in
light of the perspectival nature of Kant's philosophical programme leading up to
Religion, to see the book as an answer to the question 'What may I hope?' Therefore, he
agrees with Davidovich that the third part of Kant's plan for philosophy provides the
proper vantage point from which to appreciate Religion. Palmquist is so convinced of
156
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this p lacement t hat h e even c ontends t hat R eligion r ivals t he p rominence o f t he t hird
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Critique in Kant's philosophical system. Both books answer the question of hope, but
in Palmquist's estimation only Religion gives a systematic and satisfying answer to the
question capable of standing as 'a Critique of Religious Judgment'.]59 According to
Palmquist, '[Religion] ought to be viewed as itself a transcendental Critique of
Religion—i.e., as an attempt to delineate the boundary between true religion and false
religion by setting forth the necessary conditions for the possibility of religious
experience' }60 With this plan in mind, it is most natural to assume that Kant is
integrating aspects of all three of his theological methods.
These philosophical and theological considerations set the stage for Palmquist's
interpretation of Religion. He takes the central question of Book One to be: 'Is human
nature originally good or evil?' Kant's answer to this question, argues Palmquist, is
'two-sided'. On the one side, when we refer to the 'potential that resides in every human
being ..., then we must regard human nature as originally good'.161 Kant calls this
feature of the human person 'the predisposition'. On the other side, if 'the question
refers to the actual state of every human person in their first (and subsequent) moral
act(s), then we cannot avoid the conclusion that an original ('radical') evil exists in
every human nature'.162 Humans in this sense are 'evil by nature'. Book Two, by
contrast, asks 'How can an evil person become good?' Kant's answer here again, says
Palmquist, involves two parts. First, 'no matter how good we are, we cannot be good
enough to please God'. God is holy and perfect; we are unholy and flawed. Second,
'by acting morally we render ourselves susceptible of "higher and, for us [i.e., for bare
158 In a way reminiscent of Clement Webb's interpretation of Religion, Palmquist suggests that 'it could
replace [The Critique of Judgment] as the third Critique, with [The Critique of Judgment] then being
regarded as a supporting work'. Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, 123.
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reason] inscrutable assistance'".164 We can hope to become pleasing to God by acting
morally and by becoming susceptible to divine assistance to make up for our moral
deficiencies. Book Two, according to Palmquist, is an argument for the claim that'grace
is a necessary condition ofbecoming good'.165
Given this general understanding of the direction of Kant's arguments in
Religion, Palmquist moves on into specifics. He defines the main distinctions of Book
One under the notion of the moral disposition. As we saw in Chapter One, belief in the
existence of the moral disposition is not negotiable for Kant: it must be upheld for the
sake of our identity and dignity as humans. Palmquist's interpretation of Religion takes
this moral disposition to be at the heart of Kant's argument—the conceptual point of
reference toward which the other features of Book One point. This is no less true for the
theological elements of the book. For Palmquist, Kant in Book One is forwarding an
argument about the moral relationship between God and humanity and the prospects for
future hope in light of our inadequacies. We believe in God as the transcendental ground
of being on moral grounds; humans are creatures with moral dispositions. Kant is thus
probing the meaning of the relationship between God the moral ground ofbeing and
human beings under the rubric of hope and as a transcendental reflection on the nature of
religious experience.
Palmquist defines the generic human disposition as 'the timeless ground of a
person's maxims at any given point in time'.166 Precisely what this means is difficult to
determine. Although Palmquist seems satisfied, at least initially, with maintaining this
definition in its somewhat paradoxical state, he thinks Kant's strategy is to unpack the
meaning of the human disposition in order to get at the transcendental conditions of
religious experience and the contours of critical religious belief. Palmquist contrasts the
human disposition with what Kant calls the original human 'predisposition'. The
predisposition is 'the timeless ground of a person's maxims at the very outset of life,
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before any moral actions have been performed'.167 Palmquist contends that the human
disposition is essentially a combination of the 'predisposition' with what we might call a
'post-disposition'. When the disposition is considered in its original state of goodness, it
is thought of as the predisposition; when the disposition is considered subsequent to its
employment in nature, it is thought of as the post-disposition. This second aspect of the
disposition, P almquist t hinks, i s w hat K ant m eans w hen h e s ays h umans a re ' evil b y
nature'. When the human disposition, which is originally good, is employed in nature it
naturally inverts the moral order of incentives.
In light of Kant's double-aspect understanding of the human disposition—as
comprised of both a predisposition and post-disposition—his position on the nature of
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the human disposition is that it is a 'good or evil' disposition. The human disposition
is therefore a profoundly moral disposition, viewed either in its original state of
innocence or the existential state of evil. Between these two aspects of the disposition,
we find what Kant calls 'the propensity to evil'. Palmquist defines the propensity to evil
as the act of each individual in time of having 'actively chosen [evil] even though we are
essentially passive recipients of the "indwelling" of radical evil';169 it is the defining
feature of the moral disposition and manifests itself in the actual choices humans make
• • 170 • • •
in their encounter with the natural realm. In other words, the propensity to evil is the
fulcrum on which the moral disposition is balanced between its original state of
innocence and its existential state of corruption.
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Conceived transcendentally, the propensity to evil testifies to a hidden
'indwelling' of evil in the human species. This indwelling of evil is a feature of Kant's
argument that neither Green nor Davidovich take fully into account. That Palmquist
addresses it is part of the strength of his interpretation. Palmquist argues that the
indwelling of evil is 'a noumenal act [which] produces an evil propensity in all members
of the human race'.171 A noumenal act is by definition inscrutable and the best we can do
is locate the ground of evil in the propensity to evil.172 Radical evil, therefore, 'is a
mystery not unlike the mysteries of pure intuition and freedom, both of which Kant
regards as basic facts of human nature that must simply be acknowledged, and cannot be
proved or explained by reason'.173 Radical evil 'somehow produces in human beings a
propensity to evil'.174 For this reason, radical evil is the noumenal complement to the
propensity to evil, effecting the turn from the predisposition to the post-disposition and
creating a situation in which each human disposition must be converted to the good.
According to Palmquist, 'Radical evil converts our potential good into virtually the
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opposite: the propensity to evil', and this circumstance requires that we convert back
to the good disposition through a change of heart. This conversion, he argues, is not just
an intellectual acknowledgement of radical evil and the need to change our ways, but an
equally 'radical conversion of one's disposition'.176 Conversion must be possible
because duty demands it. Nevertheless, it is not a conversion back into the original state,
but a turning toward the good in full realization of the possibilities and pitfalls
associated with such a conversion.
Despite the sense this interpretation makes of Religion, Palmquist admits the
presence of profound paradoxes. In fact, Palmquist seems to argue that Kant's intent in
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Book One is to show that we necessarily meet with certain paradoxes from the
perspective of reason alone. On the one hand, Kant believes that it must be within our
power to obey the moral law and, by extension, convert our disposition back to the good,
while on the other hand, he asserts that despite 'a seed of goodness that still remains'
evil is ' inextirpable by human powers'. This paradoxical account of the human condition
requires that we seek divine aid as the only reasonable way forward. How even God
could provide the kind o f a ssistance that maintains human autonomy and moral self-
determination is a mystery, but mystery is part and parcel of the mysticism Palmquist
attributes to Kant. Palmquist argues that Book Two rests on another point ofmystery—
one that serves as part of the eventual solution to the dilemma of radical evil. In Book
Two, Kant holds that 'the "ideal ofmoral perfection" exists in every human person as an
"archetype" and "can give us power'".177 According to Palmquist, 'there is no purely
rational explanation for the presence of this archetype of the perfect person within us,
other than to assume it is an inscrutable gift from some higher power'.178 The ideal of
moral perfection is thus the inscrutable gift that counterbalances the scales of divine
justice. On one side, we have the inscrutability of indwelling evil and on the other the
gift of the archetype of perfect humanity.
All of this may appear folly according to the analytic logic of Kant's detractors,
but makes perfect sense according to the synthetic logic of Kant's critical mysticism.
The positing of the moral archetype does not work miracles on the human disposition by
itself, but 'faith in the practical validity of that idea which lies in our reason has moral
worth' (6:63(56)). It is an inscrutable gift ofGod that emerges out of the moral life.
Practical faith in God and the provision of the archetype 'enables a person to actively
turn away from the evil heart within and obey the moral law'.179 Palmquist's position is
that once the archetype is 'glimpsed' and 'incorporated ... into a good maxim'
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conversion or a change of heart takes place. He argues that this is not a restoration of
respect for the moral law, but a purifying of the law as the supreme ground of our
maxims. T here i s ' pain' i nvolved i n a c onversion o f t his k ind a nd ' This p ain c an b e
regarded as a kind of punishment for the past evil we have perpetrated'.181 Palmquist
repeatedly asserts of Kant's position that 'God will judge our moral constitution not by
our action but by our disposition'.182 He thinks that this coheres with God's justice
1 OT
because 'even though we are not fully good, we are regarded as good by God'. Kant's
• *184
philosophy of religion follows the dictum 'Try your best and God will do the rest'.
Just why God would be willing to 'do the rest' appears to be a third point of
inscrutability in Kant's position on religion, but one that is consistent with the tenets of
Palmquist's account of Kant's critical mysticism. We do not know why God would do
such a thing as forgive, but we feel it and can on moral grounds believe it.
When nature and freedom are considered simultaneously, we are driven to
reflection on the question of hope in the context of felt harmony. Palmquist argues that
the third Critique provides an insufficient account of this harmony and the religious
feeling that is often associated with it. Religion, as a transcendental critique of the
possibility of religious experience, offers a way forward. Palmquist calls it 'critical
religious mysticism'. Once we recognize that the human predicament is fundamentally
paradoxical, a Religion-styled narrative of evil and redemption, based on moral fortitude
and divine grace, becomes a rational answer to the question of hope. This paradoxical
solution is illustrated clearly in Palmquist's account of how individuals are to work out
their salvation. According to his interpretation of Religion, grace and works are both
required for the hope of salvation. Grace is the theoretical means and works are the
practical means. They can never be thought of at the same time, however, for to do so
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would yield a contradiction. From the point of view of judicial reasoning, the nature of
the relationship between grace and works is inscrutable. Palmquist puts it like this:
The question this raises is: What is their proper order? From one point of view,
grace must come first, because there is no way a person can erase the evil deeds
he or she has already done, and the first moral (i.e., freely chosen) action
performed by every person is evil. God must take the initiative. But how does
this happen? Kant says bare reason cannot answer this question. All we can do
is recognize the space left open by reason, which needs to be filled. Filling this
space is not an optional extra, intended only for those who need a crutch; rather,
it must be filled in some way by God's grace if a person is to become well-
pleasing to God. Naked reason cannot tell us exactly how this will happen. Only
faith, as a compliment to the inadequacy of our theoretical reason, can pave the
way for such a disclosure.
Mystery and inscrutability are the hallmarks of Palmquist's interpretation of Kant. He
gives intellectual credibility to them precisely because, for Kant, religion is rooted in the
paradoxical and ineffable phenomena of religious experience. Like Green, Palmquist
speaks of a 'space' or 'aperture' left open by reason and, like Davidovich, he argues that
human reflection must fill in the gap. His interpretation uniquely occupies this space by
appeal to Kant's belief in God as the ground of being and in the reality of the moral
disposition that stands in relationship (either pleasing or displeasing) to the living God
through religious experience.185
This is a highly dissatisfying interpretation of Religion to someone like
Michalson, who will not be content with systematic (and convenient) appeals to
mystery. S omething as crucial to a theory of religion as its account of radical evil in
human nature appears to need more tangible argumentative support. 'At minimum',
Michalson argues, 'it is not clear how Kant can legitimately make a claim about
185 This is where Palmquist's position diverges greatly from that of Green. For Green, religious belief and
discourse are not based on any kind of experience of the "numinous" in the sense of Otto. In fact,
according to Green, Otto has it backwards. '[RJeason's own requirements ... give rise to the need to
affirm the existence or experience of an enigmatic object'. Green, Religious Reason, 118.
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something as crucial as innateness on the basis of an appeal to agnosticism'. Perhaps
an occasional appeal to mystery would be acceptable, but this is not the only place that
we find mystery in Religion. Michalson thinks that Kant's use ofmystery is so pervasive
that the entire 'argumentative structure of Religion'' appears 'heavily dependent on
precisely this timely use of the argument from ignorance'.187 Palmquist anticipates this
appeal to ignorance and understands it as the natural outcome of reason at the outer
bounds of its transcendental employment. Michalson simply thinks it argumentatively
inadequate and out of step with the logical precision valued throughout Kant's
philosophy prior to Religion. On Michalson's interpretation, Kant is caught in the
dilemma of making either a coherent argument without a systematic appeal to mystery
or giving up all hopes of having any argument at all. In Palmquist's interpretation, the
relentless logic of Kant's critical philosophy evaporates into paradox in his philosophy
of religion, yet in so doing it remains true to his systematic and subtle defence of critical
mysticism.
Clearly, textual precedent exists for holding that Kant's philosophy of religion
appeals, at certain junctures, to inscrutability.188 The strength of Palmquist's
interpretation is that it anticipates these appeals and is ready-made to explain them as
indicators ofKant's 'Critical Mysticism'. However, at the end of the day, it seems that if
our understanding ofReligion only stands by way of an appeal to inscrutability, then the
charge that must be overcome is that Kant's whole procedure is all too convenient. What
Michalson has succeeded in showing is that there is an issue of convenience at the heart
of several of Kant's key arguments in Religion, and, in the context of Kant's elaborate
argumentation, it seems unlikely that he desires his philosophy of religion to stand only
on appeal to inscrutability. More needs to be done by way of understanding the nature
and extent of Kant's philosophical foundations for theology if the issue of inscrutability
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is to be overcome. In the end, Kant wants more out of his position in Religion than the
interpretations of Green, Davidovich, and Palmquist are able to grant, and therefore we
must continue looking within Kant's own writings ifwe are to grasp what Kant intended
for theology under his strictures.
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CHAPTER THREE
KNOWLEDGE, COGNITION, AND FAITH
I. Knowledge in Kant's Theoretical Philosophy
As seen in the previous chapters, there is a history of Kant interpreters who think
religion and theology are appropriately grounded in Kant's writings composed after the
Critique ofPure Reason. What is common to the three main interpretive camps is the
belief that Kant's theoretical philosophy can be combined with other parts of his
philosophical programme, particularly, its moral, aesthetic, and religious dimensions, to
establish a rational foundation for religious belief. What the previous chapter has made
clear, however, is that none of these approaches yields an account of Kant's philosophy
of religion that handles the important and very specific inconsistencies Michalson finds
in Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason.
This chapter explores the important issues surrounding knowledge and faith in
the first Critique with a view to exposing resources useful in understanding Kant's
philosophy o f r eligion. I argue that an enhanced understanding o fKant's p osition on
knowledge and faith in the first Critique gets at the root of the problem of how to
understand Kant's philosophy of religion and that understanding the difference between
how knowledge relates to faith and how cognition relates to faith enables us to posit a
solution t o t his p roblem. O ur g oal i n t his c hapter i s t o p resent c ognition a nd faith as
resources in the first Critique important to the development of Kant's transcendental
theology and show how these resources can help us to interpret Religion.
In this opening section, we explore Kant's strictures on knowledge by comparing
the work of P. F. Strawson and Henry Allison. This comparison demonstrates that the
epistemological claims of the first Critique do not provide a complete, self-sustaining
paradigm, and its incompleteness bids further inquiry into the nature of Kant's
transcendental philosophy and the development of his understanding of transcendental
theology. Sections Two and Three focus on Kant's understanding of cognition and faith
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as the point of departure for the development of Kant's transcendental theology. Section
Four posits a new hypothesis for understanding Religion based on the developments in
Kant's thinking that are linked to these resources.
Strawson does not deny that metaphysical optimism is found in Kant. In fact, he
shows that there are many places in the first Critique and elsewhere where Kant implies
as much. What he does deny is that Kant's metaphysical optimism rests on coherent and
cogent philosophical argumentation. For Strawson, the main accomplishment of Kant's
first Critique was to set philosophy (as opposed to metaphysics proper) 'on the sure path
of a science' so that it could compare favourably with mathematics and the natural
sciences. Kant's key tool is what Strawson calls 'the principle of significance'. He
defines it as 'the principle that there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful,
employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential
conditions of their application'.1 If a concept, theological or otherwise, is used in such a
way that its 'experience-situation' cannot be specified, then we are not using the concept
in a legitimate way. Kant appears to support this doctrine in the Second Chapter of the
Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgement: 'All concepts, and with them all
principles, even such as are possible a priori, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the
data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity'
(B195). According to Strawson, this is evidence that Kant's chief contention is against
the very possibility of 'transcendent metaphysics'.
Outside of the principle of significance, philosophers and theologians might
seem to have access to information about the nature of reality as it is in itself. However,
the feeling that our ideas can correspond to reality outside of our ability to specify an
experience-situation, Kant tells us in the first Critique, is the delusion of dogmatic
metaphysics. It was the singular task of Kant's critical philosophy to establish the
boundary between what can be known and what must remain unknown. 'The
transcendental concept of appearances in space [(viz., the known)] ... is a critical
1 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds ofSense: An Essay on Kant's Critique ofPure Reason (London: Metheun,
1966), 16.
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reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, ... but rather
that objects in themselves are not known to us at all' (A30, B45). His philosophy,
carrying on the insights of David Hume, acts primarily as a kind of categorical sieve,
separating the non-empirical ideas about the nature of reality from ones which c ould
conceivably obtain in some possible experience-situation. Nevertheless, says Strawson,
some ideas that are bereft of empirical significance do arise in the course of scientific
inquiry and have two discemable purposes. First, they stimulate the indefinite extension
of empirical knowledge by inspiring our quest to understand nature in all its
manifestations; and second, they make possible other forms of life, such as the moral
life, which are important for maintaining our sense of humanness. In short, a genuinely
scientific metaphysics exists only in 'the investigation of that limiting framework of
ideas and principles the use and application of which are essential to empirical
knowledge, and are implicit in any coherent conception of experience we can form'.
Strawson highlights an important duality in Kant's epistemology. 'This is the
duality of general concepts, on the one hand, and particular instances of general
concepts, encountered in experiences, on the other'.3 We must have general concepts in
order to classify anything that enters our conscious experience and if something does
enter our conscious experience it must possess general characteristics. Particular
instances of general concepts are called 'intuitions'. The combining of particular
instances of general concepts (or intuitions) with the general concepts themselves is the
process that Kant calls judgement.4 Of course, Kant is intimately familiar with the
dualism here expressed, and establishes it in Western philosophical heritage with his
famous dictum: 'thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are
blind' (A51/B75). Involved with this dualism are two faculties: the receptive faculty of
sensibility and the active faculty of understanding. The former is the source of intuitions,
while the latter is the source of concepts. This 'prepares the way', says Strawson, 'for
2
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ascribing to these faculties, as their source, those limiting features which he finds in the
notion of experience in general'.5 Kant's strictures on what counts as knowledge are
limited to this intuition-concept formula. 'Thus it seems that there is no conceivable way
in which concepts could be instantiated in our experience except by being aware of them
in space and time'.6 Space and time are forms of intuition that reside 'in us' and make
the theatre of nature in which experience is possible. 'The applicability of these notions
is, then, a further necessary condition of the possibility of anything which deserves the
name experience or empirical knowledge'.7
Now, the interesting thing about this fairly standard formulation of Kant's
theoretical philosophy thus far is that, though Strawson clearly understands it as an
advance beyond the transcendent claims of the dogmatic metaphysicians as well as the
preoccupation with the contents of our consciousness of the strict empiricists, he
• *8believes it also contains 'the seeds' of what would become a 'disastrous model'. For
Strawson, Kant's focus on the limiting features of distinctly human experience
ultimately cuts us off from reality itself. 'Of things as they are in themselves as opposed
to these appearances of them, we have, and can have, no knowledge whatever; for
knowledge is possible only of what can be experienced, and nothing can be experienced
except as subjected to the forms imposed by our sensibility and our understanding'.9
Strawson thinks it doubtful that Kant can maintain much of a separation between his
transcendental idealism and the empirical idealism of someone like Bishop Berkeley,
despite his vigorous defense to the contrary.
The reason for this close identification between Kant and Berkeley in Strawson's
interpretation has to do with the incompatibility of the principle of significance with the
doctrine of the thing-in-itself and its related concept of 'affecting'. Transcendental
5
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 20.
6
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 20.
7
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 20.
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9
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idealism, according to Strawson, is not merely the doctrine 'that we can have no
knowledge of a supersensible reality ... [but] that reality is supersensible and that we
can have no knowledge of it'.10 Kant puts it thus: 'since appearances are nothing but
representations, the understanding thus relates them to a something, as the object of
sensible intuition: ... a something = X, of which we know nothing at all' (A250, B307).
This doctrine, what Henry Allison and others would later call the 'two-world'
interpretation, 'swiftly plunges into unintelligability' and presses Kant's philosophy
towards a d ecidedly a nti-metaphysical p osition. Strawson p oints o ut s everal p roblems
with maintaining such a philosophical position, but for our purposes we will focus on
one in particular. If we maintain the existence of two worlds in our epistemic outlook,
one which is the world-as-it-appears given the constituents of human experience and the
other is the world-as-it-is-in-itself unconditioned by these constituents, and we
simultaneously assert that these worlds are in fact related because the latter gives rise to
the former by 'affecting' it, then we are forced into a contradiction regarding the
unknowability of the world-as-it-is-in-itself:
The doctrine that we are aware of things only as they appear and not as they are
in themselves because their appearances to us are the result of our constitution
being affected by the objects, is a doctrine that we can understand just so long as
the 'affecting' is thought of as something that occurs in space and time; but
when it is added that we are to understand by space and time themselves nothing
but a capacity or liability of ours to be affected in a certain way by objects not
themselves in space and time, then we can no longer understand the doctrine, for
we no longer know what 'affecting' means, or what we are to understand by
'ourselves'.11
Although Kant points out that we are unable to comprehend how the awareness of this
affecting is possible, he does not point out, says Strawson, the fact that this lack of
comprehension threatens the viability of his entire position that things in space in time
10
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 38.
11
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 41
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are mere appearances. Of course, if this is true, Kant's transcendental idealism is closer
to being identified with empirical idealism than it is to being aligned with empirical
realism.
Strawson takes the most acceptable of Kant's notions to be the principle of
significance and the possibility that Kant's programme affords a scientific metaphysics
of experience.12 The possibility of any kind of transcendent metaphysic is difficult to
establish and highly improbable on this scheme. Strawson identifies 'two attempts,
substantially i ndependent o f e ach o ther, t o s how h ow t here a rises t hat i dea o f r eason
which, with the assistance of the transformed dynamical ideas, give impetus to the
attempt at extra-empirical knowledge of God'.13 The first is 'the idea of a supremely real
being is an idea we are inevitably led to entertain by the commonplace thought of every
particular object of experience as having a thoroughly determinate character'.14
Strawson believes that there is 'no plausibility at all in Kant's suggestion that that the
entire enterprise of science is necessarily conducted under the aegis of the idea of an
intelligent creator, and that we are thus inevitably led to this idea by Reason's
characteristic search for general explanations'.15 The second is 'the idea of a supremely
wise Author of Nature is a presupposition of natural science'.16 Strawson contends that
the idea of God, as an absolutely necessary existence, absolute perfection, and ultimate
ground of everything, is a plausible contention, but only insofar as the cosmological
arguments of the Antinomies are deemed successful. Even if a moderate degree of
success is ascribed to them according to these arguments, the idea of God as so stated is
impossible to sustain.17
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 42.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 221.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 221.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 37.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 221.
17 Cf. Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 36-37 and 207-215.
130
For Strawson, the only good conclusion to draw from Kant's inability to
establish the cogency of any claim to extra-empirical knowledge of God is to declare
Kant's entire approach to philosophical theology to be illusory. Kant understands reason
as being ineluctably driven to escape the chain of causal dependence of one empirical
existence on another by assuming the existence of a necessary being that is not
contingent on anything else and also does not belong to the sensible world. Kant also
thinks that this conclusion can be inferred logically from previously stated doctrines and
premises. However, according to Strawson, there is no way to move logically under
transcendental principles from universal causal dependence of every particular existence
to the existence of something (necessary or contingent) outside of the sensible world.
Kant's belief that we simply cannot conceive of how this occurs but that it must occur is
simply an illusion of reason. 'Lacking any such conception, we are as far as ever both
from the final satisfaction of theoretical reason, which demands a complete explanation
of everything, and from the achievement of the philosophical theologian's aim of
proving the existence ofGod'.18
The only avenue left unexplored for the possibility of knowing God given Kant's
theoretical philosophy is 'the enterprise of theoretical theology' itself. 'That is the
attempt to prove the existence of God from the character of our actual experiences of the
world'.19 Strawson notes Kant's affection for the teleological argument (or physico-
theological proof) for God's existence, but also its limitations. Any theoretically
propounded argument for theology falls into a dilemma: either appeal to non-empirical
or transcendental modes of argument and be exposed to the same problem as the
cosmological argument, or depend on strictly empirical principles to form analogies and
fall short of the theological aim. For this reason 'Neither by a priori nor by empirical
arguments can the existence of a divine being be established'.20 It is possible to think
things that may in fact be true about God, but we are not able to know that these things
18
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 224.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 226.
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are true of God, and this is tantamount in Kant's way of thinking to not really having
any knowledge, or even the possibility of knowledge, at all. Things predicated of God
simply will not stick as forms of knowledge. Implicit in this assertion is a 'two-fold
... 01
negative utility to theology itself. 'If we are inhibited from asserting, we are also
inhibited from denying, on theoretical grounds, what we may have other, perhaps moral,
grounds for accepting'.22
In contrast to Strawson's analysis of the onto logical deficiencies of Kant's
philosophy, Henry Allison's interpretation focuses on the epistemological sufficiencies
of Kant's philosophy, emphasizing empirical realism and transcendental idealism as
complementary features of his theoretical philosophy. Allison begins the defence of his
interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy by casting it on the backdrop of the
traditional interpretation of Kant's first Critique. He distils this interpretation down to
two b asic i nsights: (1) t he r eal i s u nknowable; and (2) k nowledge i s r elegated t o t he
9T • • • ,
subjective realm of appearances. This interpretation of Kant combines a psychological
(or phenomenalistic) account of what we actually experience in the mind, and thus
'know', with the postulation of another set of entities that are in fact unknowable. Kant
deemed it necessary, according to proponents of this interpretation, to explain how the
mind acquires its representations in the face of the difficulties inherent in maintaining
this bifurcated position. We are appeared to, and these appearances have to come from
somewhere. Critical reasoning asserts that the philosopher cannot revert back to
21
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 226.
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Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 226. Historically, Strawson's interpretation builds on the well-known
interpretation and critique of Kant in the work of H. A. Prichard. Prichard believes that Kant's subjective
starting point forces him to maintain one of two alternatives: (1) things of experience only seem to be
extended in space and time, and this 'seeming' implies that our mental experience of extension and
duration is only an illusion (Berkeley Idealism); or (2) our representations of things really are spatial, and
this doctrine is incoherent because mental ideas cannot be extended and located in space (Cartesian
Absurdity).22 Given the fact that Kant clearly does not want to go down the road of point one, Prichard
focuses his attack on the fact that Kant's appearance talk is in fact incoherent as it stands (Prichard, Kant's
Theory of Knowledge, 116.). Unless Kant wants his philosophy to be logically driven towards a
sophisticated form of Berkeleian p hilosophy, i t r equires the kind of r ejuvenation that Strawson's work
represents.
23
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empirical idealism by just assuming that appearances are real. The basic assumption of
the traditional interpretation, as exemplified by Strawson, is that the mind can only be
appeared to by acquiring data for representation from the real (but unknown) world. The
mind has to be 'affected' by things in themselves. Saying even this about things in
themselves, however, contradicts their characteristic unknowability. Ifwe can know that
they affect representations in the mind of a human being, then we can know something
about them. This, though, is ruled out by the definition of their very nature.
Allison summarizes Strawson's position on the incoherence of Kant's doctrine of
appearance as follows:
As Strawson sees it, transcendental idealism is the direct consequence
of Kant's 'perversion' of the 'scientifically minded philosopher's' contrast
between a realm of physical objects composed of primary qualities and a mental
realm consisting of the sensible appearances of these objects (including their
secondary qualities). This mental realm, like its Kantian counter part, is thought
to be produced by means of an affection of the mind, in this case by physical
objects. Kant allegedly perverts this model by assigning the whole
spatiotemporal framework (which according to the original model pertains to the
'real', that i s to s ay, t o physical objects) to the s ubjective c onstitution o f the
human mind. The resulting doctrine is judged to be incoherent because, among
other reasons, it is with reference only to a spatiotemporal framework that one
can talk intelligibly about 'affection'.24
This is what Allison means by the 'two-world' interpretation of Kant's epistemology.
There is the world 'out there' and the world of space and time constituted by the
subject's inner state of consciousness and its sensations. It is only the latter world, the
world of appearances or representations, that we can know. It has as its source the world
out there—and that world out there is the real world—but we can only know of it insofar
as it affects our sensibilities and synthesizes with our concepts. We can never know the
real world as it truly is.
24
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Allison's critique of and rejoinder to this standard portrayal of Kant is rooted in
its failure 'to distinguish sharply between the empirical and the transcendental versions
of two generally acknowledged and closely related distinctions'.25 The distinctions
Allison has in mind are between what he calls 'ideality' and 'reality', and 'appearances'
and 'things in themselves'. Ideality signifies for Kant what is mind-dependent or in the
mind. Reality, on the other hand, signifies what is mind-independent or external to the
mind. In the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Dialectic, Kant makes the
explicit distinction between the empirical and transcendental senses of 'ideality' based
on the well known and sometimes disputed distinction between his critical philosophy
and Berkeleian philosophy. Allison argues that there is an implicit distinction in these
passages between the empirical and transcendental senses of 'reality' as well. This
additional distinction is the real key to making clear the complex nuances in Kant's
theoretical philosophy. These two pairs of distinctions, taken together, create four
separate conceptions of philosophy, two of which, can be combined to yield the proper
conception of Kant's theoretical philosophy: namely, transcendental idealism and
empirical realism.
Transcendental idealism, refers to the universal, necessary, and a priori
conditions for the possibility of experience and knowledge. Transcendental idealism is
not concerned with imagining some affecting realm and positing reality within that
realm, but instead with understanding the way in which an object as an assumed part of
the real is able to be conceived. It refers to the boundaries and constituents of knowledge
rather than to a realm of knowledge posited over and against a realm of unknowable
things. It removes the strong ontological features of transcendental realism and does so,
according to Allison, on critical and Copernican grounds that are distinct from the
empirical idealism of Berkeleianism. For Allison, 'to speak of appearance in the
transcendental sense is simply to speak of spatiotemporal entities (phenomena)—that is,
insofar as they are viewed as subject to the conditions of human sensibility.
25
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Correlatively, to speak of things in themselves transcendentally is to speak of things
insofar as they are independent of these conditions'.26
Empirical realism, on the other hand, refers to an intersubjective realm of objects
that makes up what Kant calls 'the island of truth'. It is here that rational discourse is
able to probe the depths of nature with a view to saying something true about reality as
we experience it. The real in empirical realism refers to that which is common to all
those perceivers with similar noetic structures and sensory apparatuses. This definition
of empirical realism appeals to those passages in Kant where he discusses the 'common
sense' of humankind and the language of experience that, though imperfect and prone to
err, can lead humanity progressively towards a deeper understanding of our world. To be
empirically real is to be member of that class of entities that we can talk meaningfully
about, make knowledge claims about, and make discernable arguments as to the actual
nature of the thing under consideration. This process is open to every subject on
theoretically neutral ground. Provided that our rational inquiries are motivated by a
design plan aimed at truth, a clear picture of the knowable emerges along with the nature
of our empirical access to it. It is linked to the strictly empirical distinction of seeing the
world of appearance in a certain way (subject to specifiable conditions in which the
experience as such occurs) and imagining the experience of some object in some ideal
circumstance (independent of the conditions in which the experience in question occurs).
It involves the ongoing process of seeking truth through rational and inter-subjective
dialogue. To be transcendentally ideal refers to the epistemic distinction between how
objects may be considered: In the first case, objects can be considered 'in relation to the
subjective conditions of human sensibility' or as they 'appear'. In the second case,
objects can be considered 'independently of these conditions' or as they are 'in
themselves'.
One of the key distinctions between Strawson's and Allison's respective
interpretations of Kant is that the former engenders what Nicholas Wolterstorff calls
26 Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 7.
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'Kantian anxiety'. This anxiety is based on the fact that 'we can have no knowledge of
supersensible objects through the categories' and yet 'we may nevertheless legitimately
• • • 98
think of such objects in terms of categories'. It appears difficult to reconcile the notion
of two worlds in language that can in principle be understood. Although both worlds
require spatiotemporal definitions in order to understand them in even the simplest
terms, only the phenomenal can be defined without some kind of implicit contradiction.
Ifwe accept merely Kant's principle of significance as defined by Strawson, then we are
left with a serious quandary with regards to how any kind of supersensible or
metaphysical discourse is possible.29 In Strawson's words, it 'discredits], once and for
all, the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics'.30 In so doing, 'It has a different kind of
importance as leaving room for certain morally based convictions, not amounting to
knowledge'.31
Allison's interpretation appears not to create the same metaphysical anxiety as
Strawson's interpretation, because it maintains a clear distinction between the
combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism and its counterpart
transcendental realism and empirical idealism. Allison understands the former
combination as the starting point for critical philosophy and the initial step in a
thoroughgoing analysis of human experience. When we seek the necessary conditions
for the possibility of experience, we must begin with the objects of appearance. These
are the things, when we first open our senses, about which we can say something
27 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Is it Possible or Desirable for Theologians to Recover From Kant?" Modern
Theology 14/1 (January 1998), 1-18.
28
Strawson, The Bounds ofSense, 264-265.
29 Strawson's understanding of human knowledge under Kant's theoretical philosophy is reducible to two
fundamental points: first, 'we can have some non-empirical knowledge (knowledge which does not rest on
the actual course of experience) of objects of possible experience in space and time', and second, 'we can
have no other non-empirical knowledge, and hence no knowledge at all of anything else'. Strawson, The
Bounds of Sense, 240. These implications of the principle of significance obviously create problems for
the establishment of the possibility of metaphysical discourse.
30
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immediately coherent and meaningful. The transcendental conditions, however, yield
knowledge of the synthetic a priori variety.
The key point of Allison's interpretation is that these transcendental conditions
'do not determine how objects "seem" to us or "appear" in the empirical sense; rather,
they express the universal and necessary conditions in terms of which alone the human
mmd is capable of recognizing something as an object at all'. Kant's transcendental
idealism is not a psychological thesis about how entities impact the mind to form
appearances of the real in human consciousness; instead, it is a philosophical treatment
of the conditions that govern human knowledge: We can know things as they appear
because of the 'epistemic conditions' governing the way in which this knowledge is
received.33 Examples of epistemic conditions include space and time, or what Kant calls
'concepts of an object in general', and the category of causality, which is a specific
'objectifying condition'. These are examples of what Kant, in the first Critique, calls
'necessary conditions' for the possibility of experience. However, Allison submits that a
'broader notion of an epistemic condition better captures the essential thrust of Kant's
thought'.34 For Kant i s not p rimarily c oncerned with the knowledge that c omes from
experience, but with the epistemic conditions which give rise to that knowledge. This
means it is possible, and perhaps even probable, that mathematics and metaphysics are
more important to Kant's real concerns than is empirical knowledge as such.
Nevertheless, as Allison puts it, 'Epistemic conditions must ... figure in the Kantian
32
Henry E. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1983), 9.
33 Allison defines 'epistemic condition' as follows: a condition 'that is necessary for the representation of
an object or an objective state of affairs'. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 10. Things like the
brain, central nervous system, and the senses might be thought of as epistemic conditions; although, what
Allison has in mind is not these intermediating conditions, but the constitutive ones, which are universal
and necessary. Yet, one might think of logical conditions, like the law of non-contradiction, as being a part
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rule for thinking, but not for the representation of objects'. Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 10.
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account of nonempirical knowledge'.35 The task of the critical philosopher is to find out
the nature and extent of these epistemic conditions and to seek explanations for all forms
of human experience. For, as Kant puts it, 'The possibility of experience is therefore
that which gives all our cognitions a priori objective reality' (A156, B195). This is at
once a more suggestive and metaphysically useful understanding of Kant's theoretical
philosophy than that of Strawson in The Bounds ofSense, and is crucial to understanding
the development of Kant's philosophical programme in terms of its theological
implications.36
In Allison's interpretation of Kant there is no doctrine of two mutually exclusive
worlds, because Kant's project is deemed to have been predominantly epistemic; it
shows what it is possible for humans to know of reality as it is represented to us by the
requisite receptive capabilities of the human mind. What appears to be the most
revolutionary of Kant's concepts, on this interpretation, is not a metaphysic complete
with a detailed ontology, but a transcendental methodology for establishing philosophy
on firm footing—a philosophical basis from which to do critical science and to explore
critical metaphysics, though never from the same point of view. It is a firm Kantian
commonplace that there is a boundary line between the world-as-it-appears or the
'known', and the world as-it-is-in-itself, or the 'unknown'; and that this boundary line
dismisses what Kant calls dogmatic metaphysics, which attempt to establish 'the three
primary objects of scholastic philosophy, namely freedom, immortality, and God' as
35
Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, 11. One example of this principle is found in Kant's account
of analytic judgments. According to Allison, 'the pure concepts in their "logical use" can even be regarded
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possible objects of knowledge. What is less commonly realized is that a distinctly
transcendental form of human cognition constitutes the boundary line and is a crucial
part of the epistemic conditions making experience possible.
In Strawson's more recent work on Kant, he addresses interpretations like
Allison's and summarizes two distinct interpretive theses for understanding Kant's
• • • TR
theoretical philosophy that appear c onsistent with the first Critique. Strawson notes
that, like his own interpretation in The Bounds ofSense, Allison-like interpretations deny
the logical viability of the two-worlds doctrine.39 According to Strawson, such
interpretations offer neither two-worlds nor two-realisms; instead, empirical realism is
maintained and 'we are merely offered the cautious and surely legitimate reminder that
human knowledge cannot exceed the bounds of human cognitive capacities'.40 In
Strawson's view, we are forced into entertaining one of two possibilities for capturing
the essence of Kant's critical philosophy: either empirical idealism or epistemic
idealism. The first path results from a closer analysis of what the thing in itself would
have to mean on this scheme:
If, in accordance with a purely negative concept of the noumenon, the thought
of things in themselves is to be understood simply and solely as the thought of
the very things of which human knowledge is possible, but the thought of them
in total abstraction from what have been shown (or argued) to be the conditions
of the very possibility of any such knowledge, then it must surely be concluded
that the thought is empty; for the doctrine that we can have no knowledge of
things as they are in themselves then reduces to a tautology: the tautology that
knowledge of things of which we can have knowledge is impossible except
37
England, Kant's Conception of God (George A lien & UnwinLtd., 1929), 205. Metaphysical objects
cannot be known in this way, argues Kant, precisely because they are by definition beyond the physical
and have no possible intuition corresponding to their conception.
38 P. F. Strawson, Entity and Identity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). By inverting the implications of
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under the conditions under which it is possible; or we can know of things only
what we can know of them.41
Going down this road of interpretation insulates Kant's idealism from the charge of
saying more than can be said about the supersensible or unconditioned objects. It also,
suggests Strawson, makes the 'idealism' in Kant's 'transcendental idealism' appear
vacuous—'little more than a token name'.42 It is, in a sense, more Berkeleian than
Platonic, or more empirical than metaphysical. The second path is to understand the
thing in itself as the by-product of 'the brilliant and largely persuasive demonstration of
the necessary structural features of human knowledge and experience which makes the
first Critique a work of unique philosophical importance'.43 Here we simply defer the
ontological question and understand the thing in itself as reality unconditioned and the
product of the intellectual virtue ofhumility.
Strawson essentially leaves us with a choice to either accept his earlier analysis
of the theoretical philosophy, and thereby limit the effective range of Kant's philosophy
to the empirical realism of the first Critique, or accept something like Allison's
interpretation, complete with its inherent theological vagueness, and seek clarity from
the developments in Kant's philosophy subsequent to its purely theoretical derivations.
Important to notice about the second option is that much of the metaphysical optimism
of the two-world interpretation is lost, and with it, those portions of Kant's critical
writings that appear suggestive of theological realism. As Strawson remarks, 'the
thought of a separate, transcendent realm of reality has withered'.44 What we are left
with then, as we try to hold Kant's first Critique together in the light of his competing
objectives, is a kind of fuzzy middle ground position—between not totally abolishing the
implication of two realisms in his transcendental turn to the subject and understanding
41
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that 'there may be more to the real things we can have some knowledge of, than we can,
or ever could, know about them'.45
What we learn then from Strawson's careful analysis is that there is vagueness in
the theoretical philosophy, which suggests simultaneously that theoretical knowledge is
the philosopher's 'island of truth' (i.e., a rationally defensible philosophical
epistemology of the empirical world) and that the 'vast ocean' of metaphysics must be
charted in a way other than that of dogmatic metaphysics, but in a way consonant with
the transcendental nature of reason. Evident to Strawson is that in all interpretations of
Kant's theoretical philosophy
the curtain of sense cuts us empirical beings irrevocably off from knowledge of
things as they are in themselves, yet the curtain is not, according to Kant, in
every respect impenetrable. From behind it reality, as it were, speaks: giving us,
not information, but commands—the moral imperative; and, with that,
something else: a (kind of) hope and even faith.46
Strawson's work leaves us with the realization that the first Critique, when isolated from
the remainder ofKant's corpus, does not constitute a complete system. The first Critique
alone, p er Kant's admission o f unavoidable problems surrounding God, freedom, and
immortality, and the lack of any clear indication of what the development o fhis
transcendental idealism will look like, is left wanting. It is not that the first Critique is
incoherent, but it appears on close inspection to be incomplete both in exposition and
extension.
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II. Knowledge, Cognition, and Faith in Kant's Transcendental Theology
While Kant's first Critique may not present a single definitive account of the
theoretical philosophy, it does offer a clear case for the position that God cannot be an
object of knowledge. Virtually all interpreters agree that this claim serves as a backdrop
for the intricate arguments of the Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic parts of the first
Critique, especially those well-known passages in the Transcendental Dialectic
critiquing the traditional proofs for God's existence. The claim also extends throughout
Kant's writings after the first Critique and serves to limit the way in which the rational
foundations for religious belief can be constructed. Despite the obvious theological
challenges this position presents, Kant's explanation of the transcendental feature of his
philosophy in the first Critique is decidedly open to the notion of developing a
transcendental theology. This openness can be seen in the Introduction to the first
Critique, again in the Doctrine of Method at the end of the first Critique, and sprinkled
throughout the rest of the text.
In the Introduction, Kant speaks of the natural predisposition of reason as it
'pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered by any
experiential use of reason and of principles borrowed from such a use; and thus a certain
sort ofmetaphysics has actually been present in all human beings as soon as reason has
extended itself to speculation in them' (B21). The openness to the development of a
transcendental theology is also found in Kant's admission that the transcendental
philosophy itself is not complete, and what remains to be done rests in 'an exhaustive
analysis of all of human cognition a priori' (A13/B27). Toward the end of the first
Critique, Kant confirms his plan to develop the implications of his programme into a
coherent system of transcendental inquiry: 'Under the government of reason our
cognitions cannot at all constitute a mere rhapsody but must constitute a system, in
which alone they can support and advance its essential ends. I understand by a system,
however, the unity of the manifold of cognitions' (A832/B860).
Added to the various hints throughout the first Critique regarding Kant's desire
to develop some kind of transcendental approach to theology, we encounter specific
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passages devoted to working out the details of what the critical philosophy will allow
theologically. A well-known passage is Kant's discussion of the antinomies of reason
(A405-A567/B432-B595). In this passage, we find not only Kant probing the limits of
reason where theology is concerned, but also a confidence that reason has the resources
to d eal w ith t he i dea o f G od r ationally. Kant w rites, for e xample,' Now I a ssert t hat
among all speculative cognition, transcendental philosophy has the special property that
there is no question at all dealing with an object given by pure reason that is insoluble by
this very same reason' (A477/B505). More specifically, Kant contends that 'If the object
is transcendental and thus in itself unknown, ...then we should seek an object for our
idea, which we can concede to be unknown to us, but not on that account impossible'
(A478/B506).
We even find Kant's openness to theology in The Second Book of the
Transcendental Dialectic Chapter Three, subtitled 'The ideal of pure reason' (A567-
A642/B595-B670). V ery o ften commentators focus o n S ections T hree-Six o f C hapter
Three (A583/B661-A630-B658), wherein Kant sets out to show that all types of
speculative reason in support of God's existence are fallacious. However, the context of
Kant's arguments against such proofs is Kant's attempt to display the contours of his
transcendental theology relative to their theoretical limitations. Reminiscent of similar
distinctions made in his Lectures on Rational Theology, Religion Within the Boundaries
of Mere Reason, and The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant discusses the difference
between theology 'from pure reason (theologia rationalis) or from revelation (revelataf
(A631/B659). In keeping with his subsequent work, Kant focuses on rational theology.
Interestingly, the key elements of Kant's account of rational theology in his subsequent
discussion concern his definitions of deism and theism: 'Someone who admits only a
transcendental theology would be called a deist; but if he also accepts a natural theology
he would be called a theist' (A631/B659). Regardless of where one believes Kant finds
himself in this distinction, the point here is that even after Kant's refutation of the
traditional proofs for God's existence, he still finds it necessary to discuss issues of
rational theology.
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These dispersed hints of openness to theological inquiry are telling insofar as
they i ndicate that K ant's p essimism o ver o ur ability t o g ain t heoretical knowledge o f
God from things like the traditional proofs for God's existence is not constitutive of a
pessimism regarding theology in general. Kant shows signs of optimism regarding the
development of some type of transcendental theology amidst his strictures on
knowledge. Nevertheless, we still face the question of what part of Kant's denial of
knowledge leaves room for faith. Perhaps the best way to delve into these features of
Kant's thought is to introduce them on the backdrop of a debate spawned by Peter Byrne
with his article, 'Kant's Moral Proof of the Existence of God'.47 Byrne's article presents
a direct challenge to the very possibility of a Kantian theology. He makes the case for a
fundamental flaw in any attempt to advance beyond Kant's strictures on knowledge of
God to a rationally defensible posture of faith in God. Where Strawson and Allison
mainly do exegetical analysis of Kant in order to show what Kant took to be (or should
have taken to be) the implications of his theoretical philosophy for epistemology and
ontology, Byrne's assessment ofKant's philosophy is primarily analytic, focusing on
first Critique doctrines and the difficulties they pose for grounding theological faith in
practical reason.
Byrne's main point is to challenge the logic of moving from Kant's 'denial of
knowledge' of God to his claim to establish 'room for faith'. He observes that since for
Kant 'Knowledge that God exists is in principle impossible ... it follows that we could
AS
never have any good reason for claiming to know that God exists'. Now, any cognitive
or volitional activities that depend on knowledge of 'God exists' are likewise to be
denied. If Kant's transcendental theology is meant to cohere with his position on
knowledge, any kind of justifiable faith in God is problematic. Byrne thinks there is a
fundamental incoherence in Kant's procedure: 'If one rules out knowledge of God as
impossible in principle then one also rules out the possibility of faith, where this entails
47 Peter Byrne, 'Kant's Moral Proof for the Existence of God' Scottish Journal of Theology (1979)
32:333-343. Henceforth called 'Kant's Moral Proof.
48
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believing o r t hinking t hat G od exists' .49 F or B yrne, Kant' s c lear i ntention i s t o m ake
room for faith in practical reason in spite of the fact that he has rigidly denied
knowledge of God in theoretical reason. But, according to Byrne, Kant's plan simply
does not work.
Byrne's understanding of Kant's movement from knowledge to faith boils down
to an analytic contradiction:
1) If justifiable faith in God requiring the truth of 'God exists' is possible, then the
truth of 'God exists' could in principle be established;
2) If the truth of 'God exists' could in principle be established, then it is possible to
have direct empirical evidence of God's existence;
3) Kant denies that it is possible to have direct empirical evidence of God's
existence;
4) Therefore, he likewise denies that the truth of 'God Exists' could in principle be
established and that justifiable faith in God requiring the truth of 'God exists' is
possible.
Kant essentially claims that we can deny the possibility of direct empirical evidence of
God's existence without denying that justifiable faith in God requiring the truth of 'God
exists' is possible. Byrne puts it this way: 'So what Kant is doing is denying that we can
have direct evidence for the truth of "God exists", whilst saying that we are fully
justified in believing or thinking that God exists'.50 Kant's attempt to circumvent this
deduction focuses on practical reason. For Byrne, however, 'practical considerations
[that] fully justify his faith that God exists' are not possible.51 Kant's earlier denial of
knowledge entails the simultaneous denial of any fully justifiable faith whatsoever.
49
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Contrary to Byrne, Don Wiebe argues that Kant's theology is rooted in 'cognitive
faith ... [and] can quite legitimately, even if only in a weak sense, be referred to as
religious knowledge'. Wiebe counters Byrne's concerns regarding the coherence of
combining Kant's knowledge and faith doctrines with a novel attempt to unify the two.
His argument attempts to put the two positions on the same cognitive (and thus logical)
plane. Wiebe calls practical reason 'a practical function of the same reason [as
theoretical reason]'.53 Kant's denial of knowledge in the first Critique creates a
'cognitive vacuum' or 'need' in reason and practical reason is what fills in this vacuum
or satisfies this need. Wiebe puts it thus:
Kant obstinately denies knowledge of the unconditioned. The cognitive vacuum
at the apex of our system of knowledge must remain theoretically or
speculatively empty; but not thereupon completely cognitively empty. If reason
in its theoretical use cannot fill the vacuum, perhaps reason in its practical use
can. The ideas of reason, that is, if not capable of theoretical justification may be
capable of a practical justification.54
The idea is that the inherent logic of theoretical reason leaves an empty void in
the area of knowledge. Being at the apex of our knowledge, this void has a quite
discernable shape that only the practical dimension of reason is readily able to fill. If
reason is ultimately going to be logically consistent, reason needs to perform its practical
function and fill in the emptiness at the apex of our knowledge. According to Wiebe,
if we are to avoid moral absurdity ... this cognitive vacuum in our system of
knowledge must be filled with something more than mere logical possibilities.
Certain assumptions must be made, that is, if moral experience is not to be
denied as illusory or the moral law invalid. Such assumptions or "postulates", as
Kant designates them, can neither be affirmed nor denied but can be believed or
52
Don Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution: Kant on the Nature of Faith' Scottish Journal of Theology
(1980) 33:516. Henceforth called 'The Ambiguous Revolution'.
53
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 518-519.
54
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 519.
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disbelieved—they are "mere things of faith", objects for concepts whose
objective reality cannot be proved.55
Wiebe's main point is that the 'things of faith' are able to fill in the theoretical void in
knowledge even though the 'things of fact' cannot. According to Wiebe, things of faith
are 'rational' but they do not constitute theoretical knowledge. 'Acceptance of them',
avers Wiebe, 'is not justified on theoretical grounds but rather on practical grounds'.56 In
support of his thesis, Wiebe notes an interesting passage from the Critique ofJudgement
on faith:
Faith ... is the moral attitude of reason as to belief in that which is unattainable
by theoretical cognition. It is therefore the permanent principle of the mind to
assume as true on account of the obligation in reference to it, that which is
necessary to presuppose as condition of the highest final purpose, although its
possibility or impossibility be alike impossible for us to see into.57
In the above passage, Wiebe draws our attention to the boundaries of theoretical reason
and the resourcefulness of practical reason to fill out whatever knowledge is needed to
complete reason's quest to understand. His interpretation radically disassociates
knowledge and faith according to the boundary between them, and then argues that
morality, when it fulfils its function, affords human beings a different kind of
knowledge—a lesser knowledge called practical or moral faith.
The emphasis ofWiebe's account is thus on what morality can do for theoretical
reason when its resources have run out, but its desire to know remains.58 It can help us to
55
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 520.
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57 Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 521. Cited from Hafner (1951), 324.
58
Notice, however, how Kant's emphasis in that passage is more on how practical faith in God is firmly
established because it is 'necessary to presuppose as condition of the highest final purpose'. Kant's
emphasis in the third Critique, as Davidovich has shown, is on purpose and meaning reflectively drawing
moral faith outward for the sake of meaning, rather than for the sake of knowledge. This insight is
important to keep in mind as we progress toward an understanding of the development of Kant's
transcendental theology.
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make theoretical assumptions. What reason has, thinks Wiebe, is practical evidence for
belief in God akin to theoretical evidence, even if only in a loose sense.
[The] pronouncements [of practical reason] are not to be considered as the
intuitive knowledge of theoretical reason, but rather as assumptions. However,
when pure practical reason provides reality to these assumptions, transforming
them into "postulates", some entry into the theoretical sphere is gained, but not
such as to allow us to call postulates knowledge without some sort of
qualification. Nevertheless, they are still more than mere assumptions.59
Wiebe argues that practical reason gains access to the theoretical sphere through the
aperture supplied by practical faith. This aperture does not lead to theoretical reason per
se, but instead into the wake left after the theoretical philosophy has run through the
traditional attempts to prove God's existence. Kant's so-called demolition of the proofs
for God's existence creates room for practical reason to develop a notion of God to meet
the needs of reason in a practical way.60 When we postulate God, we assume his
existence for moral reasons. Although not theoretical knowledge, this postulation is a
lesser form of knowledge based on moral considerations. It is, thinks Wiebe, an
assumption with a discernable theoretical shape and moral justification.
The main problem with Wiebe's thesis has to do with where it leads: namely,
moral faith entails knowledge of metaphysics. Wiebe writes, 'a very important
characterization of the nature of moral faith ... [is] that through it we gain, in some small
way, an extension of our theoretical knowledge'.61 In a response article, J. C. Luik
directly contradicts Wiebe's central contention that faith involves an extension of
knowledge. He points out that the principal problem with Wiebe's interpretation is that
59
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 522.
60 This outside-in approach (viz., the practical filling in the theoretical) anticipates a c entral feature of
many of the theological affirmative interpreters over the last twenty years.
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Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 525. 'Kant suggests this extension of theoretical knowledge
through practical reason as early as the first Critique'. Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 527. 'But,
whereas theoretical reason could think the idea without contradiction, it could not assume any objective
reality to it. Practical reason does give it that objective reality and hence extends theoretical reason'.
Wiebe, 'The Ambiguous Revolution', 529.
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in it 'the postulates are ... not suppositions, subjective injunctions or maxims to act "as-
if' freedom, immortality and God were real, but rather, in effect, covert extensions of
theoretical knowledge'.62 On Wiebe's interpretation, Kant's theoretical boundary line
between noumena and phenomena is either not fixed or not impregnable. For the
practical philosophy appears to be giving knowledge of things of which, in theory,
reason can know nothing. Luik points to Kant's short essay 'What is Orientation in
Thinking?' to clarify matters.
Kant places the entire discussion of the "concept of a First Being" within the
context of a discussion of the "need of reason ... to presuppose and assume
something which it may not pretend to know on objective grounds". The "need
of reason", Kant argues, provides us with nothing more than a "subjective
ground" for believing in the existence of God.63
Luik also points out that 'Kant goes on to speak of rational belief in God's existence as
"a subjectively sufficient assent associated with the consciousness that it is an
objectively insufficient assent; therefore it is contrasted with knowledge". Notice how
this claim contradicts Wiebe's key contention'.64 Luik's response to Wiebe picks up
where Byrne's argument left off, characterizing Wiebe's interpretation in terms of 'a
recasting] of Kant's denial of knowledge to make room for faith to denying theoretical
knowledge to make room for practical knowledge'.65 It agrees with Byrne that moral
faith is equivalent for Kant with acting 'as-if, but that Kant's arguments do not appear
successful in linking the two positions. Luik crystallizes this position by arguing that
there is in fact 'quite literally no Kantian theology'.66
Both Wiebe and Luik make valid points regarding Kant's transcendental
theology, but there is an instructive and quite fundamental disconnect between their two
62 J. C. Luik, 'The Ambiguity of Kantian Faith', Scottish Journal of Theology (1983) 36:341.
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positions that leads them to discuss at cross purposes. This disconnect involves the
identification of the words 'knowledge' and 'cognition'. Rolf George makes important
clarifications regarding Kant's use of the term Erkenntnis (cognition) relative to the term
zT7
Wissen (knowledge) in his essay entitled 'Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant'. He
points out that Johann Christoph Adelung's dictionary of 1793 lists ten senses for the
root Erkennen and highlights two senses of particular interest to the study of Kant. In
one sense,' the word may be translated as "to come to know," or "to know.'"68 This
sense of the term erkennen 'has become very much more common during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries'.69 For this reason, the common tendency when interpreting Kant
is to assume that cognition means knowledge without significant variances.70
Interestingly, as George points out, 'Adelung does not allow, or even mention, the
i\nominalization of Erkenntnis in connection with [the definition "to know"].' This
indicates that Erkenntnis had in Kant's time latitude of meaning that resists
generalizations.
The other sense of Erkenntnis that George thinks is significant to the study of
Kant 'requires the direct object construction; in this sense the word means "to represent
it to ourselves clearly or obscurely, distinctly or indistinctly ...'".72 Unlike the way in
which most today use Erkenntnis to mean knowledge of empirical objects, 'To have
Erkenntnis of a thing [in the time of Kant] was to have in one's mind a presentation, an
7T • ■
idea, an image, a token referring to that thing'. Thus, we should expect that cognition
67 RolfGeorge, 'Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant', in Interpreting Kant, ed. MoltkeS. Gram (Iowa
City: University of Iowa Press, 1982), 31-39.
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(followed by a noun in the genitive) still works only for certain lofty subjects, as in Erkenntnis der
Wahrheit, Erkenntnis Gottes, etc., but not for trees or ships'. Nevertheless, there is still the tendency to
nominalize Erkenntnis as knowledge. George,' Vorstellung and Erkenntnis in Kant', 34-35.
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in Kant's writings is a bigger and more flexible concept than merely knowledge in the
sense of Wissen. George makes the case that Kant's use of the termErkenntnis is in
many cases more closely associated with earlier uses of the word as a kind of mental
representation rather than a synonym for knowledge. One can have such a mental
representation or idea without the need for a corresponding intuition. He highlights
Leibniz as a key example:
Leibniz had thought that the German word Kenntnis would be a good equivalent
of the Latin terminus simplex. The suggestion of Leibniz places the word
Kenntnis in opposition to judgment: it is a term of judgment, not itself
judgmental. Similarly, Wolffe had used the expression as pertaining to concepts
and terms rather than to judgments. "When we represent a thing to ourselves, we
recognize it (erkennen). When our concepts are distinct, then our cognition
(Erkenntnis) is distinct too."74
George's point of returning to Leibniz and Wolffe is not to show that cognition is in all
instances distinct in definition from knowledge. This would contradict conventional
wisdom and make many ofKant's arguments in the first Critique virtually impossible to
understand. Instead, 'Translation of Erkenntnis as "knowledge" is appropriate much of
the time, but not because Kant used the word in the contemporary sense, but because,
quite generally, knowledge was then thought to be a felicitous kind of representation, a
sort of successful reference'.75
George dubs the theory of reference at work in Kant's mind (and in the academic
culture at large) 'the Adamic Language Theory of knowledge'.76 He describes it as
follows:
If one represented an object in one's mind by a kind of token that was really
fitting, in the way in which the names that Adam gave to things were the real
74
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names of things, then one was thought to be as close to knowing the thing as
was humanly possible. This makes understandable the close connection in
eighteenth-century philosophy between good reference and knowledge: To
know is to have a good picture, the right concept, the correct name, of a thing.
Hence the appropriateness of translating Erkenntnis as "knowledge" on many
occasions. Nevertheless, reading it always as "knowledge" not only leads to
absurdities, but effectively bars one's understanding of central concerns of the
Critique?1
According to George, 'Kant wanted to use the term Erkenntnis much in the way in
which Leibniz had suggested: We note that the two subdivisions under the term are
• • 78
intuitions and concepts, i.e., singular and general terms'. Thus, cognition can be
thought of as a judgement taking the form of knowledge, but it can also be thought of as
a terminus simplex in the sense of Leibniz; for, as Kant is reported to have asserted in his
lectures known as the Vienna Logic, only a connection of cognitions constitutes a
judgement.
George's work demonstrates that the distinction between knowledge and
cognition is very important to keep in mind as one moves through the finer details of the
first Critique—for example, he makes specific application of the uniqueness of
Erkenntnis to the derivation of the table of the categories. While George does not
examine the development of Kant's transcendental theology, it is this application of
George's insight that is fruitful for our discussion here. The occasional distinction
between cognition and knowledge opens the possibility that Kant holds a firm
distinction between faith and knowledge, but not necessarily between faith and
cognition. While all examples of knowledge in Kant's way of thinking are 'claims to
knowledge', all examples of cognition are not necessarily claims to knowledge.
The Byrne/Wiebe/Luik debate, outlined above, moves forward in its discussion
of faith and its relationship to knowledge without recognizing this possible/occasional
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distinction between knowledge and cognition. For Luik, 'God simply cannot be made an
• « 7Q
object of cognition as natural phenomena can', while for Wiebe 'since faith refers to
objects that are not capable of cognition it is based on other than evidential grounds—
OA
although to repeat, not other than rational grounds'. The language of both Wiebe's and
Luik's essays indicate that their arguments assume cognition and knowledge to be
identical. Wiebe's claim that objects of faith such as God cannot be cognized gives clear
indication that he is identifying cognition with knowledge. This forces him to conclude,
against Kant's theoretical strictures, that faith expands the reach of knowledge. In other
words, the conclusion that faith expands knowledge is the only way for him to make
sense of the crucial texts on faith. Faith has nowhere else to go in Wiebe's interpretation,
except to knowledge.
In contrast, Luik forwards arguments concluding that faith and knowledge do not
overlap in Kant's theoretical philosophy. Interestingly, however, Luik's argument
against Wiebe betrays a very similar identification of knowledge and cognition. We have
already noted Luik's contention that 'God simply cannot be made an object of cognition
as natural phenomena can'.81 This is true when cognition is taken to be identical to
knowledge, but not true when cognition is understood as the mental act of getting God in
mind. Luik writes, 'The idea of God can never be an "object of rational inquiry" as
Wiebe claims because it can never be an object in the way that natural phenomena can.
As outside space and time, and thus outside of possible experience, God is
fundamentally resistant to human understanding'.82 Luik is right in the technical or
theoretical sense of understanding as it relates to knowledge; practical faith cannot
extend theoretical knowledge. Luik is not right, however, in implicitly linking
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knowledge with cognition in all cases.83 With the assumption that knowledge and
cognition are really the same things, the logic of Luik's argument drives him to the
conclusion that faith has no room in Kant's philosophical programme.
Byrne, on the o ther hand, talks about being able to think God (or get God in
mind), and the moral inference of acting as-ifGod exists.84 The former seems to indicate
that Byrne has an implicit understanding of cognition or something like it at work in his
interpretation of Kant. We can, on Byrne's reading of Kant, 'entertain the thought that
God exists'.85 However, this is declared insignificant because Byrne feels that Kant must
link faith with Wissen. He avers that these two conclusions hardly amount to knowledge,
and, insofar as they provide no evidence for the proposition 'God exists', this 'does not
amount to faith'.86 Certainly, Byrne's conclusion is instructive if we understand faith to
be rational in the sense that it is built on Wissen (and this is the thrust of Byrne's
argument). But as we will see there is an existential feature to the rational that draws on
cognition as distinct from knowledge and gives significance to our ability to have God in
mind and live as if he is there, even in the face of theoretical ignorance.
Leslie Stevenson probes Kant's definition of faith in an essay entitled 'Opinion,
Belief or Faith, and Knowledge'. He claims faith (Glauben) has a discemable meaning,
and is a plausible concept when understood in terms of the transcendental development
of Kant's philosophical theology. Faith, Stevenson concludes, 'is holding something to
87
be true, and being practically but not theoretically justified in doing so'. The faith
which Kant understands to be involved here is of a special kind, however: 'The
conviction is not logical but moral certainty, and, since it depends on subjective grounds
(ofmoral disposition) I must not even say "It is morally certain that there is a God," etc.,
83 Luik admits that 'Kant does acknowledge that the postulate of reason is in no respect inferior to
knowledge, but this, of course, does not confer upon it the status of knowledge'. Luik, 'The Ambiguity of
Kantian Faith', 342.
84 Kant introduces the as-if doctrine in the first Critique. See A672-3/B700-1.
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but rather "I am morally certain" etc.' (A820/B857). Referring to this passage from the
first Critique, Stevenson writes, 'Here Kant strikes an existentialist note, giving us a
sneak preview of his practical philosophy. It seems that the distinction between moral
beliefs and theoretical beliefs about the supersensible is not between different
propositions, but different styles of believing the same propositions: firmly believe in a
• oo . ,
moral way, unstably believe in the doctrinal way'. If Stevenson is right, moral faith is a
viable concept on Kant's terms, although it remains to be seen precisely what 'practical
justification' ofmoral faith might mean.
There are, for Kant, objects of cognition that have no theoretical correspondence
in experience and thus no argument objectively sufficient for belief in these objects can
ever be made—they do not have objective reality (see A156). Yet there are objects of
cognition that, despite their lack of objective reality, are possible objects of faith that go
beyond mere opinion: 'I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not contradict myself
but in order to ascribe objective validity to such a concept ... something more is
required' (Bxxvi). Another way of putting Kant's point is that we can think about
freedom, immortality, and God, and have many opinions about them; however, more is
• • OQ
required to establish their objective validity in a way that matters to faith. This more,
argues Kant, 'need not be sought in the theoretical sources of cognition; it may also lie
in the practical ones' (Bxxvi).90 Throughout the first Critique Kant's clear concern is
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that we realize that what cannot be known in theory can, in principle, be cognized and
that the source of this cognition may lie in some other form of reasoning, in particular,
practical reasoning.
Kant provides two criteria for subjectively sufficient reasons to believe in an
object of cognition: (1) criteria of practical reason, which provide reasons for postulating
the existence of God according to the interests of moral reasoning, and (2) criteria of
cognition, which is grounded in the universal validity of concepts that is required of all
human reasoning. While criteria of practical reason apply only to faith, criteria of
cognition apply to reasoning about knowledge and faith alike. Stevenson writes,
As Wood has pointed out, Kant holds that both wissen and glauben are based on
grounds that are universally valid—that is, reasons that appeal to the judgement
of any rational person. They both involve conviction rather than mere opinion or
persuasion, but the degrees of conviction are different—wissen must be based
either on logical proof (deduction) or such strong empirical evidence (induction)
as to amount to knowledge beyond all reasonable doubt, whereas glauben is
based on inner faith or moral commitment. (Glauben can be even stronger than
wissen in another way, for as Kant remarked in his lectures, people have
sometimes been ready to die for their moral or religious beliefs but not for
mathematical theorems.)91
The i nternal 1 ogic o f p ractical faith t akes t he i dea o f G od p rovided b y cognition a nd
infuses it with meaning according to the universality of freedom and the moral law. This
way of understanding the 'relentless logic' of practical reason is consistent with the
work of Ronald Green, except that the aperture for transcendental theology on this
interpretation is not one opened by prudential considerations. Instead, transcendental
theology works itself outward from the theoretical philosophy according to Kant's
understanding of human cognition. Only in this sense is the moral development of
Kant's transcendental theology consistent with the tenets of speculative reasoning.
freedom is realized without 'any contradiction thereby occurring' (Bxxviii). According to Kant, freedom
'asserts its place', and with it morality is critically established (Bxxix).
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According to Kant in the Second Preface to the first Critique, 'pure speculative reason
is, in respect of principles of cognition, a unity entirely separate and subsisting for itself,
in which, as in an organized body, every part exists for the sake of all others as all others
exist for its sake' (Bxxiii). Kant's position is that all reasoning must be discursively
consistent and moral reasoning on theology advances on the work of its theoretical
counterpart only on this cognitive basis.
III. Morality, Meaning, and Kant's Existential Faith
As we saw in the previous section, human cognition allows reason to get God in
mind. We can think God and consider the world as God's creation, even though we
have no corresponding intuition of God. Yet, the movement of transcendental theology
to objective validity in a way that matters to faith requires a transition to moral
reasoning. Kant's moral philosophy makes this transition and initiates the next major
development of transcendental theology. So far, we have been considering Kant's
transcendental theology solely in terms of its development in theoretical and practical
terms. However, when nature and freedom are considered simultaneously, which
according to Kant they must, a teleological gap opens up in the critical analysis of
reason. The exploration of this gap, with its implications, constitutes the next stage of
Kant's development of the transcendental theology.
The gap between nature and freedom creates space in Kant's philosophy for the
question of meaning to be raised: Davidovich explains this as a need to know that there
is a history: 'Kant sees this as a problem that can only be answered through a
teleological principle, from the point of view of a conception of the end of history in
light of the rational Ideal of the Highest Good'. 2 Holistically speaking—that is, from the
point of view of the faculty of judgement in the third Critique—the moral system, in the
face of threats to its viability, holds together only in the context ofmeaning, purpose, or
what Kant sometimes calls the Highest Good. Kant's transcendental pursuit of an answer
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to the question of hope in the face of the nature/freedom gap, raises the idea ofGod from
merely being a postulate of the moral life to a level at which God's existence and the
meaning of the world become mutually self-sustaining tenets of transcendental faith, for
while we cannot establish the existence of God on theoretical terms, as Davidovich
points out, Kant believes 'we are justified in c laiming validity for our contemplative
thought about [a moral designer of nature]'.93 The development of transcendental
theology beyond merely God the postulate of the moral life to God as the object of
moral and religious faith directly correlates to the conviction that the world is
meaningful. Palmquist identifies this reciprocal relationship as the 'theocentric'
character ofKant's philosophy. PermeatingKant's critical writings is the irrefragable
conviction that the world is meaningful and that belief in God (despite the lack of
determinable objective reality in this belief) is the only reason why the world would
ultimately make sense.
Important to note is that this link between the meaningfulness of the world and
the existence of God does not constitute an argument for God's existence. As Byrne
notes, no such argument can be made:
Kant's moral proof has to fulfil conflicting requirements. He needs an argument
from an ideal if he is to give a distinct role to practical reason in supporting
belief in God, a role substantially different from the fallacious one performed by
speculative reason in advancing the traditional proofs. But at the same time he
needs an argument from a fact if the process is to produce belief.94
What this link between meaning and God does indicate is that Kant's denial of
knowledge of God in the first Critique is a simultaneous denial of knowledge that the
world is meaningful. Now this does not mean that Kant's quest for moral faith is
religiously insignificant—because of the problem of unity, reason must find a way to
escape the strictures of the theoretical philosophy so that reason can find harmony with
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what has already been decided by moral reason.95 But this does mean that Kant's notion
of faith is tantamount to an existential leap of moral faith: We are left with a choice to
live as if God is there or to live as if God is not there.96 From the theoretical vantage
point, a decision cannot be made (Kant is a theoretical agnostic on the question of God's
existence); from a practical vantage point, however, we must postulate God's existence
ifmorality is to make sense (Kant is a practical theist): 'I will inexorably believe in the
existence of God and a future life, and I am sure that nothing can make these beliefs
unstable, since my moral principles themselves, which I cannot renounce without
becoming contemptible in my own eyes, would thereby be subverted' (A828/B856).
Keith Ward accepts many of the main features of this type of interpretation but
thinks that Kant is never able to get beyond a purely formal expansion of his ethical
theory. L ike Strawson, W ard grants that there is some ambiguity in the first Critique
regarding the status of transcendental idealism and suggests that interpreters of Kant
must give some account of Kant's optimism regarding the eventual development of a
critical metaphysic. He writes, '[Kant] holds open the future possibility of a final
synthesis of human knowledge under necessary principles, even though such a synthesis
must wait for the analytic method to be fully explored first. So ana priori universal
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science remains the Kantian ideal, which he was never entirely to abandon'. Despite
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Kant's clear intentions however, Ward argues that a continuous thread of theological
agnosticism permeates his writings from Dreams to Religion. In defence of this position,
he presents an historical account of Kant's thinking that tracks the evolution of his
position on ethics from Dreams ofa Spirit-Seer (1766) to Religion (1793). Kant's quest
for a universal science, according to Ward, includes attempts at providing grounds for
theology in the transcendental recesses of reason, but the prospects for these grounds are
severely curtailed by the limiting conditions of the first Critique and the merely formal
way that Kant develops his moral philosophy.
Ward, like Palmquist, begins his analysis of Kant's position with Dreams. They
both argue that Dreams is what the tone and force of language suggest it to be: a frontal
attack on metaphysics as represented in the work of the mystic Swedenborg. Unlike
Palmquist, Ward thinks this attack spills over into metaphysics more generally
considered. Dreams marks a time in Kant's life, argues Ward, when metaphysical
speculations became meaningless to him. The pursuit of moral perfection was the only
meaningful aim in human life. Accordingly, 'One might see the main argument of the
Dreams, t hen, a s b eing toe stablish t he i ndependence a nd 1 ogical p riority o fm orality
over theoretical speculation'.98 In Dreams, suggests Ward, 'Metaphysics is confined to
an analytic role, resolving concepts into their fundamental elements. It cannot provide
knowledge of the ultimate nature of reality. It is at most "the science of the boundaries
of human reason'".99 This theme is carried over to the first Critique and remains a
central component in Kant's transcendental thinking on theology. Thus, Ward contends
that 'Dreams marks the nadir of Kant's metaphysical interests' and the true source of
Kant's turn toward morality in his later writings.100 Metaphysics to the degree of Kant's
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pre-critical writings does not emerge again for Kant until his moral theology of the
second Critique in a very different form.101
This new form, often called Kant's moral theology, erases much of the robust
realism of Kant's earlier and more conventional approach to metaphysics in favour of a
kind of moral formalism conducive to the transcendental nature of reason. Ward notes
that the task of establishing an a priori universal science, though begun in the first
Critique, does not begin to receive Kant's full attention until Groundwork of the
Metaphysics ofMorals and the second Critique. In the practical writings, suggests Ward,
Kant moves toward establishing a formal system of thought based exclusively on moral
feelings: 'But the whole material content ofmorality—the belief that specific things and
acts are good—must, [Kant] believes, derive from feeling'.102 In the formalization of the
rational resources that support this moral feeling, Kant developed his system of ethical
ideas in four stages. The final stage, Ward argues, envisioned the triumph of reason over
sense and the formalization of the moral realm in his thought.
Ward understands Kant to be a theological moralist whose transcendental
philosophy gradually moves from theoretical agnosticism to moral non-realism. To
support his view, Ward shows a correlation between the latter part of Kant's pre-critical
period (i.e., the markedly sceptical and silent part) and his critical period, utilizing an
interpretation of Kant's theoretical philosophy that aligns itself closely with the type of
interpretation we find in the early work of Strawson. Nevertheless, Ward remains
sensitive to the many indications in Kant's philosophy that are meant to have positive
implications for faith. In Kant's Lectures on Ethics, Ward points out that Kant explicitly
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affirms that 'though ethics cannot depend upon metaphysical or theological belief, it
• •• •• ...i rn
necessarily gives rise to theological belief and cannot exist without it'. Although
clearly positive in theological intent, little ofKant's pre-critical metaphysics survives the
Copernican revolution in Ward's estimation. Kant's rational foundations for theology
are directly related to the support they receive from his moral theory, and, for this
reason, they remain but a formal aspect of his moral development of transcendental
theology.
Ward's emphasis on the formal in morality and conclusion that Kant's thinking
on theology lacks of any real metaphysical content have clear implications for the way
in which he interprets Religion. Ward cannot hold that Religion develops Kant's moral
theology in specific ways, because this development ends with the postulation of God as
a merely formal component of morality. In line with this view, Ward argues that
Religion is meant simply to vindicate the formal nature of the moral theory. It introduces
resources for helping us to think of ways of overcoming our moral shortcomings when
the reality ofmoral evil threatens to undo reason. According to Ward on Kant,
the o nly important t hing i n r eligion i s t hat w hich is c ommon t o a 11 r eligions,
obedience to the moral law and hope of grace to remedy man's seemingly
inevitable moral deficiencies. Beyond this a man may believe what he pleases,
as long as he does not regard the specific observances of his own religion as in
themselves an especially pleasing service to God, or as any more than "a means
of awakening within us a godly disposition".104
Key to note about Ward's interpretation of Kant on religion is that moral character and
religious belief and practice are at some remove from each other (as long as religion
does not lead to moral deficiency, the content of belief is not significant) and God is
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never to be thought of as though he were a real entity, but merely as an idea postulated
for the religious life.105
Ward interprets the first Critique much along the lines of the early Strawson. He
sums up Kant's view of God this way: 'Thus not only is talk of God "empty" or purely
formal—being not founded on sense perceptions—it is necessarily inapplicable to the
object it attempts to conceive. So there is no question that a noumenal object might
correspond to these ideas of reason'.106 Ward's main point is that 'the Critical doctrine
of the formal nature of the categories of thought and their restriction to the role of
functions of discursive thought requires that our concepts actually be denied any literal
application to transcendent reality'.107 The position common to both Strawson and Ward
is that our beliefs, cast in theoretical language, are inherently agnostic because we not
only cannot know if they correspond to a transcendent reality, but, logically speaking,
they could never correspond with reality. For this reason, Ward, like the early Strawson,
understands Kant's philosophical foundations for theology to support only agnosticism.
This differs markedly from other interpretations of the first Critique, such as the double-
aspect interpretation of Allison (though Allison has yet to fully develop his
interpretation of Kant in directions that would make this insight plain), as well as other
ways of relating Kant's philosophy of religion to his philosophy proper.
Allen Wood's interpretation of Kant provides an important counterbalance to
Ward's.108 Wood agrees with Ward that 'The term idea is borrowed by Kant quite
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consciously from Plato ... [and] refers to any of several concepts formed a priori by our
rational faculty, to which no possible experience can correspond'.109 Wood also agrees
that 'since our concept of God is an idea of reason, no sensible content corresponding to
it can ever be given. This concept is thus an "empty" or "problematic" one, a concept
incapable of serving as a vehicle of (empirical) knowledge'.110 He also agrees, to a
certain extent, with Ward's basic deduction:
On the basis of a Kantian epistemology, it might look as if there is very little we
are entitled to say about the divine attributes. For according to the critical
doctrines, all the properties of which we can form any determinate conception
are phenomenal realities, which are necessarily limited in their degree. We have
no acquaintance with any of the realitates noumena which lie behind these
appearances; and consequently no determinate conception of the properties
which belong to an ens realissimum.in
Wood makes this important contribution to our study, however. Even though Kant's
denial of theoretical knowledge makes literal language about God problematic from the
point of view of empirical realism in the sense of Strawson, it does not mean that
language about God rooted in the rational recesses of reason is likewise impossible.
Referring to difficult principles surrounding knowledge of God in Kant's theoretical
philosophy, Wood writes,
These strictures, however, do not really apply to some predicates, such as those
based on the categories, or on the "pure derivative concepts," such as duration
and change. For although such concepts are "empty" ones in their application to
noumena, they are nevertheless available to us a priori as formal elements of our
concept of a thing or object in general. Kant gives the name "ontological
109
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predicates" to these "a priori realities" which belong to God in virtue of the fact
that they "refer to the universal attributes of a thing in general."112
The idea of God in Kant's work is among those that have a direct relationship to the
conditions of reason that give rise to the very possibility of experience. Wood writes,
'the most proper idea ofGod, as a supremely perfect being or ens realissimum, ... comes
about in the course of our attempt to conceive the conditions for the "thorough
determination" of things, that is, the unconditionally complete knowledge of them, or the
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thoroughgoing specification of the properties belonging to them'.
In Kant's thinking, God is the focal point for all discursive reflection on the
nature of the world and our experience. Wood summarizes,
Kant's theory is that since the idea of a most perfect being includes in it every
possible perfection or reality, the complete set of properties which might belong
to any possible thing could (in theory) be determined by limiting or selecting
from properties of God in the right way. The idea of God therefore provides us
with a (purely abstract) conception of "the material of all possibility," of a
source from which all the properties of any and every possible thing could in
principle be derived.114
Wood concludes that 'The idea of God is a necessary idea of reason, and Kant has only
respect for our natural interest in the content of this idea and our theoretical curiosity
about the existence or nonexistence of an object corresponding to it'.115
Lest one think that the idea is merely a place holder in Kant's system, useful for
holding the whole philosophy together yet merely an empty concept on closer
examination, Wood points out that Kant 'even thinks that a certain amount can be
known about the content of the idea of God and the attributes which must be thought in
112
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it'.116 Wood takes much of this knowledge of the idea of God to be negative in nature.
According to Wood, Kant 'holds that predicates drawn from phenomena can be applied
to God if certain restrictions and qualifications are duly observed. First, he says, we must
proceed by the via negationis to separate all limitations from the predicates we select....
[Kjnowledge, volition, and moral goodness ... may be applied to God'.117 There is,
however, a corresponding thread of reasonable discourse about God present in Kant's
critical philosophy from its earliest inception. Wood names these predicates
'psychological' insofar as they are 'drawn from our empirical acquaintance with the
human self or soul as part of nature'.118 Wood writes, 'Kant insists that [properties
discovered via negationist must be applied by the via eminentiae.... The properties of
finite things must be revised or modified to accord with the nature of an infinitely real
being if we are to be able to ascribe them to God. Once again, if a property cannot
survive this modification, it cannot be literally ascribed to God at all'.119 Kant calls any
theology that limits itself to a modest list of ontological predicates 'ontotheology' or
'transcendental theology'. Kant 'regards such a theology as useful from a moral or
religious standpoint, in that it prevents us from adopting an "anthropomorphic"
conception of God, one drawn from empirical principles'.120 Any theology that develops
in the direction of psychological predicates Kant terms 'moral theology'.
The point is that Kant draws on these grounds for rational theology as he makes a
transition from the theoretical philosophy to the moral philosophy. Important for our
purposes is that this transition is as much theological as it is philosophical. In moving
from the first Critique and Prolegomena to the second Critique and Groundwork, Kant
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is also making a transition from pure transcendental theology (or onto-theology) to
moral theology. Wood is clearly right that Kant cannot 'be satisfied, from a moral or
religious standpoint, with transcendental theology all by itself. For its concept of God is
"deistic"; it is merely the concept of a supremely real ground or cause of the world'.121
The requirements of his burgeoning anthropology require that morality matter and that
the world be understood to have meaning. This is not knowledge in the theoretical sense,
but an important part ofKant's burgeoning existential faith based on moral sensibilities.
According to Wood,
Moral faith, in Kant's view, requires "theism," the belief in a "living God," a
being endowed with knowledge and free volition, who governs the world wisely
according to moral laws.... Transcendental theology, says Kant, is an
indispensable "propaedeutic" to a fuller theology, but remains "idle and useless"
122from a moral-religious point of view unless supplemented by it.
The formal elements of Kant's moral subjectivity propel the transition to the
moral but do not restrict moral theology to mere theological non-realism. Inasmuch as
human identity is wrapped up in a prior commitment to the good and the moral order of
the universe, Kant is likewise committed to a robust moral faith that extends the realm of
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transcendental theology, broadening it and deepening it. Wood writes, 'The supreme
good for man, in other words, does not consist in bringing himself into harmony with an
order ( natural, s ocial, o r s upematural) g iven o utside h im, b ut r ather i n generating h is
own system of order and imposing it freely on his own actions and on the world'.124
There is a strong sense of theological subjectivity in Kant, but this is offset by the moral
moorings of faith and the quest for developing faith in a way consonant with a
meaningful world. Wood sums up the point this way: 'According to Kant, we believe in
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God because this belief harmonizes with, and is rationally required by, our moral
disposition to pursue the highest good'.125
Belief is not without tether to the theoretical philosophy, however. As Wood
contends, 'Kant's justification of theism must be sought not only in the moral and
existential considerations leading to practical faith, but also in the theoretical dialectic
which i s s upposed t o furnish t his faith w ith a c lear a nd compelling c onception o f i ts
natural object'.126 What this means is that 'Like the other ideas of reason, the idea of
God arises for Kant from an attempt to think the "unconditioned" in respect to
127
appearances which must always be given as "conditioned" in some specific manner'.
In the end, argues Wood, 'Kant's theology remained quite conservative. It drew its
object of moral faith from an idea generated by theoretical reason, the idea of an ens
realissimum. And it developed this idea ... very much along the lines of traditional
scholastic and rationalistic theology'.128 Therefore, it seems that we have good reason to
think that Kant's concern for leaving open the possibility of God's existence, our ability
to cognize God, and the need for us to live as if he is there is indicative of a desire for a
type of realist faith, not in the sense that we have knowledge that God is there, but in the
hope that God is there because his existence matters for the ultimate well-being of
reason. Nevertheless, if this account of the development of the transcendental theology
is accurate, it likewise would be correct to hold that Kant's philosophy does not support
in any obvious way either theological realism or non-realism. Since we can have no
theoretical knowledge of God's existence or non-existence (which is required for a
realist or non-realist stance), to live in the moral life is to make the existential decision to
live [practically] as a theist despite theoretical ignorance.
With t his i n h and, w e s till face the q uestion, h ow far c an t he d evelopment o f
Kant's rational foundations for theology be pressed and what are their limits? This
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question is what I take to be the central importance of Wood's charge to Kant
interpreters (noted in Chapter One). He writes, 'there is an area of Kant's philosophical
thought—itself badly neglected by responsible scholarship— ... This area of thought is
Kant's investigation of rational religious faith'.129 So far in this study, we have seen that
Kant's transcendental theology of the first Critique yields the idea of God the ens
realissimum. According to Wood, Kant's transcendental methodology yields a rationalist
conception of God much in line with traditional rationalist theologies. Kant's
development of this idea in his moral philosophy yields the postulation of God endowed
with knowledge and free volition, and who governs the world wisely. This postulation,
according to Green, provides the core conception of God (or moral theology) at work in
the human religious consciousness. Kant's judicial theology then yields the possibility of
an existential faith in God the divine moral judge who intelligently designed the world
and enables human beings to live in the world in a meaningful way. Davidovich calls
this kind of theology 'contemplative'.
Through this series of developments Kant's rational foundations for theology
become progressively more significant to the study of religious faith. However, it is only
the third phase of this development that justifies the writing of Religion as an original
contribution in line with the tenets of Kant's critical philosophy. Clearly, the writing of
Religion makes little sense from the point of view of Strawson's 'principle of
significance'. All talk of human dispositions, the divine being, the prototype of perfect
humanity is meaningless speculation if all we have is empirical realism (without the
transcendental idealism portion). If we grant Kant's intention to develop his
transcendental theology in the direction of moral faith, Religion might legitimately be
understood as an amendment to the moral philosophy itself. Although this understanding
ofReligion is common in the field of Kant studies and appears to have some support in
the text itself, it does have the significant drawback of revising some of the most crucial
tenets of the moral philosophy. Ought no longer implies can in Religion, for example, if
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radical evil is understood to be a principle which chastens and amends the reciprocal
relationship of freedom and the moral law in practical reason.
My working theory is that the issue of meaning is, for Kant, caught up in giving
some account of the whole of human experience, and this is primarily a third Critique
issue. When facts and values do not add up to produce the Highest Good (where the
Highest Good is understood to be a state of affairs in which human happiness is directly
proportional to human virtue), this appears to be evidence against the meaningfulness of
the world. Added to this general dilemma of verifying the meaningfulness of the world
in the face of particulars, Kant senses another even deeper problem with an existential
faith in God and the meaningfulness of the world. In Religion, Kant introduces the
concept of 'radical evil' in making the case for human moral depravity. With the
presentation of moral depravity, Religion introduces a threat to the meaningfulness of
our world at the very ground of the transcendental theology. For even if the world is the
work of an intelligent designer and we may hope that evils will be reconciled by the
divine judge in the world to come, humanity's collective fate before that judge is
inevitable condemnation for an innate moral corruption. How can there be moral hope if
this is the inevitable outcome?
Here the importance of our above understanding of cognition takes on
significance as a starting point for approaching Religion. Radical evil and the question of
moral hope (i.e., meaning in the face o f radical evil) opens the door for cognition to
press its understanding of God into service in order to find a rational remedy for human
depravity and a critically satisfying answer to the question of hope. It seems reasonable
to expect that if Kant felt reason is able to cognize anything of God beyond designer and
judge that would support an existential faith commitment to God, we should find such
developments within this work. The remainder of this dissertation offers an
interpretation of Religion built on the understanding of cognition and faith outlined
above. Once again, the issue of coherence, which Michalson has aptly laid before us, is
crucial to keep in mind. IfReligion is found to rest on irreconcilable inconsistencies, as
Michalson claims it is, then no cognition sufficient for faith can be established—this
would violate the requirement of systematic unity. If, however, humanity, God, and the
170
world can be cognized in a way that is coherent and flows from prior commitments of
the critical philosophy, then one final stage of the development of Kant's rational
foundations for religious faith will be complete.
The interpretive line that we will follow approaches Religion as an exploration of
cognition that furthers Kant's transcendental theology in the face of radical evil and the
light of moral hope. There are three key features about this interpretation that are
noteworthy. First, this interpretation emphasizes the centrality of Kant's notion of the
moral disposition. The moral disposition represents an assumption on Kant's part based
on human dignity that lies at the very heart of his philosophical programme. This
assumption initially appears in the first Critique. Kant presents the disposition as a
feature of humanity that is pivotal to the stability of the moral faith: 'rational belief is
grounded on the presupposition of moral dispositions' (A829/B857). However, until
Religion, the disposition represented an unexamined presupposition on Kant's part. This
is why Silber, for example, suggests that the development of the disposition is 'the most
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important single contribution of the Religion to Kant's ethical theory'. The
exploration ofReligion which follows (especially in the treatment ofBooks One and
Two) concurs with Silber's assessment of the importance of the disposition to Kant's
argument in Religion, and understands the book to be largely an exploration of the
implications of this concept.
A second noteworthy feature of this interpretation is that, based on internal
features of the text (especially the problem of Book One and its rejoinder in Book Two),
it argues that Kant's notion of 'humanity' or the 'human species' is best understood as a
Platonic concept of species. This Platonic understanding of Kant may seem strange on
first blush; however, it should be noted that numerous Kant interpreters, including
Michalson, have recognized this aspect of Kant's philosophy, even if relatively few have
made very much of it. Michalson states in his The Historical Dimensions of Rational
Faith, 'it does not seem altogether odd to speak of Kant's religious outlook as a
130 John R. Silber, 'The Ethical Significance of Kant's Religion' in Religion Within the Limits ofReason
Alone, Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson, Trs. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), cxiv-cxv.
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synthesis of Platonism and Christianity'.131 He goes on to enumerate other interpreters
who recognize this, including such interpreters as J. Bohatec, Michel Despland, and
Friedrich Paulson. Thus, throughout any interpretation o fKant's position in Religion,
one needs to keep in mind the distinction between when Kant speaks of the human
individual versus humanity universal in this more Platonic sense. Very often, the latter is
mistaken for the former, when emphasizing the Platonic sense instead would have made
more sense of the passage under consideration. This insight will be carried throughout
the interpretation of Religion that follows and is the key feature of the text to keep in
mind to understand how Kant's Religion overcomes Michalson's central objections. The
farther an interpreter moves away from the Platonic emphasis in Religion, the more
inconsistent Kant's philosophy of religion appears to become.
The third has to do with structure. In the Second Preface, Kant points out his
vocational commitment to the perspective of the pure philosopher in the context of two
experiments that he says are being performed in the book. In the first experiment, Kant
assesses the extent to which 'revelation can at least comprise also the pure religion of
reason'' (6:12). He tells us that 'the philosopher, as purely a teacher of reason (from
mere principles a priori), must keep within the inner circle [of reason alone], and,
thereby, also abstract from all experience' (6:12). In short, the first experiment is to
abstract from all possible experience what is essential to natural religion or religion
within the boundaries of reason alone; the second experiment is to examine one example
of a so-called 'revealed' religion to see to what extent it matches up with religion
rationally conceived.132
131
Michaelson, The Historical Dimensions ofRational Faith, 117.
132 There are various ways in which one might be able to identify the structure of Kant's arguments in his
first experiment. Despland separates them into two views based on the moral and religious intent that may
lay behind Kant's arguments. One view sees Kant's turn to religion as a remedy for the problem of radical
evil. Religion, on this view, provides a statement of Kant's philosophy of religion revolving around the issue
of human depravity. The other sees the moral/religious community as Kant's attempt to overcome the
individualistic standpoint of the moral philosophy. On this view, Kant finds the moral philosophy wanting in
the 1790's because of a gap that emerges in the concept of the Highest Good. Despland, Kant on History and
Religion, 182.
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Kant's transition into the second experiment appears most clearly in the
introductory paragraphs of the First Part of Book Four. Having argued that 'a religion
can ben atural, y et also r evealed, i f i t i s s o constituted t hat h uman b eings c ould a nd
ought to have arrived at it on their own through the mere use of their own reason'
(6:155), Kant turns to 'consider a revealed religion as yet natural, on the one hand, but
on the other hand, a learned religion; ... [and] test it and be able to sort out what, and
how much, it is entitled to from the one source or the other' (6:156). Kant then proposes
more specifically to offer an assessment of revealed religion as expressed in New
Testament Christianity: 'In our case this book can be the New Testament, as the source
of the Christian doctrine of faith. In keeping with our intent, we now wish to expound
the Christian religion in two sections—first, as natural religion, and then, second, as
learned religion—with reference to its content and the principles found in it' (6:157).
The language referring to a test and a prior intent indicate that Book Four marks the
turning point in Religion to the second experiment. Kant assumes from this point
forward and throughout the rest of the Book that his conception of natural religion has
been adequately articulated and that, with it, he is ready to assess the merits and demerits
of the Christian religion. The interpretation of Religion offered here in summary and in
the next chapter, focuses on the first experiment as the development of Kant's rational
foundations for religious faith. The second experiment is addressed, but only in a more
survey form, which is meant to confirm and apply the offered interpretation of the first
experiment.
The next chapter is an exegetical presentation and partial defence of Kant's
Religion, Books One through Three. The presentation is largely expository in nature, and
the defence refers specifically to Section Four, which deals with Michalson's objections
to Religion's coherence and the resolution to these objections inherent within the
interpretation. This exposition ofReligion is admittedly difficult to follow as it works its
way through the most complex details of this classic text. Therefore, the fourth and final
section of this chapter is a summary statement of the interpretation to follow and is
meant to be used as a reference tool for navigating the intricate exegesis of Books One,
Two and Three in Chapter Four.
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IV. A Hypothesis for Interpreting Religion: The Transcendental Union Thesis
This brings us to the hypothesis for understanding Religion, which I call the
'Transcendental Union Thesis'. This hypothesis understands Books One through Three
of Religion to consist of presentations of three types of union: the union of the human
species (Book One), the union ofmoral converts and the Prototype (Book Two), and the
union of the ethical community (Book Three). As the term Transcendental Union Thesis
indicates, the hypothesis is not indicative of t heoretical grounds for rational religious
belief; instead, Kant's entire discussion in Religion is understood to be a continuation of
the development of his transcendental reflection on the foundations for religious belief
that first surface in the first Critique. In other words, these unions are not ontological,
but transcendental—they are part of an argument for the necessary cognitive conditions
for the possibility of rational religious faith in the face of specific threats to moral hope.
In reference to Book One, this hypothesis involves a movement in hermeneutic
emphasis away from an examination of the individual, which Michalson takes to be
imported from Kant's moral philosophy, to a transcendental analysis of a single moral
disposition that belongs to the whole human species. Rather than this analysis referring
to human individuals collectively, I understand Kant's analysis of the human species to
be reflective of a more Platonic concept of species, one cognized as a single universal
from which the individual derives their nature. Kant's focus is thus on the human
disposition universally conceived and the subsequent moral peril that arises from his
analysis of this disposition. In Book Two, this hypothesis specifically refers to belief in
the reality and availability of a possible union between human persons and the
disposition of the prototype of perfect humanity. This union of human beings with the
prototype's disposition is possible only by way of an act of moral faith, wherein
humanity's corrupt disposition is abandoned in favour of an adoption of the prototype's
good disposition at the moment of conversion. This union, I suggest, is at the heart of
Kant's argument for moral hope in Religion and crucial for understanding Kant's
philosophy of religion in a consistent fashion. In Book Three, this hypothesis refers to
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banding together (or union) of persons under the good principle. This tangible union of
individuals presents a vision of hope in the form of a people of God, who, united under
the prototype's disposition, seek to form an ethical commonwealth.
The hypothesis being presented here thus understands the notion of union to
provide shape and direction to Kant's entire argument. Specifically, the concept of union
forms the neck of an hourglass-shaped argument in Books One, Two, and Three of
133*
Religion. It is a central feature of the formulation of the problem of radical evil in
Book O ne a s K ant e stablishes t he h uman p redicament a s o ne r elated t o t he w hole o f
humanity (or humanity as a species); i t is a central feature of the formulation of the
solution to human depravity in Book Two as this solution revolves around the union of
human persons and the disposition of the prototype; and it is a central feature of Kant's
vision projected in Book Three as this vision depends on a unified ethical
commonwealth as a people of God. With this before us, I turn now to a summary of the
first three Books ofReligion according to this hypothesis.
Synopsis ofBook One 0/Religion
In the opening of Book One of Religion, Kant probes the question of the moral
nature of humanity as a species; that is, whether humanity is by nature good, evil, both
good and evil, or neither good nor evil. In the opening paragraphs of Book One, Kant
deductively eliminates two possibilities, namely, that humanity is neither good nor evil,
and that humanity is partly good and partly evil. Regarding the first, Kant shows that the
moral law is a sufficient incentive for action, one that is positively and necessarily
present in human reason. In order for humanity to be morally neutral (i.e., not positively
disposed to the moral law), humanity would have to first intentionally and decisively
silence the moral law. Such an action is equivalent to being evil, however. By Kant's
lights, then, there is no such thing as moral neutrality. Regarding the view that the
133 Michel Despland argues that major sections of Books One, Two, and Three of Religion form the heart of
Kant's project, while Book Four and many of the closing remarks of each Book merely apply the religious
findings of reason to religious communities with specific reference to Christianity. Despland, Kant on History
and Religion, 183-84.
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human species might be partly good and partly evil, Kant submits that this possibility
requires the will to hold simultaneously two determinants of the power of choice (i.e.,
the moral and some other incentive). Yet, to hold two determinants of choice in tandem
would be tantamount for Kant to an inversion of the moral order of incentives. Allowing
a non-moral determinant to be a governing incentive along side the moral means, in
essence, that the exclusive authority of the moral as the supreme incentive has been
usurped. Such an inversion is the very definition of evil. For these reasons, there can be
no such thing as a moral duality in the Kantian paradigm.
The deductive elimination of these two possibilities narrows Kant's inquiry to an
either/or: Humanity as a species is either good or evil. With the narrowing down to only
these two possibilities, Kant establishes that the species must have a universal
disposition. The alternative is that individuals determine their own moral standing,
which requires that the species be morally neutral. Kant has already shown such
neutrality to be impossible, however. While Kant does not, in these introductory
arguments, establish whether humanity is good or whether humanity is evil, he does
ascertain the validity and necessity of a universal moral disposition in the human
species.
With this established, Kant moves on to argue for how we must cognize the
moral nature or disposition of humanity. By definition, to speak of a moral disposition
means: (1) that it is rooted in freedom (an essential point for establishing moral
culpability and imputability), and (2) that it relates to maxim-making. The status of the
moral disposition as a universal disposition, however, implies two further points: (1) that
the disposition must be cognized as innate in the individual (i.e., present from the
individual's very first use of freedom, lest we assume a moment of moral neutrality),
and (2) as such, this moral disposition does not merely relate to maxim-making in
general, but represents the first (or universal) ground of all maxims—whether good or
evil.
Understanding the consistency of Kant's argument depends upon seeing the
introduction of freedom as a continuation of his discussion of the universal disposition
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of the species rather than a new discussion centered on the individual. The latter
movement would be a rupture in his argumentative flow, whereas the former represents
simply a feature of the cognizing process of the moral disposition of the species. If we
maintain a universal moral disposition (as Kant argues we must), we must also posit an
accompanying notion of freedom universal in keeping with Kant's former plan for
cognizing the disposition as moral. This freedom universal explains how the human
disposition earns a moral status and imputes this status to the individual. Kant confirms
this point by highlighting the biblical narrative of The Fall wherein Adam determines the
moral bend of the species. Kant affirms the truth of the Adamic narrative in an a-
historical sense, taking Adam to be a pictorial representation of the freedom universal.
The transcendental character of moral cognition indicates that the freedom universal
does not stand in time in a single historical figure, but must be thought of as standing
outside of time and has made its choice from this vantage point. The disposition's
innateness speaks of its presence in the individual to whom, as part of the species, the
universal is passed, while the role of freedom and imputation resides in the freedom
universal.
Kant's argument does not in its initial stages indicate whether the human
disposition is good or evil, but it is clear where he is headed, namely, that humanity is
evil by nature. But the road to this conclusion must first go through question of
necessity: Can we admit that the human species is evil by nature, but not evil by
necessity? Kant addresses the relationship between humanity's predispositions and
propensities as a way of showing how we can affirm a dispositional bend to the species
without making such a bend necessary to the very concept of the species. Kant outlines
three basic predispositions in humanity (viz., animality, humanity, and personality) that
encapsulates the range of incentives for the exercise of freedom, from humanity's baser
instincts all the way to the more lofty reverence for the moral law. According to Kant,
each of these predispositions is inherently good, though not immune to perversion. The
importance of presupposing these predispositions to be good in their original state, for
Kant, rests in the danger of finding them to the contrary. If evil can be simply attributed
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to a natural or original predisposition (e.g., animality), then a subsequent evil nature
would be necessary for humanity, and thereby neither imputable nor rooted in freedom.
The inherent goodness of humanity's predispositions makes way for Kant's
discussion of propensity as manifest in three forms ofmoral evil (viz., frailty, impurity,
and depravity). Each of these forms of corruption represents what Kant calls an
inversion of the moral order of incentives. Each of the incentives found under the
heading of humanity's predisposition to the good is sufficient, when considered alone,
for determining the actions of humanity. There is an appropriate prioritization of these
incentives, however, which when violated is moral corruption. Humanity ought to
subordinate all incentives to the incentive of the moral law; and when any incentive
(e.g., one found under the heading of animality) is raised to a level equal with or greater
than the moral law, the moral order of incentives is inverted, the disposition is corrupted,
and human beings example a propensity to evil. Since it is self-evident in Kant's eyes
that humans do not act solely according to the moral law, we must infer that the ground
of all maxims, i.e., humanity's universal moral disposition, is corrupt, having adopted
into its supreme maxim an inverted order of moral incentives. In this way, Kant is able
to assert that humanity as a species has a predisposition to good, but in its prioritization
of the incentives can be, and apparently is, evil in disposition. Kant avers that the species
is reasonably established to be evil insofar as it bears an inverted order of moral
incentives, but it is not necessarily so insofar as its incentives need not be disordered by
definition.
Synopsis ofBook Two o/Religion134
At the opening of Book Two, Kant introduces the antithesis of our corrupt
humanity, established in Book One, namely, humanity in its full moral perfection.
Cognition commends belief in such a perfect humanity under the presumption that the
134
According to Gordon Michalson: 'With the doctrine of radical evil and the related account of moral
regeneration, we find Kant discovering the limits of his own Pelagianism'. Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 7.
Contrary to Michalson, this 'original predisposition to good' does not necessarily indicate Pelagianism.
Rather, Kant's discussion of this in Book One seems to point to more of a Thomistic notion of what the
will desires is good.
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world is meaningful and created by God. In Kant's view, only such a perfect humanity is
pleasing to God, and therefore, only an example of perfect humanity could constitute an
object of divine pleasure sufficient to cause God (who is supremely concerned with the
moral) to create the world. And since it is evident that our innate, corrupt disposition
clearly falls short of this ideal, we must presume the existence of a being who does
possess such a pristine disposition. This being, Kant names 'the prototype' (Urbild.).
This moral prototype is cognized by Kant as both an eternal divine being, and a
participant in human nature: The prototype is a divine-human being. Kant submits that
this union of divinity with humanity is constitutive of a divine condescension wherein
the prototype, or the divine Son of God as Kant calls him, willingly took on humanity of
his own accord. The reason Kant conceives of the prototype in this way is because Kant
is unable to conceive of our evil humanity willingly throwing off its own corruption and
elevating itself to the standard of holiness; and therefore, Kant submits the divine-human
union in the prototype can be cognized no other way than as a divine being who
willingly takes on human nature.
Kant's pursuit of an answer to the question of moral hope under the rubric of
human cognition o f G od b ids h im to avoid 1 eaving t he p rototype a s a stagnant i deal.
Given that a person's disposition is empirically inaccessible, our understanding of the
disposition depends on the outward display of the inward moral bend. Thus, our
understanding of the prototypical disposition, Kant suggests, also depends on us
cognizing a picture of moral activity that reflects the prototype's inward dispositional
perfection. For this reason, Kant posits a transcendental, non-temporal history of the
prototype. This narrative is much like the gospel narrative of Jesus of Nazareth, but
unlike a strictly historical narrative, the prototypical narrative is a type of non-history
commended through reason alone: It is how we must cognize the prototype, not what we
have observed about him through some set of historical events. As such, the
transcendental narrative, suggests Kant, is universally valid and accessible to all. Now
simply because Kant bids us to a type of transcendental non-history, this does not mean
that the cognized narrative could not be manifest in history. To the contrary, Kant argues
that an historical manifestation of the prototype must be possible. However, since the
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prototypical disposition is empirically inaccessible, there arises an epistemic problem:
We could never know that an individual was the prototype. And it is for this reason that
Kant contends that the required prototype must always to be sought only in reason.
Now in the face of humanity's dispositional corruption and subsequent moral
peril, the prototype grounds moral hope. As established in Book One, the human
individual begins with a corrupt disposition, displeasing to God, which belongs to the
human species universally conceived. As a result, the human individual is in need of a
new disposition if she is to become well pleasing to God. The prototype alone possesses
a disposition that pleases God, and therefore, Kant submits, it is only the adoption of this
prototypical disposition that can give us hope of being found pleasing before the divine
judge. Such an adoption is possible because of the Son of God's condescension in taking
on humanity; thus, the prototypical disposition is available to the human individual.
Moral conversion, then, is a revolution in disposition wherein the c onvert adopts t he
prototype's disposition in the place of the innate, corrupt disposition, and in this way
moral hope is secured: With this ideal disposition now present within the convert, there
is good reason to hope that God (who judges the heart) will count the convert as
pleasing.
Kant does not presume this solution to radical evil is without its difficulties,
however. Instead, he raises three problems facing the application of moral conversion,
two of which are epistemological in nature, while the third concerns the anatomy of
moral hope. The two epistemological problems result from the disposition's empirical
inaccessibility. This inaccessibility prevents us (or anyone else) from knowing our true
dispositional bend. Hence, we face two questions: (1) Can even God judge our
disposition? and (2) Can we ever be assured that our disposition has improved? The first
question is easily resolved: Kant presumes that while we may not perceive our
dispositional bend, the perfect judge, who judges the heart, must know our disposition.
In the second question, we face a pragmatic issue: While Kant feels a modicum ofmoral
uneasiness is healthy, he acknowledges that without any assurance of dispositional
change, despair seems inevitable and perseverance impossible. Kant's solution seeks a
balance where assurance is secured, but not with a certainty that gives way to
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complacency. E ssentially, Kant s uggests o ne m ust e xercise m oral faith, following t he
prototypical example, and after a time, examine whether their life shows evidence of
moral improvement. If there is such evidence, one may reasonably presume their
disposition has improved, but if, despite one's best efforts, there is morally stagnation or
regress, they can entertain no hope of ever improving. Therefore, moral faith entails both
inevitable uncertainty (given empirical limitations) and reasonable hope, or lack thereof
(given the empirical evidence).
Kant's third difficulty regards the question of how the dispositional revolution
serves to secure moral hope and s atisfy d ivine justice. There are three aspects of the
convert's predicament that this dispositional revolution serves to remedy: (1) the infinite
moral debt incurred by the convert's original dispositional corruption, (2) the finite
moral debt incurred through particular transgressions by the convert, and (3) the
convert's lack of positive righteousness before God. By fleshing out the dynamics of
how the convert's adoption of the prototypical disposition serves to address each of
these failings, Kant is able to show the anatomy of how moral hope/redemption is
secured.
Regarding the convert's original dispositional debt, we find that such debt is,
according to Kant, infinite because the corruption resides in the disposition itself: It is
the disposition that gives rise to all corrupt maxims. In this light, there is nothing
salvageable about the disposition, and justice can only be satisfied with its death. A
judicial difficulty emerges, however, as one considers the distinction between the pre-
conversion individual (i.e., the old man under the corrupt disposition) and the post-
conversion individual (i.e., the new man under the prototypical disposition). While the
old man deserves death, this penalty is inappropriate to the new man; yet, the old man
and the new man are both physically represented by a single individual. How then is
God to delve out justice? Here Kant shows the initial significance of the dispositional
revolution. Since the old man and new man are titles based on dispositional affinities,
the dispositional revolution of conversion is death to the old man: The old man is the
human individual under the corrupt disposition, the abandonment of this disposition in
favor of the prototypical disposition marks the death of the old man—the individual is
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no longer united to the corrupt disposition. Thus, according to Kant, conversion itself
satisfies justice's demand regarding the old man's infinite moral debt.
While this conversion (or death) satisfies the infinite debt of the old man,
however, the new man still retains debt for particular transgressions during the process
of "sanctification"—if we can use that term. This represents the second feature of the
convert's predicament, and thus, the second hurdle for moral hope. Where the resolution
of the convert's infinite, dispositional debt centers on the dispositional revolution, the
resolution here involves the suffering of the prototype. Post-conversion failings are
distinct from pre-conversion failings because they do not arise from the disposition, but
from weakness amidst the post-conversion process ofmoral improvement—the convert,
by definition, has abandoned the corrupt disposition. Post-conversion debt is, therefore,
finite because it concerns the particular transgression, not the dispositional nature itself.
As such, this debt may be paid for by another—namely, the prototype. The dispositional
union between the convert and the prototype provides the basis for atonement in that
there is already a moral union between convert and prototype: The convert is united to a
once foreign disposition (viz., that of the prototype) with its merits, and the prototype is
equally united to once foreign moral debts (viz., those of the convert). In this light, the
prototype may suffer in payment for the convert's finite moral debt.
Once both infinite and finite debts have been resolved, there still remains the
third and final problem. While the infinite and finite debts no longer provoke displeasure
in God, this is at some remove from establishing the convert as positively pleasing to
God: The convert has a need for positive righteousness. And while an individual may
seek to fill this moral lacuna with good deeds, Kant is clear that such deeds can never
exceed our moral duty. Thus, Kant again points to the union between the convert and
prototype as the source of positive righteousness—a source hinted at earlier in this
summary. J ust a s t he d emerits o f h umanity's c orrupt d isposition a re imputable t o t he
individual, so the merits of the prototype's disposition are imputable to the convert—the
convert's new disposition is pleasing to God. Moreover, insofar as t he p rototype has
willfully undergone a form of suffering not required by duty and without any personal
benefit, the prototype has acquired a surplus of righteousness. In the convert's union to
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the prototype, this excess of righteousness is imputed to the convert. Therefore, with all
debts paid and divine pleasure secured, hope reaches its fullness for the individual.
Synopsis ofBook Three 0/Religion
At the opening of Book Three, Kant highlights a conflict that exists within the
moral convert. Kant suggests that while a given individual may undergo a revolution in
disposition, abandoning humanity's corrupt disposition for the disposition of the
prototype, this dispositional revolution does not erase the influence of the evil principle.
Rather, the prototypical disposition only provides moral freedom. The human individual,
who is otherwise bound under the corrupt disposition, may adopt the prototype's good
disposition and live under its dominion. Nevertheless, both dispositions reside in
humanity considered universally, and the convert must combat the evil principle by
clinging to the good disposition.
This combat sets the tone for Book Three. The moral convert bears the
responsibility to undo this evil, but the question of Book Three is how. Kant suggests
that what places the convert in danger of moral regress is not primarily the convert's raw
nature, b ut is h is c ommunion w ith o ther h uman b eings. K ant t hinks i t i nevitable that
humans that begin with a corrupt disposition as innate, when brought together, will
naturally corrupt one another. Book Three centres on overcoming the negative effects of
the communal context on moral progress and hope. Kant's solution to this type of
contextual moral regress involves an intentional banding together of individuals with a
view to the prevention of evil and the promotion of the good. To combat the evil
principle, t he m oral c onvert m ust u nite w ith o ther c onverts u nder t he g ood p rinciple.
Only by establishing such an ethical community can we hope that the good principle will
win the day over evil.
Kant's vision for the ethical community has three main features. First, it must be
constituted under non-coercive laws; in other words, those who are united under the
moral law must be allowed to adhere freely to the moral law. Second, the ethical
community proper is the totality of all ethical societies. Since the duties of virtue
concern the entire human race, individual ethical societies do not constitute the ethical
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community on their own. Third, this ethical community (or kingdom) has need for a
ruling authority. Kant's description of this authority (e.g., the authority must know the
most intimate parts of humans and be able to exercise true justice accordingly) leads him
to conclude that God himselfmust oversee the ethical community. This threefold picture
of the ethical community, Kant admits, is an ideal that may not be attained by individual
human effort, but the task of instantiating such a community is a duty of a special kind,
namely, one that belongs to the human species. For this reason, only individuals who are
united (specifically in the form of a visible church) in the hope that God himself will one
day establish the ethical community can hope to carry out this duty.
Kant insists that a true church must have a universally valid foundation, and this
emphasis leads into Kant's discussion of pure religious faith. For Kant, a pure religious
faith is a faith that has its roots in reason and the moral law. This type of faith is distinct
from a purely historical faith. Pure religious faith is built on a rational, and thereby
universally valid, foundation, whereas historical faith requires that humans have access
to particular facts that are contingent. Thus, only pure religious (or rational) faith can
found a universal church. Despite Kant's claim that pure religious faith's moral/rational
foundation is the only sufficient foundation for the true church, he does not suggest that
rational faith can be established without an accompanying historical faith. This need for
the historical is specifically due to human weakness that feels a need for revealed
religion in order to be satisfied. Given this felt need, ecclesiastical faith, while not part
ofpure religion, must serve as a vehicle for pure religious faith.
Here there arises the interplay between ecclesiastical faith and pure moral faith.
According to Kant, there are many different kinds of so-called revealed faiths, but only
one religion. Kant claims that various faiths can meet with the same true religion and
serve as its vehicle; hence, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity do not represent disparate
religions but only disparate faiths. Kant is careful not to assert that all these faiths are
vehicles for true religion, but only that all faiths can be vehicles for religion. For Kant,
the key to this relationship is that the faith in question has to be interpreted and re¬
interpreted until the moral doctrines are brought to the fore.
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It is in this interpretive process that the biblical scholar becomes important for
Kant. Kant admits that human weakness feels a need for a sacred text to serve as an
authority for the community. Thus, there is a comparable need for scriptural scholars
who draw from the holy texts the pure moral doctrines. The scriptural scholar is central
to Kant's picture of how human weakness (which demands a holy book) and pure
rational religion come together: The human demand for sacred scripture gives rise to the
additional demand for scholars who examine the origin, language, and historicity of
scripture in order to pull from the text the official understanding of the church
community. When these scriptural scholars draw from the text the pure moral doctrines,
humans become able to embrace rational religion amidst their felt need for a sacred or
revealed text.
It is important to understand that the pure religious doctrines of which Kant
speaks do not merely concern moral behaviour, but Kant's dispositional philosophy as
well. Saving faith, for Kant, is faith in the good disposition. Two conditions characterize
this faith: the hope of being absolved of transgressions before the divine judge and the
hope of a conversion to a new life conformable to duty. The two conditions add up to
one faith and belong together necessarily—as seen in Book Two. Thus, the pure moral
doctrines, which the biblical scholar must explicate, include Kant's dispositional
philosophy ofBooks One and Two.
It must be understood that this emphasis on rational religion does not necessarily
preclude the presence of the historical in a rational faith. Rather, Kant's position centers
more on the role of the historical in a rational faith. According to Kant, one may be
legitimately awakened to the prototype by way of an empirical example (e.g., Jesus of
Nazareth), and such a person would be set on the path of pure moral faith just as if they
were awakened to rational religious faith through good life conduct. However, if one
makes the empirical manifestation the condition for faith, such a faith becomes
contingent, no longer universally accessible, and thus no longer rational. Therefore,
rational religion must not merely possess the prototypical truths but hold these truths as
necessary.
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For the purpose of Book Three, Kant is particularly concerned with the church
that he sees as the example of rational religion, namely, Christianity. While Christianity
arose out of Judaism, Kant denies that Judaism shared the universal seed of rational
religion. To Kant, Judaism is not a religion at all. It emphasizes ceremonial laws,
political solidarity, and genealogies. Essentially, Judaism is concerned with external
conduct, not the disposition, thinks Kant, and thus, it is not a rational religion.135 The
importance of this point is that, for Kant, Christianity is understood to have latched hold
of Judaism as its vehicle and then dispensed with this vehicle in just the sort ofway Kant
commends. Christianity sought, for the sake of human weakness, to draw a link between
it and the Jewish faith, but it replaced ceremonial law with a concern for the disposition,
replaced earthly concerns with the after life, and did away with hollow rituals.
Kant admits that Christianity in some forms can diverge from rational religion by
making the historical the condition of faith. When this possible divergence is combined
with the various blemishes of Christian history, including strife, division, and
persecution, it would seem that Christianity is not a rational religion, but a dogmatic one.
Based solely on the political history, Kant admits, there is nothing to commend
Christianity as true religion. Nevertheless, for Kant it is clear—presumably due to the
similarities between Books One and Two and the teachings of the New Testament—that
Christianity in its pure form was instantiated as a pure religious faith. And for this
reason, Kant contends that the present is the best point in church history, as now there
are those who sow this seed of true religious faith, which he hopes will free religion
from arbitrary dogmatic and ecclesiastical disputes, and one day unite human beings in a
visible representation of the kingdom of God.
135 Kant's understanding of Judaism will seem erroneous to most modern readers who are familiar with the
Jewish faith. For our purposes in this dissertation, Kant's accuracy on this point is less important than the
role it serves in his philosophy of religion. Thus, we will not be concerned with correcting his
understanding of Judaism, but only with understanding it in the context of his arguments.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANEXEGETICAL PRESENTATIONAND PARTIAL DEFENCE OFKANT'S
RELIGION: EXPERIMENT ONE
I. Book One: The Human Disposition and the Problem of Depravity
As we now move into an expository treatment of Book One in support of the
summary previously given, it should be noted that I will not have the opportunity in the
space provided to cover every paragraph. For example, I omit 6:36-44 from the
expository analysis, since (as I understand it) this is merely a reiteration of arguments
made in earlier sections of Book One. We will be focusing here on what I take to be the
thematic heart of Kant's argument, consisting of three exegetical points of focus. The
first two points are found in Kant's opening arguments (6:18-26 and 6:20-26,
respectively).1 These arguments set the stage for Kant's assessment of the human
predicament that follows. There are two discernable lines of argumentation in his
Introduction. The first is Kant's argument for a universal moral nature of humanity as a
species that must be either good or evil. The second is Kant's argument for how we must
cognize this universal moral disposition. These two lines of argumentation set the
agenda for Kant's discussion in 6:26-35, which is the subject of the third exegetical
segment. Whereas 6:26ff. is often thought to represent the most substantial part of
Kant's argument, I argue that it exists for a more specific purpose, namely, to analyze
the relationship between good predispositions and dispositional corruption in preparation
for Kant's eventual declaration that humanity is evil by nature.
Religion 18-26 (Humanity's Universal Moral Nature)
At the opening of Book One of Religion, Kant begins by pronouncing a
'complaint as old as history, even as old as the older art of poetic fiction' that' "the
1 Kant refers to these opening arguments later in Book One as the 'Introduction' (6:36), identifying them
as established points of reference for his analysis. Henceforth, Kant's opening arguments in 6:18-26 will
be referred to as the 'Introduction'.
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world lieth in evil'" (6:18). He contrasts this ancient lament over humanity's 'decline
into evil' (6:18), with the '[m]ore recent ... heroic opinion ... that the world steadfastly
... forges ahead in the very opposite direction, namely from bad to better' or that at the
very least 'the human being [has] the predisposition to move in this direction' (6:18-20).
Kant suggests that while this optimism may be an accurate assessment of certain cultures
in terms of civil advancement, it does not seem to be an accurate assessment of the
moral direction of humanity. Kant highlights 'the moralists, from Seneca to Rousseau'
as t hose w ho h old s uch o ptimism a nd s ubmits t hat t hey c learly ' have n ot d rawn t his
view from experience' (6:20). Quite the contrary, argues Kant, 'we may presume that it
is ... just an optimistic presupposition' (6:20).
Despite his initial dismissal of the moralist's optimism regarding human nature,
Kant does not move forward presumptuously or in a reactionary way toward the
opposite extreme of moral pessimism. Rather, he is aware that there are various ways of
conceiving the moral nature of humanity. For example, 'the question arises whether a
middle ground may not at least be possible, namely that, as a species, the human being
can neither be good nor evil, or, at any rate, that he can be the one just as much as the
other, partly good, partly evil' (6:20). The exploration of these 'middle ground'
possibilities constitutes Kant's initial inquiry into human nature. His elimination of these
possibilities in the arguments to follow will leave Kant with the conclusion that
humanity as a species must be either good or evil. Kant's strategy is not one of a simple
appeal to experience, nor can it be, for in order to declare a human being to be evil, one
must be able to observe his maxims, which 'we cannot do ... unproblematically even
within ourselves; hence the judgment that an agent is an evil human being cannot
reliably be based on experience' (6:20). Instead, Kant's inquiry takes the form of an
analytic investigation complete with assumptions and inferences.
Kant's inquiry as one regarding 'the species' (6:20) could be construed as
bringing an assumed universality to bear at the outset. However, Kant's analysis of the
middle ground position that humanity is 'neither good nor evil' (6:20) provides a kind of
sub-argument against the possibility that human nature is an individual rather than
universal affair. If moral nature is individually determined, then good and evil are not
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characteristics of the species. Consequently, if it can be shown that this middle ground
position (i.e., that humanity as a species is morally neutral) is problematic, then a
universal moral nature in humanity would be established. Kant identifies moral
neutrality with what he calls the 'rigorist's criteria' (6:23; cf. 6:22), which holds that the
species must be morally neutral so that the individual can, by way of 'the absolute
spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom)', determine his own moral standing by
what he personally 'has incorporated ... into his maxim (has made ... into a universal
rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself)' (6:24). Kant's
treatment of this middle ground position represents the portion of his investigation that
determines whether or not there is a universal moral nature. Kant gives two arguments
against this possibility and so for the necessity of cognizing a moral d isposition t hat
belongs to the species as a whole, i.e., a universal moral disposition.
The first of Kant's arguments against moral neutrality appears in a footnote in
6:23. In this argument Kant contends that an indifference to the moral law ultimately
becomes equal to a malevolent resistance to the moral law. Moral indifference, thinks
Kant, would only be possible 'if the moral law in us were not an incentive of the power
of choice' (6:23). However, since it is foundational to Kant's philosophy that 'the law is
incentive' for the human species (cf. 6:27f. on the predisposition to personality), Kant
concludes that 'the lack of the agreement of the power of choice with it [the moral law]
... is possible only as a consequence of a real and opposite determination of the power
of choice, i.e. of a resistance on its part' (6:23). This resistance by the power of choice
to the moral law signifies not neutrality, but a volitional movement against the moral
law. Such resistance to the good can only be dubbed evil. Thus, Kant concludes that
moral neutrality is simply impossible as it ultimately defaults to resistant malevolence.
The second argument, appearing in 6:24, is also rooted in the universality of the
moral law, but takes on a slightly different dynamic. The former argument is stated in
the negative (highlighting neutrality as resistance to the moral law), whereas this latter
argument states it as a positive (neutrality as an elevation of competing incentives). Kant
again begins with the premise that 'the moral law is itself an incentive in the judgment
of reason' (6:24). If the moral law does not alone determine one's actions (as would be
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the case for a neutral as opposed to good species), it indicates that 'an incentive opposed
to [the moral law] must have influence on the power of choice of the human being in
question' (6:24). Such opposing incentives can only obtain such influence, however,
when the individual 'incorporates the incentive (and consequently also the deviation
from the moral law) into his maxim (in which case he is an evil human being)' (6:24). In
other words, one can only misprioritize moral incentives by choosing to usurp the
natural place of the moral law, i.e., to elevate an opposing incentive to a competing
status. Therefore, 'it follows that [the deviant's] disposition as regards the moral law is
never indifferent (never neither good nor bad)' (6:24).
Having eliminated the possibility that the species can be thought of as morally
neutral, thereby establishing the universality of humanity's moral disposition (whatever
its moral bend), Kant moves on to consider the only other middle possibility, namely,
that humanity as a species is both good and evil, or is good in part and evil in part.
However, Kant's argument against this moral duality is set forth in 6:24-25 (and a
parallel is later reiterated in 6:36), in which he contends that the very notion of moral
duality leads to contradiction. His argument builds upon the simplicity (or indivisible
nature) of the moral law—to accept the moral law is to accept it without qualification. If
one 'is good in one part, he has incorporated the moral law into his maxim' (6:24); and
yet, if one is also 'evil in some other part' (6:24-25), we would need to maintain that 'the
moral law of compliance with duty in general is a single one and universal' (6:25). Thus,
'the maxim relating to [the moral 1 aw] would b e universal yet p articular a11he same
time: which is a contradiction' (6:25). In this way, this second of the two middle ground
possibilities is also eliminated.
To this point, although not yet bringing us to the actual nature of humanity's
disposition, Kant has moved us away from moral neutrality and moral duality to an
either/or position: Humanity as a species is either good or evil. He has hinted at his
favour for dispositional corruption by referring to the moralist's position as 'just an
optimistic presupposition' (6:20), but he continues his strategy in Book One of resisting
any kind of premature conclusion. Rather, he closes the Introduction to Book One with
the preliminary conclusion that we must cognize the moral disposition not as belonging
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to individuals but to the species. This universal moral disposition must also be thought
of, not in terms of neutrality or duality, but in terms of good or evil: '[B]y the "human
being" of whom we say that he is good or evil by nature we are entitled to understand
not individuals (for otherwise one human being could be assumed to be good, and
another evil, by nature) but the whole species' (6:25). In short, Kant is satisfied that he
has reached, through careful consideration and elimination of the possibilities, the
human disposition universally conceived and morally fixed.
After providing clear arguments against moral neutrality and duality in reference
to the species, Kant does something unexpected. He backs away from an unequivocal
acceptance of his own conclusion, suggesting that this conclusion (while not resting on
anthropological research) cannot be held as proven unless anthropological research
demonstrates that there is no individual that stands as an exception to the dispositional
bend we ultimately ascribe to the species (whether good or evil). As Kant puts it, 'this
can only be demonstrated later on, if it transpires from anthropological research that the
grounds that justify us in attributing one of these two characters [i.e., good and evil] to a
human being as innate are of such a nature that there is no cause for exempting anyone
from it, and that the character therefore applies to the species' (6:25-26). This disclaimer
may be mere epistemological humility on Kant's part, but in light of the context of
Religion as a whole, it seems likely that it is motivated by more important reasons.
First, ifKant's argument for a universal, morally fixed disposition is sufficient to
draw a conclusion regarding the disposition of any individual, then Kant destroys the
hope of a Christie redeemer. We may conclude, for example, that Jesus of Nazareth is
not the sinless redeemer he claimed to be. Like all individuals, he is part of the human
race, and therefore his disposition is fixed. If humanity is good, Christ is also good but
not unique in this regard (a strikingly naive conclusion), and if humanity is evil, Christ
too is evil and cannot be our redeemer (a conclusion that Kant thinks cannot be known
or in any way determined; cf. 6:63). Yet, as the argumentative thrust of Book One
moves toward establishing the problem of humanity's moral corruption, the solution of
which hinges on the prototype of perfect humanity set forth as our redeemer in Book
Two, the complete elimination of the possibility of a morally distinct redeemer would
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ultimately be detrimental to Kant's project. Second, as is well known, Kant roots moral
hope in Book Two in a revolution of disposition, one that is conceived. Yet, any hope of
having laid hold of an alternative disposition is impossible if Kant's argument gives
license for us to draw dispositional conclusions regarding all individuals. We cannot
hope that we have laid hold of an alternative good disposition, for we know from the
above a rguments t hat o ur d isposition i s e vil w ithout e xception. T herefore, K ant m ust
provide this disclaimer to prepare for moral hope in Book Two.
Religion 20-26 (CognizingHumanity's Moral Disposition)
Returning to the Introduction with a different focus, we now examine Kant's
understanding of how this universal nature or disposition (as previously established)
must be cognized. Kant's first point regards the term 'nature'. He recognizes that the
notion of a universal moral nature appears to lend itself to a concept of unruly desire that
overshadows freedom, forcing individuals to act in a given manner. That is, nature is
usually taken to be 'the opposite of the ground of actions [arising] fromfreedom'' (6:21).
Kant affirms that, when taken in this way, the term nature indeed 'stand[s] in direct
contradiction to the predicates morally good or morally evil' (6:21) for, as Henry Allison
has argued, the moral law and freedom imply each other.2 However, this juxtaposition of
the terms moral and nature does not move Kant to a type of outright Pelagianism (as
some have suggested).3 Indeed, Kant's arguments to this point would prevent such a
view since Pelagianism, with its emphasis on human freedom, comes very close to the
rigorist's criteria previously refuted. Yet this similarity to the rigorist's criteria does not
mean t hat K ant i gnores Pelagian concerns for m oral freedom and r esponsibility, o nly
that his view (as will be touched on below) is more of a novel philosophical synthesis of
Pelagian and Augustinian perspectives than a capitulation to either system.
Because the disposition is regarded as moral, we must hold, says Kant, that the
disposition 'itself always be a deed of freedom' (6:21). Without such a view, the moral
2
Allison, Idealism and Freedom, 114-118.
3
Michalson, Jr., Fallen Freedom, 7.
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'use or abuse of the human being's power of choice ... could not be imputed to him ...
[or] be called "moral"' (6:21). In other words, if we are to maintain that humanity's
disposition is properly predicated as moral, and that it represents something for which
human beings are culpable, 'the ground of evil cannot lie in any object determining the
power of choice through inclination, not in any natural impulses' (6:21). This rootedness
in freedom also indicates grounding in 'a rule that the power of choice itself produces
for the exercise of its freedom, i.e., in a maxim' (6:21). Therefore, maintenance of a soft-
determinist view of freedom, for example, in which the will is determined by 'natural
impulses' (choosing what it wants and yet determined in what it wants), would be
inadequate in Kant's view. In short, the designation of the disposition as moral implies a
rootedness in freedom, a rootedness in freedom implies that the disposition is grounded
in a maxim, and the grounding of the disposition in freedom and in a maxim implies that
it is imputable.
This discussion of freedom could lead some to believe that Kant has switched
from a discussion of 'the species' (6:20) to a discussion of individual autonomy.
However, as Kant continues, he gives every indication that his inquiry regards the
species considered u niversally. T he d isposition represents a foundation, o r w hat K ant
calls a 'subjective ground', for the individual's exercise of freedom. This universal base
is antecedent to all individual uses of freedom, but it remains distinct from these
individual manifestations. It is only their ground: '[B]y "the nature of a human being"
we only understand here the subjective ground ... of the exercise of the human being's
freedom in general ... antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the senses'
(6:21). This subjective ground represents, not the individual's personal will, but rather a
common universal power of choice for the species, which is the basis for the individual's
adoption of various maxims and exercise of freedom. Kant asserts, 'Whenever we
therefore say, "The human being is by nature good," or "He is by nature evil," this only
means that he holds within himself a first ground ... for the adoption of good or evil
(unlawful) maxims, and that he holds this ground qua human, universally' (6:21). The
power of choice is not an individual diverse ground, but a single universal ground for the
species that individual humans hold qua human. As Kant reiterates at the close of the
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Introduction, 'by the "human being" of whom we say that he is good or evil by nature
we are entitled to understand not individuals ... but the whole species' (6:25).
Since Kant's argument (already highlighted above) shows that the human species
must be either good or evil (6:23f.), Kant is required to move to a position that is at least
partially Augustinian in nature. Pelagianism (like the rigorist's criteria) requires at least
a moment ofmoral neutrality for the individual, and thus must conceive ofthe species as
being morally neutral so that such a moment is available for each individual. In doing
away with such moral neutrality, Kant, amidst his affirmation of the Pelagian concern
for freedom, ultimately must seek to hold the importance of freedom in tandem with the
more Augustinian notion of the human species sharing a common disposition. To use
Kant's language, 'We shall say, therefore, of one of these [two] characters [i.e., good
and evil] ... that it is innate in him [the individual]' (6:21). In accord with an
Augustinian perspective, this innateness indicates that the dispositional bend (whether
good or evil) is 'the ground antecedent to every use of freedom given in experience ...
and is ... present in the human being at the moment of birth' (6:22). Yet, in accord with
the Pelagian concern for culpability, this bend is moral and so we must hold that 'the
human being is alone [the dispositional bend's] author ... which must itself again lie in
the free p ower o f choice' (6:22). Tom ake s ense o f t his t ension, w e must d istinguish
between 'the free power of choice', which c oncerns the species, and the individual's
'use of freedom given in experience', which is 'innate' (6:22). To be consistent, Kant
must place the freedom that chooses the disposition outside of the individual and inside
the universal moral disposition.
While Kant highlights this concept of freedom universal prior to eliminating
moral neutrality and duality, it is after these arguments that the rationale behind this
point comes into sharpest view. Having narrowed the logical possibilities regarding the
moral disposition to the either/or of good and evil in reference to the species, Kant has
established that the disposition must be a single disposition that all individuals share. Its
universality is not merely a type of commonality in which all individual dispositions are
found to be alike, but rather a single disposition that belongs to humanity as a species.
Since the species must be either good or evil, it must therefore bear a single disposition
194
that is the subjective ground for all individuals within the species. The use of freedom
that answers the Pelagian concern is not the individual's will exercised following a time
ofmoral neutrality but of freedom universally conceived. It is freedom universal that we
share as members of the species, and it is the disposition chosen by freedom universal
that we as individuals bear as innate. As Kant puts it, '[The disposition] has not been
earned in time ([he who harbors it] has been the one way or the other always, from his
youth on). The disposition ... can only be a single one, and applies to the entire use of
freedom universally' (6:25).
The coming together of the notion that the disposition 'must be adopted through
the free power of choice' (6:25) and the innateness of this disposition as 'present in the
human being at the moment of birth' (6:22) is found in this concept of freedom
universal. Kant submits in 6:31 that individual actions are 'performed in accordance
with [the supreme] maxim'. This maxim, while innate to the individual, 'is adopted in
the power of choice' (6:31), i.e., by freedom universal. Because this adoption 'precedes
every deed' (6:31) by the individual, this grounding maxim ultimately serves as 'the
formal ground of every deed' (6:31). The adoption of the supreme maxim by freedom
universal, while 'not ... earned in time' (6:25) (i.e., in a historical context), is
nevertheless 'an intelligible deed' in keeping with the cognizing of the moral
disposition: 'The former [i.e., the adoption of the formal ground of every deed] is an
intelligible d eed, c ognizable t hrough r eason a lone apart from a ny t emporal condition;
the latter [particular manifest vice] is sensible, empirical, given in time (factum
phenomenon)' (6:31). For this reason, Kant calls the non-temporal adoption of the
supreme maxim by freedom universal 'peccatum originarium' (original sin), which
indicates that freedom universal is not found in a single historical individual (e.g.,
Adam) but has chosen the dispositional bend for the species in a non-temporal way prior
to any individuals' physical birth and subsequent exercise of freedom. We may note in
this light Kant's emphasis on 'the moment of birth' (6:22) when speaking of innateness,
as contrasted with his emphasis on the species, cognition, and non-temporality in
reference to the choosing of the dispositional bend. The power of choice conceived
195
universally, then, provides the place where both the free and universal elements of the
moral nature are found.
This process of cognizing the disposition does eventually reach certain limits at
which Kant is forced to appeal to a level of inscrutability: 'he holds within himself a first
ground (to us inscrutable)' (6:21). However, inscrutability is not appealed to in the face
of contradiction, but rather, the appeal only comes in reference to the nature of freedom
itself, i.e., 'why I have adopted an evil maxim and not a good one instead' (6:22) or 'the
cause of this adoption' (6:25). It is in this aspect of freedom and freedom's relationship
to maxims that inscrutability is finally brought to bear, despite the fact that 'we cannot
avoid asking about it' (6:25). While the supreme maxim's adoption itself may be
inscrutable, Kant's analysis of the disposition is far from being dependent on
inscrutability in its constitution. He presents the necessary features of the disposition as
dictated by reason: it applies to the species, must be morally fixed, must be innate, must
be rooted in freedom (universally conceived), and it must be imputable.
Religion 26-35 (Good Predispositions andMoral Corruption)A
In 6:26, Kant focuses on what he calls human 'predispositions' (Anlagen). These
predispositions are an inextricable (or original) feature of the human species, i.e., they
'belong to the possibility of human nature' (6:28). According to Kant, these
predispositions serve as 'elements of the determination of the human being' (6:26). In
other words, each of the diverse incentives that determine the human being's power of
choice (e.g., respect for the moral law, ambition, compassion, etc.) falls under some
larger predispositional heading, three ofwhich—animality, humanity, and personality—
Kant defines relative to the level of cognitive aptitude it requires. The first, the
predisposition to animality, Kant defines as basic self-preservation, which is constitutive
of a 'merely mechanical self-love ... for which reason is not required' (6:26). The
second, '[t]he predisposition to humanity' (6:27), also falls under the rubric of self-love
4
Kant's treatment of the topic of predisposition and corruption goes beyond 6:26-35. In 6:36-39 Kant
reiterates what he feels has been established on the topic. The exegesis here will draw occasionally on
6:36-39 for support, but because of its redundancy, the exposition undertaken here will not dwell there.
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as a predispositional tendency to 'evaluate one's own happiness relative to others'.
Unlike animality, however, this predisposition requires a certain level of discursive
reasoning as it'involves comparison (for which reason is required)' (6:27). The third of
these, '[t]he predisposition to personality' (6:27), is simply 'the susceptibility to [have]
respect for the moral law as of itselfa sufficient incentive to the power ofchoice'' (6:27).
This predisposition exists for the sole purpose of provoking obedience to the moral
law—a unique feature of the human species. Of all humanity's predispositions, this
predisposition is uniquely rooted in reason and thus embodies 'the idea of humanity
considered wholly intellectually' (6:28).
Beneath these three headings (animality, personality, and humanity) are found
the incentives that determine the power of choice. Kant submits that each of these
predispositions is good in its original state in the sense that it stands in agreement with
the moral law. By this, Kant does not simply mean that these predispositions avoid
conflict with the moral law but, to the contrary, that they in fact bid conformity to the
moral law. In this sense, the original state of goodness is less related to an implicit
ontology and more like an original function: 'All these predispositions in the human
being are not only (negatively) good (they do not resist the moral law) but they are also
predispositions to the good (they demand compliance with it)' (6:28). In this light,
Kant's claim indicates that humanity has within its very nature (or very possibility)
predispositions that testify to and, in this sense, serve as a guide for the moral law. For
as these predispositions 'belong to the possibility of human nature' (6:28), they cannot
be stripped from the human person; thus, there is an immutable testimonial within
humanity to what human beings ought to be.
It may seem at this point that Kant has answered the question regarding
humanity's dispositional bend. If the very possibility of human nature requires the
presence of good predispositions, then it would seem that humanity as a species is good
in disposition. However, such is not Kant's intent for, in the midst of describing these
predispositions, he highlights various ways these good predispositions may be perverted
and turned into vices. For example, the predisposition to humanity, with its tendency to
compare, may move from a search for 'merely equal worth [with others]' (6:27) to 'an
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unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others' (6:27). Hence, humanity's
predispositions, while good, are not incorruptible. Kant's notion of predispositions here
seems to be reflective of a type of Thomistic scheme. In his Treatise on Law, Aquinas
submits that actions are always set in motion by reason for the sake of obtaining a
certain good (specifically related to felicity), and the concern of the moral law is to order
human reason in such a way as to guide human beings to this good in an appropriate
manner. Kant's account echoes this notion in reference to the Highest Good: The good
that is sought by humans can only be found in obedience to the moral law, yet humans
can seek their desired good through unlawful means, and such a misdirected search
gives rise to vice. To put it another way, evil is not done for evil's sake but represents a
perverted quest for some good. Kant confirms this interpretation most clearly in 6:37:
'The depravity of human nature is therefore not to be named malice, ifwe take this word
in the strict sense, namely as a disposition ... to incorporate evil qua evil for incentive
into one's maxim ... but should rather be named perversity of the heart, and this heart is
then called evil because ofwhat results'.
For Kant, the importance of establishing the goodness of humanity's
predispositions regards the issue of necessity. If moral evil can simply be blamed on a
certain predisposition (e.g., the predisposition to animality), it 'makes the human a
purely animal being' (6:35) and strips humanity of its moral freedom and culpability. If
the statement he is evil by nature is derived 'from the concept of the human being in
general' (6:32), i.e., from a predisposition that belongs the possibility of human nature,
'then the quality [evil] would be necessary' (6:32). The notion of necessity moves in
contradiction to the notion of freedom and moral culpability. For this reason, Kant's
excavation of reason must show that evil is 'not a natural predisposition but something
that a human being can be held accountable for' (6:32). If the human being is found to
possess a p ropensity t o moral e vil, s uch e vil m ust b e c ognized as h aving i ts r oots i n
freedom not merely in physical propensities (cf. 6:35fi): 'Every propensity is either
physical ... or moral ... In the first sense [i.e., physical propensity], there is no
propensity to moral evil, for the latter [i.e., moral propensity] must originate from
freedom; a physical propensity ... to whatever use of freedom, be it for good or evil, is a
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contradiction. Hence a propensity to evil can only attach to the moral faculty of choice'
(6:31). For this reason Kant delays his c onclusion regarding the moral disposition of
humanity: humanity's original predispositions are good and free of blame for moral
evil—even if humanity's moral disposition is not.
Having established how good predispositions can logically coexist with
corruption, Kant is able to move on to discussion of the nature of moral corruption
without placing such vice in the category of necessity. He introduces moral corruption in
his transition from the topic of predisposition to the topic of propensity. Propensity,
according to Kant, refers to the working out of the dispositional bend o f the species
(whether good or evil). He reiterates that humanity's moral propensity (propensio) must
be clearly 'distinguished from a predisposition' (6:29). He also acknowledges that a
propensity, like a predisposition, 'can indeed be innate' (6:29); however, a moral
propensity must 'be thought of (if it is good) as acquired, or (if evil) as brought by the
human being upon himself (6:29). In other words, moral propensity must be rooted in
the human being's (in the sense of the species) freedom as opposed to humanity's
predispositions ( which a re g ood) o r s trictly p hysical p ropensity (which i s n ot m oral).
The rootedness of the moral disposition in freedom [universal] has already been
thoroughly treated in the above examination of 6:20-26. Suffice to say that Kant believes
he has disarmed the problem of necessity in his treatment of predispositions as
contrasted with the nature of corruption, and is therefore ready to address the nature of
the moral disposition without concern.
What should be clear from the interpretation thus far is that nowhere has Kant
made a declaration regarding the dispositional bend of the human species, and therefore
his initial discussion in the section on propensity is merely an act of defining what he
considers to be the 'different grades' (6:29) of corruption that would exist if humanity's
disposition were evil. Kant provides three of these: frailty (fragilitas), impurity
(impuritas), and depravity (vitiositas,pravitas). Frailty speaks of a general weakness,
which discovers that while the moral law seems 'objectively or ideally' (6:29) the
greatest of incentives, in practice it seems 'subjectively' weaker than other incentives.
Impurity speaks of the unfortunate tendency of the heart not to treat the moral law as 'its
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sufficient incentive, but on the contrary ... [to need] still other incentives besides it in
order to determine the power of choice' (6:30). As Kant summarizes it, 'actions
conforming to duty are not done purely from duty' (6:30). Depravity—the most severe
grade of corruption—speaks to 'the propensity of the power of choice to maxims that
subordinate the incentives of the moral law to others (not moral ones)' (6:30).
Each of the above corruptions exemplifies what Kant later, in 6:36, indicates is a
misprioritization of the moral order of incentives (those found under the heading of
humanity's predisposition to the good). Ideally, all incentives should be prioritized in
such a way as to secure the moral law's place as supreme incentive, and when this is not
done, the moral ordering of incentives is overturned: '[T]he human being (even the best)
is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them
into his maxims' (6:36). The corrupt human being 'incorporates the moral law into those
maxims, together with the law of self-love' (6:36). However, because these two laws
cannot 'stand on an equal footing' (6:36), it follows that 'one [i.e., the moral] must be
subordinated to the other [i.e., self-love] as its supreme condition' (6:36). Since the
moral law ought to, without qualification, be the supreme incentive, 'this reversal of
incentives ... [is] contrary to the moral order' (6:36).
Again, it must be remembered that Kant's discussion of moral propensity is still
in the context of an investigation of the species, specifically with a view to answering
the question of its dispositional bend. Therefore, we must be careful to recognize that
Kant has not redirected his argument; rather, as demonstrated in 6:18-26, his is
undoubtedly a universal, as opposed to individual, inquiry. As shown above, Kant
begins his arguments in Book One centred on the human species, and his conclusion in
6:32 is also centred on the species: "'He is evil by nature" simply means that evil applies
to h im c onsidered i n h is s pedes'. T hus, i t must be r emembered t hat the i nversion o f
incentives, if reflective of the human being, is a dispositional corruption rooted in the
will universal. This interpretation is essential to Kant's consistency, for he assumes that
the mere defining of the three grades of moral corruption (corruptio) which exemplify
this type of inversion is sufficient to establish as evil the moral disposition of humanity
as a whole.
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This sufficiency is precisely what Kant infers immediately following his
definitions of frailty, impurity, and depravity: 'the propensity to evil is here established
(as regards actions) in the human being, even the best' (6:30). Kant does not feel it
necessary to go into 'the formal proof ... of the multitude of woeful examples that the
experience that the human deeds parades before us' (6:32-33), nor does his argument
appear to require an appeal to particular human deeds; for Kant, it is common sense that
humans do not act according to the moral law alone as sufficient incentive.5 And since it
is evident that human beings do not act solely according to the moral law, it is equally
evident that the ground of all maxims (i.e., the supreme maxim adopted by the will
universal) must be corrupt—we are simply left with no other option. It is the
fundamental nature of this dispositional flaw that gives rise to Kant's well-known
declaration that this corruption is radical: 'This evil is radical, since it corrupts the
ground of all maxims' (6:37).6
II. Book Two: The Prototype's Disposition and Moral Conversion
This section provides an expository interpretation of key portions of Book Two
ofReligion. Once again, we will not have the opportunity in the space provided to cover
every paragraph. Instead, we will be focusing on the thematic heart of Kant's argument,
where his case for moral hope comes into sharpest relief. The first such section, 6:60-66,
focuses on the prototype of dispositional perfection presented through the process of
cognition as a necessary ideal if the world is to have meaning. In this section, Kant
establishes the prototype's significance for us as human beings and also fleshes out the
5 Kant does list some of these historical ills in 6:33-34. As apparent from the flow of Kant's argument set
forth above, these 'formal proofs' from experience are not the basis for his conclusion that humanity is
evil by nature.
6 The accuracyof the interpretation defended above is confirmed in 6:41-44 where Kant examines the
biblical account of the Fall. Kant suggests that such a narrative is helpful when c onceived of as an a-
historical picture of the universal will and choosing of the disposition, or a type of transcendental narrative
'without regard to the condition of time' (6:41). Rather than being an appeal to biblical language when all
philosophical resources have ran out, as it is in Michalson's interpretation (Michalson, Fallen Freedom,
117), it is used to illustrate the truths of reason.
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particulars of how we must cognize this prototypical ideal. In the next section, 6:62-71,
Kant explains the details of what moral faith (or practical faith in the Son of God) looks
like and the degree of assurance we may have regarding our having secured dispositional
redemption. Finally, we focus on 6:66-76 in which Kant fleshes out the significance of
the union that takes place between the convert and prototype in the appropriation of the
prototypical disposition. It is in this section that Kant lays out the anatomy of moral
conversion and the subsequent relationship between the prototype and those who have
adopted his disposition, which grounds the hope of becoming pleasing to God. With this
sketch in hand, we turn to 6:60-66.
Religion 60-66 (Cognizing the Prototype)
At the beginning of Book Two, Kant introduces what he calls 'Humanity ... in its
full moral perfection.' Such humanity embodies the very antithesis of our corrupt nature
(established in Book One), and is, to Kant's mind, the only reason why God would
create the world. Kant submits that morally perfect humanity is '[tjhat which alone can
make the world the object of divine decree and the end of creation' (6:60). Even though
he gives little explanation for why he thinks so, it appears that for Kant only such
humanity could incite God (who is supremely concerned with the moral) to create via
his pleasure with it: 'from [Humanity in its full moral perfection] happiness follows in
the will of the Highest Being directly as from its supreme condition' (6:60), and thus, 'In
him God loved the world' (6:60). The perfect humanity referred to here must (given
Kant's argument for c orruption in Book One) possess a disposition distinct from our
own, one that exhibits the moral perfection our humanity lacks. This dispositional^
ideal humanity Kant refers to as 'the prototype' (6:61). Given that such an ideal is
needed to retain the meaningfulness of the world, Kant presses ahead in cognizing the
prototype, which indicates that he takes the meaningfulness of our world to be
axiomatic, most probably on the basis of what Michalson calls 'the principle of
proportionality'.7
7
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 38.
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The prototype, Kant tells us, has existed within God from all eternity and is not
created (indicating both its transcendence and non-temporality). Kant's assumption is
that the prototype is linked to the very being of God; i.e., insofar as God is necessarily
eternal, so too is this perfect humanity: 'This human being, alone pleasing to God, "is in
him from all eternity", the idea of him proceeds from God's being; he is not, therefore, a
created thing' (6:60). The argument throughout Book Two indicates that the prototype is
cognized not merely as a type of humanity but as a type of divine-humanity. The
prototype is 'God's only begotten Son, 'the Word' (the Fiat!) through which all other
things are, and without whom nothing that is made would exist' (6:60). He is a 'divine
human being [who] had actual possession of his eminence and blessedness from
eternity' (6:64). Unlike humanity's corrupt disposition in Book One, the prototype, as
divine, (apparently) possesses its dispositional perfection as an inherent and eternal
property of its being.
The divine-human nature of the prototype, including its inherent and eternal
perfection, sets up the basic concept that grounds the entirety of Book Two. The
prototype, Kant tells us, is our only hope for overcoming the dispositional corruption of
Book One: 'only in him and through the adoption of his disposition can we hope "to
become c hildren of God", etc.' (6:60-61). Thus, the prototype is not an ideal merely
'presented by reason for emulation' (6:61), but is 'the prototype of moral disposition in
its entire purity' (6:61). The disposition of the prototype is presented to us in reason and
is m ade available for adoption. M oral h ope d epends o n u s a dopting, o r a ppropriating
(6:66), the disposition of the prototype through moral faith: 'In the practicalfaith in this
Son ofGod ... the human being can thus hope to become pleasing to God (and thereby
blessed); that is, only a human being conscious of such a moral disposition in himself ...
is entitled to consider himself not an unworthy object of divine pleasure' (6:62). The
disposition of the prototype 'alone [is] pleasing to God' (6:60), and therefore, moral
hope rests on incorporating the prototype's disposition into our person.
It is important to understand that, for Kant, the prototype is not an ideal that can
be thought of as an inherent member of humanity, but is an ideal available to humanity
as the result of an act of divine grace. Kant is clear that 'we are not [the prototype's]
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author' (6:61), and we should instead hold that 'thatprototype has come down to us from
heaven, that it has taken up humanity' (6:61). In other words, the prototype's humanity
(and subsequent accessibility to humanity) is not an inherent feature of its own being but
should be cognized as something that the divine Son of God willingly assumed in order
to make available to our own corrupt species a disposition in full moral perfection. Note,
however, that this is not incarnation in the sense of traditional Christian theology as a
temporal, historical appearance but rather a non-temporal, primordial incarnation in
which the divine Son of God takes on humanity conceived Platonically, His disposition
is implanted in the human species and therefore available for adoption by the human
individual. It is this primordial incarnation that is the condition for the creation of our
world and is discovered in cognition. This top-down access to the good disposition
emerges for Kant because, whereas he finds it inconceivable that 'the human being, evil
by nature, would renounce evil on his own and raise himself up to the ideal of holiness'
(6:61), it is not inconceivable that the divine Son of God has condescended to us and as
such is a provision of divine grace. 'This union with [humanity] may therefore be
regarded as a state of abasement of the Son of God.... The human being ... who is never
free of guilt ... [is] hence unworthy of the union of his disposition with such an idea,
even though this idea serves him as prototype.' (6:61). And since Kant has already
established in Book One that humanity, though corrupt, is not evil by necessity, he finds
no conflict in holding that the ideal of holiness 'take up humanity—which is not evil in
itself—by descending to it' (6:61). Therefore, Kant presents the prototype as a 'divine
human being [who] had actual possession of his eminence and blessedness from
eternity' (6:64).
As this talk of condescension may indicate, Kant's cognizing of the prototype
does not leave the prototype as a mere stagnant ideal. Rather Kant submits that we must
have an accompanying account of the moral activities of the prototype:
We cannot think the ideal of a humanity pleasing to God ... except in the idea of
a human being willing not only to execute in person all human duties, and at the
same time to spread goodness about him as far wide as possible through teaching
and example, but also though tempted by the greatest temptation, to take upon
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himself all sufferings, up to the most ignominious death, for the good of the
world and even for his enemies (6:61; emphasis added)
The prototype's purpose, namely, 'to deliver [his enemies] from eternal damnation'
(6:64), shows that Kant's thinking on the prototype is more dynamic than mere
condescension. The particulars of this account, for Kant, are rooted in the utter
perfection of the disposition itself: '[H]uman beings cannot form for themselves any
concept of the degree and the strength of a force like that of a moral disposition except
by representing it surrounded by obstacles and yet—in the midst of the greatest possible
temptations—victorious' (6:61). Since the empirical cannot yield the disposition itself,
such an account of the prototype's activity is needed in order to cognize the full depth
and complexity of the prototype's moral perfection. Thus, 'the abasement' of the Son of
God, of which Kant spoke earlier, points not merely to his union with our humanity, but
also of the suffering he endures: '[though] not bound to submit to sufferings, he
nonetheless takes these upon himself in the fullest measure for the sake ofpromoting the
world's greatest good' (6:61).8
It should be noted here, however, that this prototypical narrative is not, for Kant,
an actual history. Having identified the prototype as 'presented to us by reason' (6:61),
and as an ideal to which conformity is part of 'our universal human duty' (6:61), Kant
indicates that the prototype is necessary—i.e., the prototype is not contingent on
historical happenings. Kant draws out more clearly in 6:115 of Book Three this
difference between necessary and contingent beliefs. There, Kant distinguishes between
a religion grounded in an historical event, which 'carries ... the consciousness of its
contingency', and a religion grounded in reason, which 'can be recognized as
necessary'. The account of the activities of the prototype presented here in Book Two is
a non-temporal narrative; it is how we must cognize the prototype, not what we identify
about the prototype from having experienced a particular history. As Kant puts it, 'the
required prototype always resides only in reason' (6:63). For him, the prototype
8 This righteous suffering of course, contrasts with the human individual who, in his moral guilt,' can
regard himself as responsible for the sufferings that come his way' (6:61).
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necessarily resides in reason because (1) the prototype (with his narrative) must be
universally accessible if elevation to this prototype is to be a universal human duty, and
(2) since the prototype is a dispositional ideal, 'outer experience yields no example
adequate to the idea; as outer it does not disclose the inwardness of the disposition but
only allows inference to it' (6:63). Therefore, cognition gives us access to the disposition
in a way experience cannot, also providing a non-temporal narrative that, as a necessary
feature of reason, is 'perfectly valid for all human beings, at all times, and in all worlds'
(6:66).
Kant argues against the need for (although not the possibility of) a particular
historical manifestation of the prototype in 6:62-66 by drawing on the ought-implies-
can-principle: ' [the p rototype] h as c omplete r eality w ithin i tself. F or i t r esides i n o ur
morally-legislative reason. We ought to conform to it, and therefore we must also be
able to' (6:62). The prototype, as the picture of what we ought to become, bears a link
with the moral law; and thus, conformity to his image, for Kant, falls under the category
of duty. For this reason, Kant submits that if we must first establish an example from
experience of someone who is able to conform to the prototypical ideal in order to
validate the idea, we would need to likewise demand such an example of the moral law
in order to validate its authority: 'If we had to demonstrate in advance that it is possible
to be a human being conforming to this prototype ... we would have to entertain
reservations about allowing even to the moral law the authority of unconditional and yet
sufficient determining ground of our power of choice' (6:62). Clearly, for Kant, it is
evident prime facie that 'even if there never had been one human being capable of
unconditional obedience to the law, the objective necessity that there be such a human
being would yet be undiminished and self-evident' (6:62). Consequently, the validity of
the prototypical ideal, in like manner, retains the same type of validity: 'There is no
need, t herefore, o f a ny e xample from e xperience torn ake t he i dea o f a h uman b eing
morally pleasing to God a model to us; the idea is present as model already in our
reason' (6:62). Todemand such an o utward experience i s only t o c onfess what Kant
calls 'moral unbelief (6:63).
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To be sure, Kant's concern for guarding against the prototype's being made
contingent on a historical appearance is not meant to defeat the possibility of such an
appearance. On the contrary, after arguing against the need for an empirical
manifestation of the prototype, Kant does submit that such a manifestation must,
nevertheless, be possible.9 He moves from the ought-implies-can-principle to the claim
that 'an experience must be possible in which the example of such a human being
[pleasing to God] is given' (6:63; emphasis added). Kant, of course, qualifies this by
noting that this possibility exists only 'to the extent that one can ... ask for evidence of
inner moral disposition from external experience' (6:63), for clearly, as already stated,
'as outer it does not disclose the inwardness of the disposition but only allows inference
to it, though not with strict certainty' (6:63). Therefore, there is a balance in Kant's
thinking: The required prototype, as a universally valid dispositional ideal, resides
always only in morally-legislative reason, while the ought-implies-can-principle
indicates that a manifestation must be possible—at least, to the extent that outward
deeds give evidence of an inward disposition.10 This assumption does not mean,
suggests Kant, that if we find a historical individual who perfectly emulates the
prototype (e.g., Jesus of Nazareth), that we would presume him to be the prototype. On
the contrary, 'we would have no cause to assume in him anything else except a naturally
begotten human being (because he too feels to be under the obligation to exhibit such an
example in himself)' (6:63). In other words, since it is human duty to conform to the
prototypical ideal, we should not think that one who emulates the prototype is unique.
This does not mean 'that we would thereby absolutely deny that he might indeed also be
9 This marks a clear difference between the non-temporal narrative of the prototype in Book Two and the
non-temporal pseudo-narrative ofour human universal's choosing of the corrupt disposition (paralleled
with the Adamic narrative of the Fall; see 6:41-44). In Book One the disposition has been chosen and its
effects are present in this world already among human individuals; there is no need for a hypostatization in
a particular individual. Whereas the prototype's non-temporal narrative may very well be manifest in
history, both narratives are cognized and non-temporal, but the prototypical one retains the possibility of
empirical manifestation.
10 Kant suggests that the prototype incarnate 'though in fact totally human, would nonetheless be able to
speak truly of himself as if the ideal of goodness were displayed incarnate in him.... F or he would be
speaking only of the disposition which he makes the rule of his actions but which, since he cannot make it
visible as an example to others in and of itself, he places before their eyes externally through his teachings
and actions: "Which of you convinceth me of sin?'" (6:65-66).
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a supernaturally begotten human being' (6:63), but given that it is our duty to conform to
such an image anyway, the quandary itself 'from a practical point of view ... is of no
benefit to us' (6:63).'1
Hence, the picture we have of the required or cognized prototype is that he is an
eternal divine being who has taken on human nature, presented himself to us for
emulation, and endured all manner of suffering for our salvation; the idea of him resides
first and foremost, not in history, but in our morally-legislative reason, and is therefore
universally valid—though an empirical manifestation of this ideal in history must be
possible. Kant's solution to human depravity is that human beings adopt the disposition
of t he p rototype and c onform t o h is image. T his s olution p rovides a n umber o f c lear
connections between Kant's line of thought in Book One and his discussion of the
prototype in Book Two. In Book Two, the prototype is cognized not merely as an
individual, but as a type of humanity—a cognized universal of human moral
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perfection. As such, his incarnation is not a temporal, historical incarnation, but a non-
temporal transcendental incarnation in the form of a perfect disposition implanted in
humanity universally conceived. The prototype's disposition, as a perfect disposition, is
the antithesis of our corrupt disposition in Book One. By placing the prototype within
God, Kant places the prototype (like our corrupt human universal of Book One) outside
the empirical or 'apart from any temporal condition' (6:31). However, the prototype
11 In fact, such a 'hypostatization in a particular human being' (6:64) may only hinder our practical pursuit,
says Kant, if we were to realize that such a historical individual's 'unchanging purity of will [was] not
gained through effort but [was] innate.' Certainly, 'the thought that this divine human being ... willingly
divested himselfof [his eternal blessedness] for the sake of plainly unworthy individuals ... to deliver
them from eternal damnation—this thought must attune our mind to admiration, love and thankfulness
toward him' (6:64); however, 'he himself could not be presented to us as an example to be emulated'
(6:64). Kant is aware that this dual nature could be construed as doing damage to the prototype's role as
exemplar. Kant affirms that the prototype's divinity, which makes him immune to moral failing, is not a
suitable example. However, since the prototype is equally part of humanity, it is our legitimate duty, says
Kant, to seek to elevate ourselves to his moral perfection: '[The] idea of a conduct in accordance with so
perfect a rule ofmorality could no doubt also be valid for us, as a precept to be followed' (6:64).
12 Kant does refer to the prototype as a 'human being' (6:60), but it seems that in the context of his
argument, this is in keeping with his language of Book One, in which he moves between sp eaking of
humanity as a species and the human being as a reference species: 'by the 'human being' of whom we say
that he is good or evil by nature we are entitled to understand not individuals ... but the whole species'
(6:25).
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bears a d isposition t hat, 1 ike o ur c orrupt d isposition, c an b e p resent i n and a ffect t he
moral propensity of human individuals; yet, unlike our corrupt disposition, the
prototype's disposition is not innate to the individual. It must be adopted in place of the
corrupt disposition. Human hope thus rests on a revolutionary exchange of disposition:
ours for that of the prototype.
Religion 62-71 (On Moral Faith)
In Book Two, 6:62, we find the first mention of moral faith or what Kant calls
'the practical faith in this Son of God). In the context of Kant's argument, this phrase
refers specifically to the pragmatic application of our need to appropriate the prototype's
disposition in order to be found pleasing to God. On this score, the primary means of
appropriation, it seems, is duty itself: '[I]t is our universal human duty to elevate
ourselves to this ideal ofmoral perfection, i.e. to the prototype ofmoral disposition in its
entire purity' (6:61). Since disposition (as stated above) is beyond our ability to observe,
even in ourselves (see 6:63), our quest to appropriate the prototypical disposition must
be worked out in our moral life: In my search to lay hold of the prototype's disposition, I
must seek to live a life (or cultivate a character) that reflects such a perfect disposition.
This quest becomes the pragmatic import of the cognized non-temporal narrative of the
prototype. Such a narrative provides a picture of what the prototypical disposition
outwardly looks like in all its purity, and thus a picture of the type of character we must
seek to cultivate. Therefore, while 'In the practical faith in this Son of God ... the
human being can thus hope to become pleasing to God (and thereby blessed)', certainty
of such moral hope requires that we believe that our disposition is of such a kind that, if
subjected to the same type of temptations, trials, and suffering we cognize the prototype
as undergoing (e.g., spreading good as far and wide as possible, enduring every
temptation, undergoing the most ignominious death, etc.), we would bear up underneath
such things and emulate the prototype's example perfectly. This litmus test, which
compares the outward evidence with the inward disposition, can alone give complete
assurance:
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only a human being conscious of such a moral disposition in himself as enables
him to believe and self-assuredly trust that he, under similar temptations and
afflictions (so far as these are made the touchstone of that idea), would
steadfastly cling to the prototype of humanity and follow this prototype's
example in loyal emulation, only such a human being, and he alone, is entitled to
consider himselfnot an unworthy object of divine pleasure (6:62).
At first glance, such a standard would seem to be a barrier to moral hope. Given
that K ant h imself acknowledges t hat t he ' human b eing ... i s n ever free o f g uilt e ven
when he has taken on [the prototype's] disposition' (6:61), it must be asked how a
human being might ever say with confidence that he has taken hold of the prototypical
disposition?
This difficulty for moral hope Kant addresses in 6:67-71. It is a concern related
to what Kant calls 'moral happiness' (6:68), or 'the assurance of the reality and
constancy of a disposition that always advances in goodness (and never falters from it)'
(6:67). Kant highlights the common desire for internal assurance of having already
procured redemption and final perseverance—typically along lines that parallel the
Pauline concept of the Holy Spirit testifying with the believer's spirit that the convert is
already a child of God (cf. Rom. 8:16). The desire for (and perhaps even pursuit of) such
a witness is essentially, to Kant's mind, a search by the convert to 'feel of himself that
he can never fall so low as to regain a liking for evil' (6:68). The difficulty with such a
self-assuring solution is, of course, that 'one is never more easily deceived than in what
promotes a good opinion of oneself (6:68). Yet even more problematic is that Kant feels
that such an assurance is of little moral motivation, since 'the constant "seeking after the
Kingdom of God" would be equivalent to knowing oneself already in possession of this
kingdom' (6:67-68). It is better, thinks Kant, for human beings to "'work out their
salvation with fear and trembling'", to use Paul's phrase (6:68; Phil. 2:12).
Kant acknowledges that certainly 'without any confidence in the disposition once
acquired, perseverance in it would hardly be possible' (6:68). However, given his
contention that 'a human being's inner experience of himself does not allow him so to
fathom the depths of his heart' (6:63), such confidence is not as unshakeable as one
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might prefer. Confidence, for Kant, can only be based on an account of the outward
evidence that 'allows inference to [the inward disposition]' (6:63). To use Kant's words,
'We can ... find this confidence ... by comparing our life conduct so far pursued with
the resolution we once embraced' (6:68). Assurance must be based on an evaluation of
personal moral progress. This evaluation yields two possible results. First, one may find
that 'from the time of his adoption of the principles of the good ... [he] has perceived the
efficacy of these principles on what he does, i.e. the conduct of his life as it steadily
improves, and from that has cause to infer ... a fundamental improvement in his
disposition' (6:68). Such improvement gives cause to hope that 'he will no longer
forsake his present course' (6:68) and 'if after this life another awaits him, that he will
persevere in [the good principle]' (6:68). In short, 'he can legitimately assume that his
disposition is fundamentally improved' (6:68). This outcome contrasts with the
observation for one who despite 'repeated resolutions to be good ... has always relapsed
into evil' (6:68). Such an observation can only rouse 'conscience to judgment' (6:69).
Thus, while we cannot observe the disposition itself, in Kant's scheme, moral
improvement or regression gives legitimate testimony of the inward disposition.13
Kant is clear that the type of moral improvement required to procure confidence
of dispositional improvement is not indicative of moral perfection. Certainly, an
individual possessed of personal perfection would be 'entitled to consider himself not an
unworthy object of divine pleasure' (6:62). However, Kant makes apparent that even the
one who observes moral improvement and has legitimate grounds to think that he will
'come ever closer to his goal of perfection' (6:68), cannot expect to attain perfection.
Such a goal is simply not attainable in Kant's mind: '[he] can ... reasonably hope that in
this life he will no longer forsake his present course ... and come ever closer to his goal
of perfection, though it is unattainable' (6:68). Therefore, the convert, while having a
13 The moral convert and the moral reprobate represent two trajectories, or what Kant calls 'either a
blessed or a cursed eternity' (6:69). The blessed eternity being a picture of steadymoral improvement
rooted in the adoption of the prototypical disposition and subsequent conformity to that image, and the
cursed eternity being a moral degeneration, unable to subdue the evil that is rooted in the corrupt
disposition of our evil human nature or disposition.
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reasonable hope that a genuine change of disposition has occurred, still faces moral
failings. In the face of such transgressions, moral progress that points to dispositional
change may serve as comfort, but it cannot make one 'absolutely assured of the
unchangeableness of... [their] disposition'' (6:68). As Kant states, 'we cannot base this
confidence upon an immediate consciousness of the immutability of our disposition'
(6:71). In short, the convert may take comfort based on an improved life, but comfort is
not certainty; it is only a reasonable hope based on the outward evidence of an improved
inward disposition.
Religion 66-76 (The Anatomy ofMoral Hope)
Under the section titled 'Difficulties that Stand in the Way of the Reality of this
Idea and Their Solution', Kant sets forth three potential difficulties for the application of
the prototype to moral hope. The first difficulty is straightforward and easily resolved; it
simply concerns the question of how we can hope to be judged pleasing based on our
inward disposition if our outward deeds are not perfect. Kant's answer is simply that we
will be 'judged by him who scrutinizes the heart' (6:67). Thus, while the particular 'deed
is every time ... defective' (6:67), the 'disposition from which it derives and which
transcends the senses' is what is judged by God, and therefore 'a human being can still
expect to be generally well-pleasing to God, at whatever point in time his existence be
cut short' (6:67; cf. 6:60-61)—provided he has, in fact, adopted the prototype's
disposition. The second difficulty Kant raises concerns moral happiness, already
addressed in the previous section. The third difficulty, however, is where Kant draws out
the particular dynamics of how dispositional conversion satisfies divine justice and
grounds moral hope. It is on this third difficulty that we will focus for the remainder of
our expository treatment.
Kant phrases this third difficulty as follows: '[Ejvery human being, even after he
has entered upon the path of goodness, [is] still a reprobate in the sentencing of his entire
life conduct before a divine righteousness ... however steadfastly a human being may
have persevered in such a disposition ... he nevertheless started from evil' (6:72). This
starting point speaks of the evil nature or disposition, which is innate in every human
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individual, i.e., 'present in the human being at the moment of birth' (6:22).14 The
difficulty this presents for moral hope resides in the unfortunate reality that this original
debt 'is impossible for [the convert] to wipe out' (6:72). Kant gives three reasons for this
impossibility. First, even if the convert perseveres in the good disposition to such a
degree as to avoid incurring new debts, it is not 'equivalent to his having paid off the old
ones' (6:72). Second, the convert cannot produce through the 'future conduct of a good
life, a surplus over and above what he is under obligation to perform each time' (6:72),
for the convert's 'duty at each instant is to do all the good in his power' (6:72). Third,
dispositional evil 'is not a transmissible liability which can be made over to somebody
else ... [It is] the most personal of all liabilities, namely a debt of sins which only the
culprit, not the innocent, can bear' (6:72). It is apparent that this non-transmissible
liability refers to the dispositional debt of sin, for Kant states that it cannot be
transmitted 'because the evil is in the disposition and the maxims in general (in the
manner of universal principles as contrasted with individual transgression)' (6:72).
Kant's solution to this tripartite difficulty has three corresponding features that lay bare
the anatomy of moral hope: (1) the resolution of infinite dispositional guilt through
moral conversion itself, (2) the vicarious suffering of the prototype for finite non-
dispositional guilt, and (3) the imputation of the prototype's surplus of righteousness to
the convert.
Regarding dispositional evil, Kant notes that the moral debt resulting from such
corruption is not like a financial debt or even a particular legal transgression in a human
court—such debts are finite and transferable. In contrast, dispositional debt cannot be
transferred and is infinite. The transgression 'in the manner of universal principles'1
(6:72) ultimately 'brings with it an infinity of violations of the law', for this dispositional
corruption gives rise to the individual's propensity to evil—it is 'the subject of all
inclinations that lead to sin' (6:74). It is for this reason that such corruption 'brings with
it... an infinity of guilt... because the evil is in the disposition'' (6:72). As a result, Kant
14 Kant later states this expressly: 'this original debt ... that precedes whatever good a human being may
ever do (this, and no more, is what we understood by radical evil; cf. Section One)' (6:72).
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explains, 'every human being has to expect infinite punishment and exclusion from the
Kingdom of God' (6:72). Kant's resolution to this infinite dispositional guilt comes to
light as he considers the divine judge who 'knows the heart of the accused' (6:72).
While one may think that the easy solution here would be to condemn the perpetrator,
Kant suggests that God, who knows the inwardness of the disposition, cannot mete out
justice so simplistically. The punishment of the corrupt disposition cannot be rightly
extended to and carried out upon the convert who has adopted the prototype's
disposition. The convert, in his new disposition, is 'a human being well-pleasing to God'
(6:73), even though in his former disposition he was 'the subject of God's displeasure'
(6:73). God must carry out justice, but the deity can no longer carry out the punishment
germane to the old man, for such a penalty would fall only on the new man.
Kant submits that since justice was executed 'neither before nor after
conversion' (6:73), 'the punishment must be thought as adequately executed in the
situation of conversion itself (6:73). In other words, ifjustice is to be rendered, then the
'punishment whereby satisfaction is rendered to divine justice' (6:74) must be rendered
in ' the v ery c oncept o f moral c onversion' ( 6:73). Kant d efines c onversion i n P auline
terms as "'the putting off of the old man and the putting on of the new'" (6:74; Col. 3:9-
10). In the context of Book Two, this language refers specifically to the dispositional
revolution in which the convert abandons the corrupt disposition of our humanity in
order to adopt the disposition of the prototype. This revolution is not indicative of two
acts 'separated by a temporal interval' but of two sides of the same coin: 'conversion is
... a single act, since the abandonment of evil is possible only through the good
disposition that effects the entrance into goodness, and vice versa' (6:74). Therefore,
while the convert is '[p]hysically ... still the same human being ... in the sight of a
divine judge ... he is morally another being' (6:74). The old man's identity was wrapped
up in the individual's union with the corrupt disposition; in abandoning such a
disposition for a new disposition (and thus a new identity), the old man is put to death.
The convert's (or new man's) identity was defined by a wholly distinct disposition, and
thus, '[t]he emergence from the corrupted disposition into the good is in itself already
sacrifice (as "the death of the old man", "the crucifying of the flesh")' (6:74; Gal.
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2:19).15 Punishment for the infinite dispositional debt is thus rendered at the moment of
conversion with this execution of the old man, i.e., the usurping of the old disposition.16
Conversion, while satisfying the infinite dispositional guilt, still leaves the matter
of particular transgressions that arise after conversion.17 Since such particular failings
arise after the revolution of disposition, and thus presumably out of a type of weakness
amidst moral progress rather than the disposition itself, the infinity of dispositional guilt
does not apply; and therefore, such debts are finite. For these Kant indicates the
prototype may suffer: 'And this disposition which he has incorporated in all its purity of
the Son of God—or (ifwe personify this idea) this very Son of God—bears as vicarious
subsitute the debt of sin for him, and also for all who believe (practically) in him' (6:74).
It is often recognized that the disposition 'bears as vicarious substitute' the debt of sin
for the convert in this passage, but what is often missed is that 'disposition' here does
not merely refer to a new inclination in the convert, but is a reference to the being from
whom the convert's new disposition is adopted, i.e., the prototype.18 Kant makes this
15 Kant's language may serve to confuse some readers regarding what he is claiming here. His use of
biblical language (especially the crucifying of the flesh) is often used in Protestant circles in reference to
the daily mortification of the flesh (i.e., the process of sanctification) and thus may lead some readers to
understand Kant as speaking of the convert's daily battle against the flesh (e.g., Michalson, Fallen
Freedom, 93-94). However, given that Kant has in view here the moment of conversion, and has made
plain that the problem in view cannot be resolved post-conversion, this interpretation is highly unlikely.
Instead, we should probably understand Kant to be referring not to the daily mortification of the flesh, but
to the unique death of the old man at the moment of conversion, in which the old self is put to death by
way of being replaced by the new man.
16 In this interpretation, j ustice is not found in the 'long train of life's ills' that follows, as many have
argued. See Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 117. These ills, while undertaken by the new human being
'simply for the sake of the good,' 'are still fitting punishment for someone else, namely the old human
being,' and cannot serve as a vehicle for justice as they are post-conversion ills, which Kant has already
established cannot be a vehicle for justice. Michalson recognizes the difficulty with placing justice in such
ills, but treats this simply as inconsistency on Kant's part rather than a deficiency in his own
interpretation. See Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 119.
17 The question of why those undergoing a dispositional revolution continue to sin is rather ambiguous in
Religion. It is not entirely clear whether the evil principle is still present but no longer dominant (cf. 6:73)
or whether the evil principle is a remaining contextual influence due to the life of the convert amidst those
of the corrupt disposition (cf. 6:93), or perhaps a mix of both of these options. Ultimately the particulars
on this score are beyond the scope of this paper and of little relevance to understanding the dynamics of
Book Two that concern us here.
18 Such a statement seems peculiar if one understands the disposition simply to be a change of heart in the
convert. In that case, Kant would be suggesting that the convert's sudden change of heart bears his debt of
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plain in both his reference to practical belief ('believe (practically) in him'), which
parallels his earlier language of the practical faith in the Son of God, and in his naming
of the prototype as the personification of the good disposition: 'And this disposition ...
or (if we personify this idea) this very Son of God' (6:74). Thus, the disposition which
the convert 'has made his own' provides the link between the convert and the prototype
that makes it possible for the prototype to bear (or atone for) the convert's remaining
non-dispositional failings—and not only those of the convert, but also the failings of all
who believe practically in him (i.e., adopt his disposition): '[A]s savior, he satisfies the
highest justice through suffering and death, and, as advocate, he makes it possible for
them to hope that they will appear justified before their judge' (6:75).
Finally, with all debts paid, there is still the convert's need for positive
righteousness before the divine judge. It is key to understand here that Kant retains, from
Book One, the notion of moral imputability between the individual and his disposition.
Just as the demerits of the corrupt disposition have been cognized as imputable to the
individual (cf. 6:21; 31), so Kant assumes that this same imputability applies to the
convert's appropriation of the prototypical disposition. He suggests that the convert's
adoption of the prototype's disposition enables the imputation of the prototype's
righteousness to the convert. Thus, the convert's adoption of the prototypical disposition
not only pays for the convert's debt of sin (both infinite and finite), but allows the
prototype's surplus of righteousness or 'surplus over the merit from works' to be found
within or 'imputed to' the convert, thereby providing more than mere moral
acceptability, but positive righteousness with which the deity is well pleased (6:75).
sin, which (it would seem) one would have to take poetically—since the new disposition takes the place of
deeds before God, this change of heart metaphorically takes the role of a Christ figure for the convert.
(Gordon Michalson, for example, understands the passage in this way. See Michalson, Fallen Freedom,
120.) However, this interpretation makes little sense of the claim that the disposition accomplishes this
end not only for the convert, but also for 'all who believe in him' (6:74). Can it be that Kant is really
suggesting that one can find atonement by believing in someone else's change of heart? Either this
common interpretation is correct and Kant's thinking here is even more hopelessly absurd than often
suggested, or Kant is actually commending faith in something other than ourselves, e.g., the prototype.
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III. Book Three: The Ethical Commonwealth and the Establishment of Kant's
Vision ofHope
As we now move into an expository treatment of Book Three, it should be noted
once again that we will not have the opportunity in the space provided to cover every
paragraph. Rather, the examination will centre on what I take to be the thematic heart of
Kant's argument, which consists of three exegetical focus points. The first is found in
6:93-101. Here, Kant highlights the need for the moral convert to unite with other moral
converts in an ethical community, and provides a picture of what this community must
look like. One of the key features of this community is its universality, which gives way
to Kant's discussion in 6:102-124 of pure rational religion—the focus of the second
exegetical section. Kant suggests that only rational religion is a sufficient foundation for
a universal church, and thus, he lays bare the particular nature of rational religion and its
necessary relationship to ecclesiastical faith. Finally, in 6:124-147, Kant turns to his case
for Christianity as rational religion, and it is this argument that occupies the third
exegetical section. I will argue that here Kant seeks to demonstrate that Christianity in
its pure form exemplifies the very rational religion he commends.
Religion 93-101 (The Needfor andNature of the Ethical Commonwealth)
Having established in Books One and Two of Religion that humanity bears a
common corrupt disposition that must be replaced by the prototype's good disposition if
humans are to have moral hope, Kant moves in Book Three to the more practical
dimensions of moral faith/sanctification. He opens Book Three by highlighting the
internal moral conflict that exists within the convert, an opening that re-emphasizes that
the dispositional revolution discussed in Book Two does not obliterate the influence of
the evil principle on the moral convert. Whereas the prototype has come down to
humanity and made available to individuals a good disposition, this new disposition only
promises moral freedom by providing an alternative disposition. The human person, who
is otherwise bound under the corrupt disposition, now has available a good disposition,
namely, the disposition of the prototype. The human individual may adopt this new
disposition and thus live under its dominion. Yet, Kant is clear, the redemptive work of
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the prototype does not erase the evil disposition in the human species, and thus, does not
eliminate its influence on the human individual. As Kant states at the close of Book
Two,
So the moral outcome of this conflict [between the good and the evil principle]
... is not really the conquering of the evil principle—for its kingdom still
endures ...—but only the breaking up of its controlling power in holding against
their will those who have so long been subject to it, now that another moral
dominion ... has been revealed to them as freedom (6:82-83).
In conversion, the new disposition 'has the upper hand over the evil principle'
(6:73), but nevertheless, both the good and evil dispositions reside in humanity
(universally conceived). Hence, the convert, despite having adopted the new disposition,
is ever pressed by the evil principle and must resist this evil, persevering in the good.
Kant describes this internal moral conflict in battle-like terms in the opening of Book
Three: '[EJvery morally well-disposed human being must withstand in this life, under
the leadership of the good principle, against the attacks of the evil principle ... and assert
his freedom which is constantly under attack' (6:93). The moral convert bears the
responsibility to seek to undo evil, yet the question of how to extricate oneself from evil
resonates throughout Book Three: '[The convert] is bound at least to apply as much
force as he can muster in order to extricate himself from [the evil principle]. But how?
That is the question' (6:93).19 The importance of this question is tied directly to moral
hope. If faith in the prototype, which grounds hope, is wrapped up practically in the
throwing off of evil, Kant's argument must still answer the practical question of how the
moral convert is to 'remain forever armed for battle' (6:93).
19 This internal moral battle, Kant suggests, is the convert's 'own fault' (6:93). On this point, we must take
Kant to be referring to his e arlier c ontention in Book One that the evil bend of the disposition, while
chosen by the human universal prior to any exercise of individual freedom, is, nevertheless, imputable to
the individual as part of humanity—the innateness of the disposition to the individual does not eliminate
culpability. Thus, the convert, despite having adopted the good disposition, is under the attack of the evil
disposition; but this conflict exists only because humanity (universally considered) chose the evil
disposition. It seems this is the type of fault Kant has in view.
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As Kant engages this question, he suggests that an examination of 'the causes
and the circumstances that draw [the convert] into this danger and keep him there' (6:93)
indicates that the tendency to moral regression does not come 'from [the convert's] own
raw nature, so far as he exists in isolation, but rather from the human beings to whom he
stands in relation or association' (6:93). In other words, 'malignant inclinations ... assail
his nature, which on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among other human
beings' (6:93). Because it has already been shown in Book One that all human beings
prior to conversion are naturally under the dominion of the evil principle (i.e., they bear
an innate corrupt disposition), Kant thinks it inevitable that humans will corrupt one
another. This negative communal influence is not necessarily due to the overtly
depraved character of those the convert is in community with (i.e., it is not 'necessary to
assume that these are sunk into evil and are e xamples that lead [the c onvert] astray'
(6:94)), but rather, moral stifling and even regression is simply the inevitable result of
the convert being amidst a community composed of the dispositional^ corrupt: ' [I]t
suffices that they are there, that they surround [the convert], and that they are human
beings, and that they will mutually corrupt each other's moral [predispositions] and
make one another evil' (6:94).20 Thus, those who are converted to the good principle are
under the inevitable threat of evil merely by being a part of humanity in association with
humanity. Kant's problem in Book Three centres on overcoming the negative effects of
the communal context on the practical faith in the prototype, and on the subsequent
negative effects on moral hope.
Kant's solution to this type of contextual moral impediment involves the
establishment of 'a union which has as its end the prevention of this evil and the
20 The substitution in the above quote (i.e., changing 'disposition' to 'predispositions') is representative of
an e xegetical d ecision t o side with the Hudson/Green translation. Assuming the interpretation ofBook
One previously defended is correct, the human disposition has already been said to be corrupt prior to any
exercise of freedom; along this same train of thought, it is unlikely that Kant intends to root dispositional
corruption in communal interaction that takes place within time (especially when translating it in the
singular, 'disposition', which would point to the common universal disposition). Kant has just previously
made mention of the originally good predispositions as the place in which corruption does not reside (a
point he has already argued for in Book One), making a movement to a discussion of the communal
perversion/corruption of these predispositions a natural progression of his argument.
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promotion of the good' (6:94). This union is envisioned as 'an enduring and ever
expanding society, solely designed for the preservation ofmorality by counteracting evil
with united forces' (6:94). In other words, to combat the moral degeneration that occurs
amidst the dispositional^ corrupt and persevere in the good so as to secure moral hope,
the moral convert must unite with other moral converts in the form of a community to
successfully overcome the evil principle. Without such a communal effort, the convert
would be ill equipped to persevere in the good principle: 'If no means could be found to
establish a union which has for its end the prevention of this evil and the promotion of
the good in the human being ... however much the individual human being might do to
escape from the dominion of this evil, he would still be held in incessant danger of
relapsing into it'. (6:94). Only with such a dominion 'can we hope for a victory of the
good principle over the evil one' (6:94); and without it, '[ijnsomuch as we can see ... the
dominion of the good principle is not otherwise attainable' (6:94).
Prior to going further into his argument, Kant sets forth some basic definitions
that set the stage for his discussion of the nature of this united ethical community. First,
Kant distinguishes between what he calls the state ofnature and the civil state. The state
of nature is a type ofprivate self-governing, in which 'each individual prescribes the law
to himself ... Each individual is his own judge' (6:95). This private self-governing
contrasts with the civil state, in which Taws are public' (6:94). Next, Kant distinguishes
between the ethical and the juridical. The ethical denotes humans ruled by the laws of
virtue. Such laws are non-coercive—those ruled by them choose to be ruled by them.
The juridical, on the other hand, involves laws 'which are all coercive laws' (6:95); thus,
political rule falls under this rubric.
With these definitions in place, Kant's subsequent definitions of the ethico-civil,
the ethical state of nature, and the juridico-civil follow naturally. The ethico-civil (or
ethical community) is an association of non-coerced human beings united under the laws
of virtue, which are made public. It is here that the union of individuals for the
promotion of the good must reside. This term contrasts with the ethical state of nature,
which, even though it also refers to the human being under the laws of virtue in
association with other human beings, denotes a condition in which each individual is his
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own judge and 'there is no effective public authority with power to determine ... what is
in given cases the duty of each individual' (6:95). It is into this category that the moral
convert apart from the community falls. The juridico-civil moves away from the guide
of virtue and instead 'is the relation of human beings to each other ... under public
juridical laws (which are coercive laws)' (6:95). Political governances would fall under
this rubric.21
The importance of these definitions to Kant's argument is that they lay bare what
'a union which has for its end ... the promotion of the good' (6:94) must look like by
definition. There are three main features of the ethical community which Kant sets out.
First, we find that individuals, all of whom begin in an ethical state of nature even if
under the rule of the juridico-civil state, cannot be forced to enter into an ethical civil
state by any ruling power, for by definition one cannot be coerced into an ethical civil
state of non-coercive laws. As Kant puts it, 'it would be a contradiction (in adjecto) for
the political community to compel its citizens to enter into an ethical community, since
the 1 atter entails freedom from coercion in its very concept' (6:95). Thus, the ethical
community must be one that is composed of individuals united under the good principle
without coercion.
Second, we find that 'since the duties of virtue concern the entire human race, the
concept of an ethical community always refers to the ideal of a totality of human beings,
and in this it distinguishes itself from the concept of a political community' (6:96). In
other words, individual ethical societies do not constitute the ethical community, for
each particular ethical society shares a common unifying principle with all other ethical
societies, namely, virtue or the good principle. Thus, the ethical community proper is the
totality of all such ethical societies. To use Kant's words, 'each partial society is only a
representation [of an absolute ethical whole]' (6:96).
21 Kant also speaks of a juridical state of nature, which is, by definition, the self-governing individual's
wielding of coercive laws, the result of which, Kant tells us, 'is a state of war of every human being
against every other' (6:96-97). We may liken this to an almost Hobbesian state of nature. For our purposes
here, however, this juridical state is not of particular relevance.
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Third, we find that the ethical community as a union of individuals under a
common principle is rightly called a kingdom, and thus, there is a movement in Kant's
thinking to a presiding authority over that kingdom. It is here that Kant identifies the
ethical community with a people of God. This movement is based first on the need for
an authority able to unite individuals in a way that mere human effort cannot; thus, the
instantiation of an ethical community 'will need the presupposition of... a higher moral
being through whose universal organization of forces of single individuals, insufficient
on their own, are united for a common end' (6:98). We also find that the notion of the
civil state demands a public lawgiver, i.e., 'someone other than the people whom we can
declare the public lawgiver of an ethical community' (6:99). Kant ascribes three
necessary characteristics to this lawgiver: First, his laws must be part of his 'prior
sanction', not merely conjured by his will. Second, the lawgiver must know 'the most
intimate parts of the dispositions of each and everyone' (6:99). And third, he must be
able to 'give to each according to the worth of his actions' (6:99), i.e., exercise true
justice. Kant concludes that 'this is the concept of God' (6:99), and '[hjence an ethical
community is conceivable only...as a people ofGod, and indeed in accordance with the
laws ofvirtue' (6:99).
This threefold picture of the ethical community, Kant admits, is an ideal that is
'never fully attainable'; it stands as the central component of the philosophical
representation of the Highest Good. The task of instantiating such a community is,
nevertheless, still a duty of the human species, even though the effort to do so is 'greatly
scaled down in human hands' (6:100). This duty is unique, however, in that it is not a
duty of the individual, as is moral law, but a duty of the human species: 'For every
species of rational beings is objectively ... destined to a common end, namely the
promotion of the highest good as a good common to all' (6:97). In this light, it is
apparent that the fulfilment of this duty cannot come about by individual effort, but
instead must come about through 'a union ... into a whole toward that very end' (6:97-
98). And ultimately, even with such a union, Kant submits that it is beyond our ability to
know whether the instantiation of such a union is within our power, and, for this reason,
this duty 'differs from all others in kind and in principle' (6:98).
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Given this knowledge gap, Kant contends that the convert must believe that God
himself is the one who will establish the ethical community. This is not to say, however,
that the convert has license to be idle regarding the formation of the ethical community,
letting each 'go after his private moral affairs and entrust to a higher wisdom the whole
concern of the human race' (6:100). On the contrary, Kant submits that each person
must 'conduct himself as if everything depended on him' (6:101), for only in so doing
can we hope that God 'will provide the fulfillment of his well-intentioned effort'
(6:101), i.e., the formation of the ethical community. In short, while the duty to form the
ethical community belongs to the species, the individual must move toward this end as if
it were an individual duty, clinging to the hope that God himself will instantiate the
ethical community.
The practical implications of this movement toward the ethical community are
worked out in Section Four, in which Kant suggests that the idea of a people of God (or
ethical community) can only be realized in the form of a church. Kant distinguishes,
however, between the invisible, visible, and true church. The invisible church is a type
of universal church composed of 'all upright human beings under direct... moral divine-
governance' (6:101). This church encompasses the totality of converts and ethical
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communities. The visible church is a congregation of people under the good principle,
which exemplifies an imperfect manifestation of the ethical community. The visible
church 'displays the (moral) kingdom of God' to whatever extent the invisible church is
actualized in nature and represents the practical means for the individual to press
forward in bringing to pass the ethical community. The true church is a synthesis of the
invisible and visible church and must, according to Kant, consist of the following
requisites: (1) Universality, it must be 'founded on principles that necessarily lead it to
universal union'; (2) Purity, its drive must be purely moral; (3) Relation Under
Freedom: the relations within the community and with the political community must be
22 Kant suggests that the invisible church is beyond experience, but does not state his rationale for this
definition precisely. It would seem that it is either because the disposition is beyond experience and so the
church's members cannot be identified with certainty, or because we do not experience the whole of the
moral upright at any one time.
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rooted in freedom; and (4) Immutable Constitution: it must be rooted in laws that are
immutable, not fallible creeds that lack authority (6:101-102).23 Each of these
distinctions, as we will see in the sections to follow, point to rational religion as the sole
foundation sufficient for the true church.
Religion 102-124 (Ecclesiastical Faith as the Vehicle ofPure Religious Faith)
In Section Five, Kant moves from the idea of the church to its ground in what he
calls 'pure religious faith' (6:102). Pure religious faith is a faith that has its roots in
reason and the moral law; it is a rational faith. This type of faith, Kant suggests, must be
distinguished from a purely historical faith, which finds its roots in a particular series of
historical events. Because the former (i.e., pure religious faith) is built upon a
moral/rational foundation, Kant suggests that it can be 'convincingly communicated to
everyone' (6:103), for humans universally retain these testimonies in reason. Historical
faith, on the other hand, requires that humans have access to the particular/contingent
facts, which face the challenge of showing their historical 'credibility' (6:103). This
universal verses contingent feature of these two faiths is the primary distinction between
them. Kant writes, 'So if the question How does God wish to be honored? is to be
answered in a way that is universally valid for every human being, each considered
simply as a human being, there is no second thought that the legislation of his will might
not be simply moral. For a statutory legislation (which presupposes a revelation) can be
regarded only as contingent' (6:104). For this reason, only pure religious
(rational/moral) faith can, according to Kant, found a universal church.
Despite Kant's claim that pure religious faith's moral/rational foundation is
universally v alid, he does not suggest that such a faith can be established without an
accompanying historical faith. Rather, he contends that 'due to a peculiar weakness of
human nature, pure faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, [enough]
to found a Church on it alone' (6:103). According to Kant, rational faith needs a
23 This list does not represent an exact quote of Kant's titles, which are as follows: '1. Universality... 2. Its
make-up (quality), i.e. purity... 3. Relation under the principle of freedom... 4. Its modality, the
unchangeableness of its constitution' (6:101-102).
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historical counterpart in an ecclesiastical form to achieve its aim of becoming the
religion of humankind. While ecclesiastical faith is not part of pure religion, 'in the
molding of human beings into an ethical community, ecclesiastical faith naturally
precedes pure religious faith' (6:106). Kant uses the metaphor of a 'vehicle' (6:106) to
explain this relationship: 'a statutory ecclesiastical faith is [sic] added to the pure faith
of religion as its vehicle and means for the public union of human beings promoting it'
(6:106). This relationship is needed not because of inadequacy on the part of rational
faith, but, as already indicated in the above quote, because of a weakness on the part of
human beings.
For Kant, the moral is the only sure divine revelation, and 'a morally good life is
all that God requires of [humans] to be his well-pleasing subjects in his Kingdom'
(6:103). Nevertheless, humanity in its weakness has difficulty understanding (or perhaps
believing) t he fulfilment o f i ts d uty t o b e s ufficiently p leasing t o G od. Subsequently,
there arise various amoral rituals that men imagine 'they must perform for God' (6:103)
directly in the manner one honours the human Tord[s] of this world' (6:103). Such
rituals are the basis for what Kant calls 'a religion of divine service instead of the
concept of a purely moral religion' (6:103). It is this felt need for amoral (and therefore
non-rational and non-universal) acts of service that gives rise to the subsequent felt need
for a revelation of the particular services the deity requires. Kant suggests that, because
of this particular felt need in humans, for rational religion to be palatable, scripture must
act 'as a revelation to present and future generations ... [and] must be the object of the
highest respect' (6:107).
This need for scripture is again not an indication of an inadequacy in rational
faith, but only of the weakness of humanity: humanity feels the need for divine
revelation beyond the moral law in the form of a sacred text. As a result, Kant notes,
scripture has a kind of intrinsic value for humanity: 'A holy book commands the greatest
respect even among those ... who do not read it' (6:107), and thus, 'no subtle argument
can stand up to the knockdown pronouncement, Thus it is written'' (6:107). A religious
faith based on an authoritative scripture has greater stability than a social or political
religion, for example, that is diffused the moment 'the state breaks down' (6:107).
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However, since the worth of a given scripture must, according to Kant, still be weighed
according to the strictures of reason, the best holy book would be one that contains the
'purest moral doctrine of religion' (6:107).
We begin to see here in the centre ofBook Three an important interplay between
ecclesiastical faith and pure moral faith. Kant's way of unpacking the relationship
between the ecclesiastical and the moral is through an analysis ofwhat he calls 'revealed
faith'. According to Kant, there are many different kinds of so-called revealed faiths, but
only one religion. In one rather remarkable passage (6:107-108), Kant claims that
various faiths can meet with the 'one and the same true religion' and serve as its vehicle.
Thus, Judaism, Islam, and Christianity do not represent disparate religions, but only
disparate faiths. Kant argues that most people do not profess religion, but profess instead
an ecclesiastical faith. He is careful not to assert that all these faiths are vehicles for
religion, only that all faiths can be vehicles for religion. As we will see, Kant later
contends that Judaism in and of itself does not contain rational religion. It is only after
Judaism is reformed into Christianity that it actually becomes a vehicle for pure rational
religion. While Kant's case study on Judaism will be examined in more detail in the next
exegetical section, suffice it to say for the moment that Kant's test of a faith is whether
and to what extent it 'harmonizes with the universal practical rules of a pure religion of
reason' (6:110). The concern is not the theoretical elements of various ecclesiastical
faiths, but only that which 'work[s] toward the fulfillment of all human duties as divine
commands' (6:110). In the drive toward the purification of ecclesiastical faith into that
which could be identified with moral faith, universal principles ofmorality must be used
as the supreme interpreter of any given holy book or set of religious beliefs.
Kant acknowledges that such a criterion may lead to a forced interpretation of a
given religious text in the attempt to see if it can be raised to the level of religion, but he
suggests that this phenomenon is not new. Rather, it is 'how all types of faith ... have
always been treated, ... teachers ... kept on interpreting them until, gradually, they
brought them ... in agreement with the universal principles of moral faith' (6:110-111).
After giving a number of examples of historic reinterpretations of religious faith along
moral lines, ranging from the Greeks to the Hindus (see 6:111), Kant suggests that this
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observation should not offend against the literal aspects of a given faith's texts, because
the moral truth brought to the fore in the reinterpretation is more deeply rooted in human
beings than the images being reinterpreted. Moreover, 'we [cannot] charge such
interpretations with dishonesty' (6:111), but rather, such interpretations need only to
'assume thqpossibility that [the authors of scripture] may be so understood' (6:111).
Whether or not Kant is warranted in the adoption of this hermeneutic of sacred texts, his
point is clear: the particular historical meaning is distinct from that which 'is to make
better human beings' (6:111), and since the historical meaning 'contributes nothing to
this end' (6:111), Kant submits that 'one can do with [the historical] what one wills'
(6:111).
This hermeneutic guides Kant's account of how the human need for revelation
and pure rational religion come together. This human demand for sacred scripture gives
rise to the additional demand for scriptural scholars, defined by Kant as those who
examine the origin, language, historicity, and the like of the sacred 'to preserve the
authority of a church based on holy Scripture ... even if such scholarship establishes
nothing more than that there is nothing in the Scripture's origin which would make its
acceptance as immediate revelation impossible' (6:112). Such scholarship serves to
reinforce the faith of 'those who fancy that they find in this idea [of revealed Scripture] a
special strengthening of their moral faith and, therefore, gladly accept it' (6:113). This
type of scholarly endeavour draws on resources inaccessible to the layperson (e.g.,
ancient languages) and pulls from the text 'the understanding of the church community'
(6:113).24 When this understanding of the role of scriptural scholarship is combined with
Kant's rational religion, we find the hermeneutical meeting place of the rational and the
historical. According to Kant, only 'the religion of reason and scholarship'' (6:104)
constitute legitimate expositors of scripture; therefore, the task of interpreting the sacred
scripture has as its goal 'the transformation of the ecclesiastical faith for a given people
at a given time into a definite and self-maintaining system' (6:114). In other words, as
scriptural scholars seek to draw from the text pure moral doctrines and present these as
24 It is because of this role that Kant calls scriptural scholars the 'trustees of a sacred document' (6:113).
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the textual understanding of the church community, humans become able to embrace
rational religion within their felt need for a sacred text because rational religion is
presented to them via the sacred text.25 Hence, Kant calls 'the authority of Scripture ...
the worthiest and ... only instrument of union of all human beings into one church'
(6:112).
Prior to any further discussion, it is important to understand that there is a natural
and smooth progression in Kant's thinking on moral faith throughout Religion. Kant's
notion of pure moral religious doctrine does not merely include the moral philosophy of
the second Critique and Groundwork, but also refers to the doctrines of dispositional
corruption and redemption from Books One and Two.26 Ultimately, for Kant, only faith
rooted in the 'morally good disposition' constitutes saving faith. Kant clearly indicates
throughout Book Three that Book Two is an integral part of rational religion, and we
must also note that the dispositional hope of Book Two assumes the dispositional
corruption of Book One. According to Kant, '[sjaving faith holds two conditions for its
hope of blessedness' (6:116). The first is the hope of being absolved of transgressions
before the divine judge—i.e., 'the lawful undoing (before a judge) of actions done'
(6:116)—and the second is the hope of a conversion to 'a new life conformable to its
duty' (6:116). Both find their culmination in Kant's prototypical theology of Book Two.
Therefore, faith in the prototype 'refers, in itself, to a moral idea of reason' (6:119), to
use Kant's words; and thus, faith in the prototype is part of the pure moral faith ofBook
Three.27
25 While Kant admits that the authority of the scriptural scholar is perhaps suspect given human nature,
any weakness 'can be made good through public freedom of thought' (6:114); as scholarly insight
undergoes scrutiny and becomes open to better insight, 'they can count on the community's confidence in
their decisions' (6:114).
26 While this point comes up explicitly in 6:116f., Kant has already hinted at the importance of his
dispositional philosophy in his discussion of the church as that which bears 'the constitution of a
household' (see 6:102).
27 Here Kant engages in a discussion related to the Lutheran/Kantian distinction of the order of faith in
absolution of sins and the movement toward a changed life. Kant admits that if humans believe that their
sins are absolved, it will produce a great willingness to engage in moral striving. However, there are two
main difficulties with this type of connection. First, it is impossible, to Kant's mind, to think that a rational
human being who knows he deserves punishment could think himself to be completely absolved of all
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Nevertheless, this emphasis on rational religion does not necessarily preclude the
presence of the historical in a rational faith. Kant's position has more nuance than a
mere dismissal of the historical; he focuses on the role of the historical in the
establishment of rational faith. Specifically, when considering faith in the prototype, it
does not matter whether one is awakened to the prototype that resides in reason by way
of an empirical manifestation (e.g., Jesus of Nazareth) or by way of contemplating pure
life conduct as the only way to please God (e.g., Books One and Two ofReligion)-, both
are set on the path of pure moral faith, for both involve faith in the prototype. There can,
however, be a rift between these two if one makes the empirical/historical manifestation
the condition for faith. In this case, saving faith would not be universal (and therefore
not rational), since the historical is only accessible to a few and the empirical does not
provide direct access to the disposition. As Kant puts it in 6:119:
The living faith in the prototype ... refers, in itself, to a moral idea of reason ...
By contrast, faith in this very same prototype according to its appearance ... is
not, as empirical ... one and the same as the principle of a good life conduct
(which must be totally rational); and it would therefore be something quite
different to wish to start with such a faith and derive a good life conduct from
it.... However, in the appearance of the God-man the true object of the saving
faith is not what in the God-man falls to the senses, or can be cognized through
experience, but the prototype lying in our reason which we put in him (since
from what can be gathered from his example, the God-man is found to conform
to the prototype), and such a faith is all the same as the principle of a good life
conduct—Hence we do not have two principles here that differ in themselves, so
that to start from the one or the other would be to enter on opposite paths, but
only one and the same practical idea from which we proceed.
guilt merely by believing the 'news of a satisfaction ... rendered for him' (6:116). To expect such faith
from a person is unreasonable, according to Kant. Second, if the knowledge of this satisfaction rendered
for transgressions is found in a historical event, then this starting point of the faith is contingent and non-
universal. In such a historically rooted (or theoretical) faith, Kant notes that belief in absolution is a duty
placed on humans, and the subsequent life conduct is a matter of grace; but in the moral life, good life
conduct is a duty, and faith in absolution is a matter of grace that follows in the working out of our duty.
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In other words, rational religion must not merely possess the prototypical truths, but hold
these truths as necessary, lest they diverge from rational religion.
At t he v ery e nd o fD ivision O ne, K ant r ecaps the c entrality o f t he m oral, t he
ecclesiastical as the vehicle, and the hope that true religion will one day cast off all
empirical grounds of determination and rule over all. This philosophical vision includes
the abandonment of the distinction between laity and clergy, as both are privy to the
truths of moral reason; this final state is, for Kant, envisioned as being the will of God
who will ultimately rule over the ethical state 'inadequately represented and prepared for
in the past through the visible church' (6:122). However, this vision is not a merely
moralistic vision, as traditionally assumed. Already apparent from the centrality of
Kant's dispositional philosophy in Books One and Two and the importance of the
church in the journey of moral faith is that Kant's vision is a vision of faith and
community. Thus, to truly understand the particular nature of this vision, we turn in the
third exegetical section to Kant's view ofChristianity as a rational religion.
Religion 124-137 (The Rational Merits of Christianity and Kant's Historically
Expanded Vision of Victory)
In the second half of Book Three, Kant moves from the philosophical to the
historical representation of the gradual establishment of the dominion of the good
principle on earth. He argues that we cannot expect from empirical religion a universal
history regarding religion (i.e., true religion). Ecclesiastical faith as a public affair
purports to give such a history, but is limited by 'the restraining conditions of religious
faith to which it must necessarily conform' (6:124). Kant, in anticipation ofhis later
Conflict of the Faculties, holds that the narrative of history must consist of a conflict
between faiths of divine service and moral faith, and while human beings in their
weakness may be inclined to exalt the former over the latter, only the latter can truly
make a person better. This conflict is not a war, however, but more of an engaging
critical comparison. 'Hence we can expect', writes Kant, 'a universal historical account
only of ecclesiastical faith, by comparing it, in its manifold and mutable forms, with the
one, immutable, and pure religious faith' (6:124).
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For Kant, the history of various ecclesiastical faiths is not unified, for a history
can only find unity if restricted 'to that portion of the human race in which the
predisposition to the unity of the universal church has already been brought close to its
development' (6:124), i.e., to those who share an internal commitment to
universal/rational principles of the good. Without the universal guiding light of pure
religious faith, the church would be in a constant state of war and forever prone to
schism. Kant is therefore only concerned with the history of the true church, the one that
brings peace to purely ecclesial conflicts by embracing the principle of unity afforded by
a rational faith. For the purpose of his project in Division Two of Book Three, then,
Kant focuses on that church 'which from the beginning bore within it the germ and the
principles of the objective unity of the true and universal religious faith' (6:125). For
Kant, Christianity in its purified form is that church.
Kant's c ase for b eginning w ith C hristianity c entres o n h is d enial t hat J udaism
shares this universal seed of rational religion. According to Kant, Judaism only
'provided the physical occasion for the founding of this church (the Christian)' (6:125).
Kant asserts rather forcefully that '[sjtrictly speaking Judaism is not a religion at all'
(6:125). He highlights the emphasis in Judaism on ceremonial laws, political solidarity,
and blood descent, and suggests that its moral laws were merely 'appended to it...[and]
do not in anyway belong to Judaism as such' (6:125). The laws of Judaism, according to
Kant, are concerned with external conduct, not the disposition, and, far from being
concerned with universality, are exclusivist and ruled by a God hostile to all other
peoples. Nevertheless, in Kant's account, these features are not forwarded as unique to
Judaism, but rather, Kant holds a similar position on the faith of 'most other people'. He
avers that other ancient religions' 'doctrine of faith equally tended in this direction'
(6:127). Thus, all pre-Christian religions lack the seed of universal religion.
The importance of showing that Judaism and the other pre-Christian religions do
not rise to the level of rational religion speaks to Kant's desire to bring clarity to his
earlier claim that any faith can, in fact, be a vehicle for rational religion. In Kant's mind,
although there are many possible candidates for a historical faith that might precede pure
religious faith, only those candidates onto which rational religion actually latches serve
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as a vehicle for pure religious faith. This is the very point of contact between rational
faith and historical faith. According to Kant, Christianity laid hold of Judaism as its
vehicle and then dispensed with it in the precise way Kant suggests rational religion
ought to do. Thus, the story of the universal church begins with Christianity: 'We
cannot, therefore, begin the universal history of the Church ... anywhere but from the
origin of Christianity' (6:127). Christianity in its purest form, as the example of rational
religion that has taken hold of a historical faith and used it as its vehicle, therefore
provides K ant with a tangible illustration of the reinterpretation of ecclesiastical faith
into a pure religion. For the sake of human weakness, Christianity sought to draw a link
between it and the Jewish faith, but it replaced Jewish law with a concern for the
disposition, its earthly concerns with the afterlife, and its ritualistic concerns with
freedom from the law. Thus, 'the new faith ... was to contain a religion valid for the
world' (6:127).
Kant admits that Christianity in some forms can demand the historical and make
it a condition for faith, thus distinguishing itself from rational religion: '[T]o this
teaching there are nonetheless added in a holy book miracles and mysteries, and the
propagation of these is itself a miracle requiring historical faith' (6:129). Moreover, this
emphasis o n t hat w hich i s o nly h istorically v erifiable (e.g., m iracles), i n c ombination
with the various blemishes in Christian history (i.e., strife, division, persecution,
hierarchies, etc.), would seem to indicate that Christianity is not pure religion but a
historical dogmatic religion. Kant's response to this history emphasizes that it was 'a
learned public from whom the history of the political events of the time has been
transmitted to us' (6:130). Kant has in mind here the Romans, and the point is that their
records do not recognize the religious revolution of Christianity happening in their
midst, only the political results.28 Based solely on this political history, Kant admits
there is nothing to commend Christianity as true religion. Nevertheless, he contends
(presumably due to the overwhelming similarities between the doctrines of Books One
28
According to Kant, it is only 'later, after more than one generation' that they investigate Christianity's
nature (but not its origin). Therefore, we do not have a record of the moral nature of Christianity's
adherents until after 'Christianity developed a learned public of its own' (6:130).
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and Two and the teachings of the New Testament) that regarding the religious origin of
Christianity, 'the fact still clearly enough shine[s] forth from its founding ...
Christianity's true first purpose was none other than the introduction of a pure religious
faith, over which there can be no dissension of opinions' (6:131). It is only 'because of a
bad propensity in human nature' that the vehicle for this pure moral faith eventually
gave way to these political atrocities (6:131).29
Toward the end of Book Three, Kant shows how the New Testament, even in its
apocalyptic vision, fits with rational religion—specifically, the battle between the good
principle and the evil principle. Kant uses the Christian apocalyptic narrative, with its
expulsion of enemies and so on from a visible Kingdom appearing 'under the
governance of [God's] representative vicar', in such a way that 'the end of the world
constitutes the conclusion of the story' (6:134). The Kingdom of God was manifest in
Christ through morality, for it was Christ who bid his disciples to lay hold of the good
by like behaviour and band together with others of like mind.30 However, Christ warned
that happiness could not be expected on earth, only trials; the great reward of those who
embrace the good awaits them in heaven. The final triumph of the church is depicted as
the separation of good and evil, the end of earthly life, and a victory in which the church
has overcome all obstacles and entered into immortality. It also involves the damnation
of its external foes, and the salvation of those in the church, now made citizens of
Heaven. This image, says Kant, 'is a beautiful ideal of the moral world-epoch brought
about by the introduction of the true universal religion and foreseen in faith in its
completion' (6:135). Therefore, Kant concludes that these images (e.g., the Anti-Christ,
the millennium, the nearness of the end) 'all take on their proper symbolic meaning
before reason' (6:136).
29 Kant maintains that'the present' is the best point in church history, as now there are those who sow the
seed of 'true religious faith'; and Kant hopes that when it grows, it will unite human beings as 'the visible
representation ... of the invisible Kingdom of God on earth' (6:131).
30 Kant does not use the name Christ in his discussion of the historical origin of Christian, but only 'the
teacher of the Gospel' (6:134). However, it is apparent from his use of this title that it is meant to refer to
Jesus ofNazareth, even though, to be sure, we do not (like many interpreters) take Kant's reference to the
prototype to be a reference to Jesus of Nazareth.
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IV. Objections to the Coherence ofReligion and Their Solutions
Before we are able to affirm the expository interpretation of the previous three
sections and the promise of my three-part hypothesis for interpreting Religion, it is
important to consolidate and deal on a case-by-case basis with the specific exegetical
challenges made in the previous chapter. There, as one follows Kant's train of thought
(or various trains of thought) throughout Religion, myriad potential conundrums or
wobbles present themselves. Gordon Michalson presents a comprehensive case for the
incoherence of Kant's philosophy of religion (and by extension its usefulness in
providing a rational foundation for theology) by raising crucial questions regarding the
coherence of each book in Religion. To determine whether or not these objections are
merely obstacles to be overcome or in fact defeaters of Kant's entire project in Religion,
it will be helpful here to summarize these objections relative to the parts of Religion at
which they are aimed. Michalson's challenges to Kant's programme in Religion, ones
that remain even after the analysis of the previous chapter, can be boiled down to two for
each of the first three books of Religion. Dealing with the objections in this systematic
way will help us throughout this section as we determine the merits ofmy hypothesis for
interpreting Religion.
Objections to Book One and Their Solutions
Regarding Book One, Michalson is particularly concerned with the way in which
Kant defines and inter-relates a complex array of concepts. These include the
predisposition to good, propensity to evil, humanity being evil by nature, radical evil,
and the principle of the Highest Good (proportionality); each of which have a central
place in the initial stages of Kant's narrative. Michalson thinks the way in which Kant
begins Religion, by focusing on the predisposition to good and the propensity to evil, is
incoherent. This general concern for the coherence of these concepts is compounded by
the various ways in which evil is imputed to humanity in Book One. Two primary
questions emerge when evil is considered relative to humanity in the context ofReligion:
1) How can Kant maintain a coherent position (and thereby justify the position that
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humans are evil by nature) given his starting point of a distinction between the original
predisposition to good and a propensity to evil? 2) How also does Kant likewise defend
the position that evil is innate and yet brought on by ourselves? Michalson is thus
concerned with the consistency of the concepts and the coherence of the argumentation
in Book One.
The interpretation of Book One in the first section of this chapter is strikingly
different from that of Michalson in Fallen Freedom. According to Michalson, Kant's
argument in Book One is as follows: Kant puts forward the idea of the original
predisposition as an ontological claim about 'basic human nature as it is prior to any
exercise of human freedom'.31 It is an ontological thing basic to all human beings, which
is present in individuals prior to any free activity; it is the 'something' of the disposition
that precedes any exercise of freedom. Since, for Michalson, Kant is ultimately
concerned with maintaining individual autonomy in the face of radical evil, the human
disposition must be conceived of as being originally good. Without what Michalson calls
this 'seed of goodness', humanity is left with no moral options in the face of natural
incentives. Michalson collapses the argument for the original goodness of the
individual's predisposition into an account of the primordial nature of the human
disposition—thus, for him, the predisposition and disposition, for all intents and
purposes, become one and the same. This integration is of principal significance for his
interpretation o f B ook One. K ant's s ubsequent argument for t he p ropensity t o e vil i n
human beings is thought by Michalson to be merely a formal one; it analyzes various
ways of defining humanity and morality and concludes that evil is a tendency that no
. . ...
human seems capable of resisting. In Michalson's view, Kant provides empirical
evidence that humans do in fact commit evil to shore up his formal argument. However,
31
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 38.
32 Radical evil, on Michalson's interpretation, is a new idea for Kant that, when placed alongside the
claims of his moral philosophy, plunges his philosophy of religion into a downward spiral. Michalson puts
it this way: 'The entire account of radical evil toward which Kant is moving is in fact based on the insight
that there is an inevitable pattern connected with our willing of evil maxims, and the notion of the
propensity is Kant's way of transcendentally delineating this pattern without allowing its inevitability to
turn into outright necessity'. Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 41.
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since Kant knows full well that he cannot move in a critically satisfying manner from
empirical manifestations of evil to declarations regarding the nature of the human
disposition, he is thus driven to a strategy that links the empirical to the formal analysis
of the various patterns ofhuman behaviour as an indirect argument for human depravity.
In short, according to Michalson, the entire discussion of a predisposition to
good and propensity to evil leads Kant to make the very complex and convoluted
inference that human beings are 'evil by nature'.33 Since for Michalson Kant's argument
hinges on appeals to empirical observation, it cannot accomplish what Kant needs it to
accomplish, namely, the establishment of the universality of radical evil in human
nature. No matter how many examples one forwards of individual instances of evil, one
can never arrive at declarations regarding the species, which is precisely what Kant does
in Michalson's interpretation.34 If, following Michalson, we understand Kant to be
starting with an overriding concern for individual autonomy, and so understand Kant's
philosophy of religion to be presenting a forensic analysis of the human condition along
the above lines, then Kant's philosophy of religion does appear to give way to a number
of conundrums. Yet, despite the legitimacy of these concerns, within the interpretation
provided above, these difficulties are curtailed and in many cases simply resolved.
Michalson's emphasis on individual autonomy and the ontological status of the
predisposition to the good, I suggest, exacerbates these difficulties. When Kant's
argument is understood according to a movement in our thinking that emphasizes the
species and the cognition of its moral disposition, the elements of Kant's argument—
such as the disposition, predisposition, propensity, innateness, and freedom—all find an
appropriate place.
As we have seen, Kant's arguments do not begin with a declaration that human
beings were originally created good and then became evil through some individual or
societal action. Instead, Kant's inquiry strictly concerns the question of whether the
33 Michalson argues that Kant arrives at 'a frustrating conceptual logjam at the point where [he] wants to
link innateness and the propensity to evil'. Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 67.
34
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 69.
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species (as opposed to the individual) bears a moral disposition. His subsequent
derivations are that humanity does bear a moral disposition, this moral disposition must
be cognized as a single disposition belonging to the whole species, and this disposition
must be either good or evil—it cannot be morally grey. Therefore, we arrive at Kant's
discussion of the original predisposition to good, not as a way of understanding the
nature of humanity in any primordial or ontological sense, but as another step in a
transcendental assessment of human cognition concerning the disposition of the human
species, namely, the step of addressing the question of necessity: If the disposition is
corrupt, is it necessarily so? Kant's turn to the predisposition, rather than representing
the ontological feature of his argument, serves a purpose that aligns him closely with
Augustine and Aquinas: We must think of this universal human disposition (if corrupt)
as not seeking evil for evil's sake, but as having inherently good predispositions that
have been perverted in their search for good.
Michalson's first objection, which he takes to be the most difficult problem with
Kant's philosophy of religion, is that Kant wants it both ways. That is, he wants the
disposition to be comprised of both the predisposition to good and the transformative
propensity to evil. One key distinction between the interpretation presented in this
chapter and the one suggested by Michalson centres around how the predisposition to
good is understood. In Michalson's interpretation, Kant's reference to the predisposition
is really a reference to the primordial disposition. It represents its original state of
goodness, one that is made corrupt by the free and inscrutable choice of humans to act
according to the evil principle. I have argued, however, that the predisposition to good is
not a thing at all. Rather, human predispositions are rubrics under which the diverse
incentives that determine the power of choice fall. They provide a description of human
incentives and the declaration that these incentives, considered on their own, are good.
Nevertheless, these incentives have a proper or moral order that, if not adopted by the
moral disposition, constitutes corruption. According to this understanding, there is no
conflict between good predispositions and an evil propensity. The former refers only to
the inherent goodness of the incentives that belong to the very possibility of human
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nature, whereas propensity speaks of the dispositional bent of humanity that results from
the moral or immoral prioritization of these incentives.
Michalson's second objection concerns Kant's declaration of evil as both innate
to human beings and something brought upon us by our own freedom. The reason
Michalson finds this tension to be problematic (at best) is his paradigmatic emphasis on
individual autonomy. However, when viewing Kant's project with an emphasis on the
species (as established in Kant's Introduction), the consistency of Kant's vision again
becomes apparent. The human propensity to evil is the first real indication of the
dispositional bend of the species. As already argued at length above, the freedom which
chooses the dispositional bend (and subsequent propensity) is not an individual will, but
the will universal as part of the cognized moral disposition. The disposition's rootedness
in freedom is not a concern of individual autonomy. Rather, the need to ground the
disposition in freedom emerges in the process of cognizing the disposition, thus giving
rise to the concept of the will universal, which belongs to the species. The propensity is
chosen by the will universal and in this sense is rooted in freedom and imputable; for the
individual who is born into the species, however, the chosen dispositional bend is innate.
The movement in Kant's thinking on depravity is clearly away from the individual
concern for autonomy (or what Wolterstorff calls 'rights and obligations' ) to the
cognition of the disposition of humanity as a species and the nature of its propensity to
evil. Thus, we may understand Kant's emphasis on the disposition as rooted in freedom
to be compatible with the innateness of the dispositional bend, for the former refers to
the cognition of the species, while the latter refers to the individual as part of the species.
The interpretation defended in the first section of this chapter provides a fruitful
paradigm shift for understanding Kant's argument in Book One of Religion.
Understanding Book One as an analysis of the dispositional unity of the human species
according to cognition (i.e., whether there is dispositional unity, and if so, what is its
nature) removes the force of Michalson's conclusions. It shows that, although Kant may
35 Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, 'Conundrums in Kant's Rational Religion' in Kant's Philosophy ofReligion
Reconsidered, 44.
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be charged at points with constructing a somewhat convoluted argument, the argument
itself is essentially consistent. Where Michalson understands Kant's argument to be a
forensic examination of individual human dispositions that eventually yields a wobbly
doctrine of human depravity concerning the whole species, I understand Kant to be
performing a transcendental exploration into the unified disposition of humanity that is
aimed at establishing the nature of religious belief for rational human individuals. Kant's
conclusion, one t hat I have shown is substantially supported by argumentation rather
than empirical appeal, is that human beings must believe that they share in one unified
disposition and that this disposition has a problem—humanity is evil by nature—the
solution to which requires that we read on into Book Two.
Objections to Book Two and Their Solutions
Once again, we will limit the scope of this section to the main criticisms levelled
by Gordon Michalson against the coherence of Kant's argument in Book Two.
Michalson puts forward two main problems: First, there is the conundrum that Kant's
philosophy of religion seeks to hold human freedom/self-determination in the context of
the need for divine grace. In Book Two, Kant appears caught in a dilemma of
simultaneously declaring the need for human beings to be both the stoic heroes of their
moral regeneration and the saintly recipients of divine grace in their moral deficiencies.
The argument ofBook Two ofReligion, contends Michalson, shakes Kant's bedrock
moral assumption of the ought-implies-can principle. Radical evil threatens to undo this
dictum because, Kant tells us, humans who are 'evil by nature' are incapable of raising
themselves to a level ofmoral virtue pleasing to God. (For ease of reference, we will call
this moral self-determination versus divine grace problem, the 'stoic-saint dilemma'.)
The second major problem Michalson sees in Book Two is what appears, from
Michalson's interpretation, to be a convoluted account of moral regeneration. The
specific area of concern is what he calls the 'before and after' problem. Key to this
problem is the issue of timing: How can God be just to a person, who, over the spectrum
oftime, represents two morally distinctp eople (i.e., the old man and the new man)?
Michalson argues that Kant's account of regeneration combines divine justice and
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human identity over the life-long journey ofmoral transformation in a way that results in
a fragmented understanding of the human person and gives a convoluted account of
moral hope. To address these two concerns, for the remainder of this subsection, I will
lay out how the understanding ofBook Two argued for above dispels these difficulties.
Simply put, the stoic-saint dilemma arises when it is held that humans must be
responsible for their own moral standing before God, while at the same time only God's
grace can make up for their moral deficiencies. Ifwe are morally deficient, and i t i s
God's grace alone that makes us pleasing to the divine judge, in what sense can we say
that we are responsible for satisfying the demands of the moral law? Once radical evil
and divine grace are admitted into the Kantian paradigm, what is left of human
autonomy, according to Michalson, is only 'the lingering "seed of goodness" [which]
assures the sheer logical possibility of moral renewal'.36 In Michalson's interpretation,
this seed of goodness provides the hope that 'some as yet unspecified act or set of acts
will transform this logical possibility [i.e., moral renewal] into a real possibility'.
Therefore, moral regeneration or conversion, according to Michalson's interpretation,
means 'the transformation of the underlying disposition—from evil to good'. Such a
transformation requires a re-reversal of the order of incentives and a subsequent
restructuring of the affected disposition, all of which must be done under human power
along with divine cooperation. In the end, Michalson contends that Kant does not
possess the critical resources necessary to address this problem inherent in reason.
In the above interpretations, Michalson is correct in seeing a shift of sorts in
Kant's philosophy, but this shift does not begin with radical evil. Rather, it begins as
Kant examines the moral disposition. The emphasis here should be on how he examines
the disposition and not on the disposition per se. Kant indicates in the first Critique that
his moral philosophy must assume a moral disposition: 'rational belief is grounded on
the presupposition of moral dispositions' (A829/B857). Therefore, the notion of a
36
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 77.
37
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 77.
38
Michalson, Fallen Freedom, 77.
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disposition, does not, in and of itself, indicate a shift in Kant's thinking. Yet, prior to
Religion, the disposition constituted an unexamined presupposition in Kant's
philosophy. Given the emphasis in Kant's moral philosophy on the morally autonomous
individual, reason pressed ahead under the assumption that freedom is unhindered—
ought implies can. However, as Kant examines the implications of the moral disposition
in Religion, new insights emerge.
As shown in Section One, Kant's Book One deductively argues that the very
notion of amoral disposition requires that the human species be either good or evil;
there is no such thing as moral neutrality, and hence, there is no such thing as an
individual acting independent of dispositional influence. Insofar as Kant's arguments in
Book One point to the conclusion that humanity's dispositional bent is evil, moral
freedom is placed in danger. As Michalson rightly points out, individuals who are evil
by nature cannot make themselves pleasing to God, for humanity is bound under the evil
principle. Thus, Kant's arguments in Book Two demand an alternative disposition (i.e.,
the disposition of the prototype) tornake genuine moral freedom, progress, andhope
possible. In other words, Kant's demand that we be the stoic heroes of our moral
character cannot be met by humans who have available to them only a corrupt
disposition. If we are to progress morally, we must be able to lay hold of and walk in a
different disposition, but this alternative disposition is only available to humanity as a
result of divine grace in the prototypical condescension. In other words, humans are only
able to be stoic heroes because the divine prototype has graciously made available to
humanity his good disposition, and, in that disposition, moral freedom. Kant makes this
clear in 6:82-83, in which he uses the Christian picture of humanity bound under Satan
through sin and the redemption of humanity by Christ as an illustration of the two
opposing dispositions:
So the moral outcome of this conflict [between the good and the evil principle],
on the part of the hero of the story (up to his death), is not really the conquering
of the evil principle—for its kingdom still endures ...—but only the breaking up
of its controlling power in holding against their will those who have so long been
subject to it, now that another moral dominion (since the human being must be
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subject to some dominion or other) has been revealed to them as freedom, and in
it they can find protection for their morality if they want to forsake the old one.
We find, then, an amendment to Kant's thinking on moral freedom, and, by extension,
his thinking on anthropology. Through an examination of the moral disposition, it has
become apparent to Kant that "the human being must be subject to some dominion or
other" (6:83). There is no such thing as the autonomous individual if by this we mean
the i ndividual functioning apart from a m oral d isposition. H ence, i f t he human b eing
who is bound under the evil disposition is to be morally free (i.e., able to become the
stoic hero), then an alternative good disposition must be available, and Kant tells us this
good disposition exists only because of divine grace and the condescension of the
prototype. Grace, for Kant, is not divine assistance with every decision we make, but
rather the presence of the prototypical disposition in humanity, available for adoption,
which makes possible our abandonment of our corrupt disposition. Thus, grace enters
into Kant's thinking not as a foreign concept, but as the only concept capable of
maintaining human freedom in light of the dispositional predicament in which humans
find themselves.
Regarding the 'before and after' problem, Michalson's interpretation argues that
Kant's account 'culminates in the paradox that an act having no relation to time
produces a moral agent who is materially different "after" the act than "before"'.39
Essentially, this observation brings to the fore that Kant, as understood by Michalson,
mixes timelessness and time in his account of the moral individual. The evil disposition
is chosen through a decision that is not made in time, while the moral agent converts to
good after such a decision, indicating temporal succession. Since, according to
Michalson, K ant h as p rovided n o m etaphysical c onnection b etween m oral c onversion
and temporal succession, humans must in a sense re-convert at every decision-making
moment: 'every free act is for Kant a "conversion"'.40 Conversion in this sense is not a
moment in which the individual definitively changes but refers to any and every change
39
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of heart in which the good is chosen over evil. This interpretation, argues Michalson,
causes Kant's account to fall into a crisis of personal identity.
Considered over time, the person who made the first moral choice (though not
one made in time) to adopt an evil disposition is 'numerically' different than the person
who makes the later choice[s] to become good again. Even if we can grant that Kant is
able to account for the difference between the original human being who possesses a
predisposition to good and the same human who is evil by nature in having succumbed
to the propensity to evil, we still cannot account for the same human being who later
embraces the good again. The individual becomes more than merely an old and new man
divided by a definitive decision in time; he ends up consisting of a series of moral
individuals (viz., the original man with the seed of goodness, the corrupt man who is evil
by nature, and the moral agent who converts to the good at various times), some of
whom are related to time, others not. Michalson explains it thus:
On the one hand, the very idea of regeneration or conversion ... suggests two
distinct moral agents, a fallen and a redeemed one; while, on the other hand,
morality's noumenal insulation from the effects of time suggests just one moral
agent, due to Kant's inability to discriminate between 'before and after' when he
considers the agent as an intelligible ... being. In the first instance, the resulting
conceptual problem concerns the integration of the two different selves under a
theory of personal identity that allows us to say that the regenerated agent really
is the 'same' person ... as the guilty one. For ifwe cannot do this—if ... we end
up with two metaphysically distinct agents—it ultimately becomes unclear how
we are i ntelligibly to relate the issues of fall and regeneration.... And in the
second instance, the problem concerns showing that the agent was sufficiently
different at one point (in time?) than at another for the very idea of moral
conversion to have meaningful application'.41
41
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According to Michalson's interpretation, each of these moral individuals serves a
necessary role in Kant's account, but to hold all in tandem fragments the human person
and makes Kant's account of fallenness and redemption unintelligible.
Key to understanding how the interpretation presented here overcomes
Michalson's 'before and after' problem is to recognize the marked differences in the
interpretations of both Books One and Two. Michalson's understanding of Religion
adopts the traditional assumption that Kant's arguments are centred on the morally
autonomous individual. Thus, all Kant's talk of the species in Book One represents talk
of how human individuals by and large tend to act when considered collectively. For this
reason, Kant's discussion of the disposition, according to Michalson's interpretation, is
also focused on the individual. The non-temporal choosing of the disposition speaks of
the individual's decision to abandon the good and so become corrupt. The fallen
freedom that results under the rubric of 'radical evil' is a personal fall that every
individual as an individual undergoes. The 'seed of goodness' that remains, represents
Kant's way of preventing this fall from obliterating all hope of moral renewal. The
individual is able to draw on this dormant resource in order to scale the walls of
depravity and arrive at moral redemption. Conversion speaks of an individual's change
of heart that moves one in this direction; thus, every such change of heart constitutes a
conversion all its own.
This individual-centred picture of Religion is in stark contrast to the
interpretation argued for above. Michalson's interpretation (and subsequently his 'before
and after' objection) produces six interpretative presuppositions/decisions that one
simply need not affirm: (1) the human species is a reference to how individuals tend to
be collectively, (2) the disposition is an individual affair, (3) the fall that gives rise to
radical evil is an individual fall that every individual undergoes, (4) the predisposition to
the good is a seed of goodness that makes room for moral renewal, (5) moral conversion
is an autonomous decision to do good, and (6) the individual undergoes numerous moral
conversions. All these presuppositions emerge out ofMichalson's principal interpretive
decision on the nature of the human disposition and are challenged by the
Transcendental Union Thesis.
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The fundamental shift between Michalson's interpretation and the one presented
here, as already stated, is a shift in focus away from the autonomous individual to an
examination of the species considered universally. Rather than viewing Kant's analysis
of the species as a reference to human individuals collectively as they tend to behave, we
must u nderstand K ant's analysis o f h umanity (the s pecies) t o b e r eflective o f a m ore
Platonic concept of species in which it is cognized as a type of single universal from
which individuals derive their nature.42 Kant's question in Book One is whether the
species, thought of in this universal sense, possesses a moral disposition, and if so how
this disposition must be cognized. This interpretative shift means that the dispositional
corruption of Book One is not a personal fall undergone by every individual, but a single
non-temporal fall of the will universal that belongs to the species. The individual
possesses the corrupt nature innate to participants in human nature.43
The importance of this hermeneutic shift for understanding Kant's account of
moral conversion and hope in Book Two cannot be overestimated. Conversion is not a
simple decision to do good but a revolution in disposition. The corrupt disposition,
which is innate to the human individual qua human, is abandoned by the moral convert
in favour of the prototypical disposition. The metaphysical distinction between the
convert before and after conversion resides in the individual's standing relative to his
disposition. The old man is identified as the individual having the corrupt disposition
innate to the human individual qua human; the new man is identified as the individual
having the prototypical disposition adopted at conversion. Rather than the individual
consisting of an originally good individual, a fallen individual, and a regenerate
individual, given this interpretation, there is only the convert before and after
conversion. Prior to conversion, the individual possessed a corrupt disposition innately
as part of the human species. At conversion, this disposition is abandoned in favour of a
42 See A822-823/B850-851.
43 Kant's discussion of the predisposition to the good is not a seed of hope for moral renewal (hope does
not appear until Book Two), but is only intended to show that humanity, while corrupt, is not corrupt by
necessity. Human predispositions are good, but, with the inversion of the moral order of incentives, these
predispositions become perverted and give rise to an evil nature.
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new disposition, thereby giving way to a new moral identity. The moral progress that
follows does not represent numerous conversions, but one moral activity reflective of the
dispositional shift that took place at the point of conversion. The convert's identity as
human is retained; it is only the convert's moral identity as defined according to his
disposition that changes.
Michalson, like other theologically negative interpreters of Kant on religion,
understands Kant's argument in Religion to be intently focused on human individuals
and fundamentally concerned with understanding the God-humanity-world relationship
according to the issue of 'rights and obligations'.44 What I have argued is that Kant is
less concerned with developing his moral theory in this way than with addressing the
question of moral hope in the only way consistent with all three standpoints of his
critical philosophy. What we cannot know from a theoretical or practical standpoint, we
must look for in human cognition because the question of hope and the stability of
reason itself demand it. According to Kant's argument in Religion, we must believe that
we are indebted to God for good moral standing, for without the provision of the
prototype we have no choice regarding our standing before him—we stand condemned.
Book Two argues, however, that God has provided hope. Grace is an ever-present
provision i n h uman b eings b y v irtue o f t heir b eing h uman, a nd it i s embodied i n t he
person and work of the prototype (our moral archetype and judicial advocate). This hope
is accessible to a genuine faith that results in moral conversion. With the two-fold thesis
of Book Two—namely, that (1) the convert is united to the disposition of the prototype
and is therefore pleasing to God and (2) the prototype is united to us and thereby takes
on what is displeasing to God in the convert—divine justice is upheld, individual
freedom is established, and human hope is secured. Far from being incoherent, this
44
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Philosophy 7:4 (1990), 418-433, and Wolterstorff, 'Conundrums in Kant's Rational Religion'.
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thesis presents a critical and creative transcendental paradigm for understanding the
argument ofKant's Religion?5
Objections to Book Three and Their Solutions
Michalson illustrates what he takes to be tensions in Kant's arguments in Book
Three b y focusing on the m ethod o f b iblical interpretation one finds there. In Kant's
engagement with the Bible, Michalson senses the presence of a circularity that dictates
the entire procedure. Unpacking this engagement yields the first of Michalson's two
main objections to Kant's Book Three argument, which we will address in this
concluding portion of this section. For Kant, the moral interpretation of the biblical text
always takes precedence over what the author might have consciously meant to convey.
When Kant then shows that there is in fact moral meaning in the text, there is no
guarantee that it was the author's intention and not some completely foreign meaning:
'Consequently, any inquiry into Kant's rationale for deriving moral meaning from an
historical text comes full-circle back to the problem of the imposition of potentially
foreign meaning on to the text'.46
Michalson believes there is a vicious kind of circularity in Kant's biblical
hermeneutic, a charge he summarizes in a passage on Kant's biblical hermeneutic and
the experimental nature ofKant's inquiry into the merits ofChristianity:
The r eason Kant's method o f interpretation p roves sounsatisfactory i s t hat i t
betrays the circularity of his approach in Religion.... If Kant is committed to the
45
Keeping this understanding of Book Two in mind allows one to see a synthetic movement reminiscent
of the third Critique in Book Three of Religion. The victory of the good involves the gradual transition of
ecclesiastical faith into an ethical commonwealth. In both divisions of Book Three, entitled 'Philosophical
representation of the victory of the good principle in the founding of a kingdom of God on earth' (6:95)
and 'Historical representation of the gradual establishment of the dominion of the good principle on earth'
(6:124), we find Kant establishing a picture of hope for the ongoing history of humankind from the
standpoint of teleological judgment. Kant's vision is that human beings who possess the good disposition,
who share a common union in having been united with the prototype, must band together as a whole to
form an ethical community. S uch a community alone can provide the n atural context c onducive t o the
hope of moral progress promised in Book Two. This vision involves the need for a visible church because
of the particular weakness of human beings when brought together in nature and the inevitable time
necessary to see it to fruition.
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presupposition that the rational elements—however few—reside implicitly in
any historical faith embraced by rational beings, then his experimental inquiry
into revealed religion "in light of moral concepts," with the aim of seeing
whether t his " does n ot 1 ead b ack t o t he ... p ure r ational s ystem o f r eligion,"
loses its innocent and experimental character. The result of such an experiment
is a foregone conclusion, given Kant's theory of practical reason. There is of
course the possibility that certain particular historical faiths, like Christianity,
may more completely approximate the religion of pure reason, but Kant seems
committed to the claim that any historical faith whatever must contain at least a
minimal aspect of rational religion.47
For Michalson, Kant's theory of biblical interpretation is illuminating insofar as it
reveals the prior commitments that guide Kant's entire approach to historical religion.
'Every interpreter carries presuppositions', suggests Michalson, 'but in Kant's case, the
presuppositions involved tend to predetermine not only the questions he asks the texts,
but the answers he gets'.48 What Kant accomplishes in Book Three is not an expansion
of his moral religion, which is already fixed according to the mandates of practical
reason, but the moral reduction of biblio-historical Christianity to moral religion: 'Thus,
the 'method' by which Kant discovers the moral core of an historical faith is in fact an
offshoot of his theory of practical reason, and this guarantees in advance the discovery
of that same moral core'.49 Michalson's first major problem with Kant's position in
Book Three is thus the problem of circularity.
There are a number of presuppositions that Michalson brings to this objection
which the interpretation of Religion previously presented simply does not affirm. First,
Michalson presumes that the pure moral doctrines, which Kant suggests make up
rational religion, are those of the second Critique. However, it is my contention that the
pure moral doctrine of which Kant speaks, while including his earlier critical writings,
also includes crucial clarifications of and advances in the moral theory he presents in
47
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Books One and Two of Religion. As I understand it, Kant's arguments preceding Book
Three are meant to provide two of the key features that a truly rational religion must
contain in light of the question of hope. These two key features are the hope of moral
absolution and genuine moral progress, both of which, Kant suggests in 6:118-120, are
necessary components of saving faith. Based on the above exegesis, these features
indicate that Kant's prototypical theology of Book Two—a theology which is set up, of
course, by his examination of dispositional corruption in Book One—is a necessary part
of rational religion.
Second, Michalson suggests that Kant presupposes that all religions (or, more
accurately, all faiths) contain a seed of rational religion. In other words, Michalson
presumes at the outset that Kant is working under a pluralistic assumption. However, as
I have suggested, Kant's claim that there are faiths ofmany different kinds but only one
religion is not equivalent with arguing that there are many faiths all ofwhich contain the
seed of the same religion or are somehow linked to the same religion. Judaism, for
example, represents a faith that, in Kant's view, does not contain the seed of rational
religion. Thus, while Kant acknowledges that any faith can be a vehicle for rational
religion, this potential is not a guarantee that every faith is a rational religion; a faith
must be made to contain the pure moral doctrines if it is to rise to the level of religion,
which will only occur over time through an ongoing reinterpretation of its sacred text.
Thirdly, there is a clear difference between the interpretation of Religion
according to my hypothesis and Michalson's interpretation over the understanding of
how Kant approaches Christianity. I do not see Kant reinterpreting Christianity with a
view to turning it into a rational religion, but rather, after examining in Books One and
Two what a rational religion must hold regarding corruption and moral hope, Kant
concludes that Christianity in its pure form is a rational religion because it contains these
elements. As we saw in the above exegesis, Kant begins by showing Judaism to be a
strictly political faith. The importance of this designation is that Judaism represents, in
Kant's view, a faith that lacks the seed of pure moral religion. Kant takes Christianity to
have latched onto Judaism as its vehicle in order to introduce rational religion. This act
on the part of Christianity means to Kant that Christianity itself stands as the original
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manifestation of rational religion. Assuming this understanding is correct, Kant does not
presuppose t hat all faiths contain rational religion and then reinterpret Christianity in
such a way as to show that it does contain rational religion, but rather, quite the opposite.
Books One and Two set up the criteria for evaluating whether a religion is rational.
These criteria, in turn, give rise to Kant's two main conclusions: that Judaism is not a
rational religion, and that Christianity, with its understanding of the corrupt disposition
and the prototypical redemption, is a rational religion. Pure Christianity took Judaism as
its vehicle, thus marking the beginning of the universal history ofpure religious faith.
These changes make for a very different picture of Book Three than the one for
which Michalson has argued. Because Kant does not presuppose the presence of rational
religion in all religions and then proceed to reinterpret Christianity in such a way as to
force rational elements to emerge, the so-called circularity of Kant's argument
disappears. Rather, Kant establishes the parameters of rational religion, acknowledges
that historical faiths can be a vehicle for rational religion (although, as merely
contingent/empirical faiths, they are not necessarily vehicles), and proceeds to test faiths
according to these parameters. This procedure leads him to the conclusion that Judaism
(and other pre-Christian religions) is not a rational religion, but Christianity in both form
and function is a rational religion that does precisely what Kant has suggested religions
ought to do.50 As we turn our sights toward Book Four in the next chapter, we find that
Kant will temper his endorsement of Christianity, but only insofar as impurities have
been added to its rational core (see Section One of the next chapter).
Michalson presses his objections to Kant's Book Three arguments one step
further. Even ifwe grant that Kant can in fact relate historical faith and moral faith in the
way described above, 'The question which remains concerns the fate of this historical
"vehicle" once the moral element has been located and appreciated. It is here that we
begin to touch upon the extremely crucial issue of whether or not an historical faith is
50 In this light, we can anticipate that what Kant is up to in Book Four is not the obliteration of Christianity
from the religious scene, but the stripping away of all elements that fall outside of the rational features of
Christianity and endanger its purity and place as a rational religion.
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somehow religiously necessary for Kant'.51 This question constitutes the crux of
Michalson's second objection to the argumentative flow of Book Three, what we might
call 'the problem of necessity'. It appears that there is a sense in which Kant takes
historical faith to be necessary to the moral advance of the human race, and yet at the
same time he holds that historical faith is not necessary for rational religion. In
Michalson's words, 'however strong a case one might make for the "constructive"
aspect of Kant's view of an historical faith, it can never warrant replacing the religion of
the second Critique with a religion of revelation'. Like practical reason itself, rational
religion is self-sufficient. Nevertheless, there exists a strong undertow in the currents of
Kant's argument that seems to make the need for historical faith transform itself into the
necessity of historical faith. The irony, of course, is that Kant clearly advocates a time in
the future where historical faith will no longer be needed.
What precisely is Kant trying to accomplish by moving historical faith toward
rational necessity in terms of salvation while at the same time holding firm to the
conviction that only rational faith is in fact necessary? Michalson thinks there are but
two possibilities: 'On the one hand, the necessity of an historical faith might be
understood to mean the reliance of human salvation upon a particular historical event or
series of events'.53 This theory of necessity brings Kant precariously close to the same
problem that Michalson highlights in his assessment of the problems associated with
Book Two. Michalson takes this first kind of necessity, namely, on the historical event,
to be an uninteresting option in the context ofKant. It is either a foreign element that can
evolve into a problematic issue in the context ofKant's rational limitations, or merely a
conviction o utside t he b ounds o f p hilosophical i nquiry. As M ichalson n otes, ' Kant i s
51
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ultimately committed, not to the soteriological efficacy of anything contingent, but to the
absolute reality and validity of something universal'.54
The o ther p ossible m eaning o f n ecessity i s m ore i nteresting t o M ichalson. H e
writes, 'But on the other hand, the necessity of an historical faith can be taken to mean
the reliance of man upon revealed religion up until the time he is of sufficient
intellectual maturity to appreciate a religion of pure reason'.55 Moral religion is Kant's
ultimate 'goaf, and historical religion (or what Michalson calls 'historical and
ecclesiastical forms') is necessary to the achievement of moral religion. Michalson's
interpretation of Kant holds that any historical religion will do just fine so long as the
goal of rational religion is kept in sight: 'The exact nature or content of these forms is
immaterial; what is important is that we go through the stage represented by historical
religion in order to reach the ultimate goal'.56 The vision of Kant's rational religion
supported by Michalson's interpretation is one of a purely moralistic society in which all
formal (i.e., ecclesiastical) religion is disbanded. The problem of necessity remains in
this vision insofar as there is no clear indication as to why such a historical faith stage is
required. It seems there is a big difference between such a stage preceding rational
religion and saying that it is in fact required for rational religion. Cogently traversing the
logical gap between these two claims appears inexplicable.
This second objection obviously splits into two different forms, both of which, I
contend, miss the point of why Kant holds to the necessity of ecclesiastical faith.
Regarding the first form, certainly if Kant is simply saying that rational religion is self-
sufficient (i.e., it does not need ecclesiastical faith) and at the same time that rational
religion needs ecclesiastical faith, then we have a rather serious difficulty for Kant's
argument in Book Three. As should be noted, however, Kant indicates that ecclesiastical
faith is necessary due to human weakness, a weakness not traceable to the moral law but
54
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to the human need for the appearance of authority. Kant suggests that sacred texts bring
veneration, even by those who do not read them, and that nothing echoes with greater
authority than the declaration it is written. In Kant's view, humans feel the need for an
authority in the form of a sacred text, not because the moral law lacks inherent authority,
but only because humans are more reluctant to embrace such authority without the
venerated text.57
In short, the need for the ecclesiastical falls not to the moral law, but to the
human who, out of weakness, is reluctant to embrace pure moral doctrine without the
declarative authority of a scripture. Here we may draw on an analogy. We may, for
example, envision an academic dean of a university. This figure retains inherent
authority in the role of dean, and therefore, does not need an expensive suit or
impressive office to exercise that authority. However, without such external symbols of
authority, a student may be reluctant to believe in, and act appropriately in light of, the
authority of this figure. What this analogy brings to the fore is the fact/value divide in
Kant. What drives Kant's inquiry into rational religion in the first place is the separation
between nature and freedom. Kant is clear that rational religion is grounded in morality
and does not need the empirical in order to be self-authenticating. However, because of
our sensuous natures and our intuitive trust in the Tightness of a correlation between the
empirical and the moral, we need a correspondence between the empirical and the moral
in order for the moral to take hold of our whole person.58
Regarding the second understanding of necessity, there is a key difference
between Michalson's understanding of Kant's ultimate vision for rational religion and
the one presented here. Rather than a strictly moral society in which ecclesiastical faiths
57 This need for the sacred text is, of course, what gives way to Kant's understanding of the role of the
biblical scholar as one who has as his job to establish, through resources inaccessible to the lay person, the
authoritative interpretation of the text and the subsequent beliefs of the church; in this role, what the
biblical scholar should seek to draw from the text is the pure moral doctrine (i.e.., moral freedom,
dispositional corruption, and prototypical salvation).
58 In short, the moral law does not need the ecclesiastical in order to be authoritative, but humans need the
appearance of authority in the form of the sacred text and the scriptural scholar in order to see and
embrace that authority.
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are done away with, the vision I have forwarded as Kant's is one in which rational
religion retains much of the appearance of revealed religion. Kant, for example, retains
the notion of a church, both particular and universal, as well as the presence of scripture
and the scriptural scholar who expounds the pure moral features of the venerated text.59
Moreover, insofar as Christianity in its pure form represents a rational religion that has
already latched on to a historical vehicle and done away with it (e.g., the Pauline
rejection of the Jewish ceremonial laws as still being valid), Christianity, with its
scriptures and their emphasis on dispositional corruption, prototypical redemption, and
moral renewal, is a rational religion. Hence, the picture of rational religion provided by
this interpretation is not a purely moral society at all, but one in which the church, united
under God and his prototype according to a holy text that expounds the pure moral
doctrines, still exists in Kant's eschatological vision. What Kant does away with are
dogmatic division, political religion, and an emphasis on the historical as the condition
for faith. In the end, what is exalted are the universally valid features of the religion that
moral reason in combination with cognition has brought to light, and the vision of hope
that the ethical community strives to attain under the good principle.




APPLICATIONS OF KANT'S RATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR FAITH
I. Confirming the Transcendental Union Thesis: Book Four ofReligion
Having shown the promise ofmy hypothesis for understanding Kant's account of
rational religion in Books One, Two, and Three of Religion, the purpose of this chapter
is to consolidate the work of the four previous chapters by making application of Kant's
rational foundations for religious faith to the church and academy. To this end, this
section will first focus on Book Four of Religion, in which Kant makes the transition
from natural and rational religion to a consideration of learned and revealed religion.
Book Four can be likened to a Kantian version of Ockham's razor; i.e., using the fully
worked out rational religion of Books One to Three, Kant carves out the contours of
what, from a transcendental vantage point, can be reasonably believed to be true and
enduring about a particular historical faith. Again, Kant's focus is on unity, necessity,
and universality, and his target in Book Four is New Testament Christianity. Book Four
has a purpose that makes it, at least in part, distinct from the other three Books, and, for
this reason, it was not included in the analysis presented in the previous chapter. It is the
main part of Kant's second experiment, and, as such, there is very little in Book Four
that is new to Kant's account of rational religion (provided, of course, that one
understands the previous three books within the framework of transcendental union).
What is new in Book Four is the way that Kant applies his account of rational
religion to historical faith, and the implications this has on the eventual application of his
philosophy of religion in the university of learning more broadly considered. Book Four
sets up Kant's application of rational religion to a living historical faith in two ways.
First, he summarizes the philosophical grounds for rational religion already established
in the previous three books, and second, he sets up his inquiry such that these grounds
serve, both positively and negatively, as criteria by which to assess the historical
dimension of the Christian faith. Whether or not one agrees with Kant, that his
philosophical grounds for religion are derived not from history or experience but from
255
reason, is not at issue here. His argument is that the rational principles of religion follow
from a careful inspection of cognition in the view of the question of hope. Kant's
movement in Book Four toward the application of his understanding of rational religion
to historical religion and, by extension, to theology proper is supported in the First
Preface of Religion; it is also later confirmed in The Conflict of the Faculties. Each of
these dimensions of Book Four will be explored below with a view to articulating the
ground and framework of theology according to Kant. We will also examine an ongoing
debate about Book Four concerning whether Kant, using his own terms and arguments,
is properly called a 'rationalist' or a 'pure rationalist' (6:154-155). I will show that this
debate dissolves under my hypothesis when a careful examination of the context reveals
that Kant might best be thought of as both (and more).
In Conflict, which is the main topic of Section Two, Kant makes explicit
application of his philosophical grounds for theology (i.e., rational theology) in the
academy. Of particular interest is the way Kant applies his philosophy of religion to the
discipline of theology proper. We will examine the distinction between the disciplines of
theology and philosophy with a view to clarifying Kant's philosophical framework for
theology and showing how Kant thought this framework could best be erected and his
vision implemented. I argue that Religion, particularly Books Three and Four, provides
the basis for properly understanding Kant's position on theology in Conflict. Given the
understanding of Kant's rational theology and theology proper that emerges, I rehearse
the reasons why Kant explicitly supports the maintenance of the perspectival distinction
of the disciplines as an essential part of realizing his plan, as outlined in Book Three. In
short, if there is to be a reasonable hope for humankind, then Kant believes there must
be a university structure conducive to the eventual establishment of a universal religion.
Kant's eschatological vision of hope and the application of his vision are found in Books
Three and Four ofReligion, respectively. Philosophy and theology must always remain
in conflict, thinks Kant, because rational religion needs theology (unmixed and pure) for
two reasons: first, because of its awakening and deepening properties, and second,
because of human weakness. The awakening and deepening are directly related to
Kant's analysis of history in Book Three, while human weakness is related to the need
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for the appearance of authority in Book Three and Kant's emphasis on the condition of
the unlearned in Book Four.
Turning now to Book Four of Religion, we find that it offers little that is new in
terms of Kant's vision, but instead gives a more forthright picture of this vision as it is
applied to the Christian faith in particular. I will not provide the type of thoroughgoing
exegetical treatment of Book Four that I provide in the previous chapter on Books One
through Three, but more of a thematic summary of Book Four based on three ways it
serves to confirm the interpretation ofKant's rational religion argued for in the previous
chapter. Ifmy understanding of Books One through Three is valid, we would expect to
find three things in Book Four: First, that Kant would reiterate various features of his
rational religion, and that this reiteration would be in keeping with the foregoing
assessment of Books One through Three. Second, that Kant's practical application of his
rational religion would include a treatment of Christianity that is reflective of the vision
for religion set forth in Book Three. That is, elements of Kant's rational foundations for
theology of Books One and Two would be exalted and the peripheral cultic features of
the faith (in part derived from the Jewish faith that serves as vehicle) would be
downplayed as unimportant (if not outright harmful should they be exalted over the
rational elements). Third, that the interpretation rendered here would continue to
overcome any remaining anomalies within Book Four.
It is my contention that all three of these confirming features are found in Book
Four of Religion and so will serve as a basic outline for my treatment to follow. I first
highlight and summarize those areas in Book Four in which Kant either assumes or
reiterates his previously established rational theology, and show how such reiterations
are in keeping with my analysis in the previous chapter. Following this, I give an
overview of Kant's application of his rational vision to the Christian faith. In this
overview, I highlight in particular how Kant exalts the rational features of the Christian
religion, as well as his warnings against counterfeit service and enthusiasm in which the
cultic features are elevated above the moral/rational features, turning the Christian
religion into the Christian faith. Finally, I show how the interpretation afforded by the
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original hypothesis helps clarify an issue that has lingered in Kant studies regarding
Book Four, namely, whether Kant is a rationalist or a pure rationalist.
Echoes ofBooks One Through Three in Book Four
Kant's rational foundations for theology as set out in Books One through Three
are reiterated periodically throughout Book Four. The first instance appears at the very
opening of Book Four in Kant's review of what he feels has been established in Book
Three. Applying a bold scriptural claim to his own period of history, he asserts that the
kingdom ofGod is at hand because the principles that ground it in reason, Kant believes,
have already taken root 'even though the complete development of its appearance in the
world of the senses is postponed to an unseen distance' (6:151). Moral converts must
unite with a view to establishing this visible kingdom, and the establishment of this
union is a duty of a special kind. Whereas such corporate unity may take place apart
from deliberate effort owing to 'accidental agreement of all in a common good' (6:151),
true hope requires proactive measures (or 'special organization' [6:151]) to resist the
evil principle. For insofar as humanity is innately corrupt, it is inevitable that 'human
beings ... otherwise tempt each other to serve as tools [the evil principle]' (6:151). This
special organization represents a community under God 'as a Kingdom of God'
(6:151), and must be brought about through religion in a public setting, which, according
to Kant, requires a church. Such a church must comprise those of a good disposition
(i.e., moral converts), which from a human perspective must be presupposed in its
members since the actual nature of the disposition is empirically inaccessible. Yet, for
this very reason, he who knows the disposition must form the invisible church: 'God
must himself be the author of his Kingdom' (6:152). This divine agency does not
indicate that humans can be complacent, but instead, that we must seek to make
ourselves fit for this kingdom (and therefore must know what is required, whether such
knowledge is awoken through reason or scripture) and must work toward its
instantiation with trust in the providential hand: 'God himself is in the last instance the
author of the constitution as founder, whereas human beings, as members and free
citizens of this kingdom, are in all instances the authors of the organization' (6:152).
This picture is clearly in keeping with my previous treatment ofBook Three.
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In 6:157-158, Kant begins by again reiterating a number of points from Book
Three in preparation for his treatment of Christianity as natural religion. Interestingly,
Kant suggests that freedom, God, and immortality are rational features of true religion
and are subsequently universally communicable. This suggestion is, of course,
reminiscent of the first Critique in which Kant passed over these topics for the sake of
brevity, but it seems that in Religion he feels that such topics have since proven
themselves to be in the purview of rational religion. Kant reiterates that there is a need
for ministers (or teachers to the church) who convey the pure moral/religious doctrines.1
The importance of this formalized visible representation of the church (with
teachers prominently placed) is that the universal church is not yet realized and,
according to Kant, can n either preserve itself or be realized without a visible c hurch
body. This observation brings Kant to the instantiation of Christianity in which Jesus
exemplifies this point. According to Kant, Jesus is the first teacher of the pure religious
doctrines (e.g., dispositional revolution, immortality, etc.); thus, Kant posits, if we test
Christianity we will find within the teachings of Jesus much, if not all, of what is
essential to rational religion. Even ifwe find that amoral statutes were included in Jesus'
teachings, wee annot, s ubmits K ant, i n a ny w ay d eny h is authority a s t he founder o f
rational religion (for it may well be, and likely is the case, that such teachings were
added to Jesus' teachings).2 In many ways, this is far too effective an argument: it means
any inconvenient material is removed in advance (no matter what it is), making it appear
pointless to read the texts. However, as will be shown below, Kant has a specific
purpose in mind for the biblical scholar that makes the task of biblical exegesis
meaningful from the point of view ofKant's philosophy of religion.
1 For the remainder of this chapter, we will use the term 'pure religious doctrine' to signify the essential
tenets of Kant's rational foundations for religious belief (e.g., dispositional depravity, prototypical
redemption, etc.) from Books One, Two, and Three of Religion. These are summarized in detail in Section
Three of this chapter.
2
Conversely, Kant is also clear that we should not take the authority of Jesus to mean that all are bound
under amoral statutes that were added to his instruction (see 6:158).
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In Kant's transition to Christianity as learned religion, he emphasizes the point that
communicability is the measure of a religion built on reason (6:163-167; cf. 6:155). This
is, of course, reminiscent ofKant's emphasis in Book Two on the prototype of reason as
universally valid for all people of all times and in all worlds, as well as Kant's
distinction in Book Three between a religion contingent on historical events and a
religion that is universally accessible and valid due to its rational foundation. However,
in Book Four, Kant returns to examine the notion of human weakness i n a way that
requires the work of the biblical scholar. Here, it becomes clear that this human
weakness i s t he w eakness o f t he u nlearned p ublic w ho c annot i mmediately g rasp t he
pure religious doctrines using mere reason and need the apparent authority and clarity of
the biblical scholar to make these doctrines intelligible. Therefore, while rational
religion is universally accessible and valid, it is not universally communicable since not
all are learned. Thus, Kant returns to the need for scriptural scholars who utilize their
erudition to decipher and communicate the features of the religion as contained in a
sacred text. For this reason, the given text is 'a sacred possession trusted to the care of
the learned' (6:163). Kant goes on to reiterate the rational principles of Books One and
Two (e.g., man's dispositional corruption, the need for dispositional redemption, etc.) as
that which defines natural religion and represents the pure religious doctrines that the
biblical scholar ought to bring to the fore:
Of the evil that lies in the human heart and of which nobody is free; of the
impossibility of ever retaining ourselves justified before God on the basis of our
life-conduct and yet of the necessity of such a valid justification before him; of
the futility of substituting ecclesiastical observances and pious servile works for
the lack of righteousness and yet of the inescapable obligation to become a new
man: [of all this] everyone can be convinced through his reason, and to be
convinced of it is part of religion (6:163).
We have here again Kant's reiteration of the corruption of Book One, the hope of Book
Two, and the exaltation of reason and of the ecclesiastical in Book Three. Moreover, we
have Kant's reiteration of the need for the biblical scholar as one who expounds these
doctrines from the sacred text for the sake of the unlearned.
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In 6:166-167, Kant reiterates his understanding of the emergence of the Christian
faith that is in keeping with the account of Book Three outlined in the previous chapter.
Kant suggests that Judaism was a faith, not a religion, built upon cultic practices
contained in a text accessible only to those who knew the Hebrew language.
Christianity, however, was so bound to reason that it could be propagated 'even without
historical scholarship, at all times and among all peoples' (6:167). Kant admits that
Christian teaching weaves the pure religious doctrines amidst the teachings and history
of Judaism, but suggests that this was only due to Christianity's circumstances.
Ultimately, this weaving did not commend the cultic practices or consider them
necessary to religion, but instead exemplifies Christianity's use of Judaism as vehicle.
Hence, whenever such cultic references emerge in the Christian teachings, there is
included scholarship and reinterpretation of the Jewish tradition.
These few key portions are the more explicit reiterations in Book Four of Kant's
transcendental theology from Books One through Three. In a more extensive treatment,
we might also note Kant's emphasis on how 'reason does not leave us altogether without
comfort with respect to the lack of a righteousness of our own (which is valid before
God)' (6:171), and the continual return to the disposition both as that which must be
solidified (or 'render[ed] permanent' [6:171]) in order to obtain moral hope, and as the
basis for justification before God (e.g., 6:152, 159, 160, 169, and 171). Ultimately,
Kant's use in Book Four of his previously established transcendental theology serves to
confirm the above understanding ofBooks One, Two, and Three insofar as the presumed
backdrop for Book Four is a picture identical to the above understanding of Kant's
transcendental theology. What we will see, as we turn to Kant's application of this
vision to Christianity, is that these elements (i.e., the corrupt disposition, the need for a
dispositional revolution, the prototype, etc.) emerge not merely in reiteration, but they
are continually put forward as the positive features of the Christian faith that ought to be
exalted and held as what make it an enduring universally valid faith and the measure of
what is peripheral (and thus may be severed).
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The Application ofKant's Vision to Christianity3
Kant's vision in Book Three ofReligion builds upon the pure religious doctrines
of t he earlier b ooks and t he b iblical s cholar p utting forward t hese s ame t ruths v ia an
exposition of the sacred text. This vision sets the stage for Kant's initial discussion (at
the very beginning of Book Four, just after a summary of the Book Three vision) of true
versus counterfeit service that, once understood, makes plain his latter treatments of that
which truly serves the church; namely, that which is in keeping with the pure religious
doctrines and avoids counterfeit service. Kant's argument is as follows: Because the true
church is the invisible church—for only the invisible is composed of all true converts
and free from false converts—it follows that the servants of the true church are not
necessarily those of the ecclesiastical order, but those under the dominion of the good
disposition. This does not mean that those in the order of the ecclesiastical are therefore
necessarily engaged in counterfeit service. Rather, as long as the given church is
engaged in the matters of exalting the pure religious doctrines in the manner outlined in
Book Three, its ecclesiastical representatives serve the true church and the good
principle. However, counterfeit service can emerge when those serving amidst the
ecclesiastical order exalt the rituals over the pure religious doctrines. When this is done,
i.e., when the cultic/historical features of a faith are exalted and presented as
requirements for humans to become pleasing to God, there emerges what Kant calls
counterfeit service {Afterdienst). In such a case, the ecclesiastical representative
ultimately hinders the process of duty, downplaying the pure religious doctrines and
leading people away from the good principle to a religion of service. Such counterfeit
servants ultimately hinder the work of God rather than further it:
By a 'counterfeit service' {cultus spurious) is meant the persuasion that we are
serving someone with deeds which, in fact, go counter to his intention. This
comes about in a community when that which has value only as means for
satisfying the will of a superior, is given out to be, and is substituted for, what
3 Kant's vision is already Christian (although not orthodox) long before it gets applied to Christianity.
However, Kant has in mind the distinction between the rational and the empirical, and the presumption of
the primacy of the former. It is to Kant's understanding of this distinction that the title refers.
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would make us well-pleasing to him directly, and the superior's intention is
thereby frustrated (6:153).
In the context of religious service, the one whose will is frustrated is clearly God. As we
will see, the concern in Book Four is weeding out what constitutes counterfeit service
and what constitutes true service in the visible church by discerning what in a particular
religion (in the context o f Book Four, Christianity) is rational, universally valid, and
therefore required as duty, and what falls outside this sphere as superfluous and may be
weeded out as such.
Beginning with that which is rationally accessible to all and therefore in keeping
with true service to the church, we find Kant highlighting in 6:157-163 features of
Christianity that parallel his transcendental theology laid out in Books One through
Three. Kant looks at various points of the teachings of Jesus in order to show their
congruence with the pure religious doctrines. He highlights Jesus' denial of the civil,
statutory ordinances as morally efficacious, and instead points to Jesus commending the
disposition w hich i s p leasing t o G od. In s upport o f t his p oint, K ant h ighlights J esus'
teaching that the inner sins of the mind or the heart are just as serious moral failings as
those of the outer man (e.g., Jesus' equation of a lustful glance with adultery, or anger
with murder; see Matt 5:21-22). Kant also notes that Jesus regularly cited Jewish law,
but would then declare in its place the pure religious doctrines: 'You have heard that it
was said ... but I say to you' (e.g., Matt 5:21-22, 27-28, 31-32, 38-39, and 43-44). This
indicates, to Kant, that Jesus was not affirming Jewish tradition, but using it, we might
say as a vehicle, for the pure religious doctrines. Kant considers Jesus' words about the
wide gate that leads to destruction and the narrow gate that leads to life (Matt 7:13-14)
to be an indication of how easily the dispositional doctrines may be misinterpreted and
distorted into a religion of service; yet, he nevertheless requires that the inward
disposition be demonstrated by outward deeds (cf. Matt 5:16).
Kant goes on to list various other features of the teachings of Jesus that he feels
are conducive to the pure religious doctrines: Jesus commends duty as the supreme
incentive (cf. Matt 25:35) and denies self-interest as a legitimate incentive, suggesting
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instead that holiness was what should be pursued (6:161); he commends moral faith by
indicating that complacency may hinder the attaining of the good disposition; he
indicates that to be moral does not mean a person will be happy (6:161); and while he
does suggest future rewards in the next life, he indicates that those who pursue the good
for the sake of duty are better than those who pursue the good for the sake of future
reward (6:161-162; cf. Matt 25:35).4 In addition, Kant emphasizes that we have in Jesus
an example from experience of the prototypical ideal: as far as the outer testimony can
provide sufficient proof of an inward disposition. Kant suggests that the good disposition
is 'a capital entrusted to [Jesus]' (6:161) and that, in Christianity, 'a prototype for us to
follow (so far as human beings are capable of it) has been made visible in an example'
(6:162). Hence, Christianity is 'a complete religion, which can be proposed to all human
beings comprehensibly and convincingly through their own reason' (6:162)
Switching to Christianity as a learned religion in 6:163-167, we find
confirmation of our understanding of the relationship between philosophy and the
scriptural scholar laid out in Book Three. In preparation for this discussion, Kant
reiterates a point made in the opening ofBook Four, namely, that communicability is the
measure of whether a religion is natural or learned. This point is in keeping with Kant's
claims throughout Religion that only rational religion that is not contingent upon a
particular history can be communicated convincingly to all; in contrast, learned religion
centres around a text that requires erudition to grasp its teachings, resulting in a need for
scriptural scholars who use erudition to decipher and communicate the features of the
religion as contained in a sacred text. Thus, the given text is 'a sacred possession trusted
to the care of the learned' (6:163).
Kant does not present this feature of learned religion as a negative point, but uses
it to amplify his earlier claims from Book Three. He argues that the learned and the
rational cannot be separated. Whereas the pure religious doctrines are universally valid
4 Kant suggests that such eschatological motivations may lead to faulty thinking, e.g., seeking moral
prudence over moral duty. For instance, if rewards are likely in the future, then perhaps chastening may
simply be endured (rather than heeded) until then. Therefore, the true elect, according to Kant, are those
who act for duty without thought of reward.
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and accessible to all insofar as they are rooted in reason, not all are learned. This is part
of the weakness ofwhich Kant spoke in Book Three that creates the need for revelation,
or we might say the need for a sacred text that may be interpreted for the sake of the
unlearned. If a religion is to be valid for all the world, vis-a-vis both the learned and the
unlearned, there arises a need for learned religion and an opportunity for the biblical
scholar to communicate via his erudition and treatment of the text the pure religious
doctrines. In Kant's words:
universal human reason must be recognized and honored as supreme
commanding principle in a natural religion within the Christian doctrine of faith;
whereas the doctrine of revelation, upon which a church is founded and which
stands in need of scholars as interpreters and preservers, must be cherished and
cultivated as a mere means, though a most precious one, for giving meaning,
diffusion, and continuity to natural religion even among the ignorant (6:165).
Thus, in keeping with the vision of Book Three as explained earlier in this dissertation,
Christianity should not merely be revealed with laity blindly following behind, but
should be built on universal reason and have biblical scholars excavating its scriptures in
support of such reason as a means for communicating these truths to the unlearned.
In contrast to this vision for religion, there is that of counterfeit service. As
indicated in my treatment of Book Three, a faith diverges from the path of true religion
when the historically contingent features of the faith are exalted as the condition for
faith. Such a faith is not universally valid, nor does it give the moral doctrines their
rightful place. Kant's notion of counterfeit service is an extension of this insight. Those
who purport to serve the church but exalt the ecclesiastical features of a faith over the
rational are not truly serving the church (at least not the true church). Those who engage
in this kind of counterfeit service, Kant suggests, are not serving but taking the dominion
of t he c hurch. R ather t han t reating t he c ontingent faith a s a v ehicle for t rue r eligion,
however, those who dwell merely in counterfeit service treat the vehicle as an end in
itself and an indispensable feature of the faith. Thus, in a Christianity of counterfeit
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service, Judaism is viewed not as a vehicle but as part of the necessary structure of
Christianity.5 Priest-craft is the constitution of a church built on such service and
enthusiasm that hinders true religion. Such a church results in a ruling clergy with
articles of faith, and it dispenses with both reason and biblical scholarship. It dictates the
will ofGod to the laity and imposes service counter to the will ofGod.
Anthropomorphism, suggests Kant, is at the heart of the appeal of c ounterfeit
service. In anthropomorphism, the deity is envisioned as a worldly ruler who must be
appeased; therefore, the notion that he can be appeased becomes palatable. Hence, the
primordial origin of cultic service is rooted in fear and powerlessness. It is this notion of
service before an anthropomorphized deity that grounds Kant's notion of enthusiasm,
for, according to Kant, when one seeks to appease the deity in this way, one is seeking to
prompt the release of grace and even perceive and take comfort in its presence.
However, to say anything beyond this about its presence or how it is produced is to
claim to cause or perceive the super-sensible, which is enthusiasm.6 Kant's concern is to
keep Christianity from becoming a religion of service in which the servants of the
church ultimately wield authority, hinder the pure religious doctrines that show one how
to truly become pleasing to God, and lead people into amoral rituals in an attempt to
appease the deity as if he were a kingly ruler. It is for this reason that Kant returns
continually to the point that '[o]nly those whose intention is to find this service solely in
the disposition to good life-conduct distinguish themselves from those others by crossing
over into an entirely different principle' (6:176), reminding us again of the two different
religious paths laid out in Book Three.
What we find in Kant's engagement with Christianity guided by his vision for
religion is precisely what we would expect to find if the understanding of Books One
through Three argued for previously are accurate. Kant's investigation of Christianity as
5 Kant argues that it is incoherent to say that Christians are not bound to Jewish law but should
nevertheless view that law (or the book which contains it) as sacred, indispensable revelation.
6 Kant suggests that such an attempt to prompt supernatural effects on the world by ritualistic practices is,
for all intents and purposes, the very definition of sorcery.
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natural religion exalts the dispositional philosophy and transcendental theology of Books
One and Two, and points to Jesus as a picture of the prototype. Kant's engagement with
Christianity as learned religion exalts the importance of a sacred text as the grounds of a
church and the need for biblical scholars to engage that text. His treatment of these
topics brings into sharp relief the weakness of the unlearned that creates the need for an
authority that may be believed and from whom the pure religious doctrines may be
understood. This notion builds on Kant's emphasis on a religion valid for the whole
world, even for the unlearned and conceptually challenged. Even Kant's treatment of the
way Christianity may diverge from true religion and may be made into a religion of
service brings to the fore the importance of the proper prioritization of history and
reason, t he d ivergent p aths t hat e merge i f t his p riority i s i nverted, t he p roblems w ith
treating a faith as more than a vehicle, and the various practices (e.g.,
anthropomorphism) that ground the appeal of counterfeit service and make it a danger.
This picture is in keeping with the exegetical doctrines of Books One, Two, and Three
and the problem-solution-vision structure, argued for previously, of Kant's main
argument in Religion.
Overcoming Old Problems: Kant—Rationalist or Pure Rationalist?
With the affirmation of the interpretation so far provided, we turn to our third
level of confirmation, namely, an examination of old problems in order to shed new light
on them. The particular problem we will focus on is the much-debated question of
whether Kant considers himself a rationalist or a pure rationalist. As noted in Chapter
Two, Allen Wood argues that 'Kant is plainly a rationalist because he is simply an
agnostic about supernatural revelation'.7 John Hare presents a competing case—that
Kant is a 'pure rationalist'. He gives three reasons: 'The first question to ask is why Kant
should have introduced the category of pure rationalist at all.... The second reason is
that the term 'pure rationalist' is the sort of phrase we should expect Kant to use as
honorific.... Third, Kant sees special revelation as a "vehicle" in God's dealings with
7
Wood, 'Kant's Deism', 11.
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human beings'.8 For Hare, Kant is best described as a pure rationalist, because such a
one 'accepts special revelation but nevertheless does not think that its acceptance is
without qualification necessary to religion'.9 Even though the definition of the rationalist
seems to be broadly in keeping with Kant's rejection of naturalism and supernaturalism,
Hare argues that the designation of pure rationalist is simply a better fit for Kant and
makes the most sense of the text as it stands. Thus, it is worth taking a closer look at the
passage in question.
Kant introduces at the beginning of Book Four the basic division between
revealed religion and natural religion. Those adhering to the former, as already indicated
in Book Three, hold that the services God requires are made known only through
revelation (Offenbarung), whereas those subscribing to the latter hold that moral duty, as
presented by reason, is all God requires. It is the latter, i.e., the one who holds 'natural
religion as alone morally necessary' (6:154), that Kant dubs the rationalist. Following
the basic distinction between those who hold to revealed religion and the rationalist,
Kant lists three other titles, namely, the naturalist, the pure rationalist, and the super-
naturalist. One could interpret these labels as being distinct from and in addition to the
rationalist, which is true of both Wood and Hare, for example. In this light, the question
emerges which ofthesefourpositions represents Kant?10
A way of making sense of this paragraph that takes into account the strength of
the arguments on both sides is to understand these three titles (i.e., the naturalist, the
pure rationalist, and the super-naturalist) as representative of three sub-categories of the
rationalist. H ence, K ant begins b y i ntroducing t he b road d istinction b etween r evealed
religion and natural religion in order to identify with the rationalist as broadly
conceived, but he then provides three positions on the role of revelation relative to the
instantiation of true religion which the rationalist may hold: (1) He may deny the very
8
Hare, The Moral Gap, 42-43.
9
Hare, The Moral Gap, 44-45.
10 We say four rather than five headings because Kant does not assign a label to the one who holds to
revealed religion. He only introduces the distinction between natural and revealed religion and then
provides a designation for the one who holds to the former.
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possibility of revelation and be dubbed a naturalist; (2) he may allow for the possibility
of revelation in the instantiation of the true religion but suggest that it is not required for
religion, and so be dubbed a pure rationalist; or (3) he may hold that religion cannot be
established without revelation (i.e., that revelation is necessary for the instantiation of
true religion) and be called a super-naturalist.n Given such an interpretation, each of
these three positions is a rationalist position. They each hold that duty (rather than
revealed acts of service) is sufficiently pleasing to God, yet they differ in regard to their
stance on the role revelation plays (or does not play) in the instantiation of true religion.
In d efence o f t his u nderstanding o f t he s tructure o fK ant's a rgument, w e m ay
note the contrast between the no-nonsense, matter-of-fact way that Kant introduces the
rationalist definition and the conditional way he introduces the next three definitions. In
regard to the rationalist, Kant simply asserts 'Anyone who declares natural religion as
alone morally necessary ... can also be called rationalist' (6:154). He then switches to
the conditional when discussing the next three distinctions:
If he denies the reality of any supernatural divine revelation, he is called
naturalist; should he, however, allow this revelation, yet claim that to take
cognizance of it and accept it as actual is not necessarily required for religion,
then he can be named pure rationalist; but, if he holds that faith in divine
revelation is necessary to universal religion, then he can be called pure
supernaturalist in matters of faith (6:154-155; bold emphasis added).
As commonly acknowledged, there is some justification for understanding Kant here as
providing three additional categories beyond the rational. Given the way, for example,
he typically loads a section of text with terminology and definition, this section appears
to be simply another example ofKant distinguishing between concepts on the same level
of philosophical reflection. This perception is especially true when these four
11 One may wonder whether there is any real difference between the super-naturalist and the one who
holds to a revealed religion. The difference resides in their position on the works required by God. The
super-naturalist believes that what is morally required by God is duty, but that revelation is still required
for the establishment of a religion; whereas the one who holds to revealed religion not only holds that
revelation is required, but holds that it is required because the works God requires cannot otherwise be
known.
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distinctions are taken in isolation from the whole text and evaluated in strictly analytic
terms. If the shift to the conditional indicates that the personal pronoun 'he' is not meant
to play the same role as 'anyone' in the previous sentence, but rather to refer back to the
rationalist as broadly conceived, then there are three subsets of the rationalist rather than
three more possibilities beyond merely that of the rationalist.
Regardless of how the pronoun reference issue is resolved, there are still three
textual points that speak for understanding the shift to the conditional in this way. First,
the naturalist, the pure rationalist, and the super-naturalist are identified and
distinguished from one another by their disparate stances on the possibility and
subsequent role of revelation in the instantiation of true religion. The rationalist,
however, is not defined relative to this issue. The rationalist is only identified as one
who holds to natural religion as opposed to revealed religion, i.e., a religion of service;
however, the rationalist's stance on the role revelation may or may not play in the
instantiation of true religion is not specified. This omission seems to indicate that the
rationalist should not be categorized with the positions to follow as one offour stances
on the role of revelation in the instantiation of true religion, but should be set apart as a
main rubric under which the following three positions fall. The second indication is in
the paragraph that follows to be dealt with more in-depth momentarily. For the moment,
suffice to say that Kant turns to examining which of these three possibilities is the truly
rational position, so indicating that while the basic division between natural and revealed
religion (or a religion of service) is clear, there still remains a question regarding the
rationalist's position on revelation as it relates to the eventual instantiation of true
religion. While Kant clearly falls under the category of the rationalist (as assumed by
many traditional interpreters), the question remains: Which form of rationalist is Kant?
To put the question another way, What is Kant's position on the role of revelation
relative to the instantiation of true religion?
It is when Kant himself sets out to give an answer to this question that the third
indication is presented. According to Kant, the rationalist 'must of his own accord hold
himself within the limits of human insight' (6:155). He then dismisses outright the
naturalist position, suggesting that to deny the very possibility of revelation cannot be
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done within the limits of human insight: 'Hence he will never deny in the manner of a
naturalist' (6:155). It should be noted that this refusal to deny the possibility of
revelation represents a consistent feature ofKant's thinking and a r elatively c ommon
position for the time. In his Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, for
example, Kant asserts that 'no human being can hold it impossible that ... God might
have given to it, in a higher revelation, certain truths' (28:1119). Thus, Kant is left with
the pure rationalist and the super-naturalist as the remaining rational positions. While it
seems that Kant regularly leans in the direction of the pure rationalist, he asserts that it is
beyond the purview of human reason to make a final determination on whether
revelation is merely possible but not needed for the instantiation of religion or is both
possible and necessary to the instantiation of universal religion: 'Hence he will never ...
contest the intrinsic possibility of revelation in general or the necessity of a revelation as
a divine means for the introduction of true religion; for no human being can determine
anything through reason regarding these matters' (6:155). In other words, we cannot say
with certainty, concerning the instantiation of true religion, that revelation may play a
role but is not required, or that revelation must play a role because true religion cannot
be instantiated without it. Kant concludes, 'The point of dispute can therefore concern
only the reciprocal claims of the pure rationalist and the supernaturalist in matters of
faith' (6:155).
Having reached this point of dispute between what one 'either accepts as
necessary and sufficient, or only as accidental, to the one and only true religion' (6:155),
Kant chooses a different angle for approaching religion, namely, 'according to the
characteristic that renders it capable of external communication'' (6:155).12 Here Kant
introduces the distinction between natural religion and learned religion. The former,
Kant suggests, constitutes that of which 'every human being can be convinced through
12 We may note that Kant states, 'If religion is divided not according to its first origin and inner possibility
(for then it divides into natural and revealed)' (6:155), indicating that his discussion preceding this change
of focus falls under the basic division between natural and revealed religion. This distinction stands as
further evidence that in the entire preceding discussion, the rationalist, naturalist, pure rationalist, and
super-naturalist do not represent major distinctions but minor sub-categories that only help flesh out the
natural/revealed distinction.
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his reason' (6:155), whereas the latter constitutes that of 'which one can convince others
only by means of erudition' (6:155). The importance of this distinction is that, since it is
beyond the limits of human reason to mediate between the pure rationalist and the super-
naturalist (a point also confirmed in this paragraph: 'from the origin of a religion alone
we cannot draw any conclusion regarding its suitability or unsuitability to be a universal
religion of humanity' [6:155]), the measure of a given religion's suitability for true
religion falls to this question of communicability. We can, thinks Kant, decide a
religion's suitability for being the universal religion of humanity 'on the basis of [a
religion's] constitution as universally communicable, or not; the first property [i.e.,
religion as universally communicable] constitutes, however, the essential characteristic
of the religion which ought to bind every human being' (6:155).
However, Kant does not suggest that there is an insurmountable gap between the
natural and the learned. Rather, he indicates quite clearly that 'a religion can be natural,
yet also revealed' (6:155). Such a religion is one that 'human beings could and ought to
have arrived at ... on their own through the mere use of reason' (6:155), yet, because
'they would not have come to it as early or as extensively as is required' (6:155), the
public revelation of its doctrines proves beneficial. Thus, with the introduction of such a
religion, 'everyone can henceforth convince himself of its truth by himself and his own
reason' (6:156). In such a case, the religion rightfully bears both titles: 'the religion is
objectively a natural one, though subjectively one-revealed; hence it truly deserves also
the first title' (6:156). The difference between a religion which is both natural and
revealed and a religion which 'cannot be considered but as revealed' (6:156) is that the
former could persevere even if the revelation were lost and entirely forgotten, whereas
the latter requires that the record be preserved 'in a totally secure tradition or in holy
books as records, [or] it would disappear from the world; and a supernatural revelation
would have to come about, either one publicly repeated from time to time or one
continuously enduring within each human being' (6:156). With this distinction, Kant
makes clear that what revelation adds to is natural religion. Since religion (both in a pure
form and in a form of divine service) is always derived from the concept of 'an
obligation under the will of a moral lawgiver' (6:156)—i.e., it seeks to answer the
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question what does God require?—the very concept of religion 'is one of pure reason'
(6:156).
For t his r eason, w hen a pproaching t he t opic o f r eligion, Kant m ust a ssume t hat
'every religion in part at least, even a revealed religion, must also contain certain
principles of natural religion' (6:156). For, at the very least, all religions, even ones of
service, assume a moral lawgiver whom they are seeking to please. While not all
religions rise to the level of rational religion (e.g., Judaism and other pre-Christian
faiths), all emerge out of certain basic principles of pure reason. It is on this basis that
Kant sets up his two-part test of revealed religion: 'We too shall therefore consider a
revealed religion as yet natural, on the one hand, but on the other hand, as learned
religion' (6:156). The point of this, of course, is to test revealed religion against the
framework for r ational r eligion i n B ooks O ne t hrough T hree i n o rder toe valuate t he
[rational] quality of a revealed religion relative to this framework. To use Kant's words
once again, 'we shall test [revealed religion] and be able to sort out what, and how
much, it is entitled to from the one source or the other' (6:156). The comparison between
the rational framework derived through cognition and the claims of the revealed faith
serves to make clear how much of the revealed religion in question is in keeping with
natural religion (i.e., beliefs that reason tells us we must hold) and how much falls to
learned religion (i.e., beliefs that must be derived through erudition). Kant submits that
such a test is best carried out upon a specific example of religion and on a specific holy
book that is 'one among a variety of books dealing with religion and virtue accredited to
a revelation' (6:156). To this end, Kant centres on Christianity and the New Testament:
'In our case this book can be the New Testament, as the source of the Christian doctrine
of faith. In keeping with our intent, we now wish to expound the Christian religion in
two sections—first, as natural religion, and then, second, as learned religion—with
reference to its content and the principles found in it' (6:157).13
13 Kant makes clear that he does not want to 'intrude into the business of those to whom is entrusted the
interpretation of this very book ... or to challenge their exegesis based on scholarship' (6:157). However,
Kant is also clear that examining a holy book with the aim of discerning what falls to natural religion is
not antithetical to biblical scholarship, for the biblical scholar 'proceeds toward one and the same end as
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This way of understanding Kant's introduction to Book Four helps clarify not
merely where Kant stands relative to the rationalist versus the pure rationalist (or more
accurately, which type of rationalist Kant is—a pure rationalist or a super-naturalist), but
also clarifies the purpose of engaging in the question to begin with. Kant ultimately
views the treatment ofwhich type of rationalist reason bids us be as beyond the purview
of reason and thus unfruitful; therefore, he moves to the topic of communicability i n
order to establish the appropriate approach to religion as either learned or natural. This
shift is in keeping with our suggestion that what is important to Kant is universal validity
and communicability.
II. Philosophy and Theology in The Conflict ofFaculties
Assuming this interpretation of Religion is accurate, it is reasonable to ask what
kind of reception Kant expected his philosophy of religion to have with its readership.
Given the rigor of Kant's arguments—arguments that expound a completely new
account of religion and theology under strict rational/transcendental guidelines and that
commend not only a certain interplay between philosophy and theology, but also seek to
example it in Book Four—one might think that Kant's hope was for theology simply to
submit to the clear teachings of reason. However, Kant is not naive in his vision. In the
Preface to the First Edition ofReligion, he gives a glimpse of his expected reception of
Religion and suggests that this reception is a part of the book's intended purpose. Kant
indicates that his rational religion is in keeping with his occupation as a philosopher, and
he presents it to the theologian as such. This presentation is not presumptuous; it does
not indicate that Kant believes the theologian would or should simply accept it. Rather,
Kant's plea is simply that the theologian hear the voice of the philosopher and then
engage in dialogue. His expectation is that outright opposition will occur in some cases,
but that this is necessary and good. Kant writes:
the philosophers, namely the moral good' (6:157). For more on this, see our treatment of Book Three in
previous chapters.
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For the sciences profit simply from being set apart, insofar as each science first
constitutes a w hole by i tself; o nly a fter t hat s hall the e xperiment b e m ade o f
considering them in association. Now whether the theologian agrees with the
philosopher or believes himself obliged to oppose him: let him just hear him out.
For in this way alone can the theologian be forearmed against all the difficulties
that the philosopher may cause him. To conceal these difficulties, however, or
indeed to decry them as ungodly is a mean expedient that will not wash; to mix
the two [disciplines] and for the biblical theologian to direct only the occasional
fleeting glance at [philosophy], constitutes a lack of thoroughness where in the
end nobody knows exactly how they stand in the whole with respect to the
doctrine of religion (6:10-11).
We see here the seeds of The Conflict of the Faculties. Kant is clear that his
philosophical programme represents the philosopher's position on religion. The
theologian belongs to a separate discipline, one that ought not to be confused with
philosophy, b ut o ught, n evertheless, t o engage p hilosophy. T his e ngagement o ught t o
ensue, Kant believes, even if it unearths fundamental disagreements and outright
opposition to the claims of the other. The fact that Kant singles out the theologian in the
hope that he will be heard out indicates that Religion is written, at least in part, to the
theologian; and the fact that Kant's states that Religion is not written for the lay person
but for the academic indicates that it is submitted in an interdisciplinary context within
the academy. Kant affirms this understanding of the purpose of Religion in his
Introduction to Conflict, especially in the letter to the King. In addressing Religion (at
least in part) to the theologian in an academic context, Kant is inviting engagement and
promoting conflict.
Religion is thus not the end of theology, but a philosophical statement that places
demands on theology. From this vantage point, it presents itself as the whetstone of
theological virtue, one that employs reason and conflict in a quest to understand the
nature and extent of reasonable belief. The hypothesis for understanding Religion
presented at the end of Chapter Three would therefore be incomplete without a treatment
of Kant's vision of conflict. For Kant's transcendental theology is not an end in itself,
but represents a philosophical gauntlet thrown down so that theology might one day
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realize its true form. For this reason, it is important to provide an overview of Conflict
with a view to better understanding the role Kant's transcendental theology is intended
to play relative to the discipline of theology proper.
Conflict is a compilation of three separate essays written shortly after the
publication ofReligion. The First Part or essay, entitled 'The Conflict of the Philosophy
Faculty with the Theology Faculty', contains Kant's final statement on the relationship
of philosophy and theology. The Second and Third Parts were added to the original
essay in order to give the book its structure of three higher faculties (i.e., theology, law,
and medicine) in relation to one lower faculty (i.e., philosophy) and comprise a book of
four distinct portions (including also a lengthy Introduction). We will focus here on the
Introduction and the First Part. The Introduction contains information meant to orient the
reader on how to interpret Kant's philosophy of religion relative to his vocational
commitments to philosophy and its impact on Christianity, as well as to justify the
publication of Religion and Conflict. The First Part of Conflict was written shortly after
the publication ofReligion, sometime between June and October of 1794.14 It carries the
doctrines of Kant's philosophy in general and philosophy of religion in particular into
the sphere of an academy dominated by church authority and with specific reference to
Kant's context in a Prussian religious state.
The immediate question for our purposes is whether or not Conflict adds anything
significant to our analysis of Religion by way of extension, modification, or
confirmation. There are a wide variety of opinions on this matter. On the one hand, some
interpreters think the text should not be placed into the seminal corpus ofKant's critical
writings because it is irrelevant to understanding his philosophy. Clement Webb, for
example, downplays the importance of Conflict with a single sentence: 'There is much
that is interesting in the discussion; not however much which for our present purpose
throws further light upon [Kant's] views'.15 ForWebb, Conflict does little more than
14 Allen W. Wood, 'Editor's Introduction' in Religion and Rational Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press), 235.
15
Webb, Kant's Philosophy ofReligion, 169.
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reiterate Kant's philosophy of religion in a different format. Bernard Reardon concurs,
suggesting that Conflict 'adds nothing of significance to what had been more fully said
before'.16 Other interpreters admit Conflict into the seminal corpus of Kant's critical
writings, but in a way that links it decisively to his political context. Peter Byrne
suggests that Conflict is more a political treatise than a philosophical one. As a political
• *17
treatise, it does not refer to theology in general, but to theology 'Prussian-style'. The
point is that Kant never intended his discussion of the relationship between philosophy
and theology to be true of the universal tasks of these disciplines, but only true of
Prussian academic philosophy and its relationship to the Prussian state-church. For
Byrne, there is no indication in this text that Kant means to support the viability of the
discipline of theology as an independent source of information about God; instead Kant
is consistent only insofar as he intends to uphold the role of the state-church. Susan Shell
adds that Conflict exhibits Kant's 'central strategy: to play upon the government's desire
to rule, in order to bolster the independence of the scholarly community vis-a-vis church
censorship'.18 Its arguments are meant to hasten the day that the lower faculty of
philosophy would replace the higher faculties.19
On the other hand, Conflict has much in the way of context and content-related
evidence in support of its relevance and significance in Kant's thinking. Unlike Religion,
sometimes challenged in its role as a principal source of information about Kant's
philosophy because it was written during a time of censorship, Conflict was published
after J. C. Wollner's edict of censorship had been lifted.20 When taken in conjunction
16
Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian, 157.
17 Personal correspondence, March 2002.
18 Susan Meld Shell, 'Kant as Educator: Reason and Religion in Part One of the Conflict of the Faculties',
in Kant's Legacy: Essays in Honor ofLewis White Beck, ed. Predag Cicovacki (New York: University of
Rochester Press, 2001), 335.
19
Shell, 'Kant as Educator', 345.
20
Palmquist refers to a number of interpreters who approach Religion on this basis. He cites Michalson,
for example, for affirming the view that 'Kant keeps one wary eye on the Prussian censor'. He also cites
Walsh who suggests that Kant may have intentionally included 'much vagueness and many instances of
camouflage in his expression'. Both of these claims go directly against Kant's repeated emphasis on
sincerity in religious matters. Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion, 192-193.
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with Kant's well-known concern for religious sincerity, these facts suggest with some
measure of assurance that the ideas contained in Conflict are Kant's actual thoughts on
religion and theology rather than an appeasement of the political authorities. Perhaps the
best evidence for the importance of Conflict to Kant's thinking, however, is the text
itself. It is arguably among the most accessible of all Kant's texts. Its overall structure is
clear and well crafted; it discusses the role of philosophy in the 'learned community of
the university' and the way philosophy should relate to the higher faculties of theology,
medicine, and law. Even though Conflict is the result of Kant's quick assembly of three
separate essays emphasizing philosophy's relationship to each of these areas
respectively, it coheres well with ideas expressed in his other works of the 1790s,
especially Religion. There is continuity between these two writings that suggests a
continuous and uninterrupted train of thought in Kant's philosophy throughout the
period from 1793-1798.21 Although the usefulness of Conflict as a resource for
understanding Kant's position on religion and theology may or may not be discernable
on the basis of the above considerations alone, the text itself clearly has important things
to say about Kant's position on the roles of philosophy and theology proper, and these
will be the focus ofmy remarks to follow.
Kant on the Interdisciplinary Role ofPhilosophy
Much has been made of Kant's letter to the King placed in the Introduction to
Conflict. Frequently, this letter is taken as a way for Kant to justify his publication on
the topic of religion after he had told the King that he would not publish on this topic
again. Yet this assumption overlooks an even more important theme, namely, the
vocational difference between philosophy and theology at the heart ofReligion (7:8-9):
Since ... I make no appraisal of Christianity, I cannot be guilty of disparaging it.
In fact, it is only natural religion that I appraise ... But when reason speaks, in
21 It is important to note that Conflict was not translated into English in its entirety until Mary Gregor's
translation in 1979. This fact could explain, in part, why the widespread dissemination of Kant's
philosophy of religion has been so entrenched in the traditional interpretation. If the majority of English-
speaking readers did not have access to the whole of Kant's writings until recently, it is not hard to
imagine why the part of his philosophy having to do with religion would be so poorly interpreted.
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these matters, as if it were sufficient to itself and as if revealed teachings were
therefore superfluous (an assertion which, were it to be taken objectively, would
have to be considered a real disparagement of Christianity), it is merely
expressing its appraisal of itself...
Pervading Kant's arguments to justify the writing of Conflict, we find confirmation for
understanding Religion based on the philosophical standpoint of the entire work. Even if
we assume that one of his main reasons for adding the letter is simply to justify the
publication of Conflict, it still matters that underlying this justification is Kant's sincere
desire to be heard on how to understand his philosophy of religion in general and
Religion in particular.22 In this introductory letter, Kant explains why he chose to entitle
his work Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: '[It] was to prevent a
misinterpretation to the effect that the treatise deals with religion from mere reason
(without revelation). That would be claiming too much, since reason's teachings could
still come from men who are supernaturally inspired. The title incicates [sic] that I
intended, rather, to set forth as a coherent whole everything in the Bible—the text of
religion believed to be revealed—that can also be recognized by mere reason' (7:6).
Kant identifies the central features of his philosophy of religion with Christianity and
reiterates that his task in Religion was to articulate those beliefs on which philosophy
and theology can be in agreement (or in one accord). He goes on in the letter to spell out
at least two areas in which this is true, one having to do with the merits of the purely
rational nature of his inquiry and the other having to do with rational faith and the
content of human cognition.
Regarding the rational in Religion, Kant writes, '[Reason] is merely expressing
its appraisal of itself—not in terms of its [theoretical] ability [but] in terms of what it
prescribes us to do insofar as it alone is the source of the universality, unity, and
necessity in the tenets of faith that are the essence of any religion' (7:9). These three
22 There appears to be a reciprocal relationship between Religion and Conflict: Conflict helps
interpretation of Religion and Religion helps an understanding that, whatever particular political and
academic concerns are present in Conflict, they are relevant to religion and theology in a sense larger than
Kant's immediate historical context.
279
words cover much ground in Kant's argument in Religion and testify to what Kant
believes he has accomplished in Religion. More to the point for our purposes is the fact
that Kant explicitly links these points to the common ground that can be found between
faith and reason. This linking is not only consistent with the hypothesis previously
articulated and defended, but also suggestive of a telos to Kant's thinking that informs
every aspect of his project in Religion. Faith and reason, for Kant, come together in
freedom, immortality, and God. Of all the ideas left over from traditional metaphysics,
these alone are inherently rational and therefore universally communicable. Kant writes
in Religion that 'we can sufficiently convince every human being of [natural religion
based on God, freedom and immortality] and everyone can expect its effect at least, as
duty. This religion possesses the great prerequisite of the true church, namely the
qualification for universality, inasmuch as by universality we mean validity for every
human being' (6:157). Unity and necessity are likewise concepts in Religion, as seen in
the p revious c hapter, that fund every a spect o f Kant's argument. Unity i s a11 he v ery
heart of the hypothesis that I have employed to interpret the first three Books of
Religion, while necessity is a key concept in the advancement of human cognition
towards an answer to the question ofmoral hope.
Concerning the more specific content of faith, Kant points out that reason has
rational needs and theoretical deficiencies that find a clear utility for revelation. As
previously noted, Kant has in mind the centrality of revelation in the sense of the moral
law and the ground that it provides for rational religion, but, in Kant's estimation,
revelation and religion in this sense might never have been arrived at, at least not in a
timely and thorough fashion, without revealed religion. This potential inability is what I
take to be 'the theoretical deficiency which our pure rational belief admits it has' (7:9).
For this reason, Kant leaves room, as we saw in Book Three, for the assistance of some
type of supernatural revelation in guiding natural religion to the realization of its pure
religious doctrine: 'a religion can be natural, yet also revealed, if it is so constituted that
human beings could and ought to have arrived at it on their own through the mere use of
their reason, even though they would not have come to it as early or extensively as
required, hence a revelation of it at a given time and a given place might be wise and
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very advantageous to the human race' (6:155). In this way, historical faith based on such
a supernatural revelation provides an avenue for discerning moral revelation in a
theoretically timely and thorough manner. Kant thinks that the link between the
theoretical and the moral established by the working together of human cognition and
rational faith is the reason why revelation (however it is arrived at) must finally point to
a common (i.e., universal, unified, and necessary) rational religion. For Kant, true
revelation (by whatever name) must finally lead to this destination. Rational religion,
Kant argues, is the touchstone for the truth of revelation insofar as it resolves for the
sake of faith and reason 'the questions, for example, of the origin of evil, the conversion
from evil to good, the human being's assurance that he has become good, etc.' (7:9).
For Kant, philosophy is rooted in reason and the conviction that people have the
right and duty to think for themselves about the issues that matter most. Despland relates
the conflict of natural and revealed religion in Religion to the conflict of the
philosophical and theological disciplines in Conflict. Natural religion, from the point of
view of philosophy, is 'religion pure'. Revealed religion, from the point of view of
theology, is 'religion applied'.23 Clearly, the conflict between philosophy and theology,
for Kant, is consistent with these features: 'The biblical theologian proves the existence
of God on the grounds that He spoke in the Bible, which also discusses his nature ...
[and] must ... count on a supernatural opening of his understanding by a spirit that
guides to all truth' (7:24). In contradistinction, 'the philosophical faculty must be free to
examine in public and to evaluate with cold reason the source and content of this alleged
basis of doctrine' (7:33). When Kant writes of theology in Conflict, he is writing about
the field of inquiry where God's Word and Spirit are the presumed authorities. When
Kant writes of philosophy, he is writing about the field of inquiry where reason and
freedom constitute the standpoint of authority. From the point of view of the state
(insofar as it is related to the church), theology must remain the higher faculty, but from
an insider's point of view within the academy, philosophy must be given pride of place.
23 Michel D espland, Kant on History and Religion (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973),
119.
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In the end, the result will be for the betterment of humanity insofar as the prospects of
arriving at true religion will be enhanced.
Kant on the InterdisciplinaryRole of Theology
The majority of Conflict is concerned with a necessary dispute between
philosophy and theology over the many questions of religion, and Kant clearly wants to
ensure that the two vocations are never conflated. Theology, according to Kant, is one of
the university's higher faculties. Like law and medicine, theology establishes its norms
and bases its authority on the best available writings in the field. Since theology's
writings are understood to be authoritative (as a revelation of God), Kant refers to the
discipline of theology as the queen of the sciences, and, as Kant famously put it, the only
question left is whether philosophy carries the torch before her or the train behind. In
this sense, theology serves both the interest of the government and the will of God,
although not necessarily in a pure way or at the same time (7:17-24). In Conflict, Kant
uses the terms theology and biblical theology synonymously.24 In the constitution of
pure theology, 'there is no human interpreter of the Scriptures authorized by God, [the
theologian] must rather count on a supernatural opening of his understanding by a spirit
that guides to all truth than allow reason to intervene and (without any higher authority)
maintain its own interpretation' (7:24).
Theology proper, according to Kant, is rooted in the faith that God has spoken
and the conviction that what God has said and done, as it is written, provides a
24
Interestingly, in light of developments after Kant, a synthesis of biblical and systematic theology might
actually be closer to what he means. Galbraith recommends that we understand Kant's distinction between
philosophy and theology, not in the way described above, but in different contemporary terms. She draws
attention to the fact that philosophical theology and philosophy of religion are terms Kant used
synonymously. Her argument is that, since the university, as it is broadly conceived today, does not
identify theology as being essentially revealed theology, Kant can be thought of as a theologian or, as she
puts it, a kind of'closet theologian'. Theology today, a ccording t o Galbraith, i s e ssentially what Kant
called philosophical theology. Whether or not she is right about the nature of contemporary theology is not
at issue; what is at issue is the specific nuance of how Kant defined theology in Conflict. Elizabeth
Cameron Galbraith, Kant and Theology: Was Kant a Closet Theologian? (San Francisco: International
Scholars Publications, 1996), 63-64. For further clarification of the distinctions between rational and
biblical theology, see Kant's Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine ofReligion (28:993-1001). For Kant,
'there are no kinds of theology but those of reason and revelation' (9:999).
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trustworthy perspective on reality. This does not mean, however, that theology provides
an independent source of information about God that threatens to undo reason and the
vocation of philosophy. As already stated with regards to Religion, just as anything
known is, for Kant, the product of the synthesis of intuitions and concepts, everything
believed in rationally must be rooted in the moral and cognized for the sake of hope. In
the context of Conflict, theology must be upheld, not because it promises religious data
that cannot be gleaned from reason, but because theology promises to hasten the day that
rational religion will become all that it is supposed to be and eventually the religion of
the land. What Conflict provides Kant's philosophy of religion is the context for
completing the development of his transcendental theology. Rather than promoting
stagnation by putting theology into a theoretical, moral, aesthetic, or religious box, his
philosophy of religion is placed into the dynamic and moving environment of the
university. The conflict of the disciplines promotes the evolution of theology for the
sake of true religion.
Personifying the disciplines of philosophy and theology in Conflict, Kant notes,
'I am here only speaking of the pure (purus, putus) biblical theologian, who is not yet
contaminated by the ill-reputed spirit of freedom that belongs to reason and philosophy.
For as soon as we allow the two different callings to combine and run together, we can
form no clear notion of the characteristic that distinguishes each by itself (7:24). At first
glance, it may not be obvious why Kant believes the distinction between philosophy and
theology entails a necessary conflict. Initially, as, for example, in the conflict in the first
Critique, the dispute may be fuelled by a challenge to the veracity and viability of the
other's perspective.25 This definition of conflict is frequently attributed to the meaning
of Conflict despite textual evidence to the contrary. The philosopher maintains the
25 At least two kinds of conflict can be found in the first Critique. The first kind is not directly related to
theology. Conflicts of this kind are primarily among philosophers and are an important focus of the
'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements'. The Transcendental Doctrine ofMethod, on the other hand, has as
a principal concern the dispute between the perspectives of philosophy and theology. This second and
smaller part of the first Critique focuses on philosophy in its role as the lower faculty of learning moving
human understanding toward 'a complete system of pure reason' (CPR A707/B736). This part makes a
somewhat rhetorical argument for the perspective of philosophy o ver, and very often against, all other
perspectives.
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perspective of reason and freedom, and the theologian maintains the perspective of
Word and Spirit. When philosophy and theology disagree in their assertions, and these
assertions cover the same conceptual space, conflict for self-preservation ensues. At a
deeper level, however, the dispute involves the intentional use or abuse of authority.
Kant explains the general nature of the dispute as follows: 'there will be a conflict
between the higher and lower faculties which is, first, inevitable, and second, legal as
well' (7:32).
Since theology, for Kant, gains its authority because it is presumed to be of
divine origin and as such is sanctioned by the state, it has an authority that is inevitable
and legal. However, this authority, if left unchecked in the hands of human beings, just
as inevitably oversteps its limits and trespasses on the territory of philosophy. When this
happens, as it did in Kant's context, the philosopher's job is to use reason to challenge
the authority and content of theology. Because philosophy and theology come together
in the context of the human predicament and rely on human discourse for their public
exposition, disagreement is inevitable. Kant's contention, however, is not that this
relationship s hould b ecome e ntrenched a nd b itter, b ut t hat i t s hould b e p roactive a nd
engaging: 'this conflict of two parties ... is not a war' (7:35), but, instead, they are
'united in [their striving toward] one and the same final end (concordia discors,
discordia concorsy (7:35). The conflict Kant writes about is a civil conflict that leads
toward the final end of humankind. As already noted, this final end is a rational religious
vision in which humankind is united into a Kingdom of God or ethical commonwealth.
Only by understanding and applying the ground rules for this conflict, however, can civil
war be avoided and the continual progress of the human race toward its final end be
assured.
Philosophy and Theology: The Rules ofConflict
In the section 'On the legal conflict of the higher faculties with the lower
faculty', Kant lays out the 'formal procedures for such a conflict' (7:32-35). These four
procedures comprise the ground rules for a civil conflict of the faculties. The first rule
for philosophical and theological conflict is as follows: 'This conflict cannot and should
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not be settled by amicable accommodation (amicabilis compositio), but (as a lawsuit)
calls for a verdict' (7:33). If a theology is unable to challenge and chasten philosophy by
offering a vision of history and hope worthy of our rational commitment, then one
should side with what is confirmed in the rigors of critical philosophical reasoning. This
does not mean, however, that one ought to dispense with theology altogether. Kant's
affirmation of theology is rooted in his conviction that we need theology for the
propagation of rational religion. The philosophical side of the dispute should be against
only o ne m anifestation oft heology a t a t ime (not t heology i n general, but, i n Kant's
case, theology Prussian-style). The same is true of philosophy. If a theological
perspective on the world, God, and ourselves is more cogent than its philosophical
counterpart, if it resonates with our deepest moral instincts and longings for hope, then
that particular conception of philosophy should be reconsidered. The aim of a verdict is
not to dispense with the discipline per se, but to progress toward truly rational religion
through conflict. If one theology is rejected, according to Kant, the philosopher must
find a new one. Important to note, of course, is that in Kant's estimation this discussion
does not preclude the priority of the rational over the historical. What it confirms is that
whatever the theologian gleans from the historical can only be held out as truth if it can
be reasonably asserted that we should have thought of it ourselves.
Kant's second rule for philosophical and theological conflict confirms this line of
thinking: 'This conflict can never end, and it is the philosophy faculty that must always
be prepared to keep it going' (7:33). Here, the importance of theology to Kant is
noteworthy. If any particular manifestation of theology is unable or unwilling to
maintain conflict with philosophy, then it is incumbent on the philosopher to do
theology on behalf of the theologian. For Kant, theology is the task of mining through
the 'Word of God' in the conviction that God's Spirit will lead us to all truth. The only
way we could ever rationally believe the truth as such, however, is if it resonates with
what Kant calls 'rational religion'. This kind of priority is a product of Kant's deepest
philosophical instincts. Nevertheless, for Kant, theology is so important to the
philosophical task as it pertains to religion that a good philosopher should even be
willing to adopt the role of theologian in such a way that history and the church may
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actively chasten philosophy. Philosophy needs theology, so much so that, if theologians
were to stop doing their job, philosophers would have to do the job for them. Without
the historical, it would be impossible to know when, and at what depth, the truths of
rational theology might ever be so established.
The third rule for conflict relates to context: 'This conflict can never detract from
the dignity of the government' (7:34). According to Kant, it is always crucial to realize
that religious liberty is directly proportional to civil liberty. If we are not prepared to
support government in its endeavours to maintain open rational discourse at all times,
then we cannot hope the human race will progress. For Kant's religious vision to get off
the ground, a civil state must be established and maintained. If the government, as
protector of the people, is not held in high esteem, then open rational discourse will be
impossible. Even though theology is—both in Kant's specific historical context and in
his general way of thinking—authorized and supported by the state, the fate of any
particular manifestation of theology cannot detract from the dignity of government. For
Kant, there is a reciprocal relationship between the state and theology proper, and
philosophy's job is to make sure that whatever particular manifestation of theology is
predominant has been critically examined so as not to detract from the stability of the
rule of law.
The fourth rule for conflict concerns the evolution of human thinking towards
truth and confirms Kant's optimism towards the enduring work of theology, law, and
medicine: 'This conflict is quite compatible with an agreement of the learned and civil
community in maxims, which, if observed, must bring about the constant progress of
both ranks of the faculties toward greater perfection' (7:35). It is Kant's vision that a
truly civil society be a progressive and learned people—a morally free people to be sure,
but a people under God with eternity in their hearts. This vision is borne out by Kant's
faith in human freedom and reason and the testimony of reason and freedom to this
effect. For Kant, religion must be inherently rational, and his principal concern is that
there be established social and political structures that will enhance, rather than hamper,
the eventual establishment of his eschatological vision for religion. Without rational
rules and civil structures, philosophy would revert to a mere solitary and Socratic
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discipline and never be champion of the transition to true universal religion that Kant
takes to be central to its vocation.
These rules for the civil conflict between philosophy and theology constitute a
clear and emphatic account of how philosophy and theology are to be engaged. Thus,
Conflict is a progressive step in the fulfilment of Kant's role as a philosopher. Kant
often challenges the biblical theologian, not because the theologian's perspective is
necessarily flawed, but because it is, yet ideally should not be, in conflict with essential
elements of his rational theology. Kant also holds that the opposite is true: the theologian
ought to challenge the philosopher when their arguments and conclusions disagree. This
confrontation m ight o ccur o ver t he p roper i nterpretation o f s cripture (as i t o ften i s i n
Conflict), but it can also be over what it means to think rationally about religion. In the
court of public reason and the recesses ofpersonal belief, the philosopher and theologian
draw closer together in the truth by confronting one another in humility. This proximity
is important, because the philosopher and the theologian, whether they know it or not,
are aiming at the same goal. So Kant does not dismiss the biblical theologian, who
implores us to search the scriptures to find eternal life, by asserting that 'the only way
we can find eternal life in any Scripture whatsoever is by putting it there' (7:37); instead,
he challenges the theologian to refute the assertion that what reason demands and what
God demands have one and the same final aim.
Shell draws the following conclusion: 'Against the Mosaic-messianic faith in
God's promise as literally written—a belief that stands behind the traditionally Christian
view that 'historical faith is necessary to salvation'—Kant proposes an 'evangelical-
messianic faith' that is consistent with and preparatory to the moral transfiguration of the
Gospel'.26 In Conflict, this evangelical-messianic faith is set in a dynamic picture of a
religious dialogue between philosophers and theologians. Like a dramatic performance
with two actors rehearsing in a lively and provocative way, philosophy and theology
engage in intense dialogue. Stage left the philosopher can be heard shouting 'the
26
Shell, 'Kant as Educator', 358-359 (cf. 7:66).
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philosophy faculty must be free to examine in public and to evaluate with cold reason
the source and content of the alleged basis of doctrine [of Scripture]' (7:33). Stage right
we 'hear biblical theologians cry out in unison against the very idea of a philosophical
interpretation of Scripture' (7:44). In the midst of the play, which Kant sets up within the
walls of the Prussian academy, the expectation is that the depths of true theology will be
plumbed and the coming of the Kingdom of God will be hastened. Kant clearly holds
that the conflict is so important to the interests of philosophy that it is the philosopher's
primary task to ensure it is maintained. As a philosopher, Kant recognizes that 'the
Scriptures contain more than what is in itself required for eternal life' (7:37); they also
promote empirical religion as the necessary vehicle for true religion and are the bearer of
the 'canon of religion ... called pure religious faith' (7:37).
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CONCLUSION
From the outset, the goal of this dissertation has been to present an account of
Kant's transcendental theology and defend it against the charge of incoherence. Despite
the various attempts of theologically affirmative interpreters, it is apparent that there still
remain weaknesses in past interpretations that have sought to establish rational
foundations for religious faith in Kant's philosophy. As Gordon Michalson aptly shows,
there is what appears to be a fundamental incoherence in Kant's most thoroughgoing
theological work, Religion Within the Boundaries ofMere Reason, and in many ways it
is the remedying of this incoherence that serves as the litmus test for theologies that
purport to be truly Kantian. Even though there remains a fundamental inability of
theologically affirmative interpretations to meet this challenge (despite a variety of
helpful insights), our goal here has been to return to Kant's critical philosophy in search
of a platform from which to move forward in understanding his transcendental theology.
In our search for Kant's resources for transcendental theology, it was necessary
to face the troublesome fact that Kant's theoretical philosophy, though difficult to
articulate in a completely satisfactory way, clearly prohibits knowledge of God in the
sense of a synthesis of intuition and concept: no intuition could be sufficient to the
conception of God afforded by reason. It is not that God can be shown not to exist, quite
to the contrary, one of Kant's expressed purposes for writing the first Critique was to
silence the sceptic on this score. Nevertheless, an intuition of God as the sum of all
predicates is a logical impossibility. Our investigation made it apparent that any effort to
raise religious faith to the level of knowledge ultimately overextends itself and violates
Kant's theoretical philosophy.
In this light, it became evident that, while any attempt to raise religious faith to
the level of knowledge is wrongheaded, Kant's philosophy is not cut off from all types
of meaningful religious faith. Discourse about and belief in God find an aperture in
Kant's theoretical philosophy in the form of human cognition when we recognize the
occasional distinction between knowledge and cognition. Where knowledge requires
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intuition and concept in synthesis, cognition requires only concept. Human cognition
allows reason to get God in mind. We can think God and consider the world as God's
creation, even though we have no corresponding experience of God. Yet, the movement
of transcendental theology to objective validity in a way that matters to faith requires a
transition to moral reasoning.
Here the importance of Kant's commitment to meaning comes to play a central
role in our understanding of Kant's notion of faith and living as-if. When nature and
freedom are considered simultaneously, which according to Kant they must, a
teleological gap opens up in the critical analysis of reason. The gap between nature and
freedom creates space in Kant's philosophy for the question of meaning to be raised.
Permeating Kant's critical writings is the irrefragable conviction that the world is
meaningful and that belief in God (despite the lack of determinable objective reality in
this belief) is the only reason why the world would ultimately make sense. What this
link between meaning and God indicates is that Kant's denial of knowledge of God in
the first Critique is a simultaneous denial of knowledge that the world is meaningful.
Therefore, Kant's notion of faith is tantamount to an existential leap of moral faith: We
are left with a choice to live as if God is there or to live as if God is not there. From the
theoretical vantage point, a decision c annot be m ade; from a practical v antage point,
however, we must postulate God's existence ifmorality is to make sense.
The development of transcendental theology beyond merely God the postulate of
the moral life to God as the object of moral and religious faith directly correlates to the
conviction that the world is meaningful; and as we saw, this is at the centre of Kant's
engagement with the problem of radical evil. Thus, we approach Religion as an
examination of the question of meaning and moral hope via cognition. The thesis is that
Kant's Religion is best understood according to the rational warrant for belief in the
dispositional unity of the human species (i.e., the problem of Religion is primarily
formulated as a corporate as opposed to individualistic affair), the available union of
human beings with the disposition of the prototype (i.e., the solution of Religion is
bound up with the possibility of putting off the old disposition and putting on a new
one), and the unification of human beings converted to the prototype and devoted to
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pursuing the good by banding together in a tangible way to form an ethical community
(i.e., the vision of Religion is the eventual consummation of history in an Ethical
Commonwealth—a people ofGod devoted to the good).
In Books One and Two ofReligion, Kant makes the transition from belief in God
as a postulate to belief in God as the prototype of humanity in answer to the question of
hope. This move is very much related to his moral ground for belief as it pertains to the
moral disposition. Having concluded that the moral disposition is universally corrupt
(i.e., evil by nature), the only way to answer the question of hope is by reference to the
concepts of divine grace and moral redemption. The question underlying this entire
discussion is whether Kant has the resources to deal with the problem of radical evil.
This points t he way to a solution in the form of the divine-human disposition of the
prototype. In Kant's thinking on the prototype we see the nature and extent of his fully
mature transcendental theology, and as such it provides a framework for rational
theology.
The whole of Kant's engagement with the human disposition, the problem of
radical evil, moral hope in the prototype, and so forth provides a basic structure for what
Kant believes rational theology (or the content of belief held in the midst of the
existential leap of faith) must look like. These beliefs can now be laid out in the form of
a list:
1) Humanity as a species has a universal moral disposition that, as moral, must
either be good or evil.
2) The universal moral disposition of humanity is evil by nature, but not by
necessity.
3) There exists an ideal humanity (i.e., the prototype of perfect humanity).
4) This ideal humanity exists because of the divine Son of God who
condescended to assume the human state.
5) The prototype is the God-man whose disposition is well-pleasing to God.
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6) This prototype's disposition is distinct from our corrupt disposition and is
available for adoption by human beings.
7) Moral conversion is the simultaneous putting off of the old disposition of
humanity and the putting on of the new disposition of the prototype.
8) Moral conversion is pursued through an act of moral/religious faith that
renounces evil and commits to the good.
9) As a result of moral conversion, there is a bi-lateral moral relationship
between the convert and the prototype that atones for our moral failings and
provides positive righteousness.
10) Only those converted to the good principle of the prototype are morally free
and have moral hope.
11) The corrupt disposition still threatens to undo moral converts unless they
band together in the form of an ethical community.
12) This community must take the form of a visible church.
This list is not exhaustive, but it represents the central components of Kant's framework
for rational religious belief emerging from his critical analysis of human cognition and
the question of hope.
The pragmatic application of Kant's theology provides a picture of Kant's
combination of rational and learned religion, and shows what can go wrong if the
rational and the historical components are not rightly prioritized. The ecclesiastical
component of Kant's argument (as well as the conflict between the faculties of
philosophy and theology) comprises the filling out of this framework. In Books Three
and Four ofReligion and in Conjlict, Kant outlines the seminal features ofhistorical
faith, on the one hand, and the discipline of theology proper, on the other. Theology in
this sense is not an independent source of information about God, but instead is the
science of 'some alleged revelation'. It is founded on the written word and yet is in
constant dialogue with the standards of truth provided by rational theology. It is the
responsibility of the scriptural scholar to safeguard the written word, all the while
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recognizing that morally viable faith is rooted in the tenets of rational religion. The
scriptural scholar, whether consciously acknowledged or not, is to give external
authority to the tenets of rational religion, and through the scriptural scholar, rational
religion takes hold of historical faith as its vehicle and realizes the measure of authority
needed to bridge the gap between the moral law and our sensuous natures. This general
account of Kant's framework for rational theology essentially represents the fulfilment
of Religion's initial experiment: i.e., the all-important philosophical component of his
religious worldview. The framework for theology that emerges is one indebted to Kant's
notions ofpossibility, postulate, and prototype.
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